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2ABSTRACT
The orthodox transition literature, that has dominated the debate on Eastern Europe, 
argues that well-defined property rights are a precondition for successful transition in 
post-socialist countries. As a result, most of this literature has treated the success of 
China’s economic reforms as an enigma. The dilemma for “transition economists” is that 
the driving force behind China’s high rate of economic growth has been the outstanding 
performance of its township and village enterprises (T.V.Es). Yet, in most cases, it is not 
clear who owns the T.V.E - the local residents or the township and village government. 
This thesis puts forward two main arguments. The first is that the success which T.V.Es 
have had can be explained through drawing on different notions of the division of labour. 
The second is that T.V.Es are a specific example of a broader literature on regionalism and 
that their success suggests some wider lessons. These form the basis of an alternative 
vision for post-socialist transformation based on collective learning. The thesis suggests 
that there is a legitimate cognitive function for less than arms-length relationships in post­
socialist economies as part of a more general pattern of institutionalised diversification.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
“I think the only proper way to ownership reform is to allow people to experiment 
with different forms of ownership in different industries. From [a] dynamic point 
of view ... I prefer not to say simply that capitalist ownership is private 
ownership. What I want to emphasise is that a good ownership structure ... 
should be capable of adjusting itself to the constantly changing environment”.
Cui (1991 p.64)
"[Organisational reform in transitional economies has not been fixed in any 
definite direction yet. A variety of organisational forms may evolve through [the] 
spontaneous reaction of insiders to competition, the heritage from communism 
or the rural community, the selective emulation of advanced organisational forms 
[or] the deliberate introduction of clearer functional specialisation. ... [T]here is 
no organisational form which is absolutely superior, ... one of the advantages of 
transitional economies is that they may be able to generate a diversity of 
organisational forms by the selective emulation of better organisational forms 
depending on [the] technological and stochastic environment of each industry.”
Aoki (1995 pp.350-351)
1.1 OVERVIEW
There is a substantial literature on post-socialist transformation. There is also a 
smaller, although still prominent, sub-literature on the possible lessons from the 
Chinese experience for other socialist or post-socialist economies. Most of this 
sub-literature concludes that China’s relative success is due to specific 
conditions that are not replicated in other transitional economies. Hewett (1988 
p.302) is representative when he writes “China’s experience is in many ways 
particular and probably of limited use to [Eastern Europe]”.1 The focus in the
12
comparative literature has been on the differences between China and Eastern 
Europe such as the size of the agricultural sector and the degree of 
centralisation. An important factor in China’s success that has often been 
neglected, at least in the broader context, is the role of township and village 
enterprises (from this point on T.V.Es). To the extent that T.V.Es have been 
considered, in the comparative sense, two divergent approaches seem common. 
The first lumps T.V.Es with private firms and argues that "non-state firms” show 
the importance of competition and creating incentives. The second recognises 
T.V.Es’ ambiguous institutions but recommends clarification for future 
development. The latter approach treats T.V.Es as anomolies or short-lived 
phenomena with little relevance to other socialist and post-socialist economies.
This reflects a general trend in the wider post-socialist transition literature to 
overlook that one of the most interesting features of transforming economies is 
that a range of organisational forms is possible. Most writers focus on 
“completing" the reform which means that they make no attempt to explain why, 
in some cases such as in the T.V.E sector, the “partially reformed” reality has 
been successful. The emphasis on completing the reform means that, instead, 
most commentators tend to compare the partially reformed reality with the 
notional idea of private ownership. This focuses attention on the theoretical 
problem of how to design a workable mechanism which is faithful to the basic 
tenets of individualistic property rights. The result has been that, in spite of the 
contributions of people like Aoki and Cui, the idea that different organisational 
forms might be preferable in different circumstances and at different points in 
time has had little impact in the wider debate. This thesis hopes to take some 
small steps towards changing this situation through two avenues. The first is 
through making a contribution to the limited theoretical literature explaining 
T.V.Es. The second is to suggest that the basis of T.V.E development might be 
relevant to the transformation path in other socialist or post-socialist economies.
13
1.2 T.V.Es AND THE WIDER DEBATE
Township and Village Enterprises 
There is some confusion in the literature about the definition of T.V.Es. The 
term T.V.E will be used in this thesis to refer to enterprises affiliated with a 
township or village government (T.V.G) - ie. xiang (township) and cun (village). 
The broader term - rural enterprise - will be used to refer to rural, non-state, non- 
agricultural enterprises. The term “rural enterprise” covers both T.V.Es (as 
defined above) and various below village categories such as co-operatives, 
partnerships, private and individual firms. T.V.Es, and in a broader sense rural 
enterprises, have been the driving force behind economic growth in China. The 
number of rural enterprises grew at an average annual rate of 17.1% between 
1985 and 1995. During this period the number of workers grew at 8.4% p.a and 
real gross output value at 26% p.a. Considered in isolation T.V.Es have not 
expanded at the same rate as rural enterprises as a group but, measured in 
terms of growth in real gross output value, their performance has still been 
outstanding. Between 1978 and 1995 the number of T.V.Es grew at 1.9% p.a, 
while the number of people employed in T.V.Es increased at around 5% p.a. 
Over the same period the real gross output value of township enterprises 
increased at 19% p.a, while the real gross output value of village enterprises 
increased at 20.9% p.a (based on State Statistical Yearbook various volumes).2
The interesting point from an international perspective is that T.V.Es have 
performed well in spite of, or perhaps because of, their unusual institutional 
arrangements. The proprietor interests in T.V.Es seem ill-defined when judged 
in relation to theories of mainstream property rights. Most people consider that 
the residents of the township or village, which established the T.V.E, own the 
firm, but the township-village residents do not have the privileges of ownership - 
ie. the right to transfer, use or appropriate the assets. The property rights in the 
T.V.E are executed through communal representatives - the T.V.G. The T.V.G
14
has a pivotal role in setting up the T.V.E and, at least in the initial stages, 
exercises tight control over most T.V.Es. T.V.Es, for this reason, are sometimes 
considered to be T.V.G run enterprises although, at times, T.V.Gs act more as if 
the T.V.E belonged to them rather than the township-village residents. The 
situation is also complicated in some T.V.Es which claim to be collectively- 
owned but, in fact are operated by individual entrepreneurs. The property rights 
in these T.V.Es are not clear because, in most cases, the entrepreneurs 
received initial authorisation from the T.V.G to use the land and/or assistance 
from the T.V.G to raise capital. The issue of who owns the assets of the T.V.E is 
muddied in situations like this. The entrepreneur benefits from his/her 
relationship with the T.V.G, but the value of the T.V.E’s assets often outweighs 
the value borrowed from, or with the help of, the T.V.G (see Xu 1995 pp. 16-21).
There are at least two institutional factors that seem central to the success of 
T.V.Es. The first is the existence of informal institutions. These include implicit 
contracts in inter-firm transactions, in financial transactions, in labour market 
arrangements and in intra-firm relationships. These informal institutions are 
popular among T.V.Es as surrogates for formal rules, formal contracts and well 
defined property rights. The second is the concept of social embeddedness. 
This refers to the social component of contracting. The concept of social 
embeddedness covers factors such as the role of kinship ties and trust, built up 
in persona! relationships in the external contracts of the T.V.E. The importance 
of these sort of factors varies between township and village enterprises. The 
usual village consists of hundreds and no more than a couple of thousand 
people. Most village residents will have lived there for a long time and know 
each other well. There is often strong kinship links between villagers, and 
kinship ties in village politics are common. The usual township consists of 
several thousand or more people. There is not the same degree of closeness 
between residents. The result is that the importance of social ties and informal
15
institutions in the T.V.Es’ contracts is reduced (Goodhart & Xu 1995 pp.33-35).
T.V.Es in the Wider Debate 
Most of the influential literature in the wider debate, in particular on Eastern 
Europe, has advocated immediate transition to private property rights and/or 
clarification of ambiguous property rights. This is a generalisation and there is 
some room for argument around the edges. At one level it is true that none of the 
countries in Eastern Europe implemented the “pure" strategies proposed in 
academic articles and, at another level, there is some debate about the extent to 
which some countries were radical or gradualist. However, in terms of actual 
influence on the formulation of policies in Eastern Europe, the “rapid transition” 
or “big bang" approach to reform dominates the debate.3 The main advocates of 
big bang have held influential positions as advisers to governments in Eastern 
Europe - eg as part of Yegor Gaidar’s team of economic advisers in Russia. The 
big bang approach to reform, of course, consists of more than ironing out 
property rights. Fischer (1994 p.237) describes big bang as “a prescription to 
proceed as fast as possible on macroeconomic stabilisation, the liberalisation of 
domestic trade and prices, current account convertibility [and] privatisation, ... 
while simultaneously creating the legal framework for a market economy”. 
Nonetheless, the ownership structure is the central issue. The reform package 
is contingent on “rapid and massive privatisation” because “the government is in 
a race against time". Therefore, unless privatisation occurs "quickly and on a 
vast scale”, economic gains from transition will be lost (Sachs 1991 pp.40-41).
However, the Eastern European economies, without exception, have not 
performed as well as China. This raises a dilemma for advocates of the big 
bang approach. Most people accept that T.V.Es are driving China’s 
performance, but their institutional arrangements are ambiguous. There are 
some statistics on the real annual rate of growth in G.D.P for China and some
16
TABLE 1.1
SELECTED ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION: REAL ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH IN G.D.P (%1
COUNTRY 1980-1985 1985-1990 1991-1994 1995 1996f 1997f
China 10.2 7.8 11.4 10.2 9.7 11.1
Russia 3.2 1.3 -10.2 -4.0 1.9 4.1
Bulgaria 4.3 2.6 -5.0 2.5e 2.5 n.a
Czech Rep. n. a 1.8 -4.7 4.8 4.7 6.0
Slovak Rep. n.a 1.5 -5.2 6.5e 5.5 n.a
Hungary 1.8 0.6 -3.2 1.9 3.1 3.6
Poland 0.7 0.3 1.2 6.8 5.7 5.2
Romania 3.8 -2.1 -4.1 6.9° 4.5 n.a
NOTES: e=estimate, f=forecast, n.a=not available.
SOURCES: World Bank Tables (1995) and Institute of International Finance Report April 1996
representative Eastern European countries in table 1.1. The obvious point from 
the table is that China's rate of growth has been much higher than the Eastern 
European countries. The average annual rate of growth in China's G.D.P for 
1985-1995 inclusive was 9.9%. This contrasts with the figures for the Eastern 
European countries which, with the exception of Poland, experienced a negative 
average annual growth rate for the period 1991-1994. Each of the Eastern 
European economies performed better in 1995 than their 1991-1994 average, 
but two points should be noted. First, the growth rate for each of the Eastern 
European countries in 1995 as well as the growth forecasts for 1996 and 
1997 are not as good as for China. Second, output levels in Eastern Europe 
have not yet returned to their pre-transition levels. Figures on G.D.P levels in 
Central and Eastern Europe for 1989 to 1997 are given in figure 1.1. The 
projected G.D.P levels for Central and Eastern Europe in 1997 are about 95% of 
their pre-transition levels. And the equivalent figures for the Commonwealth of 
Independent States are much lower at below 55% of their pre-transition levels.
How do advocates of big bang in Eastern Europe explain this? There seem to 
be two main approaches. The first approach is to argue that China's relative 
success will be short-lived unless property rights are clarified. This view was
17.
FIGURE 1.1
GDP LEVELS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 1989-1997
Index 1989=100
Central/Eastern
Europe and 
the Baltics
1996 & 1997 figures are projections
NOTES: Central/Eastern Europe and the Baltics comprise:
Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Rep., Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) comprise:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
SOURCE: Financial Times Survey, ‘Investing in Central and Eastern Europe’ p.1. 
April 11, 1997
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common in World Bank publications in the immediate post-reform period in 
Eastern Europe when enthusiasm for the reforms was still high. The World 
Bank, for example, in its 1990 report on the Chinese economy stated: “The 
uncertainty attending the ownership system is putting serious obstacles in the 
way of improved performance” (World Bank 1990 p. 149). The World Bank 
recognises the success T.V.Es have had in more recent reports, but still urges 
privatisation for continuing success. The 1996 World Development Report 
concludes “T.V.Es will continue to grow, but they must also evolve. As the 
demands for finance increase and extend beyond their communities, and as 
people become more mobile, the T.V.Es' limited and implicit property rights will 
need to be better defined and made more transferable” (World Bank 1996 p.51).
The second, more sophisticated, approach is to argue that there are structural 
differences between China and Eastern Europe which explain the different 
performances (see eg Sachs & Woo 1994, Woo 1994, Sachs 1995 1996). 
There are specific factors which explain China’s success which are not 
replicated in other socialist and post-socialist economies. The argument is that 
these factors and not the choice of strategy explain differences in performance. 
Woo (1994), for example, points to a range of initial conditions that existed in 
China, but not in Eastern Europe, (i) The agricultural sector was larger in China 
than Eastern Europe, (ii) The non-state sector was larger in China than 
Eastern Europe, (iii) China’s planning structure was more decentralised than 
Eastern Europe, (iv) The Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution 
weakened the administrative capacity of the state and discredited central 
planning in China. Most papers adopting this approach conclude that, given 
these advantages, it was inevitable that China would perform better, but the 
lessons for transforming economies are limited. However, some (eg Woo 1994) 
go further and argue that, given the favourable structural conditions in China, its 
performance would have even better if it had adopted a big bang approach.4
A range of alternative views are put forward in a small number of papers which
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make a serious attempt to explain T.V.Es’ ambiguous institutional structure. For 
example Weitzman & Xu (1994) suggest that T.V.Es can be studied in terms of 
the folk theorem of repeated games. Their argument is that societies differ in 
their degree of co-operative culture. Where co-operative culture is weak 
standard property rights stories are applicable, but where co-operative culture is 
strong implicit contracts might be preferable to arms-length transactions. Pei 
(1996), on the other hand, argues that the township-village is a coalition of 
“inter-specific" resources which are owned in common. Pei argues that these 
resources generate net benefits which the township-village, as a whole, 
appropriates as economic rents. T.V.Es have been successful because net 
benefits of collective action have increased with fiscal decentralisation. Chang & 
Wang (1994), take a different tack, arguing that the T.V.E is designed to 
maximise the welfare of local citizens. The T.V.G, according to Chang & Wang, 
is given the control rights because its guiding influence is critical to the success 
of the T.V.E. The nominal ownership is vested in the township-village residents 
as a commitment that most of the benefits will remain local. Naughton (1994) 
focuses on the T.V.Es’ external relations. He suggests (1994 p.266) “T.V.Es are 
responses to the early creation of product markets which exist for a prolonged 
period without well developed markets for either factors of production or assets”.
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS
The objectives of the thesis are twofold. The first is to provide a theoretical and 
empirical contribution to the literature on T.V.Es. The descriptive literature on 
T.V.Es is of a reasonable size (eg Byrd & Lin 1990b, Findlay et al 1994, Ho 
1994). However, studies on T.V.Es are just beginning to enter a more 
theoretical stage. Thus, this is an area which is in need of further research. This 
thesis hopes to take some steps towards changing this through making two 
contributions to the limited theoretical literature mentioned above (Chang & 
Wang 1994, Weitzman & Xu 1994, Pei 1996 and Naughton 1994). The first is a
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regional model of T.V.Es which draws on the literature on reputation effects. 
This model, like Chang & Wang (1994) et al, is at the level of verbal theorising. 
The second is a formal model looking at the trade-offs occurring, in particular in 
the larger coastal firms, as T.V.Es’ contracts extend outside local communities. 
The empirical literature on T.V.Es is also limited, perhaps because of limited 
data. This thesis also seeks to make a contribution to this literature through 
testing propositions which are related to the arguments in the theoretical models.
The second more speculative objective is to suggest that T.V.Es contain general 
lessons for the path of post-socialist transformation. This involves taking a 
different approach to the advocates of big bang outlined above. It also involves 
taking a different approach to some of the existing theoretical literature on 
T.V.Es (eg Weitzman & Xu 1994 who explain T.V.E success on the basis of 
differences in co-operative culture between East Asia and Europe). The 
theoretical treatment of T.V.Es in this thesis will be developed within a 
framework which points to the similarities rather than the differences between 
China and other socialist and post-socialist countries. There is no doubt that 
China has some structural advantages, such as those which Woo (1994) 
mentions, which are not replicated elsewhere. However, the fact is that China 
has not just outperformed countries in Eastern Europe but has also performed 
much better than other developing countries with similar structural advantages. 
Thus, there seem to be some more “basic” factors explaining T.V.E success 
which might be relevant to the strategies adopted in other socialist and post­
socialist countries. These are factors inherent in the transformation process 
such as path dependencies. All post-socialist economies share some common 
path dependencies such as a political heritage from communism. This thesis 
hopes to draw out some similarities as part of a broader objective to present an 
alternative view of post-socialist transformation to the big bang approach.
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However, a point that should be made from the start is that this thesis does not 
seek to make a definitive judgement about the role of T.V.Es in China’s overall 
economic development. The scope of this thesis is limited to providing an 
explanation for T.V.E institutions at a micro level. The thesis does not attempt to 
give an historical explanation for T.V.Es or provide a macro framework for 
considering the evolution or behaviour of T.V.Es in a broader context. The 
thesis does touch on some of these broader issues, but this is not its main focus. 
Thus comments on broader issues relating to T.V.Es are at best suggestive.
1.4 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
The next two chapters are general in nature. The next chapter reviews the 
existing literature on post-socialist transformation and chapter three sets up the 
skeleton of an alternative approach. Following this, chapters four to seven focus 
on T.V.Es. Two theoretical models are presented in chapters five and six and 
some empirical results are presented in chapter seven. The possible lessons for 
other socialist and post-socialist economies are considered in chapter eight.
The rest of this section elaborates on the contents of specific chapters:
The next chapter has two objectives. The first is to review the literature on post­
socialist transformation from an institutional perspective. The institutional 
environment has received some attention in the literature (eg Clague & Rausser 
1992), but is often overlooked. The second is to provide a background to the 
economic reforms in China and evaluate them from a property rights 
perspective. A central theme in the chapter will focus on whether the creation of 
private property is essential to the success of post-socialist transformation or 
whether it should be seen as open-ended where some ex ante unspecified 
organisational form(s) might emerge. The chapter suggests that conventional 
arguments based on private property rights, in the wider literature, do not
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provide a theory which can explain socialist transformation in China. This is a 
shortcoming which later chapters, in particular chapters five and six, seek to 
address through developing two related theories based on informal institutions.
The third chapter considers three different rationales for the firm - the market, 
hierarchies and collective learning paradigms. The chapter has two objectives. 
The first is to introduce and develop the concept of collective learning as an 
alternative to market-hierarchies stories. There are some disparate strands of 
literature - literatures on the Japanese firm, flexible specialisation and techno­
economics - which share common characteristics. These common characteristics 
form a collective learning theme which, it will be argued in later chapters, forms 
the basis of an alternative approach to post-socialist transformation. The 
second objective is to explore the tension between the collective learning and 
market-hierarchies paradigms. The chapter will argue that the tension reflects 
the heterogeneous nature of the division of labour, and some attempt will be 
made to reconcile the tension through considering recent developments in the 
endogenous growth literature. These ideas provide the basis of the formal 
model in chapter six which explores the trade-offs between different paradigms.
The emphasis in chapter four shifts from the wider literature to focus on T.V.Es. 
The chapter contains two main parts. First, the chapter discusses the 
institutional characteristics of T.V.Es in some detail and raises the spectre that 
less than arms-length relationships between T.V.Es and T.V.Gs contain some 
positive features. There is also some discussion about T.V.E performance and 
non-institutional problems facing T.V.Es. However, as pointed out above, the 
main theoretical treatment of T.V.Es in this thesis is institutional based and micro 
oriented. The thesis does not purport to provide a broad macro framework so 
that comments on some of the broader issues are suggestive and not 
conclusive. Second, the chapter considers the manner in which T.V.E
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institutions have been reviewed in the literature. This part evaluates the few 
existing theories of T.V.Es (such as Chang & Wang 1994 and Weitzman & Xu 
1994) and suggests some avenues forward based on cooperative culture.
A model which presents an alternative to existing theories is presented in 
chapter five. The chapter attempts to explain why T.V.Es have been successful 
in the presence of ill-defined institutional arrangements through a regional model 
of T.V.Es' contracts. The T.V.E, in the regional model, is depicted as a strategic 
core which is supported through a series of informal institutions or strategic 
alliances. The strategic core is limited to core assets - reputation capital. The 
T.V.E’s incentive to cultivate a reputation for meeting its informal obligations is 
that if it does not it will impose extra costs, manifest in a risk premium, on 
forming informal contracts. A good reputation forms the basis for strategic 
alliances at low costs because the risk of default to the other party is reduced. 
Hence the T.V.E’s reputation is a long-term investment in an intangible asset. 
T.V.Es which are prepared to explore avenues for co-operation, based on 
reputation, might generate economic rents conducive to value creation. The 
relationship between the T.V.E and political centre (central government) also 
represents a form of strategic alliance. The political centre confers legitimate 
authority on the T.V.E sector. The T.V.E-T.V.G relationship forms a mechanism 
for solving collective action problems that build up around informal institutions.
The regional model in chapter five is extended in chapter six to explain the 
behaviour of a growing number of larger T.V.Es who enter into inter-regional and 
international contracts. The behaviour of these T.V.Es does not fit well with 
regional based explanations which just focus on reputation. It is argued that the 
growth in the number of larger T.V.Es has resulted in important related trade-offs 
between informal and formal exchange and between collective learning and 
specialisation. With the growth in the T.V.E sector regional based explanations,
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like that which will be presented in chapter five, need to be extended in order to 
explain these developments. The model, in chapter six, applies the notion, from 
chapter three, that the collective learning and market-hierarchies literatures can 
be depicted in terms of different concepts of the division of labour. The chapter 
has two inter-related aims. First, point to, and formalise, some of the relevant 
trade-offs that have emerged with the growth of T.V.Es. Second, suggest that 
T.V.Es are developing a dual character. This entails a core of strategic alliances 
based on informal exchange similar to the kigyo shudan (or business grouping) 
in Japan and an extended sector in which formal exchange is predominant.
The empirical part of the thesis is in chapter seven. It sets out and discusses 
two sets of regressions which test propositions related to the theoretical models 
in chapters five and six. The first set of regressions tests the relationship 
between profit rate and workers’ share in T.V.Es. This regression uses pooled 
cross-sectional and time series data for the period 1987-1991 inclusive and 
1993. The second set of regressions tests whether the role of the T.V.G as a 
mechanism for solving collective action problems diminishes with increased 
worker socialisation. It uses cross-sectional data on industrial T.V.Es for 1987 
and pooled data on T.V.Es as a whole for the period 1989-1991 inclusive. The 
general implications of the theoretical models and empirical testing are 
examined in chapter eight. This chapter considers the possible broader 
significance of T.V.Es for other socialist and post-socialist economies. The 
regional model, in chapter five, is developed within a framework which argues 
that T.V.Es are part of a broader "new regionalism” with a basis in the collective 
learning literature. The main objective of chapter eight is to explore this theme a 
little further. This involves consideration of the extent to which the institutional 
structure of T.V.Es presents a viable alternative vision to the big bang approach 
for other socialist and post-socialist economies. The last chapter (chapter nine) 
concludes the thesis with some general observations on the thesis as a whole.
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CHAPTER 2
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON POST-SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION
2.1 OVERVIEW
This chapter reviews the institutional literature on post-socialist 
transformation. The chapter presents some of the most influential 
institutionalist perspectives and evaluates their relevance to transforming 
economies. There will be two main themes. The first theme will focus on 
whether the creation of private property is essential to the success of the 
transformation phase, or whether the transformation phase should be 
seen as open-ended where some, as yet unspecified, distinct 
organisational form(s) might emerge. This is a contentious issue. While 
there is a growing literature which suggests that under certain 
circumstances partial property rights are more conducive to development, 
most of the institutional literature sees the creation of secure private 
property as the ultimate goal of transformation. However, it will be argued 
that, at the same time, this literature either does not adequately address 
the issue of how to create secure private property rights in practice, or 
simply assumes, rather than justifies, the need for secure private property.
The second more general theme will be that while the institutional 
literature touches on some of the issues relevant to post-socialist 
transformation, it is inadequate because it is too general and does not 
always accord with empirics. This is, in part, due to the fact that the 
literature (a) is, itself, quite new and often conceptually inadequate and ill- 
defined and (b) seeks unquestionably to extrapolate from theory 
developed, however appropriately, for very different circumstances. 
There is a presumption of generality and completeness. But, the process 
of post-socialist transformation is more complex than most of the existing 
literature suggests. This is a shortcoming which this thesis will attempt to
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address in later chapters building on the partial property rights literature.
The chapter also provides a brief overview of the economic reforms in 
China and evaluates them from a property rights viewpoint. However, no 
attempt is made to present a comprehensive review of the literature on 
China’s economic reforms. The aim, rather, will be to highlight that 
China’s reforms are not consistent with a general model that emphasises 
completeness in property rights. The chapter is set out as follows. 
Section 2.2 will review the application of specific institutional theories to 
post-socialist transformation. The theories to be considered are property 
rights economics, principal-agent theory, new economic history and 
evolutionary theory. The background to the economic reforms in China 
are presented, and evaluated from a property rights perspective, in 
section 2.3. Finally, there are some concluding comments in section 2.4.
2.2 COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
2.2.1 New Institutional Economics
New institutional economics (N.I.E) spawned from dissatisfaction with 
neoclassical economics. There are various strands of new institutional 
economics which include property rights, new economic history and 
evolutionary economics. The common thread linking researchers in each 
of these areas is a belief that institutions matter and that institutions are 
susceptible to analysis.1 The application of new institutional economics to 
the problems faced by economies in transition, however, is still in its 
relative infancy. There are an increasing number of articles offering 
broad, often country specific, views on the role of institutions in the 
transformation period (see eg Nee & Stark 1989a, Krueger 1992, Liepold 
1992, and Nagy 1992), but, on the whole, these do not provide a common 
theoretical perspective. The main contributors to N.I.E such as
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Williamson, North and their respective followers are only now starting to 
turn their attention towards the problems of post-socialist transformation, 
bringing with them the first parts of new unifying underlying theories.
2.2.2 The Property Rights Perspective
There is a growing literature which applies property rights to either post­
socialist transformation or particular issues confronting socialist and post­
socialist economies. The literature includes the application of property 
rights to (i) socialism and post-socialist transformation in general (see e.g. 
Pryor 1973, Blommestein & Marrese 1992, Comisso 1989, 1991 and 
Jasinski 1992); (ii) problems facing economies in transformation in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (see e.g. Schroeder 1988, 
Szakadat 1993, Lawandowski & Szomburg 1989, Pejovich 1987, 1989,
1990a, 1990b, Poznanski 1993, Hanson 1990 and McFaul 1996); and
(
(iii) problems facing the Chinese economy (see e.g. Granick 1990, Liew 
1991, Lee 1991 1993, Nee 1992, Shi 1993 and Jefferson & Rawski 1995).
A positive feature of the property rights literature is that, historically, it was 
influential in broadening the scope of the debate on socialism. The early 
contributions of Alchian (1961) and Demsetz (1967) suggesting that an 
evolutionary, as opposed to technological, approach to economic 
organisations was required, breathed new life into the argument about 
socialism which had largely withered following the 1930s debates 
(Williamson 1993b). The socialist controversy of the 1930s brought 
together the critics - von Mises and Hayek - and proponents - Lange and 
Lerner - of socialism (see Bergson 1948). The debate focused on setting 
prices equal to marginal cost, while ’’nagging problems such as 
incentives, controls and bureaucracy.... were never systematically 
addressed" (Williamson 1991b). The importance which the property
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rights approach attached to transaction costs rekindled interest in these 
wider issues where Oskar Lange (1938) had considered them outside the 
competence of the economist. This opened up important new lines of 
research investigating inter alia socialist labour market reform (see eg 
Granick 1988) and the socialist firm (see eg Ben-Ner & Neuberger 1989).
Nevertheless, there are some difficulties with this perspective as a 
general paradigm. The main lesson which flows through the property 
rights literature is that governments need to get the property rights 
structure straight and all else will follow. Cooter's (1987) position is 
representative. He states "provided that the legislature clearly defines 
property and contractual rights and that the legal system enforces those 
rights, then private agents will negotiate efficient outcomes” (1987 p. 
458). When Cooter refers to efficiency it is fair to assume that he means 
Pareto-efficiency or allocative efficiency. A potential problem with this 
argument is that even if property rights are fully assigned, it is not clear 
that allocative efficiency will address the main problems of socialist 
economies. Murrell (1992b p.37), for example, argues that “growth and 
change and thus innovation” are more important than allocative efficiency.
A related problem with the property rights approach is that allocative 
efficiency, in the property rights sense, tends to be seen in terms of the 
static end-state rather than the process (if any) approaching it. Building a 
market culture might be more important in the transformation phase than 
simply focusing on property rights narrowly defined. The concept of 
market culture is more broad than just property rights. The idea of building 
market culture is a multi-disciplinary undertaking involving reassessment 
of the structure and outlook of socialist society. This is important because 
it implies that there is more to post-socialist transformation than setting up 
a paradigm where, in an ideal world, private agents are free to negotiate
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allocative efficient outcomes free from outside interference. There are 
arguments on both sides of the big bang versus gradualism debate, but 
what seems undeniable is that the falls in output in Eastern Europe 
suggest that it is not possible to introduce market institutions in rapid 
succession without significant short-term costs. The introduction of private 
property rights, in reality, is more complex than Cooter (1987) implies.
There might need to be a significant period of stable convention and 
market tradition before a strong property rights framework can evolve. 
Yang (1994) suggests that the dilemma facing the post-socialist and 
socialist countries in transformation is that “communist revolution 
interrupted the evolution [of market tradition] and it may not be possible to 
now simply discontinue the socialist tradition and socialist culture which 
replaced it and reinstate private property rights” (1994 p.28). To the 
extent that there is an implication in this passage that there was a natural 
evolution toward the property rights "ideal" many would disagree. 
Madsen Pirie argues that there was a natural evolution towards 
competitive capitalism in England,2 but even if this is true there is nothing 
to suggest that China or Eastern Europe fits the Anglo-Saxon model. But, 
more than this, the role which the state played in the evolution of 
capitalism in England and the rest of Western Europe is also debatable.
Polanyi (1957), in contrast to Pirie, argues that the state had a pivotal 
role. He states (1957 pp. 139-140): “There was nothing natural about 
Laissez- Fairs; free markets could never come into being merely by
allowing things to take their course  The road to a free economy was
opened and kept opened by an enormous increase in continuous, 
centrally organised and controlled centralism”. This issue needs to be 
borne in mind when looking at the broader picture, but, having said this 
the more general point Yang makes that it will take time to build market
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tradition is pertinent. While rules may be changed overnight, the informal 
norms that provide legitimacy to a set of rules usually change only 
gradually (North 1994 p. 366). The transformation period, therefore, is 
likely to be a gradual process where new market conventions and a new 
market tradition have to re-emerge. This suggests that there is a need for 
a richer model to explain the interim period when the market culture is still 
emerging than the standard property rights literature has so far provided.
2.2.3 PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY
The principal-agent problem exists where (i) there is a conflict of interest 
between a principal (eg an owner) and an agent (eg a manager) and (ii) 
there are observability and information asymmetry problems. The conflict 
of interest arises where the principal and agent have different objectives. 
The objective of the owner might, for example, be profit maximisation 
while the manager might have broader objectives such as on-the-job 
perks, an easy life or empire building (Hart 1990). The observability 
problem arises because, although the principal can see the final outcome 
in terms of output or profit of an agent’s action, he/she is unable to 
monitor what the agent actually does. Information is asymmetric because 
the agent is the only person that knows his/her true effort. This sets up a 
moral hazard problem where the agent might take advantage of the 
principal’s ignorance to pursue his/her own goals at the expense of the 
principal’s welfare. The principal-agent literature is concerned with 
designing the "optimal” contractual arrangement between principal and 
agent that will induce the agent to act in the best interests of the principal.
The principal-agent model has been used to evaluate the C.M.I. reform 
package in China (see Lee 1991 chap. 5, 1993 and Cauley & Sandler 
1992). The term “C.M.I,”, which was coined by Lee (1991), is an acronym
31
for the contract management system (C.M.S.), the managerial 
responsibility system (M.R.S) and the internal contract system (I.C.S.). 
The C.M.S was a reform where managers of state-owned enterprises 
signed contracts with the relevant state organ ( ie. local agencies) making 
the manager responsible for the enterprise’s profits, losses and long-term 
accumulation. In theory, the M.R.S was designed to make the manager 
responsible for setting wages, bonus policies and other economic 
matters. While bureaucratic constraints meant that this objective was 
often not met in practice, the M.R.S did provide managers with greater 
freedom to set the economic agenda of the enterprise. The I.C.S was 
introduced to build a more effective internal incentive system. This 
entailed a "web of multi-tier sub-contracting within the enterprise” (Lee 
1993 p. 184). There were four levels in the hierarchy of contracts. These 
were between (i) the state and enterprise managers (ii) the manager 
and division directors of an enterprise (iii) the division director and team 
leaders and (iv) the team leader and individual workers (Lee 1993 p. 183).
The essence of Lee’s argument is that in a hierarchical principal-agent 
model, collusion among agents emerges. The Chinese hierarchy of 
economic management consists of at least five strata. These are "the 
central (Party-State) leadership, local state agencies, the local (or 
enterprise) party committee, the manager and the worker” (1993 p. 180). 
The central leadership "is the principal who bears voluntarily the political 
risk of leading the whole society; in a sense, the true residual claimant in 
socialism" (1993 p. 180).3 The other levels of the hierarchy are agents 
who need to be monitored or given incentives to behave in a manner 
consistent with the interests of the principal. The principal’s problem is 
how to enforce its enterprise reform measures through its intermediate 
agents (local organisations) to the manager and worker at the bottom.
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Lee draws on a model developed by Tirole (1986). He suggests that the 
C.M.I reforms were associated with a two-tier collusion problem. The 
"upper-tier collusion” was between local state agencies and enterprise 
managers. Here Lee argues that the combined effect of the M.R.S and 
C.R.S was to replace central leadership interference in state enterprises 
with an equally interventionist role for local state agencies. Cauley & 
Sandler (1992), who elaborate on some of Lee’s (1991) points, argue that 
to the extent manager’s bonus' depended upon meeting quotas 
contracted for with the state under the C.M.S he/she was motivated to 
accommodate the local state agency. Hence the argument is that, while 
the C.M.S dealt with the relations between local state agencies and 
enterprises, it did not address the issue of how to monitor local state 
agencies. The result according to Lee (1991) and Cauley & Sandler 
(1992) was that enterprise profits and assets were subject to expropriation 
via collusion between local state agencies and state enterprise managers.
The “lower-tier collusion” was between enterprise managers and workers. 
Under the I.C.S, workers’ compensation was supposed to be made 
dependent on their performance within the complex web of internal 
contracts with the enterprise manager co-ordinating the contracts. 
However, Lee argues that the internal enforcement mechanism was not in 
place to make either managers or workers accountable for their actions. 
The manager did not have the power to hire or fire workers (Lee 1991 
p.6). Meanwhile the local state agencies were not prepared to tackle 
manager-worker collusion. On the contrary, local agencies were active 
participants in the process. Local agencies were prepared to release 
bonus monies to the worker-supervisor coalition because, in return, they 
received a portion of the enterprise profits which was not released to the 
central authorities or retained by the enterprise. Lee suggests this
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facilitated an environment in which manager-worker coalitions flourished.
There are some problems with Lee’s dual collusion argument which need 
to be highlighted. The first problem is that, like most property rights 
theorists, Lee (1991, 1993) and Cauley & Sandler (1992) come from a 
position that assumes the superiority of private property rights. Cauley & 
Sandler (1992 p.39) make the somewhat impressionistic statement: “The 
establishment of property rights is a necessary condition for the 
functioning of markets.... For reforms to work in a centralised economy, 
property rights must be defined both within and outside the firm” 
(emphasis mine). This perspective is open to the criticism that it 
propagates the narrow view that "partial” to “complete” must constitute 
"good” to "better”. A related criticism is that there is little empirical 
verification in Lee (1991). Lee’s approach rests on the assertion that 
private property rights are a necessary condition for the proper 
functioning of the market, but this presumption is not supported in the 
book at an empirical level (see Chan 1996). Moreover, although Lee 
does make some attempt to support his conclusions regarding dual 
collusion in the "initial reforms” with statistical work (see 1991 pp. 42-49) 
there is no empirical analysis to support his views on the C.M.I reforms.
A more general criticism is that Lee’s work tends to be one dimensional. 
The principal-agent paradigm can shed light on some issues in enterprise 
reform. Most of the points Lee raises about collusion between, on one 
hand, managers and agencies and, on the other, managers and workers 
have an element of truth in an empirical sense. However his approach 
looks at just some aspects and not others. At best this offers a partial 
perspective. Hart (1990), writing on the theory of the firm, argues that the 
principal-agent approach fails to answer the question of what a firm is (or 
what determines its boundaries). “The point is that principal-agent theory
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tells us about optimal incentive schemes, but not directly about 
organisational form" (Hart 1990 p.456). The same criticism can be made 
of principal-agent theory in the context of post-socialist transformation.
Analytically there are two main problems. First, Lee focuses on exchange 
or distribution, but disregards the effects of C.M.I on production and value 
creation. In places Lee seems to treat the C.M.I reforms as if they are 
based on arms-length contracts between managers of state-owned 
enterprises and local government, but in practice no arms-length 
relationship existed. Hence, while Lee stresses the negative aspects of 
collusive behaviour, from a different angle, transactions at something less 
than arms-length might have positive connotations. The literature on the 
Japanese firm, for example, emphasises the importance to the debt- 
dominated structure of Japanese business of a long-term commitment 
from the banks. This commitment is instrumental in providing the 
management of the firm with a stable operating environment, ie it 
insulates them from repetitive takeover raids in the open market, because 
firms are not dependent on equity financing. The long-term commitment 
also extends to the on-site management helping to create an environment 
conducive to incremental innovation (see Freeman 1988). However, most 
loans are personally negotiated and the relationship between firm and 
bank is seldom (if ever) at arms-length (see Sheard 1989, Berglof 1989).
Second, Lee’s conceptualisation of local authorities as purely 
individualistic and self-interested ignores their developmental role. Most 
local agencies show a strong interest in, and take pride in, the 
development of their region relative to other regions. At times officials in 
local agencies have also engaged in personal wealth seeking - for 
example in the 1987-1988 guandao (speculating or rent-seeking officials) 
and 1993 xiahai (going down to the sea) campaigns. However, in both
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cases the cadres involved tended to be isolated from the central structure.
2.2.4 North’s “New Economic History”
The earlier work of North and his collaborators was mainly concerned with 
the relationship between efficient institutions and economic growth (see 
eg North & Thomas 1973). More recent studies, however, have focused 
on the relationship between inefficient institutional change and economic 
performance (see eg North 1990). Most of this analysis has the recurring 
theme that "institutions are not usually created to be socially efficient, 
[but] are created to serve the interests of those with bargaining power to 
create new rules” (North 1994 pp 360-361). While most of the prescriptive 
new economic history literature is directed to the rise of modern 
capitalism in Europe (see eg North & Weingast 1989), much of the 
literature is also relevant to the debate on post-socialist transformation.
The centre stage which the institutional environment literature gives to the 
role of the state is particularly relevant. The type of institutions which the 
state fosters are considered the most important determinants of economic 
growth (see North 1991 and Dugger 1995). North (1981) is representative 
of the new economic history approach when he argues that throughout 
history the interests of the ruling stratum - i.e. the apparatchiks and 
bureaucrats - were typically served by an inefficient property rights 
structure designed to maximise political and economic rent. However the 
empirical evidence on this point is inconclusive. The lesson from 
empirical studies such as De Long & Shleifer (1993) is consistent with the 
view that the interest of state rulers very rarely (if ever) coincided with 
efficient property rights. But, there have been a number of empirical 
studies which are documented in Haggard & Kaufman (1989) and Alesina 
& Perotti (1994), which raise doubts about whether the state can be 
properly depicted as a collection of self-interested bureaucrats. These
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studies suggest that the interests of authoritarian governments, about 
which the new economic history literature is primarily concerned, are best 
served by a property rights structure which is designed to maintain a high 
rate of economic growth rather than extract political and economic rents.4
Winiecki (1990a 1990b) draws on the new economic history theory of the 
state to analyse institutional change in Soviet-type economies. He 
argues that the resistance of the communist party apparatchiks presents a 
significant barrier to shifting to a more efficient property rights structure. 
The difficulties are manifest in two forms. The first is through the principle 
of nomenklatura - i.e. the right of the communist party apparatus to 
“recommend” and "approve" appointments to managerial positions. The 
second involves a system of side-payments or kickbacks from managers 
of (primarily industrial) enterprises which, in a shortage economy, are 
mostly non-pecuniary in nature (Winiecki 1990a p. 198). However this 
argument ignores Marxist theories of the state in Soviet type economies. 
For example, Mandel (1979 chap. 12) puts forward the opposing view that 
bureaucrats are quite happy to embrace private ownership because, 
unlike the Soviet type system, it allows them to openly amass wealth.5
A general problem with Winiecki’s argument is that there are too many 
generalisations and implicit assumptions. To illustrate, consider the 
Tiananmen incident. Most journalists and some serious scholars {eg Shi
1994) have characterised the Tiananmen incident as a manifestation of 
the tension between “hardline" elements (particularly Li Peng) and 
“reformist" elements (particularly Zhao Ziyang) in the Chinese leadership. 
These observers argue, as Winiecki’s mode! predicts, that the Tiananmen 
incident was largely an expression of dissatisfaction by the apparatchiks 
and bureaucrats with the loss of economic rents and political influence. 
The depiction of the Chinese leadership as consisting of “hardline” and
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"reformist” elements is a stylisation and, as such, is a simplification of 
what actually exists. The political reality in socialist economies is more 
complex than Winiecki’s model suggests. This is true at both the 
theoretical and empirical levels. At the theoretical level there are likely to 
be elements in the government and bureaucracy that are resistant to 
change, but it is dangerous to generalise that the "state”, as a whole, is a 
collection of self-interested individuals. This criticism also applies to 
North’s theory of the state. This sort of generalisation rests on crucial 
assumptions about the nature of authoritarian leadership (Haggard & 
Webb 1993). At the empirical level the fact that politicians often 
simultaneously hold views that could be interpreted as “conservative" and 
“radical" combined with political pragmatism means that there is no ready 
and steadfast dichotomy between "hardline" and “reformist” elements.
Winiecki also does not address the issue of which political structure is 
most consistent with efficient property rights. This is a criticism that can, 
more generally, be levelled at the new economic history. North (1994 
p.366), for example, states ".... an essential part of development policy is 
the creation of polities that will create and enforce efficient property 
rights”, yet has to admit “we know very little about how to create such 
polities”. Winiecki does speak in broad terms of the importance of 
“democracy”, but the empirical evidence looking at the relationship 
between democracy and economic growth is inconclusive (see Alesina & 
Perotti 1994). Similarly, the evidence on the effectiveness of democratic 
government in establishing property rights is far from conclusive. The 
very limited Russian government of the early 1990s, for example, has still 
been completely unable to enforce contracts (see Shleifer 1995 p. 115).
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2.2.5 Big Bang and Gradualist Perspectives
There are two main premises which underpin evolutionary economics.6 
First, the primary focus of the analysis should be on the mechanisms that 
produce growth and change, rather than a series of static equilibria. This 
is foremost a consequence of the emphasis which evolutionary economics 
places on innovation as a source of economic growth. Innovation, here, is 
broadly defined to include not only technological innovation, but also 
organisational and institutional innovation. Second, the analysis should 
pay careful attention to the burden which uncertainty places on the 
informational resources of individuals and organisations. The evolutionary 
approach sees agents as constrained not only by financial and physical 
constraints, but also by limits on information processing capabilities.
To overcome the constraints posed by imperfect information, evolutionary 
economics posits that individuals (through interaction) and organisations 
(via repetition) develop routines to interpret and process the flow of 
information The organisation, constrained by the existing stock of 
information, continually operates within a narrowly defined set of 
"neighbourhood routines” (Murrell 1992b p. 39) until some event occurs 
which frees them from this process. Murrell (1992b p. 39) identifies three 
such “mechanisms" in capitalist economies. These are: (1) The process 
of entry - the creation of a variety of new organisations, some of which will 
find an effective organisational structure. (2) Takeovers, mergers and 
bankruptcy, each of which remove inefficient organisations and (3) The 
resource allocation function of the market, via which resources are 
reallocated from inefficient organisations to efficient organisations.
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The evolutionary approach emphasises that the existing stock of 
organisations and informational flows is a product of the old (socialist) 
environment. The market might be more efficient in the long run, but in 
the short run routines and expectations are still best suited to the 
bureaucratic environment of central planning. The shift from central 
planning to the market also requires radical institutional change which is 
costly in the transformation phase. This cost is magnified when the 
change in environment produces a ratchet effect that removes the 
possibility of ever returning to past behaviour. The costs are particularly 
evident when long-stable co-operative agreements are no longer viable 
and have to be replaced with what are, at least in the short run, less 
attractive alternatives (Nelson & Winter 1982, Murrell 1992b pp.40-42).
The evolutionary paradigm has been used to justify both big bang and 
gradualist approaches to reform. Murrell's (1992a, 1993) prescription for 
reform is typical of gradualist reasoning. He argues that enterprises are 
generally only able to develop new routines, without a significant loss in 
efficiency, when exposed to small amounts of institutional change. 
Murrell’s view is that “the institutional matrix at the heart of any successful 
system [must be] produced slowly in an idiosyncratic, contingent process" 
(Murrell 1993, p. 120). The concept of routines in daily decision making 
has also been used to support radical approaches to reform. The 
alternative view to the gradualist perspective, put forward in support of big 
bang, is that a radical departure from past practices is required to provide 
the state with the credibility necessary to pursue further reforms. The 
argument is that there needs to be a “minimum big bang” ie. a complete 
break from past routines or a critical mass of changes is required. The 
rationale for this is that the reform process will initially be painful. 
Therefore, if there is not a complete break with the past, then rather than
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make the necessary adjustments, enterprises will subvert the reform 
process in an attempt to return to the routines of the past with which they 
feel more comfortable. The term “necessary adjustments" in this context 
means adjustment to a market economy with private property rights (see 
Lipton & Sachs 1990). If the economy does not achieve a critical mass of 
private ownership, rapidly, to induce firms to respond to market signals, 
the danger is the reform process will be compromised (Roland 1994)7
The arguments for and against both big bang and piecemeal reforms are 
not clear-cut. Most proponents of gradualism {eg McMillan & Naughton 
1992 and Murrell 1992 1993) point to the success of the Chinese reforms 
to support their claim that gradualism works. At the same time they refer 
to the poor performance of East Europe to argue that radical reform does 
not work. In contrast, the advocates of big bang {eg Lipton & Sachs 1990 
and Sachs & Woo 1994) put forward a disparate range of arguments 
disputing the premise of gradualist success and/or supporting the basis of 
big bang reform. Some controversial points deserve particular mention:8
(i) Most scholars treat the Chinese reforms as piecemeal. Naughton 
(1995), for example, likens the reform experience to "growing out of the 
plan”. However, some commentators {eg Johnson 1994 and Walder
1995) suggest that the agricultural reforms involved a big bang. While 
agricultural growth has slowed considerably since 1984, in the initial 
reform period the agricultural reforms were arguably the most successful.
(ii) The gradualist approach to reform is most evident in the state-owned 
sector. The performance of the state-owned enterprises (S.O.Es) in China 
is particularly controversial (see section 2.3 below). The issues are 
further blurred when enterprises are categorised by size - large, medium 
and small - rather than ownership type - state and non-state - (see Lo
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1997 chap. 4). Most, though, accept that the state-owned sector is, 
relative to agriculture and collective owned enterprises (C.O.Es) the least 
satisfactory performing sector (see Putterman 1995). This view is shared 
by commentators critical of state enterprise reform {eg Woo 1994 pp.284- 
288, Lee 1994 pp. 191-195) and commentators who are supportive of the 
broad thrust of state enterprise reform {eg Jefferson & Rawski 1994).9
(iii) While debatable, some commentators have suggested that Eastern 
Europe did not undertake shock therapy as its first option for reform. 
Sachs & Woo (1994), for example, argue that the big bang approach was 
only adopted after the repeated failure of piecemeal reforms. Sachs & 
Woo (1994) further argue that when Russia did implement rapid price 
liberalisation in 1992 and rapid mass privatisation in 1993, it failed to 
open the trading system or undertake macroeconomic stabilisation. 
Hence Sachs’ (1992a) position is “the problem is not the reform....the 
problem is the failure to carry through the reform". This is a controversial 
statement, and there are many who would disagree with Sachs. 
Nevertheless, the failure to implement complementary policies rather than 
the effects of shock therapy per se arguably explains, or at least 
contributed to, the poor performance of the big bang reforms in Russia.
(iv) Poland, which was the most pure example of shock therapy was the 
first East European economy to show signs of recovery in 1992-1993. 
The critics of big bang point out that Poland’s economy is the "best of the 
worst" (Murrell 1992a and Gowans 1995). While this is true, the other 
economies (such as Russia) which started from worse positions may 
follow. Related to this is the fact that although the economic situation in 
China looks much better now than it did in 1978, this is only after an
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eighteen year period - up to 1996 - whereas the big bang in Poland 
occurred much later. Therefore there is a good case that there needs to 
be a further period of adjustment in Eastern Europe before the success, 
or otherwise, of the radical reforms there can be fairly compared to China.
(v) The advocates of shock therapy refer to the reform experience in 
Vietnam which, they argue, stands in contrast to China. Woo (1994 
p.305) argues that when Vietnam initially undertook Chinese style partial 
reforms from 1985 to 1988 they were not successful. However, when the 
authorities adopted a more radical strategy (including rapid price 
liberalisation and the decollectivisation of agriculture) the growth rate 
improved significantly. This view of the reform process has some support 
in Dollar’s (1994) article on Vietnam, but it has been questioned in other 
research - see for example Fforde (1994) and Probert & Young (1995).
While each of these points are debatable, neither gradualist nor big bang 
perspectives are totally satisfactory. The problem with the big bang 
approach is that it advocates transition to the market, rather than 
transformation, which is open-ended, without (i) providing sufficient 
reasons why transition need be preferable or (ii) demonstrating that it is 
possible to create a system which is consistent with individual property 
rights which will work in practice. The two points are related. Where 
there is a pre-existing set of policies there is an a priori requirement to 
justify further reform. This involves showing that an alternative set of 
policies would work better than those that are already in place. The 
emphasis which advocates of shock therapy place on post-socialist 
transition per se leaves them open to the criticism that they are too 
focused on (even ideologically driven to - see Gowans 1995) a specific 
version of capitalism based on the Anglo-Saxon model. The result is that 
the big bang approach overlooks the potential value of a range of other
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models; capitalist models - such as the "Japanese model” and the 
"German model”10 - and market socialism which might be better suited, in 
some circumstances, to building institutions in the transformation period.
The evolutionary approach, in contrast to big bang comes close to 
advocating an open-ended transformation where different forms of 
capitalism or market socialism are foreseeable. Moreover, the gradualist 
argument, unlike big bang, stresses the pitfalls in immediate transition to 
private property and market regulation. It is, therefore, quite consistent 
with the emergence of a variation on existing models where new and 
distinct combinations of organisational forms are possible. The gradualist 
argument, however, suffers from the same flaws as the big bang approach 
in one important respect. "[Gradualist] writings have not attempted... to 
unravel the interplay between the three aspects of their focus: institutions, 
innovations and economic development. They simply leave the end state 
to be determined by the market, assuming that the most efficient 
institutions would thereby emerge ... Their break with big bang 
[therefore is] far less complete than it appears to be" (Lo 1997 p.20).
2.3 ECONOMIC REFORMS IN CHINA
Most of the literature on China’s economic reforms has focused on market 
formation at a macro-level (see eg McMillan & Naughton 1992, Naughton 1995). 
The standard argument is that price reforms precipitated a massive entry of non­
state firms, an increase in competition among non-state firms and between state 
and non-state firms and improvements in the performance of state-owned firms 
resulting from state-imposed market like incentives. In this section the 
discussion will centre on the role which property rights have played in the 
broader economic reforms.11 This will take place in two parts. The reforms in 
rural areas will be considered in subsection 2.3.1. This will be followed by an
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examination of urban (enterprise) reform in subsection 2.3.2. This section, 
however, will not look at the issues which T.V.Es raise. T.V.Es are discussed in 
chapter four where they are considered in detail. As this stage the aim is to show 
that standard property rights stories cannot provide a theory which can explain 
the success of China’s broader reforms. The main point will be that the 
empirical evidence on China’s reforms is inconsistent with the argument that 
private property rights are a precondition for successful reform. T.V.Es in later 
chapters will be used as a focal point for a concentrated study of the challenge 
to standard property rights approaches posed by the broader economic reforms.
2.3.1 Rural Reforms
Overview o f  The Reform Policies
There were two principal dimensions to China’s rural reforms: (i) The 
introduction of the household contract responsibility system and (ii) The 
gradual freeing up of markets for agricultural products. The government, 
in the first of these, leased specific plots of land to small groups of 
peasants. The peasants, in return, agreed to turn over a percentage of 
their product to the state. At first decoilectivisation occurred more or less 
spontaneously, but was quickly adopted by the state and applied 
nationwide. Thus, what began in the late 1970s as a small-scale 
experiment to lift the incomes of some of the poorest regions soon spread 
to other parts of the country. The result was that by 1983 the people’s 
commune and production team, which had formerly been the hallmark of 
the rural economy, had largely ceased to exist (Perkins 1994 p.26).
The second component of the reforms was the liberalisation of markets 
for agricultural commodities and household products. There were limited 
markets (called rural trade fairs) prior to the reforms, but they were always 
closely monitored. The peasants, subsequent to the reforms, were 
initially only able to sell household products and secondary products
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in the free market. This, however, changed in 1985 when state contracts 
for grains were made voluntary (see Perkins 1988 pp.607-613 and Ash 
1992 pp.547-551). A national trading centre in grains has since been 
established in Zhengzhou and rice markets have been established in 
Jiujiang and Wuhu (Bell et al 1993 p. 17). The number of local markets 
has mushroomed since 1985. There were estimated to be approximately 
72,000 local markets in 1992 (Bell et al 1993). These accounted for 
more than 80% of the trade in agricultural commodities (Perkins 1994).
TABLE 2.1
Various Agricultural Indicators
1978-1984 1984-1988 1988-1992 1992-1995 1996U)
Growth
Real G.D.P(a) 8.6 10.3 7.5 11.4(b,(e) 9.7(b)
Real Agricultural 
Growth{a)
7.3(d) 3.1<d) 4.3(d) 2  y tb )(e) 3.5(b)
Agriculture as a 
% of Real G.D.P
31.9 29.4 26.4 22.5(c)(a) N.A
Agricultural Value 
Added(a)
7.3(d) 3.1(d) 4.3(d) 3  y(c)(g) N.A
Agricultural
Output(a)
Income
7.7 5.8 4.9 1,6<0> N.A
Average Nominal 
Wage (Overall/35
7.9 16.2 13.3 19.8(c)lh) N.A
Average Real 
Wage (Overall/35
5.0 5.7 2.9 ■j 2(c)(h) N.A
Real Average 
Rural Wage(a)
6.7 4.5 0.5 6.9 N.A
NOTES:
(1) All statistics are expressed as percentage averages of the end of year. (2) All 
statistics were calculated from data contained in China Statistical Yearbook 
(various years) unless otherwise indicated. (3) N.A indicates statistics were not 
available to the author. (4) (a) indicates statistics which are percentage growth on 
the preceding year, (b) These statistics are contained in Standard & Poors China 
Sovereigfj Report Feb. 1996. (c) These statistics are calculated from data which is 
contained in the Institute of International Finance People ’s Republic o f  China 
Country Report March. 1996. (d) The source of these statistics is Perkins (1994) 
Table 1 and Table 3. (e) indicates that the 1995 figure used is an estimate, (f) 
indicates that the statistics for 1996 are forecasts, (g) indicates that the 1992-1995 
average is for 1991-1994. (h) indicates that figures used for 1995 were for Jan.- 
Sept. (i) The rural wage is for farming, forestry animal husbandry and fishery.
46
Table 2.1 presents statistics on various agricultural indicators. The 
reforms in the initial period improved the rate of agricultural growth. From 
1978 to 1984 the average growth rate for agricultural value added was 
five times what it had been from 1957 to 1978 (Perkins 1994 p.26). The 
reforms were also successful in raising rural incomes. From 1978 to 1984 
the growth in the rural wage, in real terms, exceeded overall growth in the 
real wage. The statistics, however, after 1984 tell a different picture. The 
agricultural growth rate slowed in the mid to late 1980s, returning to levels 
consistent with its long run average. The rate of growth in rural income 
also stagnated following the initial burst, falling below the overall average 
after 1984. In three years since 1984 real rural wages have contracted - 
1988, 1989 and 1993 (China Statistical Yearbook various volumes). .
Property Rights Issues 
Prior to 1978 there is fairly wide consensus that property rights in the 
agriculture sector were “impaired” - in particular in the Great Leap 
Forward (1958-1960) and Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Wills and 
Yang (1993a p. 56) identify five separate ways in which property rights 
were affected prior to the economic reforms. These are as follows. First, 
the mandatory procurement system forced production teams to deliver a 
certain fraction of their output at procurement prices that were much lower 
than market prices. Second, peasants access to “free markets" was 
severely controlled and at times prohibited. Third, the movement and 
occupational choices of peasants was strictly monitored. Fourth, a 
political work points system infringed on the right of peasants either to sell 
or otherwise utilise their own labour. Finally the government infringed 
upon individual and collective property rights by forcing large numbers of 
peasants to work on various construction projects without payment.
When considering each of these points it is important to bear in mind the
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distinction between property rights relating to agriculture (activities) on 
one hand, and the peasants (people) on the other. The first two points 
which Wills & Yang mention are about property rights in agriculture. The 
third, fourth and fifth point are about the property rights of the peasants 
such as basic economic and political freedoms. The sets of issues are 
not comparable. The specificity of Chinese agriculture means that the 
overriding task is to feed the people while property rights in agriculture 
are of secondary importance. From this perspective if the issue is 
whether private or public property rights are more appropriate, there is no 
reason to think that the former is more natural. In fact there might be 
good reasons for maintaining public ownership. The property rights of the 
peasants is a different matter. There is less justification for restricting 
their freedom of movement or other freedoms like occupational choices.
The rural reforms significantly improved the economic position of the 
peasants. Property rights however, were still not complete even after 
1978 (Nolan 1993 and Perkins 1994). The responsibility system gave 
households the right to use specific plots of land from the late 1970s. The 
households were free (with the exception of grain until 1985) to decide 
what crops to sow and what animals to raise. The land was leased to 
households initially for 5 years but extended in 1984 to 15 years for 
annual crops and 50 years for tree crops, but leasehold interests could 
not legally be bought or sold. The government only officially sanctioned 
trade in long-term land leases in the early 1990s and this was restricted to 
urban areas (Perkins 1994, p.29). Nevertheless, the "right to use” could 
be transferred with a certificate from the government from 1986. The illicit 
transfer of land (with tacit government approval) was also common from 
as early as 1983 (Yang, Wang & Wills 1992). The responsibility system 
also gave households the right to appropriate the surplus from the land.
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While households are required to deliver an annual quota to the 
government, beyond this they can keep what they produce. This can then 
be self-consumed, sold to the government or sold in the free market.
What role did the introduction of “partial" property rights play in the 
success of the initial reforms (1978-1984)? This is a debatable point. A 
number of commentators have played down the role which private 
property rights have played in China’s economic reforms (see eg Deng 
1993 and Naughton 1994b). Nolan (1993, 1994), for example, argues 
that China’s rural reforms have been successful in spite of the failure to 
clarify property rights adequately. He points out (1993 p.71) that the 
“economy has performed extremely well" but then goes on to state (1993 
p.74): "Instead of rapidly moving towards a system in which private 
property became a dominant form of ownership, China in the 1980s was 
committed to experimentalism and gradualism in ownership reform. In al! 
important areas of the economy, transparent, legally protected individual 
property rights were the exception, not the rule. Public ownership with 
confused property rights was the norm". Others have emphasised that 
property rights are multidimensional. They consist of the right to use, the 
right to transfer and the right to appropriate (Cheung 1983 and Yang, 
Wang & Wills 1992). The argument is that each of these rights has to be 
considered. Thus, as pointed out above, while the right to transfer land 
was not legally recognised, the rights to use and appropriate the surplus 
did exist. The argument is that, in the early to mid-1980s, these “property 
rights”, together with pricing reforms such as the elimination of mandatory 
procurement which expanded the rights of peasants to appropriate 
earnings from property, were important sources of institutional change.
An example of this latter approach is Yang, Wang & Wills’ (1992)
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empirical model. The model is tested using rural data for China from 
1979-1987. Yang, Wang & Wills (1992) decomposes the property rights 
structure into three types of rights for four kinds of property. The types of 
rights were the right to use, the right to transfer and the right to 
appropriate the surplus. The kinds of property were goods, labour, 
financial assets and fixed assets including land. Based on the four types 
of rights and four kinds of property, Yang, Wang & Wills (1992) estimate 
twelve subindexes of efficiency in specifying and enforcing property 
rights. The subindexes are then assigned weights to derive an index of 
transaction efficiency in specifying and enforcing property rights. This 
index is used to run some regressions where rural income is treated as 
the dependent variable, while efficiency in specifying and enforcing 
property rights and the division of labour are the independent variables.
The empirical model "attributes all of the growth in per capita real incomes 
in rural China to increased efficiency in specifying and enforcing property 
rights and to increased division of labour, itself dependent on efficiency in 
specifying and enforcing property rights1’ (Wills & Yang 1993a p.57 
emphasis mine). These results, however, most likely overstate the true 
position. The problem is that while Yang, Wang & Wills (1992) make 
rural incomes dependent on efficiency in specifying and enforcing 
property rights, the importance of property rights in relation to other 
potentially relevant factors such as green revolution technologies and 
pre-1978 accumulation (such as the wide-scale implementation of 
irrigation systems) in explaining changes in rural incomes is not 
investigated. While it is important to recognise the multi-dimensional 
nature of property rights, the broad definition of property rights in Yang, 
Wang & Wills (1992), together with the failure to include other
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independent variables, implies that some of the explanatory force 
attributed to property rights might be due to other factors. This suggests 
that further empirical investigation is needed to be more definitive.
The reasons for agricultural growth slowing after 1984 are also 
controversial. One explanation for the slowdown in agricultural growth 
after 1984 stresses property rights. Feder et al (1992) argue that after 
instigating property reforms in the late 1970s the slowdown in growth 
occurred because the government did not press ahead with securing 
private property in the 1980s. Government control has prevented the 
concentration of land in private hands. The flip side of this is that 
significant redistribution of income occurs through public ownership. The 
view which articles such as Feder et a! (1992) express is debatable, but 
there were two problems where property rights were potentially central.
First, the peasants were often not secure in government promises that 
they would be able to retain the land, even for the period of the leasehold. 
Perkins (1994) argues that this was an important reason why they were 
reluctant to invest in capital improvements, particularly land improvements 
such as irrigation systems, but Kung (1995) presents survey evidence 
which suggests that concerns along these lines might be overstated.12 A 
second possible problem is that the concerns of peasants about the 
state’s commitment to decollectivising agriculture manifested itself in a 
tendency to "mine” the land without regard to the medium to long-term 
fertility of the plot. Yang & Wang (1988), for example, point out that the 
use of chemical fertilisers increased dramatically after 1984 while the 
application of organic fertilisers fell significantly. The peasants’ 
uneasiness that the agricultural reforms could be suddenly reversed were 
magnified given twists and turns of previous policy. Shi (1993, p.6)
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provides a practical illustration of the uncertainty. He refers to a case 
where a local cadre placed his portrait in a peasant’s house to indicate 
that the policies would only have effect as long as he was in power.
But there are also a number of reasons why agricultural growth might 
have slowed which are unrelated to property rights. These include an 
unfavourable shift in the terms of trade between agriculture and industry 
(see eg Watson 1994) and growing income disparity between rural and 
urban areas which, it is argued, impaired agricultural incentives (see eg 
Sachs & Woo 1994). There are also other potentially important reasons 
why most crop production had returned to its long-term growth rate by the 
end of 1984. Ash (1992), for example, points to a shortage of agricultural 
inputs after the initial surge in growth. Huang (1993) argues that this 
problem was accentuated by the preference of many farmers to invest in 
rural industry. Sicular (1992), on the other hand, places greater emphasis 
on the effects of price signals to producers which, she argues, were 
favourable in the initial reforms, but negative following the reassertion of 
government controls after 1985. All of these factors which have, to 
differing degrees, been important in explaining slower agricultural growth 
in the 1980s have a common theme. After 1984 the returns to agriculture 
declined relative to the alternatives for the peasants, especially T.V.Es.13
Thus, there is a clear difference of opinion. The more extreme critique of 
the property rights perspective argues that the success of the “partial” 
reforms can be attributed almost wholly to a range of disparate factors 
and that consequently the agricultural reforms were largely successful in 
spite of the property rights structure. This view, however, has its flaws to 
the extent that it overlooks that property rights are multi-dimensional. 
While somewhat impressionistic it seems that while the property rights 
argument places too much emphasis on the role of property rights the
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extreme critique equally understates the role of property rights in the 
reform process. The answer lies somewhere in the middle. The 
implication is that most likely a range of factors, including property rights 
contributed to variations in agricultural performance, but this conclusion is 
subject to empirical verification and, thus far, the relative importance of 
traditional property rights explanations and other more general 
explanations is an empirical issue that the literature has not addressed.
2.3.2 Industrial Reforms
Overview o f Reform Policies 
The industrial reforms contained three main initiatives.14 First the profit 
retention scheme was introduced in 1979. It allowed profit making 
enterprises to retain part of their profits to set up three internal funds to 
cater for (i) production development, (ii) worker welfare and (iii) bonuses. 
The aim was to provide enterprises with greater incentives to make 
profits. Second the tax-for-profit scheme was introduced in two 
successive steps in 1983 and 1984 as an extension of the profit retention 
scheme. Its objective was to get enterprises to pay tax according to some 
pre-determined rates instead of remitting profits. In practice, however, the 
state had to introduce an "adjustment tax” which required enterprises to 
deliver part of their after-tax profits at negotiable rates. Third the focus of 
reform between 1987 and 1992 was the contract management system. It 
abandoned the pursuit of a single rate of state-enterprise division of 
profits. Instead it aimed to fix the base of tax-and-profit remittence and to 
retain extra-base profits in enterprises. Since 1993 the reform agenda 
has concentrated on the corporate reorganisation of S.O.Es - in particular 
transforming S.O.Es into limited liability companies either by grantee or 
shares, while retaining majority state ownership. This has focused 
attention on the management structure of S.O.Es and the role of
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"privatisation”. Two issues have been central in the debate (Bolton 1995). 
These are the separation of ownership and control in S.O.Es and the 
introduction of share markets and the emergence of stock offering firms.
Property Rights Issues 
The reform of state enterprises has given a lot of attention to property 
rights. Property rights in S.O.Es, however, remain in a state of flux. The 
World Bank for example in 1990 referred to the fact that “[the] ownership 
of state-owned enterprises is becoming increasingly ill-defined” (World 
Bank 1990, p. 149). More recently the comments of Jefferson & Rawski 
(1995, p. 133-134) illustrate that the situation has not improved. "Chinese 
industry continues to operate in an environment of incomplete 
specification of property rights. Rules of commerce are neither clearly 
defined nor consistently enforced. Competing firms in the same industry 
or locality face widely differing legal, fiscal and regulatory regimes. 
Government intervention in business affairs extends well beyond the 
boundaries observed in even heavily regulated market economies.
[This occurs] often with the effect of softening budget constraints”. The 
same problems exist in the emerging stock market and stock offering firms 
(Chen 1994, Mookerjee & Yu 1995). "At the central government level 
there is no clear division of responsibility among different branches in the 
macro-management of stock market development. ... [At] the firm level 
enterprises do not assume standard practices" (Chen 1994, p. 13).
The government has taken steps to clarify the relationship between the 
state and S.O.Es. The government announced a set of regulations in July 
1992 which granted enterprises fourteen detailed rights encompassing a 
wide range of freedoms in enterprise management. The new stipulations 
delineate the legal status of the state owned sector and abrogate the 
subordinate role of enterprises to government administrative organs
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(Cheng 1994, p.80). The government has also introduced a Company 
Law designed to encourage S.O.Es into the market and clarify their legal 
status (Mookerjee & Yu 1995). While the situation is changing these 
measures so far have had relatively little effect - soft subsidies and soft 
taxation (Kornai 1986) of state-owned firms are still common and until 
recently bankruptcy in the state-owned sector was relatively unknown.15
TABLE 2.2
Percentage of Industrial Output Produced bv State. Collective and Private Owned 
Enterprises 1980 -1995 Calculated at Current Prices
1980 1985 1990 1995
State Enterprises 76 64.9 54.6 30.9
Collective 23.6 32.1 35.6 42.8
Enterprises^
Private 0.0 1.9 5.4 13.2
Enterprises^
Other(c) 0.5 1.2 4.4 13.1
SOURCES: Zhongguo Tongji Zaiyao [A Statistical Survey of China](1996)
NOTES: (a) “collective enterprises” consists of urban and township-village
enterprises, (b) “private” means private owned workers with less than 
eight workers, (c) “other” means private owned firms with more than eight 
workers, joint ventures, foreign owned firms and other ownership firms.
The growth in the industrial sector, nevertheless, has been significant. 
The state sector’s share of total industrial output has fallen since the 
reforms began, but the expansion in the non-state sector has been 
substantial. This has occurred in spite of muddled property rights 
structures. Table 2.2 presents some statistics. The state sector was 
responsible for 76% of total industrial output in 1980. However, by 1995 
that figure had fallen to 30.9%. Over the same period the share of 
industrial output produced in the collective sector increased from 23.6% 
to 42.8% and private enterprises increased their share from 0.0% in 1980 
to 13.2% in 1995. The statistics for some of the coastal provinces in
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eastern China are even more stark. For example, the state sector’s share 
of industrial output in Jiangsu dropped from 34.3% in 1990 to 33% in 
1991 and again to 25% in the first half of 1994. This compares with 
Zhejiang where the state sector’s share of industrial output was 31.3% in 
1990 and Fujian where it was 33.1% in 1992 (see Cheng 1994 p.80).
Jefferson & Rawski (1995) build on the contribution of McMillan & 
Naughton (1992) to explain the gains which Chinese industry has made in 
the absence of well-specified property rights. To do this, Jefferson & 
Rawski (1995) draw on the work on product ladders of Grossman & 
Flelpman (1991) and attempt to apply it to Chinese industry. They argue 
that the growth in industrial output is due to intense competition between 
state-owned and non-state enterprises. This, they argue, erodes the 
profit base of state enterprises and marginalises quasi-rents in the non 
state sector, forcing both types of firms to become more innovative. They 
further argue that since profits are an important part of the tax base, a fall 
in profits lowers tax revenue and this hardens the government budget 
constraint. The government responds by reducing subsidies to 
enterprises which forces them to maintain the momentum of innovation.
Flowever, this explanation leaves many questions unanswered. First, 
Jefferson & Rawski place too much emphasis on competition between 
state and non-state enterprises in the product market. Hussain & Stern 
(1995, p. 159) point out that state and non-state enterprises are unevenly 
distributed and their performance varies widely across regions. Some of 
the most remarkable growth, for example, in non-state enterprises has 
occurred in the coastal regions and Special Economic Zones where state 
enterprises are thinly distributed. Jefferson & Rawski’s explanation does 
not adequately address why this has occurred. Second, while the
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government is starting to take a tougher approach to firms making losses, 
as noted above, the budget constraint is still soft relative to the standards 
of a market economy. The fact that there are still a number of state- 
owned firms which are making significant losses and which continue to be 
subsidised by the government is also overlooked by Jefferson & Rawski.
A possible reason why the industrial reforms, so far, have resulted in an 
expansion in output might lie rather in China’s economic advantages, 
particularly relative to Eastern Europe and Russia (see Gelb et at 1993 
pp. 411-416 and Nolan 1993). There were some important initial 
advantages. Nolan (1993 p.82) points out that, unlike the COMECON 
countries, China did not have to contend with the collapse of a system of 
international trade with which it was closely associated, nor did it have a 
large “monetary overhang” which gave monetary stabilisation a high 
priority in post-communist Europe and Russia. Another important factor is 
that China has experienced political and economic stability relative to the 
other transition economies. Political and military instability creates 
insecurity in property rights. The high degree of political instability (and in 
some cases, such as Armenia, military instability) is one of the major 
causes of the economic difficulties in Eastern Europe (see Ng 1995 p.28).
Nevertheless, factors such as these only tell part of the story. Another 
possible reason for growth in the industrial sector was the decision to 
decentralise government (see Qian & Xu 1993). This provided for local 
experimentation with various institutional arrangements which significantly 
increased the probability that efficient institutional forms could be 
discovered and adopted (see Chen 1993 and Qian & Roland 1994). The 
result was that some regions developed faster than others. There was 
also a flow-on effect. The decision to decentralise took full advantage of 
the close proximity of Hong Kong and Taiwan who both fuelled growth in
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foreign capital and joint venture projects in the Special Economic Zones.
The rapid growth in output of foreign-owned and joint venture projects in 
the Special Economic Zones (which is as much as twenty times greater 
than state enterprises) created a ratchet effect which flowed through to 
other more slowly growing regions and sectors of the economy. This is 
not to imply that foreign capital and joint venture projects are necessarily 
more efficient than the state-owned sector. This is a controversial issue. 
The high growth rates in the Special Economic Zones may well, for 
example, stem from the substantial economic rents which foreign venture 
and joint capital projects reap from their geographical proximity to Taiwan 
and Hong Kong. The Special Economic Zones have also received 
preferential treatment from the government including important tax relief.
The success, or otherwise, of reforms in the state sector are open to 
conjecture. There are some commentators who strongly advocate that 
the reform process has been successful (see e.g. Jefferson & Rawski 
1992 and Naughton 1995). There is some empirical evidence to support 
this view. While S.O.E share of industrial output declined, between 1978 
and 1995 S.O.E output grew at around 7.5 percent per annum (China 
Statistical Yearbook 1996). There are also a number of empirical studies 
(see e.g. Chen et al 1988 and Jefferson et al 1992) which have found that 
total factor productivity increases in state enterprises have improved 
(usually in the range 2 to 4 percent annually -see Jefferson & Rawski 
1994) since the reforms started. There are also studies, using various 
statistical techniques, which suggest a causal relationship between total 
factor productivity and efficiency in the state sector. Jefferson and Xu 
(1994) are representative. They rely on the observation that market 
forces tend to equalise financial returns to factors employed in different
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lines of business. Their study suggests that there has been a 
convergence in financial returns to capital, labour and materials among 
large and medium S.O.Es and that this has improved allocative efficiency.
However, these results are controversial. Most of the studies 
investigating total factor productivity in S.O.Es have estimated gross 
production functions using input deflators. Woo et al (1994) argue that 
studies using this approach are plagued by methodological flaws which 
undermine their conclusions. Two issues cloud the measurement of total 
factor productivity: (i) the construction of appropriate deflators and
(ii) whether "non-productive” capital and labour should be treated as 
inputs. Woo (1994) and Sachs & Woo (1994) refer instead to other 
statistical indicators, particularly the profit rate, which provide a different 
perspective on the success of state enterprise reform. Woo (1994) points 
to the extreme example of 1992 when industrial growth was 13% but 
according to the China Daily (Jan. 26, 1993) two-thirds of S.O.Es were 
making losses. While this represents a polar case the problems that it 
highlights still persist. The China News Digest (May 25 1994) presented 
statistics that, in early 1994, approximately 50% of state-owned 
enterprises were making losses.16 A report in China Today (June 1995 
p. 12) states that “more than a third of Chinese state run firms have 
admitted to being insolvent" and estimates that when allowance is made 
for “hidden losses” which are being concealed by creative accounting 
methods, as many as "60 to 70 percent of state firms are making losses”.
There are a variety of reasons which may explain the low profitability of 
state-owned firms. Naughton (1991) suggests that the primary reason for 
the decline in profitability of the state-owned sector was increased 
competition from C.O.Es. The problem with this explanation, as Woo 
(1994) points out, is that the fall in profits occurred across the board even
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in heavy industries where there was negligible new entry and in industries 
where prices did not fall. There are other, possibly more fundamental, 
reasons for the decline in profitability. For example Uehara (1995) 
suggests one reason is that most S.O.Es have outdated capital 
equipment. He also argues that the asset liability ratio is too high in most 
S.O.Es. The introduction of new tax laws, designed to harden budget 
constraints has been important. The added burden which tax reform has 
placed on the state-owned sector is illustrated by the observation that in 
1993 S.O.Es paid 32.49 million yuan in tax. After the tax reforms in 1994 
this amount rose to 51.36 million yuan (China Today June 1995 p. 12).
A narrow focus on profits, though, also misrepresents the true picture. Lo 
(1997 pp.76-78) and Singh (1993 pp.25-26) point out that in 1991 losses 
in S.O.Es were concentrated in four industries. The four industries - coai 
mining, oil & gas, machinery, and textiles - accounted for 54% of the total 
losses in 1991. However the losses in coal and oil & gas were arguably 
due to the fact that their prices were artificially depressed under the plan 
track, as part of the dual track pricing system. The machinery and textile 
industries were, on the whole, subject to market prices but, in 1991, non­
state losses in machinery and textiles were also substantial.17 The poor 
financial performance of both state and non-state enterprises in 
machinery and textiles was attributable to a market sales slump which 
particularly affected these two industries rather than enterprise efficiency.
The problems caused by ill-defined property rights might also be a 
relevant consideration in addition to the above factors. As discussed 
earlier Lee (1991 1993) and Cauley & Sandler (1992) point to a number 
of difficulties caused by an ambiguous assignment of property rights in 
state enterprises (see section 2.2.3). Lee (1993) argues that this has 
resulted in illicit collusion between the enterprise and local state agencies 
and between managers and workers that has hindered performance and
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resulted in the appropriation of state property for irregular private benefit. 
The institutional basis of the stock market and emerging stock issuing 
firms also raises property rights issues (see Morris 1995). The capital 
market is still in an embryonic stage, but Chen (1994 p. 13) points to a 
number of institutional irregularities. Two of the more serious 
irregularities are (i) many transactions are improperly conducted with no 
ownership or management right conferred and (ii) dividends are typically 
either not distributed or distributed in an inconsistent manner.18 Further 
development of the stock market might require attention to these issues. 
The government, nevertheless, is presently designing a Securities Law to 
address many of the difficulties (see Beijing Review July 31-Aug. 6 1995).
2.4 CONCLUSION
This chapter has considered four institutional perspectives and evaluated 
their relevance to the debate on post-socialist transformation. A general 
theme that runs through the chapter is that the existing literature is 
inadequate because, to this point, it is too general and conceptually ill- 
defined. This perhaps should not be surprising given that the institutional 
perspectives which are presented are concerned, on the whole, with other 
issues and only purport to deal with post-socialist transformation at a 
rudimentary level. Having said this, while the whole essence of the 
broader N.I.E is that institutions matter, N.I.E, in the manner it has been 
applied to post-socialist transformation has tended to under-emphasise, 
rather than stress, their fundamental role. The chapter has considered 
the difference between transition and transformation - "transition”, in the 
literature, suggests transition to “complete" private property rights, while 
transformation suggests a process that is open-ended with some end 
state where something less than full private property is conceivable.
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The property rights literature, discussed in this chapter, and the New 
Economic History, or at least Winiecki's interpretation of North, advocates 
transition. Two main problems are apparent with post-socialist transition: 
(a) This literature tends to assume rather than justify the need for full 
private property rights. The big bang literature, which falls within the 
property rights perspective, tends to advocate transition to a utopian 
textbook economy as the only desirable option. This overlooks the notion 
that different approaches might be valid (and needed) in different 
circumstances, (b) A related criticism is that the transition literature, in 
“imposing” full private property, also overlooks the potential relevance of 
path dependent pre-transformation institutions This, particularly in the 
case of Winiecki’s writings, seems rather perverse given the stress which 
North (eg North 1994) places on path dependent historical heritage. 
However, even the N.I.E literature which does not advocate post-socialist 
transition perse does not spell out how informal institutions might emerge 
in practice. And the gradualist perspective leaves the end-state to the 
market, assuming that the most efficient institutions will emerge.
The focus on a specific “textbook” model of capitalism also means that 
much of the transition literature coming from a property rights perspective 
treats the Chinese reform experience as an enigma. It was suggested in 
section 2.3 that arguments based on private property rights were relevant, 
among other factors, in explaining China’s economic performance. 
However when arguments based on private property rights are 
marginalised as simply one relevant factor to consider, the traditional 
property rights perspective ceases to be a theory which can explain the 
transformation process. The problem is that merely listing a range of 
disparate factors, including private property, that are (or might be) 
relevant in the transformation stage is of little value. Thus, instead of
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attempting to "fit” the Chinese reforms into traditional property rights 
stories where full private property rights are the goal, the challenge is to 
develop more general theories based on informal institutional responses.
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORIES OF THE FIRM AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFERENT 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVISION OF LABOUR
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The last chapter suggested that in the Chinese case private property is 
reduced to one factor among many that potentially explain its high growth 
rate so that property rights cease to be a theory of transition. As a first step 
toward developing a rationale for different ownership forms, this chapter 
develops the idea that different theories of the firm reflect the heterogenous 
nature of the division of labour. There are three main traditions in the theory 
of the firm. These are (i) the market paradigm which flows through papers 
such as Alchian & Demsetz (1972) and Jensen & Meckling (1976), (ii) the 
hierarchies rationale associated with Williamson and (iii) the collective 
learning paradigm which embraces various dissident perspectives. There is a 
tension in the existing literature between the market-hierarchies and 
collective learning themes. The extent to which the market and hierarchies 
paradigms, on the one hand, and collective learning paradigm, on the other, 
have universal application is not resolved. This chapter suggests a possible 
approach to reconciling the different traditions based on recent developments 
in endogenous growth. It will be argued that different trajectories - growth 
paths with substantive economic implications - underpin different 
perspectives on the division of labour. The two main traditions which will be 
considered are the detailed division of labour, first suggested by Adam Smith 
(1776), and the social division of labour, suggested by Karl Marx (1867).
The chapter is broken into five sections and is set out as follows. The next 
section provides a review of the main paradigms - market-hierarchies and 
collective learning. The similarities between the market and hierarchies 
rationales will be highlighted and these two paradigms will be contrasted with
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collective learning. Section 3.3 will consider the main perspectives on the 
division of labour and point out how each perspective underpins a paradigm 
of the firm. This section will also highlight that each paradigm of the firm 
purports to have general application and that the limitations on each are not 
clear. Section 3.4 will suggest a possible solution through placing each 
paradigm in the context of different growth paths. The last section contains 
some closing comments and has some general observations on the chapter.
3.2 THEORIES OF THE FIRM
The Market Paradigm 
Alchian & Demsetz’s (1972) “classical capitalist firm” is the seminal 
contribution in the market tradition. The paper defines the firm as a nexus 
of contracts. This represents one possible solution to the incentive 
problems created by joint {ie team) production. The problem with team 
production, as Alchian & Demsetz point out, is that the individual marginal 
products of team members cannot be verified. An implication is that while 
returns to input owners are based on the joint product, the question of 
who shirks and by how much cannot be determined from the joint product. 
This creates a monitoring problem where shirkers do not bear the full 
social cost of their actions. "Viable shirking is the result” (Alchian & 
Demsetz 1972 p.81). The problem is to find a viable institutional 
arrangement that deals with shirking (see Foss 1994 pp.49-51). Alchian 
& Demsetz suggest that the answer is to assign to one member of the 
team the role of monitoring the labour inputs of the other team members. 
The argument, thus, is that this organisational setting will produce 
efficient monitoring. The monitor has an incentive to prevent shirking 
because he/she is given the residual claim to the profits from production.
The “nexus of contracts” literature treats firms as special kinds of market 
arrangements. Alchian and Demsetz see the firm and the market as
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opposite sides of the same coin. Jensen & Meckling (1976), in the spirit 
of Alchian & Demsetz, argue that "the ‘behaviour’ of the firm is like the 
‘behaviour’ of the market; i.e. the outcome of a complex equilibrium 
process” (1976 p.220). Cheung (1983), in a similar vein, states "we do 
not know what the firm is - nor is it vital to know" (1983 p.3) and "it is futile 
to press the issue of what is or is not a firm” (1983 p. 18). The market 
paradigm claims to provide a general rationale for the firm. As Foss (1994 
p.51) observes an implication of the nexus of contracts argument is that 
exactly the same analytical tools applied to the analysis of market 
allocation can be applied to the understanding of firms. This approach 
suggests that all contractual phenomena including the firm, defined in a 
broad fashion, can be understood in terms of utility maximising choices.
Thus, the nexus of contracts argument suggests that market forces will 
generate an optimal structure of property rights - "an optimal vector of 
contractual arrangements” (Foss 1994 p.52) - leaving hierarchy and 
authority without any real function. This, however, is the complete 
antithesis of the firm in the Coasean sense. First, Alchian & Demsetz 
(1972 p.784) insist that “longterm contracts are not the essence of what 
we call the firm". Second, their market approach denies justification of the 
firm as a relational contracting device designed to internalise the potential 
costs of incomplete contracts. Williamson (1981 p. 1565) points out that 
Alchian & Demsetz cannot explain complex hierarchical firms, but more 
than this the market ontology which underlies the simple exchange 
paradigm denies the very existence (and value) of the firm as a 
hierarchical entity involving authority relations. The justification usually 
given for this is the classical defence, viz selection forces are invoked to 
explain the existence and persistence of efficient contractual 
arrangements (see eg Fama 1980 p.289 and Jensen 1983 p.331).
However, as Foss (1994 p.52) points out there is no theory underpinning
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the selection forces that generate the contractual events theorised by the 
nexus of contracts literature. These forces are, instead, only ever invoked 
ex post and, as such, are a completely ad hoc defence. The focus on the 
market, characteristic of the nexus of contracts approach, is functionalist 
in outlook. The argument, that market exchange is the epitome of 
organisations is a manifestation of seeing exchanges along an institution 
free continuum. Equally problematic is their view of the market. 
Ultimately Alchian & Demsetz and Jensen & Meckling are just talking 
about individualistic rational choices plus the Walrasian market. The 
need for, and role of, institutions such as capital markets and markets for 
corporate control are ignored. There is nothing explaining how the 
market will find an optimal solution. Instead there is an implicit assertion 
that the invisible hand of market forces will find an optimal outcome.
A related criticism is that, far from being a universal explanation, the 
market paradigm is inconsistent with the historical evolution of the firm. 
Alchian & Demsetz provide two examples of technological change which 
they claim created a shirking problem and necessitated the need for 
monitoring. The two examples are the introduction of power loom 
weaving and the emergence of the modern assembly line (see Alchian & 
Demsetz 1972, p.784). However, Lazonick (1991) criticises Alchian & 
Demsetz on the basis that the two examples are historically inaccurate. 
With respect to the introduction of power loom weaving, Lazonick argues 
that each worker tended to his/her own loom so that it was easy to 
measure individual output. Hence, contrary to what Alchian & Demsetz 
suggest, Lazonick contends that the joint product problem was not an 
issue. Lazonick’s view is supported by a number of studies of nineteenth 
century industry (see eg Pollard 1965, Landes 1969) which stress the
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“radical changes in work organisation” (Dietrich 1994 p.52) associated 
with the transition from the “putting out” to the "factory” system as a 
stimulant to growth rather than the introduction of monitoring methods.
As for the assembly line example Lazonick argues that, if anything, the 
problem of assessing individual marginal products was greater before the 
introduction of the assembly line than it was after. The reason is that the 
assembly line confined individual workers to a single repetitive task and a 
single position on the shop floor. Thus if a given worker did not conform 
to the speed of the line, the supervisor could readily pinpoint the source 
of the slowdown (Lazonick 1991 pp. 181-188) This suggests that Alchian 
& Demsetz (1972) place too much emphasis on monitoring problems. 
These observations also suggest that as a result, the exchange rationale 
for the firm is not a universal paradigm, but overstates the role of the 
market in the rise and consolidation of the managerial enterprise.
The Hierarchies Paradigm
Williamson provides a second rationale for the firm. He treats the 
transaction as the basic unit of analysis. Williamson suggests that 
economic institutions are determined by “the economising role of 
organisations” (Williamson 1985 p.xii). The aim of transaction cost 
economics is to “align transactions (which differ in their attributes) with 
governance structures (which differ in their cost and competencies) in a 
transaction cost economising way” (Williamson 1990 p. 67). There are 
different organisational forms because transactions have different 
dimensions. The principal dimensions are (1) the frequency with which 
transactions occur, (2) the degree and type of uncertainty to which they 
are subject, and (3) the condition of asset specificity. (Williamson 1985
68
pp. 52-63). Williamson makes two main assumptions. First, individuals 
behave “opportunistically” or with "self interest seeking guile". Second, 
economic agents are subject to bounded rationality. The first assumption 
is similar to neoclassical economics, but suggests “self interest seeking of 
a deeper and more troublesome kind” (Williamson 1989 p.138). Together 
the two assumptions suggest that economic agents disclose information 
in a selective manner often in ways intended to mislead and confuse. 
The result is that information is costly and distributed asymmetrically.
At first glance Williamson’s approach seems to be quite distinct from the 
exchange paradigm. For example, his behavioural assumptions differ 
markedly from the exchange approach. However, on closer inspection, 
the break between Williamson and the market paradigm might not be as 
clear as it first appears to be. Williamson focuses on a market- 
hierarchies continuum which presupposes the existence of markets. In 
this respect his starting point is the controversial proposition that “in the 
beginning there were markets" (Williamson 1985 p.87). This perspective 
is debatable and has received extensive criticism on both historical and 
logical grounds (see eg Fourie 1989, 1993, Kay 1993, Sawyer 1993 and 
Hodgson 1993, 1996). The first set of criticisms suggests that it "ignores 
a crucial fact of history: hierarchical organisation forms and contractual 
arrangements in exchange predate the price making market” (North 1981 
p.41). The second focuses on the fact that logically production must 
proceed exchange. As Fourie (1989 p. 145) puts it: "Market relations are 
nothing but relations between already existing firms (or between such 
firms and their customers). Without firms that produce, there are no 
products to be transferred and allocated by market transactions".
A result of presupposing the existence of markets is that the firm is a
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logical extension of the market rather than a separate learning process 
which differs from the collective learning paradigm. This reflects the 
Coasean perspective that the firm evolved in order to internalise, and thus 
economise on, the pre-existing costs of market transactions between 
individuals. This has meant that from the transaction cost perspective, 
the main topics of research have concentrated on the nature of the firm 
relative to the market. The firm, in this sense, is reduced to a collective 
learning free nexus of contracts in line with the exchange approach 
above. Moreover, Williamson sees the focus on inter-individual 
transactions, characteristic of the contracts approach, as a strength. He 
writes {1986 p.87) that "one of the attractive attributes of the transaction- 
cost approach is that it reduces essentially to a study of contracting".
Of course Williamson argues that, although hierarchies start with markets, 
their functions are different to markets. Hierarchies have the power to set 
(or at least influence) their planning environment. This is true, but the 
power to affect the environment, external to the firm, depends on 
decisions made at the managerial level (see Fourie 1993, Hodgson 1993, 
1996). This is the whole basis of value creation within the firm compared 
with value allocation external to the firm (ie. in the market). This 
distinction is also the basis of evolutionary-historicist interpretations of the 
rise of modern capitalism (see eg Penrose 1980, Lazonick 1991) which 
stress that it is learning within the institution which drives economic 
development. Williamson’s use of contracting, rather than decision 
making, though, extends the exchange based approach from the external 
market to the internal organisation. “The nature of the [Williamsonian] 
firm is understood through the prism of the market, which serves as the 
ultimate and overarching point of reference ... “ (Fourie 1993 p.41).
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Most of the similarities which Williamson claims between his own work 
and that of the "old institutionalists”, such as Commons and Veblen, are 
superficial. Williamson often claims that he is following Commons in 
treating the transaction as the ultimate unit of analysis (see eg Williamson 
1975 p.3), but Hodgson (1993) points out that for Commons the 
transaction is a “unit of economic activity” which is just one part of a 
cognitive whole. Another difference is that Williamson treats the unit of 
analysis as the abstract, atomistic and “opportunistic" individual. The "old 
institutionalists”, on the other hand, stress the organic and collective 
learning characteristics of institutions, which is more akin to the co­
operative learning literature below. Williamson’s references to work on 
the historical rise of the firm, and in particular Chandler (eg Chandler 
1977), are, in essence, superfluous to his basic approach. Williamson, 
when discussing Chandler’s work focuses on transaction cost issues, but 
tends to disregard the broader emphasis which Chandler attaches to the 
firm’s organisational abilities to innovate and learn. This is the central 
issue. However, because Williamson’s framework is grounded in a 
transactions costs environment, it is blinded to the learning possibilities 
that strategic competition suggests. Bianchi (1995) makes the point:
“Williamson admits of course that vertical integration has an effect 
on market concentration. But [according to Williamson] this does 
not have any effect on the firm’s organisational abilities, except by 
enhancing its monopolistic practices. ... The fact that firms, when 
facing strategic competition, are more than socially inefficient 
monopolies, completely escapes Williamson" (1995 p.188).
Williamson, like Alchian & Demsetz (1972) also argues that his approach 
provides a definitive or near definitive explanation for the firm. He states
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(1986 p. 131) "that the modern corporation is mainly to be understood as 
the product of a series of organisational innovations that have had the 
purpose and effect of economising on transaction costs" (emphasis 
added). There are at least two problems with claiming universality for the 
transactions cost approach. The first is that it ignores other perspectives 
on the firm - for example power and contested exchange (see Bowles & 
Gintis 1993). Second, Williamson ignores the potential existence of 
coordination failure in the exchange process. He sees firms as rational 
choice outcomes where hierarchies emerge from the market so as to 
economise on transaction costs. However, there is no guarantee that 
hierarchies will emerge if market coordination fails (see Stiglitz 1993).
The Collective Learning Paradigm (s)
Outside the (still) orthodox Williamsonian approach, several inter-related 
paradigms, which emphasise the collective learning attributes of the firm, 
have emerged. The search for a new collective learning perspective is 
likened in Best (1990) to a transition from the "old competition" to the 
“new competition”. "The old competition is about... managerial hierarchy, 
scientific management, and either vertical integration or 'arms length’ 
market oriented supplier relations" (1990 p.251). “The new competition", 
on the other hand, "is attacking the base of this whole superstructure: the 
production unit, its organisation, and internal governance structure” (1990 
p.252). The “new competition”, in its broadest sense, encompasses a 
range of theoretical perspectives - flexible specialisation, the techno- 
economic approach and the literature on the Japanese firm (J-mode).
The flexible specialisation literature stresses the importance of 
decentralised networks as a vehicle for cooperative learning. The 
literature on industrial districts (eg Courault & Romani 1992, Lorenz 1992) 
focuses on two aspects of cooperation. The first is the provision of
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collective goods such as training, education and research and 
development. The usual practice, in industrial districts, is for these to be 
provided through the auspices of some local institution: business 
association, trade union or regional government. The other form of co­
operation takes the form of adherence to a set of norms of reciprocal 
behaviour. This includes sharing of technical information, subcontracting 
out to less successful competitors and refraining from wage competition 
and labour poaching (Lorenz 1992 p. 195). The essential element driving 
industrial districts is cooperation. This is because reciprocal sharing 
serves the dual role of reducing the risk associated with investing in new 
products and discouraging strategies, which have the potential to be 
against the mutual interest of the parties, such as wage competition.
This perspective, in its more general form, expressed in, for example, 
Piore (1992) comes close to the new techno-economic paradigm in inter 
alia Freeman & Perez (1986) and Dosi (1988). This latter approach 
studies the characteristics of technical change and the innovative 
process. The literature, in doing this, draws an essential distinction 
between information and knowledge (see Dosi 1988 pp.233-234). The 
market provides information, but problem solving activity involved in 
search and discovery is based on competences, “visions” and heuristics 
which are a logical precondition to processing information into knowledge. 
When the innovative process is exploratory it is argued that the market is 
unable to direct the emergence and selection of radical technological 
discontinuities. While this approach denies the ubiquitous existence of 
the market, it stops short of ruling out a role for the market altogether. 
The new techno-economic paradigm instead attempts to combine market 
incentives with organisational learning in order to generate an evolving 
innovative climate. Economic opportunities, growing out of technological 
progess created through continuous breakthroughs in
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scientific exploration, are localised via in-house research and 
development. The collective learning process, in this sense, involves 
various forms of “institution specific accumulation of competences” (Dosi 
1988 p.234). This suggests that, compared with the nexus of contracts 
view of the firm in Alchian & Demsetz (1972) and Jensen & Meckling 
(1976) and the Williamson hierarchical firm, the techno-economic 
approach is consistent with seeing the firm as a separate cognitive entity 
rather than a mere extension of the market (see eg Dosi 1984 chap. 2).
The literature on the Japanese firm (J-mode) represents a third strand in 
the collective learning theme. This approach stresses the relevance of 
horizontal co-ordination among operating units and sharing of ex post on­
site information - ie. learned results. This differs from the emphasis 
placed on vertical information flows and skill specialisation in the 
literature on the stylised American firm (A mode). The main features of the 
(simplified) J-mode are depicted in Aoki's (1990) three duality principles.1
(i) The first principle states that the J-mode, compared with the A-mode, is 
less hierarchical in co-ordination, but relies more on hierarchies in 
incentives. Within the co-ordination sphere the sharing of information in 
the J-mode is multi-faceted. The indicative framework of operations is set 
out in prior planning, but as new information becomes available in the 
implementation period prior plans might need to be modified. This 
involves close co-ordination between different units in the production 
chain (captured in the kaban [just-in time] method) and different functional 
divisions in the firm. The enterprise, in this sense, cultivates a learning 
and development culture where ideas for improving plant site methods 
come straight from the shop floor (Freeman 1988). The manipulation of 
ex post on-site information in order to generate information value is akin 
to the notion of “using the factory as a sort of laboratory” (Baba 1985).
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The second aspect of Aoki’s (1990) first principle relates to hierarchies in 
ranks. The A-mode tends to be more consistent with a decentralised 
market approach to incentives in which short-term labour contracts are 
common. The J-mode, however, sees the relationship with its workforce 
as a long-term commitment on both sides. This facilitates the use of 
hierarchies as an incentive mechanism. There are separate rank 
hierarchies for blue collar and white collar workers. While each worker 
enters at an identical starting point (subject to educational credentials), 
progression up the "workplace ladder” will occur at different rates. The 
criteria for promotion are period of service and merit. The latter is not 
dependent on performance in a specific job, but takes into account a 
broad range of factors which are needed in the J-mode organisational 
sphere such as problem solving abilities and organisational skills. The 
incentive scheme, in this sense, complements the organisational 
objectives of the firm and contributes to the cooporate culture theme.
(ii) Aoki’s (1990) second principle suggests that there is a close symmetry 
between the internal organisation and financial control of the J-mode. 
The relationship between the J-mode and its banks involves a long-term 
commitment. The banks are prominent shareholders in, and an important 
source of capital for, the J-mode which tends to be debt dominated. The 
banks’ long-term commitment to the J-mode serves two inter-related roles. 
The first purpose is expressed as bearing the firm’s risk. This arises 
because, given that a large proportion of the equities held by banks and 
other corporate entities are extremely stable, the management of 
Japanese firms are insulated from takeover raids in the open market.
The second aspect relates to the exertion of control over the firm. Where 
the J-mode makes profits which are considered reasonable the banks will 
not interfere with the management of the firm. However, if profits fall
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below a satisfactory level the main bank (/'e. the major shareholding bank 
in the firm) will exercise explicit control over management and operational 
issues. The potential threat of bank intervention in the operation of the 
firm acts as a strong incentive to the "workplace ladder” to perform. The 
relationship between bank and firm, therefore, complements the internal 
rank hierarchies which, Aoki (1990) claims, is conducive to incremental 
innovations in the J-mode. There is, though, a potential cost in this 
process in terms of allocative efficiency. Lo (1997 p. 19) points out that 
where the risk bearing and control functions of the bank are asymmetric, 
the firm benefits from some degree of soft budget constraint. This 
suggests that ex ante management might not feel as responsible for the 
risk associated with its decisions compared with the A-mode. If this is the 
case, the debt dominated capital structure of the J-mode, whilst being 
conducive to collective learning, might not prove as allocative efficient,2
(iii) Aoki’s (1990) third principle builds on the second. Aoki (1990) suggests 
that the corporate management decisions of the J-mode are subject to the 
dual control (influence) of financial and workers interests rather than 
unilateral control of shareholders. The J-mode is better seen as “a 
community of people”3 than as capital owned by the shareholders. The 
importance of the banks is discussed above. The J-mode’s workers exert 
influence via the collective learning perspective. Aoki (1990 pp. 18-20) 
argues that the workers, as a group, are assets-specific to the internal 
network. The language of networks, here, links with the wider literature - 
ie outside of the literature on the J-mode - on incremental innovation (see 
eg Best 1990 chap. 9, Dietrich 1994 chap.9). The J-mode, in part 
because shareholders are seen more as a group outside the firm and, in 
part because of the long-term commitment of the banks, also tend to 
have a longer investment horizon. The management’s objectives, 
consistent with its dual obligations, focus on long-term growth and
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maintaining workers’ earnings. This contrasts with the shareholder 
controlled A-mode which is more accountable to its shareholders and, 
therefore, more concerned with creating share value in the short-term. 
The longer investment horizon, with a stable managerial environment 
discussed above, is an important stimulant to incremental innovation.
3.3 PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVISION OF LABOUR
There are two main perspectives on the division of labour. The first is the 
detailed division of labour. This notion originated with Adam Smith’s 
(1776) example of the transition from pin craftsman to pin factory. This is 
developed in the proposition that the division of labour is limited by the 
extent of the market. The main link papers between Adam Smith (1776) 
and modern exchange perspectives are Young (1928) and Stigler (1951). 
The social division of labour, on the other hand, is grounded in Karl 
Marx’s (1867) writings. The significance of the two forms of division of 
labour lies in the difference in the economic relations that each involves. 
The detailed division of labour refers to the hierarchical relationship 
between labour and capital within the firm. The social division of labour 
refers to the relationship between capitalists in competition as 
independent producers (Fine 1982 p.41). At a more abstract level the 
social division of labour has a cognitive basis. Here, conception and 
execution are integrated and innovations are achieved “through the 
tension between a deepening of understanding within a given cognitive 
frame and the pull to reintegrate back into a different frame in order to 
produce a sellable commodity” (Piore 1992 p. 169). At this abstract level 
the social division of labour, is reflected in the collective learning theme.
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Proposition 5.7:
There are logical links between concepts of the division of labour and theories of 
the firm. The detailed division of labour underpins the market-hierarchies 
paradigm. The social division of labour underpins the collective learning paradigm.
The market paradigm makes the detailed division of labour the centre­
piece of the explanation, while the relevance of the social division of 
labour is not addressed at all. This is made explicit in the new classical 
microeconomics literature, which sets out with the express goal of 
modelling Young’s (1928) views on the division of labour (eg Yang & 
Borland 1991, Yang & Ng 1995). The detailed division of labour is 
treated as a defining trajectory. The problem, however, with this view is 
that it does not give sufficient weight to collective learning stones. Piore 
(1992), writing in relation to the Chicago growth theories, makes a similar 
point. Piore states “[Chicago] need not as a matter of logic, of course, 
join the whole debate; it could simply assert that there is a single 
trajectory [ie the detailed division of labour] with the properties for which it 
is looking .... But given the extensive literature about network structures 
which is now developing, this may be a little harder to do than it was in 
the past." The same criticism could be made of the new classical 
microeconomics and, in a broader sense, the market rationale for the firm.
The flexible specialisation approach, on the other hand, posits that the 
social division of labour, and not the detailed division of labour, is the 
engine of growth. The flexible specialisation literature suggests that the 
“technological dynamism” which grew out of the famous industrial districts 
of the nineteenth century - silks in Lyon, cotton goods in Philidelphia, 
edge tools in Sheffield etc -was the driving force behind economic 
development, rather than the technical characteristics, underpinning the
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detailed division of labour, depicted in the mass production literature. 
However, while most of the initial work in this area was confined to 
explaining economic performance in specific industrial districts such as 
the literature on the so-called "Third Italy” (see eg Beccatini 1990, 
Capecchi 1990), the argument is extended in later writings to encompass 
a more general paradigm. Piore (1992 p.160), for example, suggests 
networks are " often appropriate not only to organise relationships among 
small firms, but also to structure the relationship among the internal units 
of large corporate enterprises and between the corporation .... [its] 
suppliers [and] customers These comments raise the issue as to 
what extent the flexible specialisation approach purports to be a general 
paradigm. There is a tension in the flexible specialisation literature 
between theorising from specific examples and a priori general reasoning.
The extent to which the techno-economic approach is a general paradigm 
is also not clear. While the flexible specialisation and techno-economic 
approaches are similar in perspective, their origins differ. The flexible 
specialisation approach, as discussed above, reasons from the 
experience of specific industrial districts. The attempt to generalise from 
empirical observation through, for example, building on Marshall's 
discussion of "industrial districts” in his Principles of Economics (Becattini 
1990) is a recent development. The techno-economic paradigm, on the 
other hand, developed as a general alternative to then extant theories of 
technical change. The techno-economic perspective develops a 
conceptual framework which starts from the economics of technical 
change (Dosi et ai 1990 p.x-xi). This is depicted as having wide 
application in writings in the techno-economic mould (see Dosi et al 
1988). Freeman (1987,1988), for example, studies Japan as “a national 
system of innovation”. Nelson (1988) and Teece (1988) suggest that the 
United States "innovative process” can be studied in much the same
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manner. The industrial revolution and the emergence of the United 
States and Germany as economic superpowers have also been explained 
in terms of a techno-economic perspective (eg Freeman & Perez 1986).
The importance of networks relative to hierarchies as a general 
explanation for the firm, and the inter-relationship between the two, is an 
unresolved issue within the flexible specialisation paradigm. The techno- 
economic approach, like flexible specialisation, stresses the importance 
of networks in co-operative learning. However, also consistent with 
flexible specialisation, it is not clear what room this approach leaves for 
market-hierarchies rationales for the firm. This is an issue not addressed 
in the literature. Most techno-economic studies do not even mention 
Williamson or Chandler, let alone pure exchange theorists such as 
Cheung.4 Nevertheless, although it is not clear whether the flexible 
specialisation and techno-economic approaches claim to be a general 
paradigm, new classical microeconomics, within the market paradigm, 
sees its explanation as having universal application. Yang (1994), for 
example, argues that the new classical perspective on the division of 
labour can explain differences in socialist economies. Ng & Yang (1995), 
in a similar fashion, claim that the detailed division of labour can explain 
growth patterns in Song China (960-1279 A.D) which existed about eight 
hundred years ago. The purported scope which each paradigm claims 
to have raises a tension as to the extent to which market-hierarchies and 
collective learning represent general explanations for the firm and, related 
to this, the relationship between the detailed and social divisions of 
labour, which the existing literature does not resolve. The next section 
suggests a possible synthesis through developing the idea that different 
trajectories reflect the heterogeneous nature of the division of labour.
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3.4 TOWARDS A POSSIBLE SYNTHESIS
While the flexible specialisation and techno-economic approaches do not 
spell out the relative roles for networks and hierarchies within their 
respective paradigms, the literature on the Japanese firm is more clear 
(see Aoki 1989, 1990, Itoh 1987). Aoki (1990 pp.8-9) suggests that a 
trade-off exists between specialisation and collective learning. The A- 
mode has two essential characteristics: hierarchical separation between 
planning and implementation and an emphasis on economies of 
specialisation. However, in the J-mode, some economies of 
specialisation are sacrificed in the search for a cooperative culture. 
Whether it is worthwhile sacrificing economies of specialisation, in order 
to facilitate collective learning, depends on the planning environment. 
When it is stable, learning at the operational level might not add much 
information value to prior planning. Moreover, at the other end of the 
scale, when the planning environment is volatile, decentralised adaptation 
to environmental changes might cause results which are unstable. Aoki 
argues, in these two cases, that economies of specialisation outweigh 
economies of collective learning and the A-mode is appropriate. The J- 
mode is appropriate in the intermediate case where the planning 
environment is subject to continual change, but the change is not too 
drastic. In this case the argument is that the information value created via 
collective learning and horizontal co-ordination more than compensates 
for the loss of efficiency due to sacrificing operational specialisation.
Proposition 3.2:
The two concepts of the division of labour are reflected in different patterns of 
growth. The “narrow endogenous growth” treats the detailed division of labour as 
a defining trajectory. The “broad endogenous growth”, on the other hand, can 
accommodate both the detailed division of labour and the social division of labour.
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FIGURE 3.1
Schematic Representation of the Historical Links in the Division of Labour
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Aoki’s (1990) propositions can be generalised through looking at the 
division of labour. To this end the market-hierarchies and network stories 
can be placed in the context of different patterns of growth.5 The literature 
on endogenous growth provides a means to do this. A schematic 
representation of the main perspectives on the division of labour is 
presented in figure 3.1 This table sketches (in a simplified form) the 
manner in which the detailed division of labour and the social division of 
labour have been evolved in the literature. There are two strands of 
endogenous growth depicted in figure 3.1. The "narrow" endogenous 
growth reflects Adam Smith’s detailed division of labour. This strand 
adopts a similar perspective on the division of labour to the new classical
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view, within the market paradigm, and can, like new classical 
microeconomics, be traced back via Young (1928) and Stigler (1951) (see 
eg Becker et al 1990, Jones & Manuelli 1990, Rebelo 1991). The narrow 
endogenous growth, however, tends to assume perfect competition and 
constant returns. At most it allows for increasing returns at the industry or 
economy-wide levels and even here it still assumes perfect competition or 
at least price-taking behaviour. This means that its models cannot 
capture the importance of technological progress in the growth process.
The “broad” endogenous growth, on the other hand, casts industrial 
innovation as the engine of growth (see eg Romer 1990, Grossman & 
Helpman 1991). Thus, there are two main differences between the broad 
and narrow perspectives. The first is that the broad approach models the 
endogenous component of technological progress as an integral part of 
economic growth. The second is that the broad approach has discarded 
perfect competition, working instead with models of monopolistic 
competition in the tradition of theorists such as Dixit & Stiglitz (1977). It is 
arguable that the broad view incorporates aspects of different 
technological trajectories in the sense that term is used in the collective 
learning literature - ie as a growth process with substantive implications 
for economic structure (see Dosi 1984, Piore & Sabel 1984, Piore 1992).
When compared with the broader approach, the problem with the narrow 
approach to modelling endogenous growth is that it defines the detailed 
division of labour as the technological trajectory.6 The narrow approach 
then assumes that this process is consistent with a competitive economic 
structure and that the concern is with modelling that process as a kind of 
"general equilibrium growth" (Piore 1992 p. 162). Contra the narrow 
approach, the broad approach to endogenous growth does not treat 
Adam Smith’s views on the division of labour, as interpreted by Young
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(1928), as a defining trajectory. The attempt to model endogenous 
technological process in the broader tradition as an essential component 
of growth recognises the wider concerns that Young (1928) had about 
general equilibrium theorising. Young (1928) protested that general 
equilibrium modelling could not capture the essence of economic 
progress - increasing returns - which he saw as a process of change (see 
Blitch 1983). The same concern is reflected in Kaldor’s writings which 
drew inspiration from Young (1928)7 Kaldor (1972) makes the point:
“The difficulty with a new start is to pinpoint the critical area where 
economic theory went astray. In my own view, it happened when 
the theory of value [ie. neoclassical theory of price determination] 
took over the center of the stage - which meant focusing attention 
on the allocative functions of markets to the exclusion of their 
creative functions - as an instrument for transmitting impulses to 
economic change" (Kaldor 1972 p.181 emphasis in original).
This passage, which comes close to Schumpeter (1934), raises some of 
the main concerns expressed in the collective learning literature - in 
particular that market-oriented paradigms do not recognise the 
importance of value creation. There is one possible reservation on this 
point which is raised in Lazonick (1991). The existence of increasing 
returns or endogenous technical change, in the Schumpeterian tradition, 
are not necessarily confined to the economy-wide level. The "neo- 
Schumpeterian" perspectives in figure 3.1 (the flexible specialisation and 
techno-economic paradigms) stress the importance of continuous 
innovations within the firm. Kaldor, however, in the above passage, refers 
to the creative function of markets not firms, but this can be explained on 
the basis that he wasn't considering whether increasing returns result
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from organisational co-ordination or market regulation. Rather he talks 
about the influence of macro conditions on micro-efficiency on average 
while leaving out the diverse capabilities of firms to seize opportunities.
The main point is that Kaldor highlights an important feature of Young’s 
(1928) paper which is the need to see endogenous technological 
progress as an evolving process. This is ruled out in the narrow 
endogenous growth because the technological trajectory is modelled as a 
general equilibrium process. The broader approach, however, because it 
adopts imperfect competition and focuses on endogenous technical 
change, provides the basis for a wider alternative trajectory based on 
aspects of the social division of labour - ie. treating endogenous 
innovation as a cognitive whole - which flows down from Marx through 
Schumpeter and Kaldor. Wulwick (1993) looks at Kaldor’s growth model 
in the context of writings on endogenous growth. She suggests (1993 
pp.338-339): "The things that the new growth theory discusses - path 
dependence, endogenous technology, manufacturing as an engine of 
growth, complementarities and so on - all appear in Kaldor’s insightful, 
ingenious, iconoclastic essays in one form or another. Thus it may seem 
surprising that Kaldor's growth theory has been ignored by the new 
growth theorists”. The first sentence is still true. However, the second 
sentence while true in the past, is perhaps not as apt now as it once was.
The reason is that there are now some papers which are starting to draw 
out the links between Kaldor and Schumpeter, on one hand, and the 
broader endogenous growth, on the other, at the level of formal 
modelling. Kurz (1991) and Bertola (1994), for example, both draw 
parallels between trends in the broad endogenous growth and the post- 
Keynesian growth literature at the formal (mathematical) level. Aghion & 
Howitt (1992) attempt a similar marriage between Young, Schumpeter and
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the broad endogenous growth. There is a similar appreciation for the 
historical basis of the broader endogenous growth in their latter paper - 
Aghion & Howitt (1994). Aghion & Howitt (1994) survey the broader 
endogenous growth in the context of the wider industrial organisation 
literature. Their main contribution is to point to a growing literature, in the 
broader mould, which might be traced back to the ideas discussed in 
Schumpeter. This broader literature, consistent with Schumpeter, is 
starting to look at the microeconomic underpinnings of technical progress 
at the level of the firm (see also Solow 1991 pp.410-411, Azariadis 1994).
The broader approach to modelling endogenous technological change is 
moving more towards the growth process envisaged in the collective 
learning literature. The trend towards a convergence is also reflected in 
recent reflections in the broader endogenous growth which adopt some 
points stressed in French regulationist writings - see, in this respect Boyer 
& Petit 1991 who provide a regulationist (formal) interpretation of Kaldor. 
The regulationist perspective provides a related vision of a technological 
trajectory rooted in natural evolution which is the inspiration for the 
flexible specialisation and techno-economic paradigms. These views can 
also be traced back through Kaldor and Young to Smith (see figure 3.1).
The point where the flexible specialisation and regulationist perspectives 
meet is where institutions and technical change converge as the 
mechanisms driving economic development. The narrow endogenous 
growth provides one possible trajectory which exists along a steady-state 
or consistent growth path, but the use of a Cobb-Douglas production 
function means the narrow trajectory does not need to confront the 
existence of multiple stationary points. The existence of multiple 
equilibria, however, is an interesting feature of models with increasing 
returns. It opens up the possibility that history matters, so that where the
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process ends up depends on where it starts. This is a theme stressed in 
the collective learning paradigm and, in particular, in the sub-literature 
with a Marxian theme (see eg Piore & Sabel 1984). The broad 
endogenous growth, on the other hand, treats the market structure as 
endogenous. This provides a means to model multiple growth paths (see 
eg Azariadis & Drazen 1990). It also allows for the existence, in some 
broad variants such as the patent race model, of indeterminate solutions 
and welfare outcomes which are difficult ex ante to predict (see eg 
Dasgupta & Stiglitz 1988). The literature constructing formal models 
using the principle of economic selection is a related development (see 
eg Silverberg 1988, Silverberg et al 1988). This approach goes beyond 
models such as Romer (1990) and abandons market equilibrium in toto.
Proposition 3.3
Steady-state and multiple growth paths are associated with different market 
structures or forms of competition. A steady-state growth path is reflected in a 
stable market structure or static competition. The existence of multiple growth 
paths is consistent with an unstable market structure and dynamic competition.
The notion that the narrow and broad endogenous growth reflect different 
concepts of the division of labour sets up a more general approach to 
evaluate Aoki (1990). The attempt to model path dependence in the 
broader endogenous growth provides for both stable and unstable 
planning environments in the sense that those concepts are used in Aoki 
(1990). A possible approach along these lines is to think about different 
forms of competition. The notion of a planning environment suggests 
imperfect competition - ie. that firms, to differing degrees, have the power 
to affect their external environment. This raises the issue of what firms 
are planning when the external environment is "stable” and “unstable”? 
The concept of a stable planning environment seems consistent with a
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stable market structure or static competition. A good example of static 
competition in the sense it is being used here is the United States steel 
and automotive industries in the 1950s and 1960s where high barriers to 
entry gave producers substantial market (and planning) power. The 
concept of a planning environment which is unstable, however implies 
dynamic competition in the Schumpeterian sense. There is dynamic 
competition because firms with early entry earn co-operative rents 
through continuous innovation and collective learning. However, the 
planning environment is unstable because barriers to entry are low. 
This means that firms earning supra-normal profit are under continuous 
threat from outside the industry as depicted in Dixit & Stiglitz (1977).
These observations appear consistent with the suggestion in Piore & 
Sabel (1984) that the hierarchical mode of production based on the 
detailed division of labour which epitomised many United States 
industries (such as steel and cars) until the late 1960s lost its advantage 
when confronted with product variation and weakened oligopolistic 
control. Taking this a step further, the concepts of static and dynamic 
competition are similar to the notions of steady state and transition growth 
paths in the broader literature. The model developed in Lombardini & 
Donati (1994) illustrates the relationship. It is in the broad endogenous 
growth mould and distinguishes between a steady-state growth path 
which is likened to "an ideal asymptote of evolution” and a series of 
"transition growth phases”. The steady-state path is characterised by 
static competition - /e, a stable planning environment. "At a certain 
moment in time, if we look at the economy”, write Lombardini & Donati, 
"we see monopolies and oligopolies” (stable market structures). However 
“if we observed the evolution of the economy, [dynamic] competition 
appears as the essential feature of economic progress. In the asymptote
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of evolution, in fact market power disappears” (1994 p.202). This last 
passage, which refers to the "transition phase” is consistent with an 
unstable planning environment where there is continuous innovation.
When Lombardini & Donati suggest that "market power disappears”, in 
effect what they mean is that firms do not have the same power to 
influence their planning environment. This creates a situation in the 
"transition phase” where growth is being driven by the repeated creation 
(and erosion) of economic rents ie. the planning environment is unstable. 
The term “transition phase" is used in Lombardini & Donati, but this 
phrase needs to be interpreted cautiously. There might be a number of 
trajectories, at a given point in time, consistent with the processes which 
fall within dynamic competition, so that the concept is anything but 
transitory. These trajectories are specific patterns of organisational 
innovation which co-exist with steady state growth paths, rather than 
short-lived “transitory" phenomena. The process of innovation through 
networks, in this sense, becomes embedded in the industrial structure.
An important point is that the concept of stable and unstable planning 
environments does not correspond to whether the growth process is in or 
out of equilibrium at a given point in time. This would be a sterile 
distinction without much practical relevance. The distinction, instead, is 
between a steady-state growth pattern consistent with perhaps the long- 
run growth path and a growth path where multiple growth patterns are 
pervasive. The “general equilibrium” "perfect competition” trajectory 
suggested by the narrow endogenous growth can accommodate the first 
growth path, but it cannot accommodate the second. However the broad 
approach, because it makes an attempt to deal with multiple stationary 
points, encompasses both cases. Viewed in this manner the narrow
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growth trajectory, associated with a consistent growth path becomes, in 
effect, a subset of a more general broad growth trajectory which allows for 
both consistent and path dependence affected patterns of growth.
The attempt to cast the broad endogenous growth as a wider trajectory 
has its shortcomings. The new growth models have a number of 
limitations. However, just two problems will be mentioned here which 
have particular relevance when thinking about building a wider growth 
trajectory. First, on the one hand, the attempt in the broader literature to 
incorporate different aspects of innovation into a microeconomic 
framework adds to the level of realism, in particular, relative to the narrow 
endogenous growth. The specifications used allow for some of the main 
characteristics of technological change (eg cumulativeness). However, 
on the other hand, the fact remains that these models are still very 
stylised. The stilted nature of the modelling exercise makes it difficult to 
capture the full effects of collective learning as an evolving process.
Second, the implicit assumption in endogenous growth models of rational 
technological expectations is also open to debate. The problem is that 
investment in research and development is a future oriented endeavour 
which is imparted with imperfect information and uncertain results. The 
implication of rational expectations that, at least at some level, 
entrepreneurs have a perfect understanding about the functional form of 
aggregate technology is tantamount to assuming away a large part of 
what endogenous technological change involves (see Aghion & Howitt 
1994). The assumption of rational expectations also gives some of the 
models strong equilibrium properties. This assumption is criticised in 
techno-economic writings as inconsistent with the depiction of growth as a 
disequilibrium process (see eg Dosi et al 1988). This does not affect 
attempts to construct a trajectory based on patterns of growth in multiple
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equilibria perse. However, in truth, any attempt to construct a generalised 
trajectory from stationary points is a surrogate for examining the different 
(disequilibrium) growth patterns which underlie them Thus, in a broader 
sense, the rationality assumption runs counter to the concept of a 
generalised trajectory that purports to capture different patterns of growth.
Having said this, there is a literature which is attempting to incorporate 
the concept of bounded rationality into growth models (see eg Silverberg 
1988, Silverberg et al 1988). This is closely related to the economic 
selection approach mentioned above. The broad approach to 
endogenous growth provides the basis for thinking about a different 
trajectory, but it is likely that the economic selection literature being 
developed by Dosi, Silverberg et al will provide the best mechanism for 
taking this concept further. The economic selection approach is still in its 
early stages. There are, therefore, refinements to be made, but it has the 
attraction, relative to most of the endogenous growth literature, that it has 
the mathematical framework to generalise out of equilibrium growth.
This leaves the issue of whether the collective learning and market- 
hierarchies paradigms can be considered in the context of these different 
trajectories. The above arguments regarding trajectories, of course, are 
far from conclusive. They represent a starting point for thinking about a 
more general framework. However, if the idea of different trajectories is 
accepted, the new classical view of the division of labour - ie. the detailed 
division of labour - seems compatible with a narrow trajectory or steady- 
state growth path. This links with the rationale for the firm. There are two 
Coasean traditions which seem compatible with the detailed division of 
labour. The first is the pure market paradigm in Alchian & Demsetz 
(1972) and Jensen & Meckling (1976). The second is the hierarchies 
rationale suggested by Williamson. The pure market approach stands or
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falls with the detailed division of labour. The link between the detailed 
division of labour and the pure market rationale for the firm, for this 
reason, is fairly straightforward. The extent to which the detailed division 
of labour supports the hierarchies rationale is more controversial, but 
when it is seen as a logical extension of a nexus of contracts the 
detailed division of labour provides the basis for the hierarchies paradigm.
Nonetheless, constructing a classification like figure 3.1 involves taking 
some liberties. The search for common themes, based on the division of 
labour, means that simplifications are inevitable. It would be wrong to 
suggest that the different groupings, in figure 3.1, were discrete 
categories with no overlap or that hierarchies had no collective learning 
function. The point being made is not that hierarchies do not have 
collective learning attributes or even that hierarchies do not perform 
functions, which are distinct to the market, in terms of value creation, but 
rather, that the hierarchies rationale, in the Williamson tradition, is a 
logical extension of the market and therefore, in common with the pure 
market tradition, can be supported by the detailed division of labour. It 
might be objected, quite rightly, that Williamson’s writings, distort the 
broader rationale for, and role of, hierarchies. The classification in figure
3.1, is, for this reason, a stylised representation of what, in fact, exists. 
However, Williamson has been extremely influential so that, on balance, it 
is submitted that the benefits to be had from a classification like figure
3.1, as far as drawing historical linkages, outweigh its shortcomings - ie. 
depicting what are complex issues in rather black and white terms.
The broader trajectory which is, in essence, a series of trajectories 
provides a potential framework to consider both market-hierarchies and 
collective learning. The broader trajectory is consistent with seeing the 
firm in an evolutionary context where different growth patterns (stable and
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unstable) are possible. This allows for various “technological 
competences” (Dosi 1988) or "innovation avenues” (Sahal 1985) which 
are grounded in the social division of labour. The social division of 
labour, in this sense, can support the existence of networks conducive to 
collective learning. This corresponds to Aoki's (1990) intermediate case - 
gentle change in the external environment. The broader trajectory 
because it does provide for different growth paths, can also accommodate 
scenarios where the detailed division of labour is pertinent - ie. "stable” 
and “volatile” external environments. And the detailed division of labour, 
as discussed above, can support the market-hierarchies rationales.
3.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter explored the tension between the collective learning and 
market-hierarchies explanation for the firm It is not clear, from the wider 
collective learning and market-hierarchies literatures, what role exists for 
the different approaches. The chapter suggested that this reflects the fact 
that each paradigm is premised on a particular conception of the division 
of labour, but, at the same time, does not recognise that the division of 
labour is multi-faceted. The chapter suggests that one possible approach 
to reconcile the various rationales for the firm is to place them in the 
context of different growth patterns which support different conceptions of 
the division of labour. These ideas are far from conclusive, and at times 
are speculative, but seem to suggest one possible avenue forward.
The thesis, to this point, has been general in nature. The focus has been 
on two points: (i) The emphasis in the existing literature on completing 
the reform cannot explain the relative success of China’s economic 
reforms and (ii) The different concepts of the division of labour - the 
detailed division of labour and the social division of labour - provide a
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basis for reconciling different themes on the firm - ie. market-hierarchies 
and collective learning. The remaining chapters develop these 
arguments in the context of the T.V.E sector in China. The next chapter 
presents some stylised facts about T.V.Es with particular focus on their 
institutional characteristics. The potential application of the collective 
learning theme to T.V.Es is considered in chapter five. This chapter also 
develops a regional based model of the "traditional” T.V.E. The trade-offs 
between the social division of labour and the detailed division of labour in 
some large coastal T.V.Es - in particular in Jiangsu - is explored in 
chapter six in the context of a formal mathematical model. There are some 
empirical tests of related theoretical propositions in chapter seven.
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CHAPTER 4 
INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF T.V.ES
4.1 INTRODUCTION
T.V.Es and, in a more general sense, rural enterprises,1 are central to 
China s high rate of economic growth. Rural Enterprises have grown at an 
exceptional rate since economic reforms were instigated. To illustrate, 
between 1985 and 1995, the number of rural enterprises increased at an 
average annual rate of around 17%. The average annual rate of growth in 
their real gross output value over the same period was 26% (calculations 
based on Statistical Yearbook of China various volumes). The increasing 
importance of T.V.Es is also reflected in official statements. For example 
T.V.Es were referred to in Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 southern tour speech as 
one of the three advantages of socialism with Chinese characteristics. More 
recently Jiang Zemin, when inspecting agriculture and rural industries in 
1996, also pointed out that "developing township enterprises is a 
revolutionary reform in rural construction and is of far-reaching significance".2
However, while the T.V.E sector has received plaudits, its success represents 
a seeming challenge to the standard property rights approach. The proprietal 
interests in the T.V.E appear ill-defined and ill-specified when compared 
with standard property rights perspectives. This raises a number of issues for 
the post-socialist transition/post-socialist transformation debate. This also 
gives emphasis, inter a//a to suggestions that there is an alternative to 
orthodox interpretations of post-socialist transition which dominate the debate 
on Eastern Europe. The aim of this chapter is two-fold. The first objective is 
to outline some institutional features of T.V.Es which differ from standard 
theories. The second objective is to provide a brief review of the manner in
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which T.V.E institutions have been interpreted in the literature. The chapter 
hopes to show that T.V.Es do not fit well with the usual Anglo-American 
notions of what post-socialist transition should entail. Its other related aim is 
to at least raise the spectre that the institutional nature of T.V.Es provides the 
basis for further consideration of the general direction and thrust of the 
“wider” debate on post-socialist transition/post-socialist transformation. This 
second point is made in more of a speculative fashion, at this stage. Its 
theoretical basis is elaborated in more detail in the succeeding chapters.
The chapter is set out as follows: The next section gives a brief account of 
the historical evolution of T.V.Es and outlines some stylised facts about 
T.V.Es. Section 4.3 reviews the few existing theories which address their 
unique characteristics. The argument that the ambiguous nature of T.V.E 
property rights is an impediment to further reform is presented and an 
alternative perspective that there are some positive aspects in less than 
arms-length ties between T.V.Es and T.V.Gs is raised. Section 4.4 discusses 
T.V.E performance and considers some broader non-institutional issues 
including the problems facing T.V.Es. The main aim is to paint a broader 
picture of the role of T.V.Es. However, the points made in this section are at 
best suggestive. The reason is that the main theoretical treatment of T.V.Es 
in this thesis (which will be developed in chapters five and six), is essentially 
institutional-based and micro-oriented. A full evaluation of T.V.E 
performance and the wider issues facing T.V.Es necessitates consideration 
of broader development issues - in essence it requires a macro theory of 
China’s economic development which lies outside the scope of this thesis.
4.2 SOME STYLISED FACTS ABOUT T.V.Es
There is no single T.V.E model. Instead there are regional variants. Some 
common regional variants are: (i) the Guangdong model (in the Zhujiang 
delta - southern Guangdong), (ii) the Wenzhou model (in, southern Zhejiang)3
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and (iii) the sunan model (originating in southern Jiangsu and the Yangzi 
delta). The Guangdong model has some collective firms which is similar to 
the sunan model but, given its location, there are more ventures with foreign 
capital, more direct trade with Hong Kong and more private firms. The 
Guangdong model is also characterised by large numbers of immigrant 
labour which undermines its communal character. It is considered in 
academic studies such as Vogel (1989) and Fitzgerald (1996). It has also 
been the focus of media attention.4 Huada, in southern Guangdong, is a 
recent example reported in the Beijing Review5 The report, consistent with 
the main characteristics of the Guangdong model, stresses that "Huada’s 
success is due to co-operative ventures between T.V.Es and Hong Kong 
companies”. The Guangdong model differs from the second main variant - 
the Wenzhou model - where nearly all of the T.V.Es are private firms.
The sunan model differs from both. There is a strong sense of collective 
ownership and close ties between the T.V.E and T.V.G. At an intuitive level, 
the close relationship between T.V.Es and T.V.Gs characteristic of the sunan 
model is well-documented in media reports of T.V.E “success stories” such as 
Huaxi village in Wuxi,6 Wuxi in general7 and Zhangjiagang8 in Jiangsu. The 
rest of this chapter and the models in the following two chapters focus on the 
institutional arrangements characteristic of the sunan model. The rationale 
for doing this is three-fold. First, as noted in chapter one the thesis is 
concerned with investigating institutional issues in traditional township (xiang) 
and village (cun) level enterprises and the sunan model comes closest to the 
archetypal traditional T.V.E. Second, historically the sunan model has been 
the dominant ownership form. In most parts of China, but particularly in the 
more developed regions rural non-agricultural development has followed the 
sunan pattern. This provides a basis for exploring path dependencies 
affecting the historical evolution of T.V.Es. Third, previous theorising about
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T.V.Es in Chang & Wang (1994), Weitzman & Xu (1994) et al have 
concentrated on the sunan model. The next two chapters take the existing 
literature as a starting point and attempt to both refine and extend its scope.
Historical Evolution
The sunan model has its origins in the Great Leap Forward. The 
predecessors to T.V.Es were commune and brigade enterprises (C.B.Es) 
which were first set up in 1958. C.B.Es were collectively-owned and 
controlled within the commune structure which consisted of the commune, 
brigade and production team. In southern Jiangsu they were mainly involved 
in the production of small farm machinery, chemical fertilisers, construction 
materials and simple processing of agricultural products. From the beginning 
the communal character of C.B.Es was emphasised in terms of ownership, 
control and surplus redistribution. The commune was responsible for the 
culture, work and education of the peasants (Riskin 1987 p. 124-125). This 
suggests that the evolution of T.V.Es is path dependent. Their communal 
properties can be traced to the communal character of the commune.
The economic and political fortunes of C.B.Es depended to a large extent on 
the ebbs and flows in government policies (Xu 1995 p. 12). Data on the 
output value of C.B.Es for 1958-1978 are given in figure 4.1. The gross 
output value of C.B.Es in 1958 was six billion yuan. However, in the 
aftermath of the failure of the Great Leap Forward, most C.B.Es were closed 
down when the Central Committee and State Council jointly issued a 
document stating that communes and brigades should not establish 
enterprises.9 In 1961 the gross output value of C.B.Es fell to 1.96 billion 
yuan. It is well known that statistics on gross output value in the Great Leap 
Forward are not too reliable, so we have to be cautious making comparisons. 
But the magnitude of the difference (over four billion yuan) is suggestive.
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FIGURE 4.1 
Commune and Brigade Enterprises 
Gross Output Value 1958-1978 (million yuan at constant prices)
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Total Commune Brigade
Annual rate of Growth (%)
Years Total Commune Brigade
1958-1970 0.54 -6.53
1958-1978 9.70 6.51
1970-1974 19.21 25.79 13.55
1974-1978 31.11 33.44 28.70
1970-1978 25.02 29.56 20.89
SOURCE: Islam (1991) table 1
By the mid-1960s, however, a number of C.B.Es were re-established with 
the help of urban workers who had returned to the countryside following the 
Great Leap Forward. Associated with this, the gross output value of C.B.Es
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also started to increase. For example, in 1965 in Wuxi County alone the 
gross output value of C.B.Es was 5.6 million yuan (Whiting 1995 p.91). The 
Cultural Revolution was a period of significant growth for C.B.Es. Most 
commentators seem to accept that, although government statements 
applauding their growth did not appear until later, the seeds for C.B.E/T.V.E 
development were sown in this period. The North China Conference in 1970 
is commonly considered to be a turning point. In 1970 the gross output value 
of C.B.Es was 6.4 billion yuan. At the (official) end of the Cultural Revolution 
in 1976, the gross output value of C.B.Es had increased to 24.4 billion yuan. 
The annual rate of growth in C.B.E output value for 1958-1970 was .54%, but 
for 1970-1978 the annual growth rate was just over 25% (see figure 4.1).
Southern Jiangsu was a natural place for C.B.Es to develop.10 The region 
has a strong agricultural and industrial base. Textile and food processing 
industries developed using raw materials provided by the agricultural sector. 
The periodic influx of “sent-down" workers, cadres, and urban youth 
throughout the Cultural Revolution provided technical skills, management 
experience and a network of connections. A concentration of major urban 
industrial sectors provided opportunities for C.B.Es to enter into contracts 
with state firms. These firms were also an important source of second hand 
equipment and other resources. In some counties such as Wuxi C.B.Es were 
especially encouraged. An important factor was that "in Wuxi the collective 
organisational structure of the commune and brigade were more prominent 
features of the lives of rural residents than elsewhere in China” (Whiting 1995 
p.90). The prominence was the result of the scale of resources controlled at 
the commune and brigade level. The start-up capital for many C.B.Es came 
from revenue generated by collective agriculture and accumulated at the 
commune and brigade level. In turn C.B.Es generated significant revenue for 
the commune. By the mid-1970s communes in Wuxi derived about 40% of 
their income from C.B.Es (Perkins 1977 p.224). Much of this was reinvested
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in C.B.Es. Perkins (1977 p.225) points out: “In the most developed places 
[communes] were using their new-found income not only to reinvest in more 
sophisticated industry, but also to stimulate new programs in the levels below 
the commune. This sort of development was particularly stressed in Wuxi".
There are different interpretations on the scope of, and reasons for, the 
growth in C.B.Es during the Cultural Revolution. One view is that power 
struggles in the central government meant that most of the control over local 
issues fell to local governments in this period (see eg Xu 1995 p. 14). The 
local governments in some provinces, such as Jiangsu in particular, took 
advantage of this to set up enterprises. The local governments then 
protected these "underground enterprises”, even though they were not 
officially encouraged, because they were important sources of revenue. This 
view places emphasis on the fact that in some quarters C.B.Es were regarded 
as "the tail of capitalism” (Islam 1991 p.690) and hence frowned upon. A 
different perspective is that the central government pursued deliberate 
policies of decentralisation and promotion of C.B.Es. Wong (1991) stresses 
this view. She argues that substantial state resources were given to local 
governments to finance rural industrialisation throughout the Cultural 
Revolution. Wong (1991 p. 184) suggests: "[although some of the investment 
funding for rural industry was raised locally, outside the state sector, the 
share of total investment financed by state funds was surprisingly large”.
Nevertheless, even if the centre did promote C.B.Es it is difficult to be sure 
about whether the support was active or passive. Ronnas (1993 p.228) 
argues “that the support of the central level for rural industrialisation was 
essentially of a passive nature. It consisted primarily of moral incentives and 
of the creation of an overall economic environment that was conducive to 
such development. Active support in the form, for example, of rural credits 
was of minor importance. Indeed such support on a large scale would have
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run counter to the strategy of ‘walking on two legs’". However, the statistics 
give some support to Wong’s position that promotion was pro-active. The 
centre’s budgetary expenditure increased throughout the Cultural Revolution. 
For example, between 1971 and 1975 the centre’s expenditure was 212.5 
billion yuan, compared with 153.8 billion yuan during the previous five years 
(Prime 1991 p. 198). Of the centre's total expenditure Wong (1991 pp. 186- 
187) estimates that in the period 1966-1978 as much as 35 billion yuan was 
made available for rural industrialisation in the form of designated sources 
alone.11 When various sources of informal investment - eg. replacement and 
regeneration (gengxin gaizao) funds and the different forms of diverting 
enterprise profits - are taken into account12 this figure becomes much larger.
In the 1980s, C.B.Es became a significant part of the local economy in 
southern Jiangsu. By 1990 officials in Jiangsu estimated that rural 
enterprises produced 90% of the province’s industrial output.13 In addition 
rural enterprises in southern Jiangsu produced 90% of the area’s gross 
product (Martellaro 1994 p.348). It was the most prominent C.B.E province 
and from the mid-1980s the ownership structure of C.B.Es/T.V.Es in Jiangsu 
was viewed as a model which was copied in other coastal provinces, the 
interior provinces and finally even some of the remoter parts of western 
China. Associated with this there have been several government statements 
affirming the role of C.B.Es/T.V.Es and encouraging their growth. The 
"Provincial Regulations on the Growth of C.B.Es", issued in 1978, permitted 
and encouraged the growth of C.B.Es, gave C.B.Es greater control over 
production and marketing, reduced or abolished taxation of C.B.Es and 
encouraged state-owned enterprises to assist and co-operate with C.B.Es.14
In 1983 the State Council issued guidelines which affirmed that "commune 
and brigade enterprises belong to the co-operative economy and great efforts 
must be made to continue to consolidate and develop such enterprises’’.15
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When the commune structure was dismantled in 1984, C.B.Es were renamed 
T.V.Es. When the name was changed the State Council issued a circular 
stating: “Vigorous efforts should be made to guide T.V.Es in terms of 
orientation and development ... T.V.Es should receive the same treatment 
as state enterprises and are entitled to all necessary state aid".16 In 1984 
the State Council’s Document 4 formalised the political and legal status of 
T.V.Es which enabled them to obtain bank loans as legal persons. Following 
this in 1985 the State Science and Technology Commission launched the 
Spark Programme to promote the transfer of managerial and technological 
knowledge from the "modern sector” - the research institutes and large 
S.O.Es - to T.V.Es. Recent recognition of the broader importance of T.V.Es is 
reflected in a law (No. 76 Presidential Decree in the 22nd Session of the 8th 
NPC) outling their role which came into effect in January 1997. The law 
states the task of T.V.Es is to "develop commodity production, offer social 
services, ... support agriculture [and] push ahead with rural modernisation"17.
Throughout, T.V.Es have had fairly easy access to bank credit. A common 
perception is that from late 1988 to middle 1990 rural enterprises became 
the main target of a government induced credit squeeze designed to curtail 
inflation (see Ho 1995, Wong et al 1995). In this period about two million 
rural enterprises ceased production. However, the statistics suggest that 
access to credit was not the real problem. The zhM zhengdun (readjustment 
and rectification) programme was launched in the fourth quarter of 1988 and 
put into effect in the second half of 1989. This resulted in a significant drop 
in the industrial growth rate due to a slump in domestic demand, in particular 
in the sale of consumer durables. The industrial growth rate (year-on-year) in 
the first half of 1989 was 10.8%, but it fell to 0.9% in September and -2.1% in 
October. The government responded by increasing bank credits. Thus, 
contrary to popular belief, total loans by State banks increased by 22.33% in
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1989 and 48.39% in 1990. A substantial proportion of this was directed 
towards rural enterprises. In the first half of 1990 rural enterprises received 
64 billion yuan in loans on top of 25% growth in 1989 (Lo 1997 pp.60-61).
With the exception of T.V.Es in Fujian and Guangdong who benefited from an 
“open door” policy earlier than T.V.Es in other provinces, for most of the 
1980s T.V.Es served primarily local and domestic needs. However, when the 
coastal development strategy was adopted in 1988, T.V.Es in Jiangsu and 
other coastal regions were given incentives to promote exports and utilise 
foreign investment similar to those given earlier to T.V.Es in southern China. 
As a result many T.V.Es in the coastal regions became major exporters (Ho
1994, 1995). This reflected a more general trend where T.V.Es became more 
outward looking in the mid to late 1980s particularly in the more developed 
regions. World Bank research conducted in 1986-87 in four counties - Wuxi 
in Jiangsu, Jieshou in Anhui, Shangrao in Jiangxi and Nanhai in Guangdong 
- confirms this. For example, in Wuxi just 4% of T.V.E sales were within the 
home township and 82% of T.V.Es sold less than 20% of their output in their 
home county. In all four of the counties large majorities of firms sold at least 
40% of their output outside their home province (Svenjer & Woo 1990).
There have been two main developments in the late 1980s and 1990s. The 
first is the growing trend towards converting T.V.Es to joint stock companies. 
Weitzman & Xu (1994) estimate, on the basis of personal interviews 
conducted in 1992 and 1993, that in Guangdong joint stock companies 
accounted for about 8% of T.V.Es. Joint stock companies in Zhejiang at the 
end of 1994 accounted for one-eighth of T.V.Es (Hong 1995 p.359). In May
1995, according to the Ministry of Agriculture, there were 204,000 
shareholding T.V.Es which was 12.4% of total T.V.Es.18 These figures are 
quite low, although, the number of shareholding firms is increasing all the 
time and the proportion is likely to be much higher now. For example, one 
report suggests that, at the end of 1996, 66,300 or 70% of total T.V.Es in
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Jiangsu had been transformed into joint stock forms, leasing arrangements or 
options.19 The other main issue has focused on regional differences in T.V.E 
development between the coastal and interior provinces. Policies designed 
to promote coastal development have resulted in significant regional 
disparities in the growth of T.V.Es. A central point of discussion in the 1990s 
has been the best approach to promote T.V.Es in the interior provinces. 
Both of these issues are considered in more detail in sections 4.3 and 4.4.
Ownership
Most scholars accept that the local residents are the nominal owners of the 
T.V.E (see eg Bowles & Dong 1994, Chang & Wang 1994). However, at the 
same time, most commentators emphasise that the T.V.E is not a private firm 
with well-defined property rights (see eg Nee 1992, Weitzman & Xu 1994). 
For example, Weitzman & Xu argue that T.V.Es are more akin to "vaguely 
defined co-operatives” whose ownership structure “appears to go almost 
completely against the grain of standard property rights theory” (Weitzman & 
Xu 1994 p.63). A commentator in the China Daily describes the ownership 
arrangement as follows: “In rural enterprises sponsored by local communities 
such as townships or villages, the property rights belong to the whole 
community but no individual in particular”.20 Luo writes "[we have] not yet 
found an appropriate paradigm for this peculiar system of property rights. It 
is heavily tinged with Chinese tradition and very different from the Western 
system under which the individual is the ultimate owner of property" (1990 
p. 140). The unusual nature of the T.V.E makes it hard to pinpoint the residual 
claimant. Weitzman & Xu (1994 p.75) even suggest: “There is no residual 
claimant in the traditional sense. The typical resident waits passively to 
receive or enjoy the benefits, of which the major part is not in monetary form 
but in the form of communal social investment which is shared by everyone".
Chang & Wang (1994 pp.439-441) dispute the claim that there is no residual 
claimant. They focus on the second part of the statement recognising that
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the residual benefits are shared. They point out that about 40 percent of 
T.V.E profits are paid to the T.V.G in the form of fees. These fees benefit 
both the T.V.G and the township-village residents. The fees benefit the 
T.V.G because part of the fees are used to support its running costs. The rest 
of the fees support communal social welfare programs and infrastructure 
projects which benefit the township-village residents. The other 60 percent of 
profits are6retained in the T.V.E to finance further development. The local 
residents seem to benefit most from T.V.E development because, inter alia, 
existing jobs are made more secure and more job opportunities are created. 
A third view which is a slight variation on Chang & Wang’s (1994) argument 
is offered in Qian & Xu (1993) Their argument is that reforms along regional 
lines have given greater power to local government. "With these reforms local 
governments [ie. T.V.Gs] have become almost residual claimants [because] 
they have incentives to maximise local revenues" (Qian & Xu 1993 p. 25).
Control Rights
The control rights in the initial (and intermediate) period rest with the T.V.G. 
In this context Weitzman & Xu (1994 p.69) suggest that the T.V.G. is 
regarded as the representative of the residents and, as such, is best seen as 
the de facto executive owner of the T.V.E. Chang & Wang (1994) liken the 
part played by the T.V.G., in the initial stages, to a direct managerial role. 
"[The T.V.G] will choose or approve projects, raise or help raise funds, 
mobilise manpower and other resources within its jurisdiction to support the 
project and supervise the construction process" (1994 p.437). However, at 
an operational level the control rights, in most cases, shift to managers and 
workers in the T.V.E. Song (1990) describes this process through drawing an 
analogy between the T.V.G and the T.V.E and the father-son relationship. 
The T.V.G exercises more control in the T.V.E’s early life, but as the T.V.E 
"grows up" it assumes more responsibilities. The T.V.G maintains managerial 
veto, but in the day-to-day running of the T.V.E it adopts a back seat role.
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Over time, T.V.Gs become "profit oriented economic entities that might be 
compared with holding companies, investment corporations, or headquarters 
of loosely controlled multi-divisional corporations" (Byrd & Lin 1990 p.5). 
While casual empiricism suggests that in most T.V.Es, managers and skilled 
workers assume much of the control rights over time, the T.V.G. still retains 
ultimate control because throughout the T.V.E’s life the T.V.G retains the 
power to appoint managers. Byrd & Lin (1990 pp 5-6) sum this up: "Although 
day-to-day management and business decisions are usually left to enterprise 
directors, community governments tend to be intimately involved in decisions 
on important investments, the establishment or dismantling of firms, 
significant changes in product lines [and] the appointment of enterprise 
management ... community governments can also absorb risk for 
subordinate community enterprises and can finance investments, both 
directly and through arranging other sources of funding such as bank loans”.
The Market-Oriented and Redistributive Functions o f T. V.Es 
This passage suggests that managers in T.V.Es can be seen as representing 
local governments, while being given substantial independence in managerial 
decision making. Viewed in this light the managers of T.V.Es resemble 
executives in market economies, while T.V.Gs are similar to a board of 
directors (Gang 1993 p.57). However, the relationship between the board of 
directors and the company in a capitalist market economy is different from 
that between T.V.Gs and T.V.Es in some important respects. One of the 
differences is that T.V.Gs play a role in income distribution and, on the whole, 
the control which the T.V.G exercises over the T.V.E is associated with the 
T.V.G’s redistributive role. To this end the T.V.E serves as a vehicle for the 
social welfare policies of the T.V.G. This takes at least three forms. First, the 
T.V.E is a source of revenue for the T.V.G through taxation and profit 
remittances. Second, the T.V.E is a source of employment for the nominal
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owners - the local residents. Third, T.V.Gs at times, make short-term 
transfers between T.V.Es (often routed through township industrial 
corporations) to ease structural difficulties in times of economic stagnation.
TABLE 4.1
Severity of Losses Among T.V.Es in Lin et a/'s 11992) Sample 
(% of total number of loss-making firms in the sample)
Unable to pay tax In conformity with 0
regulations
Unable to pay principal and interest on 33
bank loans
Unable to pay wages to workers 59
Unable to pay various fees levied by the 62
government
Unable to pay various service charges 68
levied by the County Industrial Bureaus
Unable to pay bonuses to workers 74
Unable to remit profits in accordance with 100
regulations
NOTES: 10.3% of the sample were loss-making firms 
SOURCE; Lin et cil (1992) p.264
The managerial operations of the T.V.E are market-oriented. By 1986 70% of 
the main material inputs of rural enterprises were purchased through the 
market, and over two-thirds of their output was sold at market determined 
prices (Singh 1993 p.27). While T.V.Gs make transfers between T.V.Es, 
local budget constraints are relatively hard. Lin et al (1992) sampled 400 
T.V.Es in Yuanping County, Shanxi in 1984-85. Table 4.1 shows the degree 
of severity of losses experienced by the loss-making enterprises in that 
sample. The results of the sampling exercise provide a good indication of 
the relative strength of various kinds of external constraints on the budgets 
and finances of T.V.Es. For example, no loss-making enterprise reported that 
they had not paid indirect taxes in accordance with regulations suggesting 
that the taxation constraint is relatively hard. On the other hand, all of the
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loss-making enterprises cut down their profit remittance to government which 
suggests that this constraint is relatively soft. Overall, the order of severity of 
different external constraints affecting various expenditure items for T.V.Es in 
the Lin et al (1992) sample (from most severe to least severe) were (i) state 
taxes, (ii) bank loans, (iii) wages, (iv) fees and service charges, (v) employee 
bonuses and (vi) profit remittance to local government (see table 4.1).
In T.V.Es which have adopted the "manager contract system" managers have 
welt specified compensation schedules which stress market criteria. The 
contract is normally an agreement specifying the manager’s independence 
and his/her obligations to turn over profits to the T.V.G. While there have 
been various criticisms of the contract system (see Schadler 1990 p.232), 
there is widespread agreement that in T.V.Es run under contract, managers 
are less subject to local government interference and are in a better position 
to defend the T.V.E’s interests (see eg Byrd & Gelb 1990 pp.379-380). 
Schadler (1990 p.231) estimates that in 1985 90% of collective enterprises 
had become contract enterprises. Gang (1993) sampled 630 rural enterprises 
(268 collective and 368 non-collective) in Sichuan and Zhejiang in 1991. He 
reports (at p.56) that 42% of the total sample and 86% of the collective 
enterprises were contracted out to either managers or management staffs.
Gang (1993) also presents evidence which suggest that there is a fairly clear 
distinction between the market and redistributive functions of T.V.Es. His 
results on the determinants of branch choice in the sample are reproduced as 
table 4.2. It shows that for the sample as a whole the support of local 
government was not as important as economic determinants such as the 
availability of skilled workers and the professional expertise of managers. 
Table 4.2 supports two general observations made above. The first is that 
rural enterprises are fairly market-oriented - for example they give strong 
considerations to product marketability when deciding whether to enter into a
109
TABLE 4.2 
Rural Enterprises 
Maior Determinants of Branch Choice (%) in Gang’s (1993) Sample
Local Government Support
1st Determinant 2nd Determinant 3rd Determinant
Whole sample 5.1 9.2 9.5
Collective 9.9 16.4 12.2
Non-Collective 1.6 4.1 7.6
Availability of Bank Loans
Whole sample 2.2 10.0 8.4
Collective 4.6 15.6 12.2
Non-Collective 0.5 6.0 5.7
“Other” Determinants of Branch Choice
Primary Determinants
A B C D E F G H I
Whole sample 30.6 31.3 1.6 8,7 13.8 1.4 4.6 92 0.2
Collective 23.3 26.0 1.9 11.8 18.3 1.5 2.7 85.5 0.0
Non-Collective 35.9 35.1 1.4 6.5 10.6 1.4 5.9 96.8 0.3
Secondary Determinants
A B C D E F G H I
Whole sample 13,5 23.3 1.6 9.7 15.6 3.0 3.7 70.4 10.5
Collective 11.8 20.2 3.1 7.6 13.4 3.1 2.7 61.9 6.1
Non-Collective 14.7 25.5 0.5 11.1 17.1 3.0 4.4 76.3 13.6
Tertiary Delerminants
A B C D E F G H I
Whole sample 9.7 5.6 1.4 5.2 17.5 4.6 8.0 52.0 30.0
Collective 15.6 5.7 1.1 8.0 19.5 3.4 4.6 57.9 17.6
Non-collective 5.4 5.4 1.6 3.3 16.0 5.4 10.4 47.5 38.9
NOTES:
(i) The number of total observations was 630 (Collective = 262 and Non­
collective = 368). (ii) Codes: A = Availability of skilled workers, B =
Professional experience of the manager, C = Funds, technologies and personal 
training provided by state enterprises, D = Locally available natural resources, 
E = Good marketability of products, F = Traditional local branches, G = 
Income increase, H = Accumulated percentages A-G, I ~ Not applicable.
SOURCE:
Gang (1993) Tables 2 and 2a.
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particular kind of business. Second, rural enterprises enjoy considerable 
autonomy in business decision making, although the decision to establish the 
enterprise in the first place is usually made by the T.V.G. However, table 4.2 
suggests that local governments have more influence on business decisions 
in collective rural enterprises relative to non-collective rural enterprises. This 
is indicated by the fact that local government support and the availability of 
bank loans is more important to collective than non-collective enterprises.
These basic points have been recognised by other commentators - for 
example Ho (1994) in his study of T.V.Es in Jiangsu, Wong et ai (1995) in 
their ten case studies of T.V.Es in Jiangsu and Shandong and Naughton 
(1994). Naughton (1994 p.268) writes: "It is clear that the successful township 
official (i.e. manager) maximises his own career prospects by maximising 
economic growth during his term as community leader and this depends 
crucially on maximising net revenue from T.V.Es". At times there have been 
some misgivings expressed about the potential for conflict between the 
managerial operations of the T.V.E and the redistributive objectives of the 
T.V.G. However, whether the potential for conflict is realised depends on how 
well the T.V.E manages the redistributive constraint on its profit maximisation 
function. A further consideration is that most T.V.Es see profit maximisation 
as a subset of a broader communal welfare function where the objective is to 
maximise the welfare of the nominal owners - the township-village residents.21
4.3 INTERPRETATIONS ON T.V.E INSTITUTIONS
A lot of reservations have been expressed about the ambiguous nature of 
T.V.E property rights. For example, an article in Nongmin Ribao (Farmers’ 
Daily) which is attributed to the Ministry of Agriculture, states: "Ownership is 
shared by everybody, while no-one is responsible for the enterprise; 
responsibilities for property rights are unclear, and so are the respective 
responsibilities for administrative duties and enterprise management.
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[Moreover] rural administrative leaders frequently interfere arbitrarily with 
enterprises”.22 The same sentiment has been expressed in many academic 
articles. Hong (1995) is illustrative when he suggests (at p.360) "under 
collective ownership everybody owns the property [which] actually means 
nobody owns [it] and nobody cares as well”. These concerns have led some 
academics to argue that T.V.Es should be converted to joint stock companies 
(eg Young 1994, Hong 1995), or for other solutions such as “markets which 
trade in property rights”.23 As alluded to above the notion that T.V.Es should 
be converted to shareholding enterprises also has strong support in official 
circles.24 The T.V.E Bureau has even issued a non binding directive giving 
advice on how to conduct shareholding co-operative reform in T.V.Es.25
However, coming from a different angle, concerns about the “ambiguous” 
nature of the relationship between T.V.Es and T.V.Gs might be overstated. 
The problem is that the emphasis on "completing" the reform (via the 
introduction of joint stock companies) overlooks two important points. The 
first is the success which T.V.Es have had and, to a significant extent, 
continue to have with ill-defined property rights. The second is the theoretical 
issue of how to design a workable mechanism which is faithful to the basic 
tenets of individualistic property rights. Articles like that in Nongmin Ribao, 
which is referred to in the last paragraph, blame conflicting responsibilities 
and managerial interference on informal ties between T.V.Es and T.V.Gs. 
The fact that property rights are unclear can, at times, present problems. 
Nobody disputes this. However, what is often overlooked is that the reasons 
for the success T.V.Es have had might be found in the same informal ties. 
The close informal relationship between T.V.Es and T.V.Gs might even be a 
strength rather than a weakness. This is particularly so given market 
imperfections which can be particularly severe in (post) socialist economies.
The nature of the relationship between T.V.Es and T.V.Gs needs further
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research, but there are a few papers which offer explanations for the 
economic success of T.V.Es in the light of ill-defined social ownership. 
Weitzman and Xu (1994) theorise that the T.V.E. can be studied in terms of 
the folk theorem of repeated games. Their argument is that societies differ in 
their degree of co-operative culture (denoted as %). Where co-operative 
culture is weak, standard property rights stories are applicable. However, 
where co-operative culture is strong (which Weitzman & Xu suggest is the 
case in East Asia) implicit contracts might be preferable to arms-length 
transactions. This argument has two pluses. Weitzman & Xu, first, offer an 
explanation for the existence (and success) of informal contracting, rather 
than focusing on transition to a textbook ideal. The co-operative culture 
argument, second, paints implicit contracting between T.V.Es as a rational 
design response given path dependent considerations. This sees implicit 
contracting as an “end” (in the context of a specific evolving process rather 
than in an absolute sense) and not an impediment to completing the reform.
The notion that informal ties between T.V.Es and T.V.Gs represent a rational 
design response is also put forward in Chang and Wang (1994). Their model 
suggests that the T.V.E is designed to maximise the welfare of local citizens. 
In this respect, their reasoning is based on the theoretical model presented in 
Grossman & Hart (1986). The focus of the paper is on explaining the 
reasons for (i) giving the T.V.G the control rights (at least in the initial and 
intermediate stages) and (ii) making the township-village residents the 
nominal owners. The T.V.G, according to Chang & Wang, is given the 
control rights because its "inputs" (meaning, in effect, its guiding influence) 
are most critical to the success of the T.V.E. The nominal ownership is 
vested in the local residents as a commitment that most of the benefits will 
remain in local hands. The allocation of ownership/control rights from this 
perspective, given the political climate, is a strength rather than a weakness.
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Pei (1996) puts forward a different explanation to Chang & Wang and 
Weitzman & Xu. He argues that the township-village is a coalition of "inter­
specific” resources which are owned in common. These consist of “kinship 
ties, ... trust and the co-operative spirit of the village group” (p.60). There are 
also other inter-specific resources which are particular to a township-village 
"such as the special knowledge obtained from long-term learning-by-doing 
and special local products” (pp.60-61). Pei argues that these resources 
generate net benefits which the township-village, as a whole, appropriates as 
economic rents. T.V.Es have been successful because net benefits of 
collective action have increased with fiscal decentralisation. "The major 
factor explaining the presence or absence of co-operation in the village is the 
net collective benefit of that action. Before reform, this benefit was seized by 
the state and co-operation was absent” (p.61). However, since the reforms, 
the notion of "eating in separate kitchens” means that economic rents from 
collective action are retained at the regional level. Pei's approach is 
consistent with, and builds on, Alchian’s (1984 p.39) definition of the firm as a 
coalition of inter-specific resources owned in common. Pei uses this 
definition to argue that the inter-specific resources of the township-village are 
institutionalised as specific contractual relations. The township-village (T.V.G 
and residents) behaves as a firm and the collective benefits are internalised.
In spite of the benefits stressed in inter alia Chang & Wang (1994) and 
Weitzman & Xu (1994) informal ties between T.V.Es and T.V.Gs present 
some problems. For example, the dual functions that the T.V.E and T.V.G 
perform (redistribution and profit maximisation) can present difficulties at 
times. The issue of where the T.V.E ends and where the T.V.G begins and 
whether the T.V.G is part of, or separate from, the T.V.E is also problematic. 
Consistent with the dominant view in the transition literature more joint stock 
companies might be needed to deal with the problems which these issues 
raise, but a common approach is for the literature to focus exclusively on the
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costs of ambiguous property rights. The desirability of “completing” the 
reform, however, needs to be seen as part of a broader picture. This requires 
consideration of the potential benefits and not just the costs of informal ties.
4.4 PERFORMANCE AND SOME WIDER ISSUES
Employment, Numbers and Production 
Table 4.3 shows the number of rural enterprises, their employment structure 
and gross output by sector for select years between 1978 and 1995.26 Table
4.4 shows the output of rural enterprises in select industries for 1990 to 1994. 
In terms of employment and gross output rural enterprises are mainly 
engaged in industrial production. For example in 1995, industry accounted 
for almost 75% of gross output and nearly 59% of people working in rural 
enterprises. The actual number of rural enterprises in the industrial sector 
was 32.6%. Rural enterprises are engaged in some heavy industries such as 
coal and electricity, although in electricity they produce only a small 
proportion of total output. Most rural enterprises are engaged in light 
industries such as building materials, clothing, farm tools, fertilisers, leather 
products, machine building, paper products and textiles (see table 4.4).
The second main sector is commerce and food services. In terms of 
enterprise numbers it is the largest sector. Commerce and food services has 
increased from 8% of total rural enterprises in 1978 to 38.8% in 1995. In 
1995 commerce and food services also accounted for 16.3% of the rural 
enterprise labour force, but its gross output was only 9.3% of the total. The 
third sector is construction. In 1995 only 4.8% of rural enterprises were in 
construction with 15.1 % of the labour force. It produced just over 9% of rural 
enterprise output. Apart from the growing importance of commerce and
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food services, the main trend in table 4.3 is the declining importance of 
agriculture. In 1978 32.5% of rural enterprises and 21.5% of the rural 
enterprise labour force were in agriculture. Relative to industry the gross 
output value in 1978 was low, but it was still 7.3% of the total. However, in 
1995, only 1.3% of rural enterprises and 2.4% of people working in rural 
enterprises were in agriculture. It produced 1.5% of rural enterprise output.
TABLE 4.3 
Rural Enterprises 
Composition of Enterprises. Employment and Output by Sector
1978-1995
1978 1984 1990 1994 1995
Number of Enterprises 1,524 6,065 18,504 24,945 22,027
(million)
Bv Sector (%)
Agriculture 32.5 4.1 1.2 1.0 1.3
Industry 52.1 79.3 39.0 28.0 32.6
Construction 3.1 1.3 4.9 3.3 4.8
Transportation 4.3 2.1 20.6 14.8 22.5
Commerce & Food Service 8.0 13.1 34.3 52.9 38.8
Total Employment 28.3 52.1 92.7 120.2 128.6
(million)
Bv Sector (%)
Agriculture 21.5 5.5 2.5 2.2 2.4
Industry 61.4 70.2 60.1 57.9 58.8
Construction 8.4 13.1 14.5 13.5 15.1
Transportation 3.7 2.5 7.7 6.0 7.4
Commerce & Food Service 5.1 8.7 15.1 20.4 16.3
Gross Output 49.3 171.0 846.2 4258.9 6891.5
(Billion yuan at current prices) 
Bv Sector (°/o)
Agriculture 7.3 3.1 1.7 1.4 1.5
Industry 77.3 72.8 71.5 75.9 74.4
Construction 8.6 12.7 11.3 9.6 9.2
Transportation 4.2 2.8 7.7 5.1 5.6
Commerce & Food Service 2.8 8.6 7.9 8.0 9.3
NOTES: Statistics on rural enterprises were only published from 1984 when
below village categories were added. The 1978 figures are for T.V.Es. 
SOURCE: Calculated from statistics in Statistical Yearbook o f China 1995, 1996
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TABLE 4.4 
Rural Enterprises 
Output in Select Industries 
1990-1994
prod net 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
coal (10,000 tons) 35,773 [33] 33,793 [31] 42,357 [38] 51,343 [45] 30,017 [24]
electricity(100,000 kWh) 135,099 [02] 135,196 [02] 163,770 [02] 189,550 [02] 208,400 [02]
chem. fertilisers (10 tons) N.A 164,654 [8.3] 207,388 [10] 317,139 [16] 512,546 [23]
farm tools (10,000) N.A 59,819 92,326 183,608 N.A
bricks (1000,000) 417,371 421,040 495,485 640,841 698,206
cement prefabfricated. 
components (10,000 in3)
60,511 55,047 9,055 22,733 N.A
granite (10,000 m3) 22,217 29,409 4,957 6,141 N.A
marble (10,000 m3) 1,809 1,371 948 2,610 N.A
clothing (10,000) 251,234 393,787 326,092 580,820 835,866
leather products (10,000) 65,131 63,700 73,974 134,581 112,381
silk textiles (10,000 m) 79,834 76,799 104,807 160,939 N.A
cloth (10,000 m) 404,462 [21] 359,928 [20] 391,048 [21] 515,151 [25] 584,624 [28]
woollen fabrics (10,000 m) 8,047 [27] N.A 12,344 [37] N.A N.A
paper products (10 tons) N.A 602,947 [41] 787,182 [46] 1,132341 [59] 546,720[49]
NOTES:
(i) N.A -  not available, (ii) Where national figures are available, rural 
enterprise output as a percentage of the national total is given in parenthesis, 
(iii) Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number, (iv) The 
percentages are estimates. The figures for rural enterprises are from China 
Agriculture Yearbook and are collected by the Bureau of Township and Village 
Enterprises. The national totals used to calculate the percentages are from the 
Statistical Yearbook o f  China which is compiled by the State Statistical 
Bureau. Caution is needed given possible discrepencies in collection methods.
Rural enterprise gross output value as a proportion of society’s gross output 
value in agriculture, industry and construction for 1980, 1985 and 1990-1995 
is given in table 4.5.27 In each of the years rural enterprises have accounted 
for 5% or less of agricultural gross output value suggesting that they are of
marginal importance in that sector. However, in construction and industry the 
situation is different. In construction, rural enterprise share increased from 
17.3% in 1980 to 31.5% in 1985 and 66.7% in 1995. The rate of growth in
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TABLE 4.5
Rural Enterprise Gross Output Value as a Proportion of Total Gross Output Value for 
Society in Agriculture. Construction and Industry
Year Agriculture Construction Industry
a b c a b c a b c
1980 39.4 1923 2.0 60 347 17.3 509 5154 9.9
1985 58.7 3619 1.6 310 985 31.5 1827 9716 18.8
1990 141,8 7662 1.8 952 1948 48.9 6050 23924 25.3
1991 179.5 8157 2.2 1141 2285 49.9 8709 28240 30.8
1992 246.8 9085 2.7 1744 3299 52.9 13635 37066 36.8
1993 401.9 10996 3.7 3227 5499 58.7 23447 52692 44.5
1994 575.6 15750 3.7 4076 7684 53.0 32336 70176 46.1
1995 1018 20341 5.0 6336 9505 66.7 51529 91893 56.1
SOURCE: Statistical Yearbook o f China (various years)
NOTES: (i) (a) rural enterprise gross output value in 100,000,000 yuan, (b)
total gross output value in the relevant sector in 100,000,000 yuan, and 
(c) = (a/b)xl00 expressed as a percentage, (ii) Comparable statistics 
for transportation and commerce & food services were not available, 
(iii) The value for 1980 is given for T.V.Es - see notes to table 4.3.
the proportion of industrial gross output produced by rural enterprises is 
similar. Rural enterprises were responsible for 9.9% of gross output value in 
1980, but in 1985 this figure had grown to 18.8% and in 1995 it was 56.1%.
While there is considerable overlap between the type of products which rural 
enterprises and S.O.Es produce, there are some important differences. First, 
rural enterprises often specialise in labour intensive production such as 
building materials, textiles and other light manufacturing. Second, 
irrespective of the goods or services that they produce, rural enterprises tend 
to make more use of labour intensive methods. For example, Jefferson et a! 
(1992) provide deflated capital stock estimates (at 1980 constant prices) for 
industrial S.O.Es and for urban and township collectives (township and above 
industrial enterprises with independent accounting mechanisms) for the
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period 1980 to 1988. They found that the gap in fixed assets per worker had 
narrowed from 5.7:1 in 1980, but it was still 4:1 in 1988. At historical values, 
fixed assets per worker in industrial S.O.Es in 1988 were approximately 
20,800 yuan, compared to 3,240 yuan in T.V.Es (including a small amount for 
service establishments). Allowing for working capital, total capital per worker 
was 26,860 yuan in S.O.Es and 6,385 yuan in T.V.Es (Ody 1992 p.11).
Performance
Both T.V.Es and the broader category rural enterprises, have grown at a 
phenomenal rate. The growth performance of both is outstanding when 
compared with the rest of the (developing and developed) world. Table 4.6 
gives some statistics on rural enterprises which illustrate their growing 
importance. The statistics on rural enterprises are from 1985 (below village 
categories were added to T.V.Es in 1984). Between 1985 and 1995 the 
number of rural enterprises grew at an average rate of 17.1 %. The number of 
people working in rural enterprises has grown at an annual rate of 8.4%. The 
original value of fixed assets in rural enterprises has grown at an annual rate 
of 27.6%, while the growth in annual real gross output value between 1984 
and 1995, consistent with the figures in tables 4.3 and 4.5, was 25.8%.
TABLE 4.6
Selected Statistics for Rural Enterprises 1985-1995 
Average Annual Growth Rates
C A T E G O R Y 1 9 8 5 - 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 5 1 9 8 5 - 1 9 9 5
Number of 
Enterprises
6 2 . 6 5 9 . 0 7 4 . 9 4 1 7 . 1 0
Number of 
Workers
1 7 . 1 4 6.02 6 . 6 5 8 . 3 6
Original Value of 
Fixed Assets
2 8 . 3 3 2 4 . 1 5 3 0 . 1 5 2 7 . 6 3
Real Gross 
Output Value
1 7 . 1 0 1 3 . 2 1 3 4 . 5 1 2 5 . 8 0
SOURCES; Statistical Yearbook o f China (various years).
(i) N.A not available, (ii) statistics on rural enterprises were only 
published from 1984. Before this published statistics were for T.V.Es. 
Figures are not given for 1984 to avoid artificially inflating growth, (iii) 
G.O.Vs were deflated using industrial G.O.V implicit price deflators.
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TABLE 4.7
Township Enterprises and Village Enterprises 
{Number of Enterprises. Gross Output Value and Number of Workers 1978-19951
YEAR Number of Real Gross Output Number of Workers
Enterprises (1000’s) Value(biIlion. yuan) (million)
at 1978 constant prices
Township Village Township Village Township Village
1978 320 1205 28.1 21.2 12.6 15.7
1979 321 1160 28.3 22.2 13.1 15.9
1980 337 1082 28.9 22.5 13.9 16.1
1981 335 1002 31.4 23.2 14.2 15.5
1982 338 1024 33.7 24.7 15.0 16.2
1983 338 1008 36.6 26.4 16.7 16.7
1984 402 1462 41.6 33.0 18.8 21.0
1985 420 1430 49.7 39.7 21.1 22.2
1986 426 1302 57.2 44.6 22.7 22.7
1987 420 1163 67.5 52.4 24.0 23.2
1988 424 1167 81.7 64.5 24.9 24.0
1989 406 1130 86.5 70.6 23.8 23.4
1990 388 1066 93.9 76.8 23.3 22.6
1991 382 1060 127.1 102.4 24,3 23.4
1992 393 1127 179.9 147.4 26.1 25.4
1993 434 1251 266.6 236.5 28.8 28.9
1994 423 1228 350.1 321.8 29.6 29.4
1995 417 1201 481.2 456.6 30.3 30.3
1978-1995
average
animal growth 
rate
1.8% 1.9% 19.0% 20.9% 5.3% 4.4%
NOTES: G.O.Vs were deflated using industrial G.O.V implicit price deflators.
SOURCE: Statistical Yearbook o f Chirm 1991, 1994, 1995, 1996
Table 4.7 presents some comparable statistics on T.V.Es for the period 1978- 
1995. The number of T.V.Es, relative to rural enterprises as a whole, has 
been static with annual growth 1.8-1.9%. The number of people working in 
T.V.Es has increased at an annual rate of around 5%. The real gross output 
value of township enterprises has increased at 19% and the real gross output 
value of village enterprises has increased at 20.9%. When compared with 
the statistics in table 4.6, this suggest that the rate of growth in the various 
below village categories such as co-operatives, partnerships, private
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and individual firms - the private sector - has been greater than in T.V.Es. 
There are also far more firms in the private sector than there are T.V.Es. The 
private sector made up 93% of rural enterprises in 1995 (Statistical Yearbook 
of China 1996 p.387). However, these figures tend to give a misleading 
picture, when weighing up the relative importance of the private sector and 
T.V.Es, for a couple of reasons. First in 1995, in spite of their small numbers 
in relative terms, T.V.Es still accounted for 47.1% of total workers in rural 
enterprises and produced 61% of their gross output value (Statistical 
Yearbook of China 1996 p.389). Second, it has to be remembered that the 
below village categories were starting from a smaller base in terms of output.
The growth in real gross output value shown in tables 4.6 and 4.7 is reflected 
in figure 4.2 which shows the average annual share of gross industrial output 
value by ownership since the reforms were initiated in 1978. Figure 4.2 
compares the share of industrial gross output for rural enterprises from table
4.5 with that of S.O.Es. Two trends are discernible. The first is the decline 
in the industrial output value in the state sector relative to the non-state 
sector. The second is the increasing importance of rural enterprise share in 
the non-state sector. The average annual share of gross industrial output 
value for rural enterprises between 1981 and 1983 was 11.19%. However, in 
1993-94 this figure was four times as great (43.25%). Table 4.8 compares 
the financial performance of collectively-owned enterprises (C.O.Es) and
S.O.Es for the period 1985 to 1994. The obvious point from the table is that 
C.O.Es and S.O.Es display similar trends. Over the period both exhibit falling 
profit rates, an increase in the proportion of loss-making enterprises, and an 
increase in the loss-to-profit ratio. On the whole S.O.Es performed better 
than C.O.Es in the boom period of 1985-1988. However, in the recession 
and subsequent rebound period (ie. since 1989) each of the financial 
indicators suggest that C.O.Es have performed better than S.O.Es.
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FIGURE 4.2
China: Average Annual Share of Gross Industrial Output Value by Ownership 
(values are annual percentages averaged over the period)
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SOURCE: Statistical Yearbook of China (various years)
NOTES: The 1978-1980 value for rural enterprises was not available.
The rural enterprise value for 1981-1983 is for T.V.Es - see 
notes to table 4.3.
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TABLE 4.8 
Comparative Financial Indicators for 
Collectively-Owned Enterprises and State-Owned Enterprises
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
collectivelv-owned 
enterprises 
profit rate 24.6 19.4 18.2 19.8 15.4 11.5 11.9 10.1 10.9 10.7
loss-to-profit ratio _ 5.3 6.4 4.8 10.5 22.4 17.2 10.7
proportion of loss making 
enterprises 
state-owned enterprises
11.7 13.2 14.7 11.7 15.7 19.4 16.7 13.7 16.5 -
profit rate 23.5 20.7 20.3 20.6 17.2 12.4 11.8 9.7 9.7 9.8
loss-to-profit ratio _ 5.3 6.4 4.8 10.5 22.4 17.2 10.7
proportion of loss-making 
enterprises
9.6 13.1 13.0 10.9 16.0 27.6 25,8 23.4 28.8 -
SOURCE:
Lo (1997) table 4.1.
NOTES:
(i) Profit rate = (profits + taxes) -5- (value of fixed assets net of depreciation + 
working capital), (ii) Profit-to-loss ratio = total losses of loss making 
enterprises -f- (profits + taxes), (iii) Proportion of loss-making enterprises = 
number of loss making enterprises -s- total number of enterprises, (iv) All 
figures are expressed as percentages, (iv) The figures are for township and 
above industrial enterprises with independent accounting systems.
Most commentators accept that, on the basis of limited studies comparing 
relative productivities, T.V.Es appear to be more efficient than S.O.Es. For 
example Weitzman & Xu (1994) calculate total factor productivities (T.F.P) for
S.O.Es and T.V.Es for 1979-1991. The average annual T.F.P for T.V.Es, 
over this period (12%) was three times the estimate for S.O.Es (4%). Woo et 
al (1994) point to a number of possible problems with T.F.P as a measure of 
efficiency. But, even allowing for methodological reservations, the magnitude 
of the differences in T.F.Ps in Weitzman & Xu (1994) suggest that T.V.Es are, 
relative to S.O.Es, efficient. Jefferson et al (1992) compare the performance 
of the state industrial sector with collectives at township level and above (ie. 
including township and urban collectives, but excluding village firms) for the 
period 1980-1988. They found that the average productivity of labour in the
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collective sector had increased by over 12% per annum over the period 
where the comparable figure for the state sector was 5.2%. They also found 
that the average productivity of capital in the collective sector grew at an 
average annual rate of 4.5% which was more than twice the figure for S.O.Es 
(2.1%). Reservations exist about these results because of possible upward 
bias in real output measures, but again even allowing for possible 
measurement errors the magnitude of the differences are at least suggestive.
The results of studies like these, using aggregate data, are supported by 
studies using firm-level data. Murakami et al (1996) compared T.F.P in a 
sample of 48 S.O.Es and T.V.Es of different sizes involved in the machine 
tool industry in Shenyang, Shanghai and Wuhan. While the sample was 
small, their results suggested that T.V.Es were more efficient than S.O.Es 
regardless of the latter's size. T.F.P in T.V.Es was found to be 42% higher 
than in large S.O.Es, 40% higher than in medium sized S.O.Es and 21% 
higher than in small S.O.Es. In another study employing a larger sample, 
Fung & Wan (1996) compare economic efficiency in the state and collective 
sectors using panel data on 7273 enterprises in Hubei in 1990. Their main 
conclusion (at p.482) is that “the state sector performed worse than the 
collective sector with a lower median efficiency index in almost all industries”.
T.V.Es also seem to be as efficient as private firms which have well-defined 
property rights. For example, Svejnar (1990) runs a series of regressions 
using pooled panel data from 400 T.V.Es and private firms in four Jiangsu 
counties over a 16 year period. He used ownership dummies to distinguish 
between T.V.Es and private firms. The co-efficients on the ownership 
dummies were statistically insignificant, suggesting that “private ownership 
and community ownership appear to have similar effects of productivity” 
Svejnar (1990 p.253). Pitt & Putterman (1996) reached similar conclusions in 
a more recent exercise. Pitt & Putterman pooled data on 200 T.V.Es and
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private firms distributed over 10 provinces from 1984 to 1989. These studies 
provide some evidence to suggest that T.V.Es are as efficient as private 
firms. But, even if it is going too far to draw detailed conclusions on the basis 
of a few studies, it is clear that ownership did not matter in these samples.
However, a few words of caution are needed. It is difficult (if not impossible) 
to draw conclusions about comparative performance without detailed 
consideration of broader development issues at a macro level. This thesis, in 
the next few chapters looking at T.V.Es, will largely abstract from wider 
development issues. Instead, the focus will be on the institutional 
characteristics of T.V.Es so that comments about comparative performance 
are just suggestive. To illustrate, the growth in gross output value of T.V.Es 
has been high and is expected to continue. A Working Conference on 
National Township Enterprises held in September 1993 set a target gross 
output value for rural enterprises for the year 2000 of 7,600 billion yuan. 
This would represent a five-fold increase over the gross output value in 1992. 
The industrial gross output value is also expected to grow to 5,400 billion 
yuan. The figure, in 1992, was 1250 billion yuan.28 At one (superficial) level 
this figure gives support to suggestions in, inter aiia, Mei (1993) that T.V.Es 
have been important vehicles for absorbing large numbers of surplus rural 
labourers. It is pretty clear that they have, but whether this is positive or not 
depends on the inter-sectoral effects this has had on agriculture and these 
sort of comparative development issues lie outside the scope of this thesis.
Regional Differences in Development 
The contribution of T.V.Es varies across regions. This, in part, reflects the 
fact mentioned above that some provinces, such as Jiangsu, took advantage 
of decentralisation, whether it was de facto  or deliberate, to get a “head start” 
in setting up T.V.Es. However, the existence of regional differences in the 
level of T.V.E development also mirrors regional disparities in general
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economic indicators (Yang & Wei 1996, Yao 1996). The provinces can be 
classified into three different zones.29 The eastern zone contains the coastal 
and suburban provinces. These have the highest G.D.P per capita and their 
enterprises produce the largest share of rural enterprise gross output. The 
central and western zone contains the lesser developed interior provinces. 
The western zone has the lowest G.D.P per capita and share of rural 
enterprise gross output. The central zone is in between in terms of G.D.P per 
capita and rural enterprise gross output value. Table 4.9 gives regional 
differences in G.D.P per capita for the period 1988 to 1995. Over the period 
the “gap index” shows that G.D.P per capita in the eastern zone has been 
about 50% higher than that in the central and western regions combined.
TABLE 4.9
Regional Differences in G.D.P per Capita 1988-1995 
(Yuan. %)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
(a) Eastern 1787 1991 2077 2392 2984 4077 5443 6768
(b) Central & 
Western
985 1083 1178 1286 1510 1934 2674 3453
(c) Gap Index 44.9 45.6 43.3 46.2 49.4 52.6 50.9 47.7
SOURCES:
Yang & Wei (1996), Statistical Yearbook o f China 1995,1996 
NOTES:
(i) (c) = 100x(a-b)/a (ii) The eastern zone covers Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, 
Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Hainan 
and Guangxi. The central covers Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, 
Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan: The western zone covers Sichuan, 
Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Tibet, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang.
Tables 4.10 through to 4.12 give some statistics on regional differences for 
rural enterprises up until the end of 1995. Table 4.10 shows regional shares 
of rural enterprise employment and gross output value for 1980, 1985 and
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1990-1995. The eastern zone share was constant at around one-half of total 
employment and two-thirds of total gross output for most of the period. This 
is in spite of the fact that it has only about 40% of the population (41% in 
1995 - Statistical Yearbook of China 1996 p.70). The central zone had 
around one-third of rural enterprise workers and produced just under one- 
third of total gross output for most of the period, although this figure fell in 
1995-1996. Finally, about 15% of people working in rural enterprises were in 
the western zone; however, over the period it only accounted for around 5% 
of total rural enterprise gross output, increasing to just over 10% in 1995.
TABLE 4.10 
Rural Enterprises 
Regional Share of Employment and Gross Output Value 
(expressed in percentage terms)
YEAR EASTERN CENTRAL WESTERN CENTRAL & 
WESTERN.
G . O . V E M P . G . O . V E M P . G . O . V E M P . G . O . V E M P .
1 9 8 0 6 5 . 0 4 7 . 1 3 0 . 2 3 4 . 5 4 . 8 1 8 . 4 3 5 . 0 5 2 . 9
1 9 8 5 6 3 . 2 5 3 . 0 3 1 . 9 3 2 . 2 4 . 9 1 4 . 8 3 6 . 8 4 7 . 0
1 9 9 0 6 4 . 9 4 9 . 3 3 0 . 7 3 5 . 3 4 . 4 1 5 . 4 3 5 . 1 5 0 . 7
1 9 9 1 6 5 . 7 6 0 . 2 3 0 . 1 2 7 . 4 4 . 2 1 2 . 4 3 4 . 3 3 9 . 8
1 9 9 2 6 6 . 4 5 1 . 5 2 9 . 2 3 2 . 9 4 . 4 1 5 . 6 3 3 . 6 4 8 . 5
1 9 9 3 6 4 . 2 4 7 . 3 3 0 . 6 1 6 . 9 5 . 2 1 6 . 0 3 5 . 8 5 2 . 7
1 9 9 4 6 9 . 4 5 2 . 3 2 3 . 0 3 4 . 2 7 . 6 1 3 . 5 3 0 . 6 4 7 . 7
1 9 9 5 6 6 . 7 5 0 . 9 2 3 . 0 3 2 . 6 1 0 . 3 1 6 . 5 3 3 . 3 4 9 . 1
NOTES:
(i) For the provinces in each zone see endnotes to table 4.9. (ii) Tibet is 
excluded because of lack of data, (iii) G.O.V = Gross Output Value (iv) 
EMP. = Employment (v) The 1980 figures for EMP are for 1981 and, 
(vi) The 1980 figures are for T.V.Es on their own - see notes to table 4.3. 
SOURCE:
Calculated from statistics in Statistical Yearbook o f  China (various years).
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Rural enterprises are broken down by sector and zone for 1995 in table 4.11. 
The central zone has the largest proportion of enterprises in three sectors: 
agriculture, construction and transportation. The eastern zone has the 
highest proportion of rural enterprises in two sectors, commerce and industry. 
However, focusing on enterprise numbers in isolation gives a misleading 
picture of the importance of each zone. In terms of gross output value the 
eastern zone produces more than 40% of total output from rural enterprises 
in four sectors. In industry and commerce & food services - the two main 
sectors where rural enterprises are involved - (see table 4.3) the eastern 
zone produces 69.3% and 43% of total rural enterprise output respectively.
TABLE 4.11 
Rural Enterprises - 
Composition of Enterprises. Employment and Output 
by Sector and Zone 1995 
(expressed as a percentage of the national rural enterprise total)
Eastern Central Western
Enterprises
Agriculture 28.4 52.5 19.1
Industry 44,4 36.2 19.4
Construction 31.9 48.9 19.2
Transportation 38.2 40.2 21.6
Commerce & Food Service 37.9 37.6 24.5
Gross Output Value
Agriculture 51.7 40.5 7.8
Industry 69.3 23.1 7.6
Construction 43.0 36.1 20.9
Transportation 40.8 39.9 19.3
Commerce & Food Service 37.3 46.5 16.2
Employment
Agriculture 39.2 46.7 14.1
Industry 57.9 29.3 12.8
Construction 41.1 28.9 30.0
Transportation 40.4 40.7 18.9
Commerce & Food Service 41.6 36.4 22.0
NOTES
(i) For details on the provinces in each zone see endnotes to table 4.9.
(ii) Tibet is excluded from calculations because of lack of data.
SOURCE
Calculated from statistics in China Statistical Yearbook 1996
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TABLE 4.12
Rural Enterprise Productivity. Exports and Pre-Tax Profits According To Zone
1994 Compared to 1986
Gross Outimt RATIO  m Exports R ATIO  12) Pre-Tax Profit RATIO  (3)
Value 1994/1986 million % of 1992/1986 Yuan/Worker 1994/1986
1986 Yuan/Worker ratio yuan total ratio ratio
western 3160 489 4.9 345
central 3562 996 10.0 532
eastern 5372 8463 85.1 784
1994
western 2882 .912 1199(a) 1.6 2.452 573 1.661
central 7155 2.01 4670 6.4 4.689 1209 2.273
eastern 17216 3.204 73487 92.0 8.683 2536 3.235
NOTES:
(i) All values are calculated at current prices, (ii) For the provinces in each 
zone see the endnotes to table 4.9. (iii) Tibet is excluded because of lack of 
continuous data, (iv) RATIO (1) measures the ratio of gross output value 
(yuan per worker) in 1994 over 1986. RATIO (2) measures the ratio of 
exports in 1994 over 1986 RATIO (3) measures the ratio of profit (yuan per 
worker) in 1994 over 1986 (iv) (a) denotes that export values are for 1992 
SOURCES:
Yao (1996) China Agriculture Yearbook 1987,1995
These figures are reflected in other indicators of rural enterprise 
performance. Table 4.12 gives regional breakdowns on labour productivities 
and profit rates for 1986 and 1994, and on exports for 1986 and 1992. Rural 
enterprise workers in the eastern zone in 1986 were 70% more productive 
than workers in the western zone and 51% more productive than workers in 
the central zone. The figures for 1994 are even more stark. Labour 
productivity, in 1994 in the eastern zone was almost six times higher than in 
the western zone and almost two and a half times higher than in the central 
zone. The statistics on profit rates are similar. The profit rate in 1986 in the 
eastern zone was 127% higher than the western zone and 47% higher than 
the central zone. The comparable values for 1994 were 342% and 110%. 
The eastern zone produced 85.1% of total rural enterprise exports in 1986. 
In 1992 this increased to 92%. These figures reflect differences in the ratios 
1994/1986. In each case the eastern zone outperformed the other zones.
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The central government is aware of the regional disparities in T.V.E 
development and has taken steps to deal with it. Jiang Zemin, at the CPC 
fourteenth Party Congress in October 1992, signalled the introduction of new 
measures when he stated: "We shall continue to devote great efforts to 
developing township enterprises and particularly support those in central and 
western regions and in minority national regions".30 Following this statement, the 
State Council, in February 1993, issued a "Decision on Accelerating the 
Development of Township Enterprises in Central and Western Regions". 
This document detailed plans to allocate an annual figure of 5 billion Yuan, 
between 1993 and 2000, to support T.V.E development in the central and 
western zones. The document contains a range of preferential measures - set 
out as nine policies - which are designed to accelerate the development of 
T.V.Es in these zones. The document directs banking institutions in the 
central and western zones to increase their lending to T.V.Es as a proportion 
of total loans and requires that local financial departments set aside funds for 
T.V.E development.31 The statistics in table 4.10, which are up to the end of 
1995, do not shed much light on its effect. This reflects the fact that there 
has not been sufficient time to this point to determine the effect of this 
document on regional differences in T.V.E development. The central and 
western zones’ share of rural enterprise gross output value increased in 
1993, but it fell in 1994. It increased again in 1995, but the figure was still 
less than the 1993 share. The fall in 1994 was due to a decline in the central 
zone share, although the western zone share increased. While, at the time of 
writing no statistics are available for 1996 so it is impossible to be sure, 
casual observation nevertheless suggests that the document has started to 
have an effect on performance across the zones during 1996 and 1997.32
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A number of non-institutional problems with T.V.Es such as product 
duplication and effect on the environment have been raised in the literature. 
Some comments on these are made below to paint a broader picture of 
T.V.Es, but without a macro framework the points made are at best tentative.
Product Duplication and Failure To Maximise Scale Economies 
A common criticism of T.V.Es is that they do not maximise scale economies. 
There is excessive duplication in some industries. The textile industry is a 
prominent example where T.V.E participation is high, but two points need to 
be made. The first is that duplication is not restricted to T.V.Es. Duplication 
is a manifestation of decentralisation or what Qian & Xu (1993) term the "M- 
Form" structure. With the M-Form structure, the Chinese economy is 
organised into a multi-layer-multi-regional form according to the territorial 
principle, in which each region, at each layer, can be regarded as an 
operating unit. This means that regions tend to be self-contained and self- 
sufficient. This also means that firms tend to be small and industries less 
concentrated. Thus, both firms and goods are duplicated across regions.
The second point is that whether duplication is, in fact, a problem is not clear. 
While there are costs associated with duplication such as inefficient use of 
scale economies, there are some potential benefits. For example Qian & 
Xu (1993 p.28) point out that duplication might reduce vulnerability to 
external shocks and increase the reliability of supplies under uncertainty. 
Goodhart & Xu (1995 p.22) suggest that duplication facilitates technology 
diffusion between firms and across regions. The reduced emphasis on 
specialisation (the detailed division of labour), with decentralisation, also 
suggests the potential for positive trade-offs with collective learning (the 
social division of labour) along the lines suggested by Aoki (eg 1984 1990) in 
the context of the J-mode. This point is explored in detail in chapter six.
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In addition the benefits and costs of the M-Form structure also need to be 
considered. With decentralisation, the major responsibilities of local 
governments revolve around regional development and welfare. The local 
government has to raise revenue on its own and, therefore, has a strong 
incentive to set up and support local enterprises for revenue generating 
purposes. There are, of course, potential costs in this process - eg. if local 
governments engage in non-co-operative games to externalise costs to other 
localities, but there are also pluses. The limited resources of local 
governments makes it hard for them to bail out loss-making T.V.Es. While it 
is difficult to verify this seems to be the reason for harder budget constraints 
in the non-state sector compared with the state-owned sector. The M-Form 
has also been important in encouraging regional development. It fosters a 
horizontal relationship between regions which facilitates regional competition 
and imitation. The regional governments compete with each other to see 
which can increase incomes the fastest. The M-Form also provides an 
avenue for regional governments to mimic the successful development 
strategies of other regions which has been important in generating inter­
regional learning. The fact is that while, from a policy viewpoint, it is not 
entirely satisfactory to say that the relative merits are uncertain, what is 
clearly needed is more detailed investigation to clarify the conflicting issues.
Poor Quality Goods
T.V.Es have been criticised on two related grounds. The first criticism is that 
the standard of the goods which T.V.Es produce is poor. The second 
criticism is that T.V.Es attempt to pass off inferior products as "famous 
brands" in a fraudulent manner (Ody 1992 p. 18). These issues present real 
problems, but neither problem appears to be restricted to T.V.Es. While 
actual evidence beyond casual empiricism is limited, the evidence that does 
exist suggests that the standard of T.V.E output is about on a par with the 
state-owned sector. The State Economic Commission, in 1987, studied 800
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firms to see whether state standards were being met. The investigation 
found that, in large S.O.Es 90% of the goods met the state standard. This 
figure was higher than in T.V.Es where 78.3% of goods met state standards, 
but the weakest performers were small to medium size S.O.Es where 72.8% 
met specified standards.33 It is also worth pointing out that the government 
has taken some steps to deal with concerns of fraud and inferior product 
design. While enforcement is, at times, problematic, a legislative framework 
is in place to deal with both fraud and failure to meet recognised standards. 
This appears to be having some effect on lifting standards. It was reported 
that in 1996 more than 22,000 T.V.Es passed the State quality control 
inspections. It was also reported that more than 1000 T.V.Es have adopted 
internationally recognised quality-control measures and standards.34 The 
legislation is not perfect, but it needs to be remembered that similar 
difficulties with inferior goods have arisen in Eastern Europe where mass 
privatisation occurred often without sufficient consumer protection legislation.
Environmental Issues 
There has been some concern expressed about the effects rural 
industrialisation is having on the environment. For example Findlay et al 
(1994 p. 186) state: “The scattered nature of the growth taking place and the 
lack of effective pollution controls, has resulted in a deterioration [in] the 
quality of soil, water and air". There is a fair bit of anecdotal evidence to 
support this claim, but the extent of the problem, at an empirical level, is not 
clear. Findlay et al (1994 p. 186) refer to a survey of T.V.E pollution levels 
carried out in 1991 which found that 366,000 of the 575,000 enterprises 
examined were major polluters.35 When enterprises in the same industry 
were compared in the mid-1980s it was found that those in rural areas 
emitted ten to twenty times more pollutants than those in urban areas.36 In 
addition, in the mid-1980s one-third of the water surfaces in three
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industrialised regions in south Jiangsu (Suzhou, Wuxi and Changzhou) was 
polluted with water at or below grade five, and most of the water in Wuxi 
County (one of three counties in the Wuxi region) was below grade four.37
A survey, which was conducted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in 
1988, found that pollution was particularly severe in two areas where T.V.Es 
are concentrated - southern Jiangsu and Shanghai.38 But, the actual number 
of T.V.Es which are serious offenders in Jiangsu, the larger T.V.E province of 
the two, seems to be comparatively small. A comprehensive survey of 
Jiangsu’s T.V.Es, during 1989, identified just 3.8% of the firms as "serious" 
polluters (and a further 28.5% as "light" polluters).39 Moreover, a slightly more 
recent World Bank survey conducted in 1991 indicates that rural firms 
accounted for only 10.7% of waste water discharges, 9.4% of air emissions, 
and 11 % of solid wastes. This is below their share of industrial output (World 
Bank 1992). However, as Ody (1992 p.20) points out, this in part reflects the 
greater concentration of T.V.Es in light industries and their limited presence 
in the chemical and smelting industries which are the leading sectors for 
waste water discharges. There is some evidence to suggest the situation has 
also improved in the last few years. In 1996, for every 10,000 yuan of growth 
in industrial output value, the levels of solid, liquid and atmospheric wastes 
were 57 tons, 31,500 cubic metres and 1.57 tons - down 52%, 50% and 50% 
respectively from 1990.40 Thus while press reports suggest that T.V.E 
pollution is a problem, there is conflicting empirical evidence on its extent.41
4.5 IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
While T.V.Es do present problems, the discussion of a few of the main 
"wider” problems in the last section is inconclusive. The reason is that the 
extent of the problems are not clear. We are restricted to making cautious 
judgements on the limited evidence that is available. In the end, while we 
cannot conclude whether T.V.Es will be successful, it seems reasonable to
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suggest that, on balance, T.V.Es have been successful to this point. This 
said, two further points need to be emphasised The first is that when post­
socialist transformation is viewed as open-ended, institutional "problems" due 
to informal ties between T.V.Es and T.V.Gs might not be problems at all. 
This point, which is at least debatable, is overlooked in the post-socialist 
transition literature. The second is that, while the evidence is at best sketchy, 
most of the problems that T.V.Es present appear to mirror difficulties facing 
other enterprises. The standard of goods produced and concerns about the 
effect on the environment are two examples. This is not to suggest that these 
problems should be ignored, but it does recognise that the process of post­
socialist transformation is a difficult one. The fact is that it takes time to 
get consumer and environmental protection legislation in place and, once it is 
in place, to iron out the difficulties. A point made above is that most (if not 
all) of the countries in Eastern Europe, which pursued rapid privatisation, are 
facing similar consumer and environmental protection issues. This suggests 
that these problems raise broader issues for the process of post-socialist 
transformation than whether property rights are or are not ambiguous perse.
The first point, however, is the most contentious and, at the same time, if 
valid, presents the biggest challenge to the transition literature. This chapter 
has stressed that the main advantage which articles such as Chang & Wang 
(1994) and Weitzman & Xu (1994) have is that they attempt to explain the 
success of what exists rather than focusing on completing the reform. A 
serious attempt to understand T.V.Es has to come to terms with why they 
have worked with ambiguous property rights, because it is the economic 
success of the T.V.E sector which presents the main challenge to the post­
socialist transition approach. The view that T.V.Es would have performed 
better in the past, or will perform better in the future as joint stock companies, 
overlooks two important facts. The first is that T.V.Es have outperformed 
firms with better-defined property rights in Eastern Europe, and the second is
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that T.V.Es are expected to continue to perform well in the future. But, to what 
extent do the explanations in papers such as Weitzman & Xu (1994) et al 
challenge the post-socialist transition approach as it has been applied in 
Eastern Europe? To put it in different terms, can the explanations for the 
success which T.V.Es have had be generalised to Eastern Europe or is the 
co-operative culture theme just a Chinese (or East Asian) phenomenon?
Weitzman & Xu (1994) make no attempt at all to challenge the post-socialist 
transition approach in Eastern Europe. The opposite is, in fact, true. 
Weitzman & Xu (1994 p.86) state: "If the ideas being put forth here are 
sound, the value of X is essentially the product of a path-dependent historical 
heritage. The costs of changing culture are very high, if culture is 
changeable at all. So it simply may not be a realistic option for Eastern 
Europe to be thinking in terms of the Chinese model. It may be that Eastern 
Europe has no choice but to take the difficult route of developing and 
strengthening traditional private property rights appropriate to a low-A, 
society."42 The view that T.V.E success is due to co-operative culture at the 
societal level is challenged by Pei (1994, 1996). He argues that "the 
success of T.V.Es is mainly due to the specific [cooperative] elements of a 
village or rural community, and not to general cultural elements" (1996 p.44). 
To some extent the differences which Pei claims exist between himself and 
Weitzman & Xu are semantic. The "inter-specific resources", which Pei 
stresses are the basis of co-operation in the village - "kinship ties, ... trust 
and the co-operative spirit of the village group" (1996 p.60) - are also the 
foundations for the cooperative culture theme in Weitzman & Xu. However, 
an advantage which Pei's argument has is that it focuses attention on a 
"group" rather than "society" as the basis for cooperative action. The notion 
of a "group" here refers to a village-township, district or region. When the 
focus is on the potential for cooperation in a group, the cooperative culture 
theme ceases to be an Asia-Europe issue. Weitzman & Xu (1994) state in
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the above passage that cooperative culture is a function of path-dependent 
historical heritage. The point is that if the "group" rather than "society" forms 
the basic unit, the potential for group cooperation - whether the "group" is in 
Eastern Europe or Asia - becomes a function of path dependent historical 
heritage. This is important because writers such as Stark (1990) and Van 
Ees & Garretson (1994) stress the relevance of path dependence in Eastern 
Europe. The focus on “group" path dependence is the starting point for 
generalising the cooperative culture theme to the Eastern European case.
A view that emanates from the Weitzman & Xu paper is that T.V.Es are an 
example of an emerging East Asian capitalism. If this is the case, the lessons 
for post-socialist transition in Eastern Europe are limited, but the problem is 
that this perspective, to some extent, revives discredited sociological theories 
of the J-mode which suggested that there were specific cultural factors 
underpinning Japanese success stories which could not be replicated 
elsewhere (see Friedman 1988, Aoki 1990), Whether this is the case is 
debatable. However, what does seem clear is that if there are lessons in the 
T.V.E experience for Eastern Europe, the J-mode needs to be seen as part of 
a broader cooperative culture theme which has a more general application. 
When the J-mode is seen as part of a broader collective learning culture 
T.V.Es begin to reflect Best's (1990) "new competition", encompassing 
elements of the J-mode and the flexible specialisation and techno-economic 
paradigms. The relationship between these themes, and their inter­
relationship with the market-hierarchies rationale, was explored in detail in 
the last chapter, but two points need to be made now. The first is that, in this 
context, it is T.V.Es as part of a broader collective learning culture, rather 
than perceived analogies between T.V.Es and the J-mode; which challenge 
the post-socialist transition approach in Eastern Europe. The second is that 
to suggest that post-socialist transformation should be seen as open-ended is 
not to imply that the collective learning theme has blanket application. What
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it does entail is recognising that informal ties, in some specific areas, or in 
specific instances, where there is a collective learning culture, have benefits 
over arms-length transactions and that this is a function of path dependence. 
This is taken up at a more theoretical level in chapters five and eight. In the 
next chapter a regional model of T.V.Es is developed in the context of a 
wider argument that T.V.Es are a specific example of a broader literature on 
regionalism. In chapter eight the latter issue is explored in more detail.
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CHAPTER 5 
THE TOWNSHIP AND VILLAGE ENTERPRISE SECTOR AS A SPECIFIC 
EXAMPLE OF REGIONALISM
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The last chapter suggested that T.V.Es in China represent a seeming challenge 
to standard property rights critiques. This chapter draws on the collective 
learning literature to provide one possible explanation for the success of the 
T.V.E sector in the presence of vaguely-defined institutional arrangements. The 
main argument will be that reputation effects underpin the functioning of informal 
institutions. This idea will be developed in the context of a broader argument 
that the T.V.E sector shares characteristics with or is in effect a subset, or 
specific example of, a broader literature on regionalism. An attempt will also be 
made to draw some parallels between the T.V.E sector and European/Anglo- 
American regionalism with a view to making some preliminary remarks about the 
lessons which T.V.Es raise for post-socialist transformation in Eastern Europe.
The success of the T.V.E sector has led some commentators to at least pose the 
question: should Russia have copied China ? (Johnson 1994, Layard 1995). So 
far, the answer has tended to be no, with theories stressing the differences 
between China and Eastern Europe, rather than the potential similarities (eg, 
Qian & Xu 1993 - “M-Form” versus “U-Form” hierarchical planning structure; 
Weitzman & Xu 1994 - differences in the degree of cooperative culture and 
Yang 1994 - differences in the degree of division of labour). This chapter, 
however, suggests that there are similarities in the existence of regional 
differences. And, therefore, post-socialist transformation should perhaps be 
seen as an open-ended process in Eastern Europe as well as Asia. The chapter 
is divided into three main sections. The main ideas in the chapter are contained 
in the next section where a regional model of the T.V.E sector will be presented.
139
The argument that the T.V.E sector is a specific example of a broader new 
regionalism is developed in section 5.3. The last section contains some 
comments about the potential relevance of regionalism to Eastern Europe.
5.2 A REGIONAL MODEL OF THE TOWNSHIP AND VILLAGE ENTERPRISE
(i) TOWNSHIP AND VILLAGE ENTERPRISES AS A SET OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
Overview
This subsection sketches a broad overview of the model. The specific issues 
that the model raises are considered in more detail later in the chapter. The 
basic concept, which underlies the theorising, is that the T.V.E consists of a 
strategic core and a series of external strategic alliances or inter-organisational 
incentives (see Reve 1989). These ideas are presented in schematic form in 
figure 5.1. The T.V.E is depicted as a strategic core which can be visualised as 
“reputation capital” or, in broad terms, "goodwill”. The strategic core or internal 
structure of the T.V.E is presented, in figure 5.1, as a juxtaposition of ownership 
and control. The nominal ownership of the T.V.E, consistent with the approach 
taken in Chang & Wang (1994), is assigned to the local residents, but the 
rights to control the T.V.E are depicted in dynamic terms. The control rights rest, 
at the start, with the T.V.G. However, over time, an arrow (in figure 5.1) shows 
control rights shifting from the T.V.G to the managers and the skilled workers.
There are various strategic expansion paths, in figure 5.1, which are external to 
the T.V.E. These strategic expansion paths are informal contracts that link the 
T.V.E to the political centre (the centra! government) and to the other entities in 
the regional network. The regional network, which encompasses the labour 
market, regional banks - including rural credit co-operatives - and other 
enterprises, will often be location-specific. Qian & Xu's (1993) M-Form argument
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FIGURE 5.1
The T.V.E. as an Internal and External Strategic Framework
the political centre
legitimate authority
The T.V.E
strategic core = reputation
residents T.V.G
nominal ownership
^  control
managers/skilled M rights
workers
labour market credit unions other T.V.Es,
private firms 
and S.O.Es
is important in this respect. With the M-Form structure, the Chinese economy is 
organised into a multi-layered multi-regional form according to the territorial 
principle in which each region, at each layer, can be regarded as an operating 
unit. The regional network for most purposes is consistent with a low level tier in 
this multi-regional framework, but the basic principles underpinning a regional 
network (the importance of reputation and informal contracts) need not be
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location specific. The notion of a regional network rests first and foremost on the 
existence of an identifiable group which contracts on the basis of trust and social 
ties. Here the term "trust” is used to refer to a means of reducing uncertainty 
and risk and enhancing cooperation in the context of business contracting (see 
further Deakin et a! 1994, Arrighetti et al 1997, Burchell & Wilkinson 1997).
The vaguely-defined character of much of the contracting within the regional 
network suggests elements of a clan structure. In transaction-cost terms, these 
relations represent a distinct form of economic coordination which lies 
somewhere between market and hierarchies (Arrighetti et al 1997, Powell 1990, 
Ring & Van de Ven 1992). The notion that the T.V.E can be seen within a 
regional network of transactions which are, at best, less than arms-length raises 
many questions. These include: (i) What distinguishes the strategic core from 
the external inter-organisational incentives? (/e. what determines the boundaries 
of the firm?) (ii) Why are control rights, within the T.V.E, (at least in the 
embryonic stages) given to the T.V.G? (and why do control rights, in most cases, 
shift to managers and skilled workers over time?), (iii) Most of the literature on 
clans stresses the need for a recognised legitimate authority to underpin the 
process of building collective norms. Thus, to the extent that T.V.Es can be 
depicted as clanlike entities between markets and hierarchies what is the source 
of legitimate authority? The rest of this section attempts to provide answers.
External aspects o f  the Township and Village Enterprise 
There are a series of informal institutions which support the T.V.E. The practice 
of informal contracting is widespread and embedded in the regional network. 
This is widely recognised among local officials. “Concerning actual T.V.E 
contracts, law officials and policy makers report that such transactions are often 
based on oral agreements instead of written contracts. Even in the case of 
written contracts, it is often the case that they are incomplete and unspecific in 
items, or there is no specific punishment” (Weitzman & Xu, 1994 p.85). While
142
primary documentation of this phenomenon is lacking on the whole, casual 
empiricism provides some general examples. First, informal contracts exist in 
inter-firm transactions. T.V.Es producing similar products often integrate into 
industrial groups in order to raise funds and promote mutual interests such as 
sales and purchases. The members of the group, which typically consist of a 
number of different regional firms with different ownership structures, help each 
other with fund-raising activities and in times of financial difficulty. Goodhart & 
Xu (1995) and Liu (1989), amongst others, point out that in most cases the 
relationship within the group is informal in the sense that long-term reputation is 
more important than explicit contracts. The concept of germen (buddy-ship, 
commitment and loyalty) underpins these informal relationships. A series of 
case studies in Anhui Province noted that most T.V.Es deliberately avoided 
formal contracts so as to maintain or to strengthen the germen relationship. The 
reason for this was their belief that defining personal relationships through 
written contracts undermined the germen spirit (Cai 1990, Wu 1996 p.452).1
The capital market provides a second example of informal contracting. The legal 
rights of creditors are not well protected and more generally collaterals are 
uncertain because of imperfect information. Therefore, it is common for T.V.Es 
to provide each other with mutual guarantees or borrow from individuals within 
the T.V.E. T.V.Es also often borrow on the basis of a guarantee from the T.V.G, 
but the actual guarantee is very rarely formalised. Instead, the process is 
consultative, where the T.V.G's views and priorities are sought. If the T.V.E's 
loan application has the support of the T.V.G, it is nearly always approved on 
the basis of an implicit understanding that the T.V.G. (and therefore, the local 
community) will absorb the risk.2 Naughton (1994, 1995) argues that T.V.G 
sponsorship greatly enhanced T.V.Es’ access to capital which is an important 
reason for their growth. He writes (1995 p. 153): “By contrast, the experience of 
other transforming socialist economies has been that new start-up businesses 
proliferate, but ... have difficulty getting access to capital and as a result remain 
small, undercapitalised and dependent on formal capital markets”. These points
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relate to collectively-owned T.V.Es which is the chapter’s main focus. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that even among privately owned T.V.Es informal 
capital markets are popular. A common practice in Wenzhou, where most 
T.V.Es are private, is zhouhui (forming an informal credit union). The credit 
union is formed between people who know each other well and is based on 
business trust rather than formalised contracts (Goodhart & Xu 1995 p.35).
The third example of informal contracting occurs in the labour market. 
Collectively-owned T.V.Es tend to operate without explicit labour contracts or 
follow practices that lie outside the scope of formal arrangements. For example, 
Goodhart & Xu (1995, pp.34-35) note that if the T.V.E is facing economic 
hardship a common practice is to close the firm down for a short period to 
reduce costs. Another reason for periodic closure in the past was that prior to 
the tax reform measures T.V.Es received tax concessions in the first three years 
of their life. Thus, it was common for T.V.Es to close down towards the end of 
the first three years and re-open with a different name. When the T.V.E closes 
down it typically makes subsistence payments to its workers which are a fraction 
of the worker’s original wages. This practice often takes place on an informal 
basis and, thus, lies outside written labour contracts. It gives T.V.Es greater 
flexibility to take advantage of tax loopholes and in times of financial difficulties.
The results from field research confirm the advantages of informal arrangements 
in the labour market. In Lin et a/’s (1992) sample of industrial T.V.Es in 
Yuanping County, Shanxi Province “there were almost no cases in which 
employees were dismissed because of lack of demand” (Lin et al 1992 p.262). 
Other field research suggests that workers are quite willing to take wage cuts in 
times of economic hardship. In 1986 the State Statistical Bureau (SSB) and the 
Developmental Institute of the People’s University sampled workers in 200 rural 
enterprises (most of which were T.V.Es) in Hubei, Sichuan, Guangdong, 
Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Anhui, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanxi and Gansu. The first half of 
1986 was a period of contraction and wages levels in the sample enterprises fell.
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A total of 77% of workers said that they were satisfied taking a wage cut given 
the economic conditions while just 4% expressed dissatisfaction. Among those 
who expressed neither satisfaction nor dissatisfaction (19%), 71% showed 
“understanding and sympathy for the enterprises and were willing to continue to 
work there”. When asked about whether it was better to cut jobs or wages 36% 
of workers favoured a reduction in wages rather than jobs which is double those 
who favoured cutting jobs (18%) - (results reported in Zhou & Hu 1987 p. 131).
The close relationship between agriculture and rural industries also contributes 
to making the rural labour market flexible. Workers are willing to accept 
temporary lay-offs and/or substantial wage cuts because opportunities exist for 
most to return to agriculture. To illustrate, in the joint SSB and People’s 
University sample, 61% of workers retained their share of contracted farmland 
(Zhou & Hu 1987 p.131). Hence, agriculture and rural industry complement each 
other. For example in the Hela Commune Agricultural Machine Plant in Wuxi "in 
the busy farming season [workers in the factories] went back to work in their 
fields and in the slack season they worked in the plant. Whenever labourers 
were needed for intensive operations in vegetable farming and fishing, they were 
also released by the plant. Thus there was a flexible allocation of labour time 
among various branches of the rural economy” (Mohanty 1993 p.35).3
Each of these informal relationships - in inter-firm transactions, in the capital 
market and labour market - represent strategic alliances. Nakatani (1984), 
writing in the context of the J-mode, suggests that informal institutions perform 
the role of an implicit mutual insurance scheme, in which firms are both insurers 
and insured at the same time. The evolution of informal institutions, according to 
Nakatini (1984), represents a direct response to imperfect capital markets.
“One of the essential functions of the capital market is to allocate risks 
efficiently among different investors in the economy, but, if the capital 
market is imperfect and management is in a position to worry about the
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business risks, in some way or another, then the grouping of firms can be 
regarded as an ingenious solution to the problem of non-existence of 
contingent markets for management risk” (Nakatani 1984 p. 229).
These comments, while directed at the J-mode, explain part of the reason for the 
formation of informal institutions in the T.V.E sector. Most commentators 
recognise that the capital market in China, at least outside the state sector, is 
underdeveloped (see eg Cheng & Malcom 1994). However, as far as capital 
markets go, the allocation of risk, of course, is not their sole function. The 
capital market also serves as an avenue to channel savings from individuals to 
enterprises. The informal arrangement where T.V.E residents pool their 
financial resources (ie. jizi) in order to fund the T.V.E is one institutional 
response in this regard, but the role which informal institutions play as strategic 
alliances in the T.V.E sector run deeper than this. The stress placed on informal 
institutions rather than formal contracts seems to be a response to deficiencies 
in the explicit institutional framework - strong legal structure, well defined 
property rights etc. - rather than just an underdeveloped capital market.
The informal links which the T.V.E nurtures (ie. strategic expansion paths) serve 
a similar role to that which Nakatani (1984) discusses, but in a broader sense. 
The development of informal institutions between T.V.Es serves to allocate the 
risk, for example, associated with contractual hold-up in the absence of a well 
defined legal framework for settling disputes. The distinction between "soft” and 
"hard” contracting is relevant in this regard (see MacNeil 1980, Williamson & 
Ouchi 1981 pp.361-362). The concept of hard contracting refers to standard 
arms-length transactions where there are formal contracts governing the 
relationship. The concept of soft contracting, on the other hand, presumes a 
much closer relationship between the parties where formal contracts are much 
less complete. Thus, with soft contracting, an elaborate informal governance
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structure (to borrow Williamson’s term), which includes inter alia accepted 
norms of behaviour, substitutes for the role of explicit or written sanctions.
The strategic expansion paths fill the role of an extended informal governance 
structure in the T.V.E. soft contracting setting. The design of the transaction 
represents a decision variable. To illustrate, think of relational contracting 
involving different degrees of “softness”. This involves considering a spectrum 
where there are two extremes: (i) where the relationship is deterministic - ie 
specified, in its entirety in a formal contract and (ii) where the relationship is 
informal meaning no formal contracting at all. The design of the transaction is a 
decision variable because moving along this spectrum involves trade-offs. 
Moving from deterministic to informal contracting, for example, involves 
sacrificing certainty for added flexibility. The extent to which the parties to the 
transaction will be prepared to make this trade-off, will depend on their 
confidence in the trading relation. But, the trading relation, it will be argued 
below, is a function of reputation. The T.V.E’s reputation for meeting its 
informal obligations, in this sense, acts as the real surrogate for explicit rules.
The strategic expansion paths represent an attempt on the part of the T.V.E to 
place itself in a position where potential costs will be minimised in the event of a 
dispute. The incentive for the T.V.E is to develop bilateral (transaction specific) 
trust relations. This involves nurturing its informal relationships with other 
entities in the regional network, such as helping other T.V.Es to raise capital, as 
a means to promote goodwill. This also involves avoiding courses of action 
detrimental to the trust relations it builds up. The immediate parties to the soft 
contract are the ones that stand most to benefit if the exchange is successful 
and have the most to lose if the contract falls through. Thus it is in the interests 
of the T.V.E to meet its informal responsibilities even if there is no formal 
sanction if it does not. This is true because even outside the specific bilateral 
(transaction specific) relationship, if one of the parties defaults, its wider 
reputation as a reliable soft contractor will be dented, thus affecting its ability to
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enter into other transaction specific relations. The need for an explicit legal 
framework is reduced because implicit contracts tend to be self enforcing.4
The role o f  reputation in defining the “strategic core ”
The T.V.E, in figure 5.1, is depicted as a "strategic core” which, it was earlier 
claimed (without supporting argument), can be seen as reputation capital. 
However, this raises an important issue not addressed so far. What is the 
theoretical basis of the strategic core, and what distinguishes the strategic core 
from the external strategic alliances? A possible answer to this lies in marrying 
Kreps’ (1990) work on reputation effects with the notion of asset specificity which 
has been stressed in most of Williamson’s articles (see eg Williamson 1979 
1981 1989). Asset specificity, which Williamson repeatedly claims is the most 
important transaction dimension, refers to the extent to which the investment is 
idiosyncratic or transaction specific. Williamson (1979) distinguishes between 
three different degrees of asset specificity. These are non-specific, semi­
specific and highly specific. He argues that classical market contracting will be 
efficacious when assets are non-specific to the trading parties, but bilateral 
market contracting will take over if assets are semi-specific and internal 
organisation will displace bilateral contracting if the assets are highly specific.
These ideas can be developed in the context of the strategic core/strategic 
alliance differentiation (see Rumelt 1982, Reve 1989). The strategic 
management literature maintains that the strategic core should be limited to 
core assets which are essential to meeting the firm’s strategic objectives. These 
core assets can be used to realise the firm’s objectives through bilateral 
governance (nurturing strategic alliances) and/or classical market contracting. 
In this sense the line which separates the strategic core (internal to the firm) 
and the strategic alliances (external to the firm) depends on how transaction 
specific the asset is. The boundaries of the firm are restricted to its core assets 
which, in Williamson’s terms, are highly asset specific. Outside of the firm,
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assets which are semi-specific can be obtained through strategic alliances or 
bilateral trust relations, and non-specific assets can be exchanged in the market.
The core (specific) assets of the firm can be of a number of different sorts. 
Williamson (1989 p.143), for example, mentions site, human asset and physical 
asset specificities among others. But it is impossible to make generalisations 
about core assets of this sort. There are, for example, some T.V.Es whose core 
assets include technological resources and others whose core assets revolve 
around particular management practices. The literature on the strategic firm, as 
mentioned above, suggests that the firm’s core assets form the basis for 
realising economies in semi-specific assets via bilateral trust relations (see eg 
Reve 1989 pp. 146-151). Of course, when the external institutional framework 
(legal system, property rights etc) is well developed such as in western 
European capitalist societies the importance of bilateral soft contracting will be 
reduced. There will always be some informal contracting based on flexible 
governance and social convention (see Macualey 1963, Williamson 1975 
pp. 107-108, Al-Najjar 1995), but the existence of a well-defined institutional 
framework provides more opportunities for deterministic exchange. However, 
where the explicit institutional structure is not strong, as in the T.V.E sector, the 
manner in which core assets act as the basis for strategic alliances takes on 
added significance. However, the problem is that simply listing a range of 
disparate core assets that T.V.Es might or might not have as the extant 
literature does, is not a theory of how T.V.Es, which often have widely differing 
core assets, are able to cultivate bilateral relations in a soft contracting setting.
The notion of reputation effects developed in Kreps (1990) provides the 
mechanics for more general theorising. This proposition rests on three points. 
The first two (I hope) should be readily acceptable. The third is, perhaps, more 
debatable. The first point is that reputation is an intangible core asset. There is 
widespread acceptance that core assets can be, and often are, intangible (see 
eg Itami 1987). The idea that reputation is an intangible core asset rests on
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accepting that there are certain standard norms of behaviour that define a T.V.E 
and are specific to that particular T.V.E. These norms of behaviour, which 
determine the T.V.E's reputation, can be mimicked but they cannot be facilely 
transferred (or redeployed in Williamson’s language) without loss in productive 
value - ie. reputation is highly asset specific. If the idea that reputation is a core 
asset is accepted it is a small step to recognise the second point that all T.V.Es 
have “reputations" relating to standard of service, whether it meets its implicit 
obligations etc. The third point is that reputation, in a broad sense, is an 
umbrella for firm specific core assets. When outside entities decide whether or 
not to enter into an informal (ie. a non-deterministic) relationship with the T.V.E, 
it is on the basis of whether the T.V.E has a culture or routines which are 
conducive to it meeting its commitments, rather than being dependent on what 
specific core assets the T.V.E might or might not have. This third point comes 
close to the notion, which is explored in Kreps (1990), that reputation is evident 
in corporate culture. To put it in different terms the argument is that reputation, 
as a core asset, is reflected in principles of conduct which are made visible to 
potential soft trading partners through the standard of past outward behaviour.
The T.V.E, through this process, acts as a mechanism to allocate the surplus ex 
ante (see Chang & Wang 1994 pp.439-441 on the distribution of benefits 
between the T.V.G and local residents). This needs some explanation. When 
entering into an informal contract the problem is that neither of the parties can 
be sure ex ante how the other will exercise its discretion in the event of 
unforeseen contingencies. However, it seems reasonable that if one of the 
parties fears that the other might not meet its informal obligations, it will either 
not enter into the informal relationship at all or it will require a risk differential to 
be built into the contract. A similar argument is made in Kreps (1990) as far as 
hiring labour. He argues that workers will require a compensating differential in 
their wages if they expect the firm to use its discretion in an unreasonable
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manner. The incentive for the firm to develop and maintain a reputation for the 
appropriate exercise of its discretion, thus, is that if it fails to meet reasonable 
behaviour standards this will impose extra costs on hiring future workers.
However, there is no reason why this argument should be restricted to the labour 
market. This applies a fortiori where there are informal contracts. The incentive 
for the T.V.E to cultivate a reputation for meeting its informal obligations is that if 
it does not it will impose extra costs, manifest in a risk premium, on forming 
informal contracts. The flip side of the coin is that a "good” reputation forms the 
basis for strategic alliances at low cost because the risk of default to the other 
party is reduced. The risk differential, in this sense, varies inversely with 
reputation - ie. the better the T.V.E’s reputation, the lower the risk differential. 
When the risk differential is marginal the savings to the T.V.E, in terms of 
contracting, represent appropriable rents. However, when the danger of default 
is great (or perceived to be great) appropriable rents will be a decreasing 
function of the risk differential. It is important to remember that the reputation of 
the T.V.E represents a long-term investment on behalf of both the T.V.G and 
township-village residents in an intangible asset. Thus, through cultivating 
strategic alliances, reputation generates economic rents because it serves 
the same function as alleviating opportunism as depicted in Klein et af (1978).5
The reputation effect has been criticised. Two of the main objections to the 
reputation mechanism are that: (i) sometimes it is difficult to recognise whether 
the firm has acted in an unfair manner and (ii) the cost of communicating 
information, regarding reputation, to other parties might diminish its penal effect. 
These criticisms are relevant in a broader sense, but might have less force in the 
case of most T.V.Es (at least in "traditional" T.V.Es). The first reason is that 
most collectively-owned T.V.Es are readily identifiable with a central regional 
entity - the T.V.G. Variations in the conduct of T.V.Gs might, therefore, be easier 
to monitor than, say, a board of directors if the T.V.E was a private enterprise.
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The second reason is the peculiar communal character of the T.V.E. This is 
particularly so in the case of smaller village enterprises where most people are 
likely to know each other and informal institutions are often built on personal and 
familial ties. However, even some of the township enterprises, which operate in 
an environment where the parties might not be on personal terms, still nurture 
informal institutions within a relatively self-contained regional network. And the 
cost of communicating reputation effects within a regional web network is likely 
to be much less than in non-regional based economies. This said, a few 
comments on the limitations of regionalism are needed. I am not suggesting, as 
Piore & Sabel (1984) do, in the context of the broader literature, that regionalism 
presents a complete post-Fordist alternative to mass production. If reputation 
effects do underpin groups of firms such as the T.V.E regional network, the 
limitations are clear. Goodhart & Xu point out the following in this respect:
“The effectiveness and arrangements of informal institutions varies under 
different circumstances. For example, such informal relationships are 
more effective, more important, and more widespread in village 
enterprises than in town enterprises because of the closer relationship 
between the firm and the residents” (1995 p.35 emphasis mine).
The criticisms of the reputation effect are relevant here. The efficacy of the 
reputation mechanism is likely to depend on how close the relationship is 
between members of the regional network. The size of the group (or region) 
might also be pertinent in terms of communicating information about reputation. 
At some point, in terms of degree of closeness and size, the reputation effect will 
cease to be an effective mechanism to support informal institutions. This issue, 
which has to be addressed for larger township enterprises whose strategic 
alliances are often inter-regional, will be considered in chapter six where some 
parallels are drawn between the external contracts of T.V.Es and the J-mode.
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(ii) THE MERITS OF INFORMAL AND FORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE PROCESSES 
UNDERPINNING INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS
To this point it has been argued that the T.V.E enters into informal contracts 
based on its reputation. Moreover, it has been postulated that reputation is a 
core asset common to all T.V.Es. However, so far we have not addressed two 
important issues. The first is under what circumstances informal institutions 
might be more efficient (in terms of being growth enhancing) than formal 
institutions and, related to this, whether informal institutions can explain the 
growth performance of T.V.Es relative to S.O.Es. The second involves some 
consideration of the process underpinning the evolution of informal institutions.
The Difference Between Formal and Informal Institutions
The very issue of what an institution is, is controversial (see Menard 1995, 
Khalil 1995). While not entering into that debate, most commentators accept 
that both markets and hierarchies are institutions. For example, Menard (1995) 
treats “institutions” as an umbrella label embracing both markets and 
organisations. Williamson (1991), takes a similar approach, positing markets 
and hierarchies as varieties of governance structures. Hierarchies and markets 
are treated here as formal institutions. The reason is that there are formal 
constraints on both hierarchies and markets. There are command constraints 
within hierarchies defining vertical information flows. The “invisible hand" with 
well-defined contractual rights act as formal constraints on horizontal exchange 
in the market. However, in the middle, the constraints on hybrids or networks 
are often informal. Hybrids contain elements of both market and hierarchies, but 
lie outside the constraint of both. Hybrid contracting is inter-organisational so it 
is not subject to command constraints which are intra-organisational. Hybrid 
contracting also tends to be based on long-term reputation rather than written 
contracts so, to this extent, explicit legal sanctions tend to take a back seat role.
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The relative advantages o f  form al and informal institutions
Given that informal arrangements are popular substitutes among T.V.Es for 
formal alternatives, the question arises under what conditions do informal 
institutions make a positive contribution to T.V.Es and when (if ever) will informal 
institutions be preferable to formal institutions? These issues can be examined 
at a few different levels. At the most basic level, at least to begin with, most 
informal arrangements emerged because formal alternatives were not available. 
The absence of a well-defined legal framework, for example, encouraged implicit 
inter-firm arrangements and the absence of well-developed capital markets 
contributed to the growth of informal rural credit co-operatives. At this level it is 
clear that informal arrangements are preferable to none at all, but it is not 
obvious that informal arrangements are preferable to both formal and informal 
institutions together. For example, if there was a well defined legal framework to 
settle disputes the parties would be freer to choose the trading environment - ie. 
the parties could enter into either a written contract or one based on reputation.
This, however, overlooks the difficulties inherent in creating formal institutions in 
(post) socialist economies and the existence of market imperfections in (post) 
socialist economies. With respect to the first point, positing a simple choice 
between formal and informal institutions on a priori grounds assumes ceteris 
paribus from a systems viewpoint - ie. formal and informal institutions are in 
place, as in established capitalist economies, or can be put in place at zero (or 
close to zero) cost. The problem is that (post) socialist economies are not 
starting from a point where formal and informal institutions represent costless 
alternatives. There are arguments on both sides of the big bang versus 
gradualism debate (see section 2.2.5), but what is undeniable is that where the 
authorities tried to introduce a series of formal institutions in rapid succession in 
Eastern Europe there were negative results, at least in terms of output levels. 
Thus introducing formal institutions might not be possible (or desirable) at least
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in the shorter term. Informal institutions, of course, also entail costs which 
become more manifest as T.V.Es grow in size and informal avenues are no 
longer sufficient. The lack of a well-developed capital market in rural areas is 
one example where the absence of formal alternatives is now impeding further 
T.V.E growth. However, the costs involved here at least appear to be the lesser 
of two evils when compared with the costs of trying to introduce formal 
institutions too fast as occurred in Eastern Europe. Thus, at one level informal 
institutions, among T.V.Es, have acted as (imperfect) substitutes for formal 
institutions while the latter have been, and continue to be, gradually introduced.
The second point is that the existence of market imperfections in (post) socialist 
economies makes informal institutions more important, in terms of obtaining 
capital and inputs, than in established capitalist economies. This relates to the 
fact that (post) socialist economies either are, or are emerging out of economies 
where capital and resources are difficult to obtain. An example is the point made 
earlier that T.V.Es often borrow from lending institutions, each other or local 
residents on the basis of a guarantee from the T.V.G, but it is unusual for the 
guarantee to be formalised. There are some advantages in this informal 
relationship compared with the situation if the T.V.E and T.V.G were at arms- 
length. The T.V.E, in particular in its start-up phase, in most (if not all) cases 
would not have the resources to give a formal guarantee to the lender. Thus 
without the informal support, and political connections, of the T.V.G which 
provides opportunities for T.V.Es to access capital and other inputs, it is at least 
arguable that the T.V.E sector would not have grown at the rate which it has.
Li (1996) describes the informal relationship between T.V.Es and T.V.Gs, in 
circumstances like these, in terms of grey markets. A grey market is one in 
which transactions may be blocked due to residual government regulations. 
However, a government bureaucrat or a government agency can properly work
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around the obstacles and make the transaction possible (Li 1996 p.3). Li (1996 
p. 16) suggests: “Given the greyness and imperfections of the market, a proper 
degree of ambiguity in property rights is perhaps necessary”. Of course 
"transition economists” object that formal capital markets and a strong legal 
framework would overcome, or at least reduce, market imperfections and thus 
eliminate, or reduce, the need for informal backing from T.V.Gs. But in some 
respects, this argument is naive in the sense that, in focusing on “completing the 
reform”, it tends to underestimate the problems in designing a workable 
mechanism that is faithful to the basic tenants of individual property rights.
Neither of these points claim advantages for informal institutions over formal 
institutions if we were in an ideal world. Moreover, neither argument provides an 
explanation for the performance of T.V.Es relative to S.O.Es. At a different level, 
though, informal institutions, in their own right, in some circumstances, might be 
more efficient (in terms of possessing growth enhancing properties) than formal 
institutions. Taking this a step further, the relative advantages of formal and 
informal institutions, in terms of different patterns of growth, might provide a 
basis for explaining the performance of T.V.Es relative to S.O.Es. The ideas are 
tentative, to the extent that comparing T.V.Es and S.O.Es, in this fashion is novel 
in the literature (Lo 1997 chaps. 2 and 4 is an exception and the discussion 
below draws readily on Lo 1997 chap.4). However, while the arguments are far 
from conclusive, and at times tend to be speculative, their focus is on attempting 
to give an explanation for T.V.E performance based on what can be observed.
Lo (1997 pp89-90) summarises several characteristics of S.O.Es and T.V.Es 
which are well documented in the literature. These are (a) T.V.Es are subject to 
a higher degree of market competition than S.O.Es; (b) the contrast between 
T.V.Es and S.O.Es can be characterised in terms of flexibility versus rigidity in 
responding to the market and (c) S.O.Es are less responsive to the market 
because of their institutional arrangements - in particular a soft budget constraint
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and rigid wage adjustment. To this list we could add (d) T.V.Es are more 
responsive to the market because the widespread existence of informal 
institutions makes them more flexible. Lo argues that both rigid arrangements 
in S.O.Es, and flexible arrangements in T.V.Es, have positive and negative 
effects dependent on the pattern of economic growth. Hence he argues that
S.O.Es outperformed T.V.Es in the boom period (1985-1988) when market 
demand was stable, while T.V.Es outperformed S.O.Es in the recession period 
(1989-1991) when there were severe market fluctuations. S.O.Es, in the latter 
period, without an exit option, were forced to keep operating, although weak 
market demand lowered revenue and rigid wage adjustment increased costs. 
The fact that T.V.Es are more flexible in response to the market - and in 
particular were able, in a lot of cases to make use of informal arrangements with 
workers in the labour market, mentioned above, to shut down for short periods - 
made them less susceptible to market fluctuations. One estimate, which Lo 
(1997 p.93) cites is that in 1989-1991, up to one third of T.V.Es closed down.
These ideas tentatively can be generalised, in terms of market demand, to 
suggest situations where informal institutions are more efficient and other 
situations where formal institutions are more efficient. The comparative 
performance of S.O.Es and T.V.Es seems consistent with the proposition that 
“rigid" formal institutions perform better when market demand is stable and 
"flexible” informal institutions perform better when market demand is more 
volatile. There is ample evidence, in this respect, to suggest that T.V.Es operate 
in an environment where there is continuous shifts in demand towards new 
products. T.V.Es are dominant in downstream "new (consumer durable) 
industries" such as T.V sets and washing machines where there has been rapid 
structural change. This sort of environment, where market demand is fluctuating, 
is consistent with the existence of economic rents for early entrants who can 
make rapid adjustment to changes in demand patterns. Thus the flexible nature 
of informal relationships, in an environment like this might have significant
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advantages over more formal arrangements where the parties are locked into a 
series of explicit obligations irrespective of changes in patterns of demand.6
The processes underpinning the evolution o f  informal institutions 
The idea that informal institutions might be preferable to formal institutions under 
certain conditions of market demand is consistent with the idea, in the new 
regionalism literature, that informal institutions possess certain distinct 
characteristics, stemming from an eclectic mix of competition and co-operation, 
which gives them learning properties. The notion that informal contracting 
serves a cognitive function is consistent with the concept of a clan - clan, here, 
conforms to Durkheim’s (1933 p. 175) conception of an organic association which 
resembles a kin network, but need not include blood relations - (see Ouchi 1980 
p. 132). The concept of the clan form has been used in the past in the socio­
economic literature to describe the informal institutions in the T.V.E sector, but 
previous analogies are lacking in some vital respects. The view that T.V.E 
regional networks can be likened to clans rests on the notion that organic 
solidarity is the basis of the clan form (Durkeim 1933 p.365).7 The concept of 
organic solidarity contemplates a union of objectives between individuals which 
stems from their mutual dependence. It is the recognition of mutual dependence 
that alleviates the need for formal sanctions. Ouchi (1980) sums this up:
“Performance evaluation takes place instead through [a] kind of subtle 
reading of signals ... which cannot be translated into explicit, verifiable 
measures. This means that there is sufficient information in a clan to 
promote learning and effective production, but that information cannot 
withstand the scrutiny of contractual relations” (Ouchi 1980 p. 137).
If informal institutions in the T.V.E sector do depict elements of clan form there 
are two issues that need to be considered. The first is the concept of 
socialisation. Most writers on the clan form {eg Barnard 1938, Ouchi 1980) 
stress that, where clans are prevalent, socialisation into the organisation is a
158
principal mechanism for mediation and control. This principle has been widely 
observed in the literature on the J-mode. The usual practice is for the J-mode to 
hire inexperienced workers and then socialise them to accept the firm’s 
objectives as their own, but the extent to which workers in T.V.Es identify with 
the objectives of their enterprise is debatable. On this point the evidence is 
mixed. A comparative study of Chinese and Japanese workers' attitudes 
conducted by Japanese academics in 1987 claimed that a "laziness disease” 
was endemic among Chinese workers (Sengoku 1988). Shih (1995 pp. 138-139) 
reached similar conclusions on the basis of interview evidence. His main 
conclusion was that “most workers ... must be prodded by materia! reward”. 6
However, Pei (1996) presents interview evidence which contradicts these 
findings and suggests a high degree of socialisation.9 The results from a T.V.E 
worker questionnaire considered in Gelb (1990 pp.289-290) support Pei (1996). 
For example, consistent with traditional lifetime employment practices in Japan, 
the results suggested that most workers were happy working for a T.V.E and 
expected to remain with their T.V.E for a long time. Gelb & Svejner (1990) argue 
that work attitudes in T.V.Es might not be that dissimilar to the J-mode. The J- 
mode, they speculate, “may be of great relevance to China because of the 
degree of community identification and low labour mobility there” (1990 p.422). 
There are close parallels between the danwei system in Chinese S.O.Es and the 
“workplace family" in Japan. “In both cases work colleagues are also 
neighbours. Work lives and after-hours lives are closely intertwined. The sense 
of community is reinforced by the workplace being a mini- welfare state that 
takes care not only of the employees welfare in work, but also their medical 
needs, retirement funds, ... education of their children etc" (Chan 1995 p.457).
A second issue that needs to be addressed is the source of legitimate authority. 
The concept of legitimate authority underpins the evolution of collective norms 
(Barnard 1938, Etzioni 1965). Within formal institutions (markets and 
hierarchies) legitimate authority is manifest in “legal” or “rational" relations, but in
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informal institutions it takes on more traditional forms (Christie 1982 pp.99-113, 
Edgerton 1985 chap. 7). The source of legitimate authority which holds together 
informal institutions tends to come from other institutions which are external to 
the affected institution. Some common examples mentioned in the literature are 
the church and educational process (see Ouchi 1980, Malle 1994), but these are 
more applicable to feudal or capitalist societies, at different points in time, than 
post-socialist transformation. Thus what is the source of legitimate authority that 
underlies the evolution of informal institutions in the T.V.E sector? The problem 
with the existing socio-economic literature, which has treated T.V.E strategic 
alliances as clan like, is that this point has not been addressed. The issue of the 
degree of socialisation in T.V.Es, along with consideration of potential 
alternative mediation mechanisms, is also glossed over in Nee (1992) et at.
(iii) THE POLITICAL CENTRE AS A SOURCE OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 
The evolution o f  reciprocity between the T.V.E and the po litica l centre 
Figure 5.1 depicts, via an arrow, the political centre (ie the central government) 
conferring legitimate authority on the T.V.E. The relationship between the 
political centre and the T.V.E represents a form of strategic alliance, as an 
extension of the above framework. The idea of a strategic alliance between the 
political centre and the T.V.E - or the T.V.E sector - seems essential in 
explaining the latter’s success, but it rests, first and foremost, on the existence of 
reciprocal benefits - ie. benefits flowing to both parties. The political centre 
confers legitimate authority on the T.V.E sector because it is in its best interests 
to do so. The basis of reciprocity is elucidated in Taylor (1982 pp. 28-29):
“Each individual act in a system of reciprocity is usually characterised by 
a combination of what one might call short-term altruism and long-term 
self interest: ... Reciprocity is made up of a series of acts each of which is 
short run altruistic (benefiting others at a cost to the altruist) but which 
together typically make every participant better off’ (emphasis in original).
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The benefits to the T.V.E sector 
The first benefit to the T.V.E (and in a more general sense the T.V.E sector) is, 
in some respects, obvious. The decentralisation process has made regions 
more autonomous (Shirk 1990, Qian & Xu 1993). Fiscal decentralisation has 
given regional based economies relative financial independence. The concept 
of “eating in separate kitchens” has also freed regional governments from 
arbitrary appropriation by the centre, allowing them to channel funds back into 
the regional network. A second benefit conferred on the T.V.E is less direct. It 
takes the form of subtle, and in some cases not so subtle, discrimination. Nee 
(1992 pp. 173-174) has documented how private firms often face discrimination 
in obtaining credit, labour and material supplies. Young & Gang (1994) point out 
that the private sector is often subject to political attacks. T.V.Es, however, have 
easier access to all of these things. This seems to almost take the form of 
political protection. As Qian & Xu (1993) describe the process: “[T.V.Es] are 
‘politically correct’, protected by at least some level of government” (1993 p.13).
The benefits to the political centre
The strategic alliance between the political centre and the T.V.E benefits the 
former in at least two ways. The first is that the success of the T.V.E legitimises 
the central government. This statement might be perceived as controversial. 
The evolution of the T.V.E sector has not always been viewed in this way. For 
example Nee & Lian (1994) adopt a position which is the complete opposite of 
what I am suggesting. These commentators argue that the T.V.E sector is, in 
effect, representative of the political centre’s declining legitimacy, but Nee & 
Lian’s view rests on the presumption that the T.V.E sector is just the first stage in 
the transition to full private property rights.10 This depicts a totalitarianist view of 
the state where control loss equates with loss of legitimacy. This ignores the 
rich possibilities that exist, in institutional structure, when post-socialist 
transformation is viewed as open-ended. Viewed as open-ended the
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decentralisation process, at one level, legitimises the political centre, because it 
manifests the central government’s commitment to reform. The central 
government does not subsidise losses or expropriate promised income in the 
T.V.E sector. The emphasis, instead, is on transferring discretion from the 
political centre to local government; a process stressed in Weingast (1993) as 
essential to building credible commitment (see Qian & Xu 1993 pp.32-33). At 
another level the T.V.E sector acts as an “engine for growth” which drives the 
entire economy. In this sense the success which the T.V.E sector has had 
legitimises the general direction the government’s economic policies have taken.
The transfer of discretion from the political centre to regional government, 
however, does not mean that the political centre ceases to be important in the 
T.V.E sector. In fact, I suggest that the second benefit to the political centre, 
arising from its strategic alliance with the T.V.E, stems from the influence that it 
can exert at a grassroots level. It would be a mistake to think that just because 
the regional network is relatively autonomous that the influence of the political 
centre at a local level is any less. To make this mistake belies a long tradition in 
political authoritarianism. Schurmann (1964 p.416), writing more than thirty 
years ago, suggested that “by training a new type of leader, the cadre, the 
Chinese Communists were finally able to achieve what no state power in 
Chinese history had been able to do: to create an organisation loyal to the state 
which was also solidly embedded in the natural villages". The commune has 
now been replaced as the basic economic unit, but the political influence of the 
cadre-entrepreneur lingers on. In many cases, the heads of the T.V.Es are also 
heads of the villages or the party branch secretaries in the villages (see Croll 
1994, X.Lin 1996) Hence, the T.V.E, through the cadre-entrepreneur, acts 
as an important avenue, at the local level, for the political centre’s policies.
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The notion o f reciprocity becomes institutionalised 
Maintaining order in decentralised communities 
The political influence of the cadre-entrepreneur, at a local level, seems to go a 
long way to explaining the efficacy of informal institutions in the T.V.E sector. 
There have been different solutions put forward in the past as to how to maintain 
social order in the absence of explicit rules. Taylor (1982) is a prominent 
anarcho-liberalist example. He (1982 pp.25-33) develops the notion of 
“community” along the lines suggested in this chapter - ie. emphasising inter alia 
the importance of the threat of retaliation, withdrawal of reciprocity and the use 
of social sanctions. Taylor (1982) then argues that "community” provides a 
decentralised solution to the collective action problem of ensuring security of 
property rights. But, the fact is that security of property rights, insofar as it is 
achieved through deterrence of potential violators, is a non-excludable collective 
good. Most of the sanctioning literature, therefore, points out that a second 
order collective action problem arises. Given that sanctioning the behaviour of 
others is costly, the incentive is to free ride on the sanctioning efforts of others.
This is where the cadre-entrepreneur is relevant. The notion of a "political 
entrepreneur” is developed in detail in Popkin (1988) in the context of the 
political mobilisation of peasant communities in the Vietnamese revolution.11 
Popkin (1988 pp. 16-17) defines a political entrepreneur as an innovator who 
solves collective action problems through changing beliefs about the value of 
collective goods and expectations about the behaviour of others, rather than 
through offering selective incentives. He shows how the Communist Party, in 
Vietnam, won support for its aims through having political entrepreneurs (ie. 
cadres) work on small scale collective action problems at the village level. The 
role of the political entrepreneur was to persuade individuals that the actions of 
others were dependent on their actions and, through acting as monitors, 
increase the amount of information in circulation about the behaviour of others. 
The cadre-entrepreneur, in the T.V.E sector, seems to perform a similar role.12
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In this context, the cadre-entrepreneur might be seen as a mechanism for 
solving collective action problems that build up around informal institutions. The 
role of the cadre-entrepreneur, as a form of lubricant that assists in the flow of 
information within the informal sector, might be viewed as a sort of de facto 
surrogate for socialisation in the absence of more explicit means. If this sort of 
characterisation has any merit, then the legitimate authority (or “traditional 
values”) which underpin soft contracting in the T.V.E sector are rooted in 
socialist political heritage. The mechanism which is being used to maintain 
decentralised social (and economic) order in the transformation period stems 
from, or draws on, the institutional framework in place pre-transformation. The 
broader lesson from this points to a need to recognise the (at least potential) 
existence of path dependent historical vestiges in post-socialist transformation.
“Implicit” versus "Explicit” safeguards 
The strategic alliance between the political centre and T.V.Es is at less than 
arms-length. Therefore there is no explicit constitutional protection for the 
T.V.E’s informal institutions. This is considered a flaw in the orthodox transition 
literature (see eg World Bank 1990) but it might, in effect, be a strength. The 
notion of reputation effects between hierarchical “superiors” and "inferiors" is 
relevant in this regard. This was the original sense in which the idea of 
corporate culture was developed in Kreps (1990). The notion of the “M-Form” 
hierarchical firm is generalised in Qian & Xu (1993) to represent the relationship 
between the political centre and regional governments. Thus, even though the 
strategic alliance between the "hierarchical superior” - the political centre - and 
the “hierarchical inferior” - the regional based economies - is not at arms-length, 
it is in the interests of both to preserve the relationship. As Kreps(1990) puts it:
“Current trading partners [can] enter into a hierarchical transaction ... with 
equanimity because each [can] trust the other to carry out the implicit 
contract in her or his own interests, to protect their reputations and 
safeguard future beneficial transactions1’ (1990 p. 124 emphasis mine).
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The benefits to the political centre stemming from the T.V.E sector are discussed 
above. The cost to the political centre in terms of damaging its reputation for 
commitment to economic reform rules out indiscriminate interference in the 
T.V.E’s activities. Thus, although there are no explicit safeguards it is not in the 
interests of the political centre to intervene ad hoc in the T.V.E sector provided 
that the mechanism in place - the political entrepreneurs - function in a smooth 
fashion. However, when the informal mechanisms for monitoring the soft 
contracting process do fail such as, for example, when cadre corruption 
becomes intolerable, because the relationship is at less than arms-length, the 
political centre can take a more pro-active position. Casual empiricism 
suggests, in this regard, that in recent times when the political centre has 
threatened to haul in the reins on economic reform it has been because of 
concern over cadre corruption (see eg Beijing Review April 1-7 1996 pp. 16-19).
Sometimes it is pointed out, quite rightly, that informal institutions encourage 
cadre corruption because they present more opportunities and make it more 
difficult to detect (see eg Liew 1992). This is a problem, but it is the same 
informal basis to the relationship between the political centre and regional 
governments that allows the political centre to monitor, and act on, cadre 
corruption. The informal nature of the relationship, together with the fact that the 
political centre could withdraw from the relationship even if it never does, serves 
to make clear to the regional based economies, and in particular the cadre- 
entrepreneurs, that it is in their best interests to preserve the strategic alliance. 
This is important because threats to the efficacy of informal institutions in the 
T.V.E sector, such as cadre corruption, in themselves, threaten to undermine the 
main benefits that the T.V.E sector provides - ie legitimising the political centre.
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(iv) THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE TOWNSHIP AND VILLAGE ENTERPRISE
Ownership
This framework provides a basis for considering the internal structure of the 
T.V.E. The nominal rights to ownership, in figure 5.1, are assigned to the local 
residents. As mentioned above, this is consistent with the approach taken in 
Chang & Wang (1994). The reasons for assigning nominal ownership to the 
local residents, within the framework developed in this chapter, are also similar 
to those given in Chang & Wang (1994). Those authors suggest that nominal 
ownership is assigned to the local residents to manifest the political centre’s 
commitment to regionalism (see Chang & Wang 1994 pp.446-447). The model 
developed above suggests that the nominal ownership rights are assigned to the 
local residents for much the same reason. Thus, in the absence of explicit 
constitutional protection for the activities of the T.V.E, the decision to give 
nominal ownership rights to the local residents can be seen as part of the 
political centre’s attempt to nurture a reputation for respecting property rights in 
the T.V.E sector. This corresponds with the notion of corporate culture in Kreps 
(1990). The difference is that it is “corporate culture" at the national rather than 
the firm level. But the language which Kreps uses is still relevant. The decision 
to give nominal ownership to the local residents is part of a set of policies 
“which gives hierarchical inferiors an idea ex ante how the organisation [ie. the 
political centre] will react to circumstances as they arise" (Kreps 1990 p. 126).
Control Rights
The control rights, in figure 5.1, are depicted as shifting from the T.V.G to the 
T.V.E manager and workers over time. The shift in control rights over time is an 
issue which Chang & Wang (1994) raise, but their model does not really address 
(see Chang & Wang 1994 p.437 footnote 10). However, when cadre- 
entrepreneurs are seen as vehicles to (i) influence people’s beliefs about the
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collective nature of informal institutions and (ii) monitor the flow of information 
within the regional web, a possible explanation emerges. It makes sense to give 
the control rights to the T.V.G in the early and intermediate periods of the 
transformation process for two reasons. The dual role of the T.V.G (the cadre- 
entrepreneurs) is relevant here. First, the reputation of the T.V.E can be readily 
identified with a prominent regional institution - the T.V.G. When the process of 
building informal institutions is first emerging it seems reasonable that the 
evolution of collective norms will be facilitated if the parties external to the T.V.E 
know that the reputation of the T.V.G stands behind the project. If the T.V.G has 
the control rights, it has the incentive to maintain its reputation in the project.
The second function of the T.V.G, suggested in this chapter, is to monitor the 
development of collective norms. It was suggested earlier that the T.V.G might 
act as a solution to the second order problem of free riding on collective 
sanctioning or as a de facto surrogate for the socialisation process. If this is the 
case, giving the T.V.E control rights to the T.V.G might make it easier for the 
political entrepreneur to monitor the flow of information about collective 
behaviour in the informal regional web. But why do control rights shift over 
time? While admittedly somewhat sketchy, and requiring empirical verification, 
the shift in control rights to the T.V.E manager and workers, over time, might 
represent a progression in the socialisation process. As the soft trading culture 
becomes embedded in the social environment the importance of the T.V.G in the 
process might diminish. At the same time casual observation suggests that 
T.V.G leaders themselves sometimes transform from political cadres to 
entrepreneurs, therefore becoming managers. An interesting empirical exercise, 
on this point, would be to compare worker attitudes (on issues such as the extent 
to which they identify with the objectives of the T.V.E) in T.V.Es where control 
rights rest with the T.V.G and T.V.Es where casual empiricism suggests shifting 
control rights. An attempt will be made to test this argument in chapter seven.
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5.3. SOME PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON T.V.Es AS PART OF A BROADER
REGIONALISM
I suggest that the success of T.V.Es, viewed in a wider context, shows that 
informal institutional responses might be valid in both "high X“ Asia and “low X" 
Europe in certain circumstances. This involves seeing informal institutions as 
legitimate cognitive alternatives in their own right, rather than just stages in the 
transition to private property rights. This sort of approach involves taking a 
different tack to that in Weitzman & Xu (1994). The framework is the research 
agenda stressing the importance of regional based economies which has 
spurned from Piore & Sabel (1984) (see eg Scott 1988, Sabel 1989). The 
success of the T.V.E sector is a specific example of the re-emergence of 
regional based economies. Before exploring this idea further, it is important to be 
clear as to what I am not suggesting. Most of the literature on regionalism, to 
this point, has centred on the "Third Italy” (eg Pyke et ai 1990). I am not 
suggesting that the Third Italy or other specific regional variants such as Silicon 
Valley or Baden-Wurttemberg have been simply transposed into the T.V.E 
sector. While the T.V.E sector shares some similarities with aspects of European 
and Anglo-American regionalism, there are equally also important differences.13
The point is that regional based economies are dependent on their local social 
and historical contexts (see Courault & Romani 1992). The new regionalism 
concept rests on recognising and nurturing path dependent differences between 
regional variants. The main criticism which the new regionalism literature makes 
of the mass production paradigm is that the latter does not recognise the 
importance of regional differences (Piore & Sabel 1984 chap. 7). The same 
criticism, as alluded to above, can be made of the post-socialist transition 
approach to (post) socialist societies. The existence of regional specific path 
dependencies is not just an Asian or European phenomenon. The regional 
specific character of the T.V.E is stressed in this chapter and elsewhere (eg
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Qian & Xu 1993, Goodhart & Xu 1995). The significance of historical and 
institutional variations in Eastern Europe has been emphasised in a number of 
articles (see eg Carroll et al 1988 and Van Ees & Garretsen 1994). Having 
stressed the existence of region specific differences, there are some general 
characteristics which define regional based economies. These provide the basis 
for a different approach that sees informal institutions as legitimate discrete 
cognitive alternatives to both markets and hierarchies. The main similarities are:
(i) The existence of informal institutions: The significance of informal
arrangements to the T.V.E is discussed above. The importance of implicit 
conventions in the “Third Italy” and in French regional variants, which rule out 
wage competition and labour poaching are discussed, inter alia, in Courault & 
Romani (1992) and Lorenz (1992). The role of implicit contracts in the J-mode is 
discussed in Aoki (1990) - see also chapter six. Another example is the informal 
exchange of information common in high-tech American regionalism - in 
particular in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (see Saxenian 1992, Tyson 1992).
(ii) A balance between co-operation and competition: This seems to be the 
main ingredient in the success of regional based economies (see eg Dei Ottati 
1994, Friedman 1988 chap. 5, Sabel 1989 pp.45-52). “On the one hand, 
competition between supplier firms produces a higher degree of specialisation 
and a more extensive division of labour; ... on the other, cooperation between 
buyers and sellers enables them to pool risks and draw on each other’s 
distinctive capabilities in the form of specific skills, information and tacit 
knowledge of processes and techniques” (Arrighetti et al 1997 p. 172). As far as 
specific examples go, the peculiar mix of cooperation among T.V.Es and 
competition between T.V.Es and S.O.Es is discussed in Qian & Xu (1993 pp.13- 
14) and Jefferson et al (1994). The importance of bilateral trust relations in a
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range of location specific regional economies are discussed in Gambetta et al 
(1988) {eg on trust and co-operation in the Lyon metal working industry see 
Lorenz 1988). Best (1990 chap.5) emphasises the balance between 
cooperation and competition in the J-mode - a non location specific example.
(iii) The existence of a distinct grouping: The term regionalism implies something 
which is location specific. And this is how the concept has been interpreted in 
most of the literature (see eg Courault & Romani (1992). However, in attempts 
to generalise flexible specialisation into a general paradigm (see eg Piore & 
Sabel 1984) the notion that regionalism must be location specific is dismissed. 
While attempts to generalise regionalism in this manner are controversial it can 
be useful to think of a "distinct grouping” as the point of reference rather than a 
region which is location specific. The reputation effect mechanism, discussed 
above, seems to rest on the existence of a relatively self-contained group rather 
than a location specific region. The keiretsu, in Japan, for example, does not fit 
easily into a location specific explanation,14 but the notion of "groupness" (Ouchi 
1981) is readily akin to the broader term. The concept of a "distinct grouping” is, 
nevertheless, often an out growth of location specific regionalism. And the term 
“distinct grouping” captures a region in local space, such as T.V.Es, as a subset.
(iv) The importance of the social setting: Where regionalism is location specific 
it is often based on, or has evolved out of, personal and familial ties. The 
importance of the social setting illustrates the recurring theme, in this chapter, 
that economic relations are embedded in a broader cultural context. This point 
has been emphasised, in the T.V.E case, in Nee (1992) and Lin (1995). The 
role which familial and broader social ties have played as the basis of the "Third 
Italy” are well documented (see Courault & Romani 1992 pp.206-207). The 
importance of small family firms in French regionalism has also been 
acknowledged (see Ganne 1992). The reputation mechanism, above, depends,
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for its effect, on regionalism having a strong element of social embeddedness.
5.4 CONCLUSION
This chapter has put forward two main arguments. The first was that traditional 
T.V.Es can be seen in the context of a regional web. The second was that the 
T.V.E experience is a specific example of a broader new regionalism. The 
literature which has grown out of attempts to explain T.V.E success, to this point, 
has not challenged the post-socialist transition approach as it applies to Eastern 
Europe. For example, Weitzman & Xu’s (1994) paper explains T.V.E success on 
the basis of differences in co-operative culture between Europe and Asia, rather 
than posing a direct challenge to post-socialist transition. Qian & Xu (1993), in a 
similar fashion focus on the differences between China and Eastern Europe to 
explain the former’s success - contrasting the “M-Form" planning structure with 
the "U-Form” hierarchical planning structure. However, if T.V.Es are part of a 
broader new regionalism this suggests an alternative view of transition in 
Eastern Europe. In concluding the chapter I want to elaborate on this point.
The problem of cooperation in institution design can be traced back at least as 
far as Chester Barnard (1938). He stressed that the problem of cooperation 
stems from the fact that the objectives of individuals often do not coincide. The 
Barnard tradition, therefore, suggests that the main aim in designing institutions 
is to find a method of controlling diverse individuals in an efficient fashion (see 
Ouchi 1980 pp.130-131). This criteria implies that the appropriate institutional 
design, on the face of it, at least in the absence of empirical evidence, should be 
open-ended. This means that both formal and informal institutional responses 
should be considered potential discrete cognitive alternatives. The issue of 
institutional design, however, following Williamson (1975), has tended to be 
interpreted in terms of either a market/hierarchies distinction or a 
market/hierarchies continuum. The problem is that the market/hierarchies 
distinction sees institutional design in black and white either/or terms positing
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markets and hierarchies as formal alternatives. The continuum perspective, on 
the other hand, provides for informal institutional responses, but as just a 
spectrum in a market/hierarchies continuum. Thus the extent to which informal 
institutions, in Williamson, are distinct cognitive alternatives is not apparent.
These ideas have been transferred over into the literature on post-socialist 
transition, which dominates the debate on Eastern Europe, as accepted doctrine. 
The post-socialist transition literature treats hierarchies and markets as the 
institutional alternatives. To do this, command economies are conceptualised as 
large hierarchies - “central planning is but the extreme point on the continuum of 
possible scales of hierarchy” (Putterman 1995 p.374). The implication of this 
sort of dichotomising is that the transition from state planning to market involves 
the straight switch of one institutional design for another. Little attention has 
been given to the notion that there might be discrete informal alternatives to 
both the market and central planning. The problem is that the big bang 
approach treats markets as the institutional answer to differing individual goals 
and thus tends to overlook the importance of path dependent historical heritage 
in Eastern Europe (see eg Stark 1990 1991 and Van Ees & Garretsen 1994).15 
The notion that markets, as institutions, have an historical dimension is also 
overlooked in the big bang tradition. The big bang view of the market as 
ahistorical and a path dependent follows, in essence, from the Williamson thesis 
that the firm as an individual is underpinned via a nexus of contracts (see eg 
Williamson 1985, 1990). The reason is that Williamson's emphasis on 
methodological individualism in extending market contracting into the firm denies 
the potential relevance of collective action in the market and, in this sense, it 
becomes a mere abstract space of exchange where agents, in an ideal world 
negotiate outcomes which are allocative efficient. However, the fact is the 
emphasis on individualism is antithetical to the cognitive nature of the institution.
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The existence of a "U-Form” hierarchical planning structure (Qian & Xu 1993 
pp. 16-18) in Eastern Europe means that, in some cases, regionalism will be 
problematical.16 But to dismiss the potential wider application of regionalism 
because there was a more centralised planning structure in Eastern Europe 
misses the main idea. The point is that regionalism is a gradual evolving 
process. The implication is that there is no single, to borrow Murrell’s (1995) 
title, "transition according to Cambridge Mass.”. The transformation process, 
instead, is often path dependent group (and region) specific. And the existence 
of inter alia ethnic diversity and cultural heritage in Eastern Europe makes this 
as relevant there as it is in Asia. This is not to suggest that clan forms will be 
the inevitable end result of post-socialist transformation. Perhaps, over time, 
even the T.V.E sector will come to resemble standard western property ideals. 
What it does mean, though, is that transforming economies should be allowed to 
develop institutional responses which are best suited to their own needs.
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CHAPTER 6 
THE TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN COLLECTIVE LEARNING AND 
SPECIALISATION IN THE T.V.E SECTOR
6.1. INTRODUCTION
The last chapter presented a regional based model of the "traditional” T.V.E.1 
The informal character of the traditional and still dominant T.V.E regional 
network has been an important factor in explaining its success. However, there 
are a growing number of larger T.V.Es which enter into inter-regional and even 
international contracts.2 The behaviour of these T.V.Es often does not fit well 
with a pure regional based explanation which focuses mainly on informal 
institutions. This chapter suggests that the growth of the T.V.E sector has 
resulted in important related trade-offs between informal and formal exchange 
and between collective learning and specialisation. With the growth in the T.V.E 
sector, regional based explanations need to be extended in order to explain 
these developments. The last chapter mentioned that the model developed 
there could be extended to explain inter-regional and international T.V.Es 
through drawing analogies with the Japanese experience. This chapter 
develops this idea in the context of a formal model. To do this, the notion from 
chapter three, that different concepts of the division of labour underpin the 
market-hierarchies and collective learning rationales for the firm, will be used.
The chapter has two inter-related aims. The first is to point to, and formalise, 
some of the relevant trade-offs that have emerged with the growth of T.V.Es 
using a model adapted from Ehrlich (1973). The second is to suggest that the 
T.V.E sector is developing a dual character. This entails (i) a core of strategic 
alliances based on informal exchange similar to the kigyo shudan (or business
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grouping) in Japan and (ii) an extended sector in which arms-length or 
formal exchange is predominant. The chapter is set out as follows: The basic 
ideas are presented in an informal manner in section 6.2. The object of this 
section is to summarise some of the main arguments made in the last chapter 
with a view to extending the framework in the formal model. There is a brief 
discussion of the notion that T.V.Es are part of a distinct grouping. This is 
followed with a discussion about the dual nature of an expanded T.V.E sector 
and the trade-offs that this involves. These concepts are formalised in section 
6.3 where a simple model which looks at the trade-offs between informal and 
formal exchange in the expanded dualistic T.V.E sector is presented. The 
implications of the model for future directions in the T.V.E sector are explored in 
section 6.4. The last section contains some general observations on the chapter.
6.2 THE TOWNSHIP AND VILLAGE ENTERPRISE SECTOR
The T. V.E Sector as a Regional Network or Distinct Grouping 
The last chapter pointed out that the notion that traditional T.V.Es operate within 
a relatively self contained regional network is consistent with a low level tier in 
Qian & Xu’s (1993) “M-Form”. Nevertheless, it also suggested that, for some 
purposes, it is more useful to think of a "distinct grouping" as the point of 
reference rather than a region which is location specific (see section 5.3). The 
importance of long-term reputation as a mechanism underpinning soft 
contracting seems to rest on the existence of a relatively self-contained group 
rather than a location specific region per se. The notion of a distinct grouping 
enables us to make some comparisons between the growth mechanism and 
external contracting of the T.V.E and the J-mode. This is consistent with a 
growing number of articles in Chinese journals advocating the introduction of 
either Japanese management practices or J-mode features in Chinese firms.3
Important differences exist in both the ownership structure of the J-mode and 
T.V.Es and the organisation of their distinct groupings (see Komiya 1987, Lee
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1991 chap. 8, Chang & Wang 1994 pp.441-442). First, the nominal owners of 
the J-mode are the shareholders who have well-defined rights spelt out in the 
Articles of Association, but the nominal owners of the T.V.E - the local residents 
- do not have shares which can be bought and sold. Second, a kigyo shudan 
includes firms in both upstream and downstream industries, but this is not 
usually the case with groups of T.V.Es. Third, the existence of extensive cross­
shareholding is a characteristic of the kigyo shudan which has no counterpart in 
the case of T.V.Es. A fourth related difference is that the kigyo shudan 
affiliations revolve around the main bank system. Thus, for most listed 
companies in Japan, the main bank is among the major shareholders of member 
firms or more typically it is representative of their interests. As such it has the 
closest informal ties with individual firms in terms of cash management and loans 
(see section 3.2). There is no direct counterpart to the main bank system 
underpinning informal links between T.V.Es, but the T.V.G's role is similar.4
Yet, in spite of these differences, there are similarities in the growth mechanism 
of the J-mode and T.V.Es. An important J-mode feature is that the major stake­
holders - external financing entities, shareholders and workers - make a long­
term commitment to the firm. Aoki (1990) argues that this promotes productive 
efficiency because it cushions the firm from the full rigour of financial and labour 
markets. To put it in different terms, the planning time horizon of the external 
financial entities, in general, tends to be longer in the stylised J-mode than in the 
A-mode. This is conducive to collective learning or continuous incremental 
technical change in productivity growth. Lo (1997) points out that there are 
similarities in the institutional structure of S.O.Es and the J-mode in terms of 
promoting incremental innovation: Hence, he suggests (at pp.91-92) “the
rigidities characteristic of China’s reformed enterprises, particularly in terms of 
low labour mobility and close government-enterprise ties, though detrimental to 
allocative efficiency, might have been conducive for productive efficiency”.
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This statement is also applicable to T.V.Es. First, while traditional T.V.Es are 
flexible in the labour and product markets, the close relationship between T.V.Es 
and T.V.Gs means that lenders are more willing to make long-term commitments 
in the financial market. For example, Ho (1994 p. 125) points out that, in 
Jiangsu, if a T.V.E is unable to service its loan, the common practice is for the 
T.V.G to transfer the debt to another, or to several other enterprises under its 
control. While allocative inefficient, long-term commitment fosters productive 
efficiency through providing a cushion for incremental innovation and learning 
through networks. The late industrialisation literature suggests that this is the 
basis for the successful adoption, adaptation and improvement of imported 
technologies and hence economic growth (see eg Amsden 1989, Best 1990, 
Lazonick 1991, Lo 1997). The Japanese have adopted, adapted and improved 
on existing imported technologies since the Meiji period. Between 1868 and 
1912 the development of so-called Meiji technologies, from existing methods, 
which were better suited to local climatic conditions than their imported western 
counterparts, was an important reason for growth (see Rosovsky 1972) After 
World War 2, consistent with Abramovitz's (1989) catch-up hypothesis, the 
Japanese imported technologies from countries like the the United Kingom and 
United States, often making improvements through incremental innovation. 
Since the introduction of the economic reforms China has followed a similar 
path, through encouraging foreign investment in allocated areas. Imported 
technologies and associated rapid structural change have been a prominent 
characteristic of Chinese growth in the reform period (see Lo 1997 chap.3). 
While collective learning associated with this growth pattern is not restricted to 
T.V.Es, it has been conducive to integrated coordination through networks.
A second feature common to the J-mode and T.V.Es is that there is no pressure 
from shareholders for dividends. In the Japanese case shareholders are treated 
as a group outside the firm like banks. This means that in the stylised J-mode, 
emphasis is placed on growth rather than short-term profit. Similarly, once the
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T.V.G has met its obligations in terms of its social welfare function, it is able to 
retain most of the after-tax profits inside the T.V.E to finance further growth. 
One estimate which Ho (1994 p. 123) gives is that in the sunan region in Jiangsu, 
in the first half of the 1980s, most T.V.Es reinvested 50% to 60% or more of 
retained profits. The results of a joint SSB and People’s University study of 200 
rural enterprises in 10 provinces suggests that this is a conservative estimate. 
The firms in the sample, most of which were T.V.Es, reinvested between 79% 
and 93% of retained earnings in 1985 (Zhou & Hu 1987 p. 142). This is similar to 
the capital-centred system in Japan where most of the capital is reserved inside 
the firm to finance further expansion. A well-known fact is that compared with 
firms in other advanced capitalist countries, the dividend to profit ratio in 
Japanese firms is much lower (see eg Odagiri 1994, Zhao 1997 pp. 17-18).
Third, both the J-mode and T.V.Es exhibit a high ratio of debts. There are 
obvious potential costs in having a high debt ratio. Attempts to reduce high 
levels of debt among T.V.Es has been one of the major reasons behind the push 
for more joint-stock companies.5 Similarly, concerns about bad debts in light of 
lower growth rates in recent years has underpinned calls for reforming the 
Japanese financial system.6 However, high levels of debt have also been 
consistent with high growth rates. Without a high level of borrowings, given the 
relative scarcity of funds, it is unlikely that T.V.Es would have grown at such a 
rapid rate. The same is true of Japan. For example in the period of substantial 
growth, between 1956 and 1970, 300 billion yen, the cumulative deficiency of 
total enterprise accounts, was made up in entirety by the surplus funds of 
residents’ accounts through “deposits bank loans" (Zhou & Hu 1987 p.122).
There are also substantial similarities in the informal character of the J-mode 
and T.V.Es1 external contracts. These revolve around the informal nature of 
contracting in both distinct groupings. The kigyo shudan affiliations, like T.V.Es, 
often operate at less than arms-length. Most loans are negotiated at a personal
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level where informal ties created, in part through cross-shareholding, are more 
important than explicit contracts. The close ties between member firms is also 
reflected in the fact that the policies which member firms of the kigyo shudan 
adopt tend to mirror the interests of the group as a whole, rather than the 
interests of individual shareholders. Member firms of the kigyo shudan, much 
like T.V.Es, also help one another in times of serious business hardship. These 
informal contracts within both distinct groups represent strategic alliances in the 
absence of formal sanctioning. Gerlach (1992) has used the term "intercorporate 
alliance” to describe contracts in the kigyo shudan. The language which Gerlach 
(1992) uses is also apt for describing alliances in the T.V.E regional network:
"Intercorporate alliances ... are institutionalised relationships among firms 
based on localised networks of dense transactions, a stable framework for 
exchange, and patterns of periodic collective action. ... The organisational 
model is neither that of Alfred Chandler’s ‘visible hand’ or Adam Smith’s 
‘invisible hand’ ... but of hands interlocked in complex networks of formal 
and informal interfirm relationships” (1992 p.3 emphasis is in the original).
The composition of the T.V.E regional network is not as homogeneous or 
organised as the kigyo shudan. Gerlach (1992 p.24) points out that the kigyo 
shudan, in Japan, have tended to follow similar patterns of membership. Each 
business grouping includes: (i) a major commercial bank at its centre (the main 
bank), (ii) a large life insurance firm, (iii) one or more general trading 
companies and (iv) one or more manufacturing firms in all important industrial 
sectors. The same general format for executive interaction between members is 
also followed through “presidents’ councils” which meet each month. There are 
no formal arrangements like this in the T.V.E regional network. The result is that 
there is generally not the same degree of semi-formalised corporate feeling in 
the T.V.E case. However, while the T.V.E regional network is not as developed 
as the kigyo shudan there are indicators that it is moving in the same direction.
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FIGURE 6.1
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF THE T.V.E SECTOR FOR THE EXTENSION OF 
THE DISTINCT GROUP AND EMERGENCE OF AN EXTENDED SECTOR
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The Dualistic Character o f  the Expanded T. K E  Sector 
The regional and emerging extended T.V.E sector 
There are signs that the growth of the T.V.E sector in terms of three factors is 
creating a dualistic character similar to the J-mode. The three factors are (i) an 
increase in the size of T.V.Es, (ii) an increase in the number of contracting 
parties and (iii) an increase in the breadth of contracting in terms of 
geographical distance. The dual structure consists of a distinct group where 
T.V.Es continue to operate predominantly at less than arms-length and an 
extended sector where there is mainly arms-length exchange between large 
T.V.Es or groups of T.V.Es. The main argument is sketched out in schematic 
form in figure 6.1. It posits that the growth in the T.V.E sector is associated with 
two main developments; institutional innovation and the emergence of an 
extended sector. The first is institutional innovation within the regional network to 
incorporate other parties into the core. In this sense, the regional network 
seems to be evolving from being a mainly geographic specific phenomenon to 
a non-location specific distinct group which is more in line with the J-mode.
The expansion of the distinct group is evident in the development of a number of 
relatively long-term alliances between regional or international investors. For 
example, Mitchell (1995) documents business groupings embracing T.V.Es, 
Hong Kong and Canadian companies which are based on (or have grown out of) 
familial ties, business trust and flexible credit. In addition a number of T.V.E 
groups based in China, but oriented towards the international market have 
emerged. It was reported in 1994 that 100 such T.V.E groups had been 
established nation-wide.7 Two years later, in 1996, there were 390 provincial 
level T.V.E groups in Jiangsu alone and 736 nationwide.8 In some cases these 
groups are highly organised. For example, at the end of 1991 groups of T.V.Es 
in Jiangsu had a range of enterprises in developing countries such as Thailand, 
the Philippines and Indonesia as well as developed countries such as Australia, 
the U.S.A, Canada and Japan with investments totalling $US 5 million.9
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After investing in and setting up joint ventures in developing countries T.V.E 
groups often set up factories there, making use of local labour, and raw and 
semi-finished materials, while using the services of local firms for selling the 
finished product (Li 1995 p.378). For example, the Changshu Polypropylene 
Fibre Factory run by Yushan Town in Changshu joined the Chemical Research 
Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Hanging Chemical Fibre 
Factory in Zhejiang Province. They pooled funds with two Thai companies to set 
up the Site (group) Co. Ltd. in Thailand which started operations in May 1990. It 
had produced 5 million metric tons of polypropylene fibre and was making profits 
by the end of the first year.10 The emergence of groups of high-tech enterprises 
provides another illustration of how the strategic core is expanding. A well 
known example is Zhongguancun in Beijing - China’s Silicon Valley. Often 
individual financiers, research institutions, S.O.Es and T.V.Es from different 
parts of China pool funds to set these enterprises up (see Zhai 1997 pp. 16-17).11 
While, unlike the kigyo shudan, these groups of S.O.Es and T.V.Es do not 
contain firms in upstream and downstream industries, a division of labour exists 
in terms of transfers of funds, labour and technologies between group members.
The second development associated with the growth of the T.V.E sector is the 
emergence of an extended sector outside of the strategic core where there is 
mainly arms-length exchange between relatively large T.V.Es or groups of 
T.V.Es. As pointed out in the last chapter, informal contracts within a regional 
network or distinct group depend on reputation and trust built up between 
contracting parties. Hence, the success of informal contracts within the regional 
network depends on the communal character of the T.V.E. The close ties 
between the T.V.E and the T.V.G give the traditional T.V.E strong communal 
properties. When T.V.Es become larger and their contracting extends outside of 
the immediate region, all things being equal, the trust embedded in geographic 
specific communal contracting is absent. This situation is common in the coastal 
provinces where T.V.Es are larger and more marketised. The Shanghai Heqing
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Embroidery and Garment Factory which was founded in 1979 in Heqing 
township east of central Shanghai illustrates this trend. It started as a small 
communal T.V.E with a few workers, but it now has 2800 workers. It has sales of 
$US 12.5 million a year and recently opened a sales office in San Francisco.12
While it is not on the same scale as the J-mode, the emergence of an extended 
sector is reflected in the increase in the number of large and medium-sized 
T.V.Es, in particular in the coastal and urban areas. In 1996 4531 T.V.Es were 
classified as either large or medium sized enterprises (L.M.Es).13 In 1997 in 
Jiangsu 1209 T.V.Es were L.M.Es.14 Large T.V.Es only account for a small 
number of both total T.V.Es and total L.M.Es in terms of numbers. In 1995 7,4% 
of L.M.Es were T.V.Es15 and in 1996 the largest 5000 T.V.Es accounted for just 
.02% of total T.V.Es,16 However, this understates their significance in the T.V.E 
sector. In 1996 the largest 5000 T.V.Es accounted for 11% of fixed assets, 6.5% 
of sales revenue, 8.1% of pre-tax profits and 13.2% of export revenue of all 
T.V.Es.17 The extended sector will also become more important as the number 
of large and medium-sized T.V.Es grow over the next few years. It is estimated 
that in 2000 the number of “big township enterprises" will be 10,000. The fixed 
assets, sales volumes and taxes of these 10,000 "big township enterprises” is 
expected to account for more than 10% of the figures for total T.V.Es. Moreover, 
in 2000 the 200 biggest township enterprises are expected to each register in 
excess of one billion yuan in annual sales.18 Because of the extent of their 
business interests, many of these large T.V.Es enter into a range of inter­
regional and international transactions most of which are at arms-length.
Trade-offs between specialisation and collective learning 
The last chapter discussed Williamson & Ouchi’s (1981) distinction between soft 
and hard contracting. The term "soft contracting” refers to exchange which is at 
less than arms-length. The term “hard contracting” refers to arms-length 
transactions where written contracts define the relationship. The distinction 
between soft and hard contracting implies some important trade-offs between
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exchange in the distinct group and extended T.V.E sector. In this section it is 
argued that there are two related sets of trade-offs. First, a trade-off exists 
between collective learning and specialisation and this is premised on a second 
trade-off between informal and formal exchange. Some explanation is needed 
about what these trade-offs involve and how they are related to each other.
Within the distinct group, opportunities exist for collective learning through 
horizontal coordination. Here the term horizontal coordination refers to 
horizontal exchanges or horizontal information flows between T.V.Es in the 
distinct group. The exchange of information through horizontal coordination 
within the group promotes learning, but the exchange is often informal and the 
information flows too subtle to be documented in formal contracts. Aoki (1990) 
makes a similar point in emphasising the importance of collective learning within 
the kigyo shudan. He states (at p.10) that “in the Japanese case, knowledge 
sharing and horizontal co-ordination based on it are often informal and based on 
verbal communications (even tacit understanding) ... undocumented 
communications generate information value by the finer use of on-site 
information that is too subtle or cumbersome to document usefully”. These 
observations suggest that because not all information can be written down, 
informal exchange generates opportunities for collective learning over and 
above those that would be available if all exchange is at arms-length. There are 
two reasons for this. Informal exchange is more flexible and it is more conducive 
to productive efficiency because it promotes collective learning via networks.
The extended sector provides opportunities for specialisation through vertical 
coordination. Here the term vertical coordination refers to the relationship 
between management and workers in hierarchies. The central feature of 
vertical coordination is the emphasis on maximising allocative efficiency through 
job specialisation and rational hierarchical control. Two characteristics of the 
extended sector promote specialisation. The first is the relative size of T.V.Es in 
the extended sector. The T.V.Es are larger so opportunities exist to maximise
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scale economies. The second is that most information flows are formal - 
command constraints exist within hierarchies and most inter-firm transactions 
are at arms-length. This releases labour allocated to collective learning through 
informal exchange such as time and effort devoted to gathering and processing 
information. This labour can be reallocated to specialised production in the firm.
A trade-off arises because informal exchange provides more opportunities for 
collective learning, but it also entails costs. These costs are time allocated to 
bargaining and coordination in the absence of deterministic sanctions and time 
devoted to collecting and processing information. These activities take up time 
which could otherwise be allocated to specialisation in the firm. However formal 
exchange also entails costs. In searching for economies of specialisation and 
greater allocative efficiency the benefits of less than arms-length exchange in 
terms of promoting collective learning and productive efficiency are sacrificed. 
Arms-length exchange reduces coordination costs, but it also reduces flexibility 
which underpins collective learning in networks. An issue that arises is under 
what circumstances will informal and formal exchange be most appropriate? 
The degree of trust between the parties is central. Within the distinct group 
collective learning is facilitated because trust exists between the parties 
dependent on social or business ties. This is missing in the extended sector. As 
a result there is more rigid exchange, but more opportunities for specialisation.
Trade-offs between different concepts of the division of labour 
In chapter three it was suggested that the concepts of soft and hard contracting 
are associated with different trajectories dependent on different forms of market 
competition. The basis of horizontal coordination between members of a distinct 
group, through networks, is the social division of labour. This notion was used to 
argue that the social division of labour underpins collective learning through 
informal exchange. On the other hand, the relative importance of vertical 
coordination in the extended sector is consistent with the detailed division of 
labour. The hierarchical relationship of capital and labour in the firm promotes a
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more stable planning environment where market competition, due to greater 
concentrations of market power, is more static. In this respect most of the larger 
T.V.Es have lost their advantages in terms of flexibility. In fact there is little or 
no difference between the internal and external organisation of most of the 
larger coastal T.V.Es and S.O.Es. As a result the larger T.V.Es in the coastal 
provinces, such as Jiangsu, are often referred to as a second S.O.E sector.
A fact that supports this observation is that the growth rate is lower in larger 
hierarchical T.V.Es. For example Xu (1995 chap.2) found that where there is the 
greatest concentration of large T.V.Es - in the suburban provinces - T.F.P is 
growing at a slower rate than in other regions. However, he also found that 
actual T.F.P levels in suburban T.V.Es were much higher than in other regions. 
If this characterisation is correct, it suggests that the related trade-offs between 
informal and formal exchange and between collective learning and specialisation 
in moving from the distinct group to the extended sector depend on trade-offs 
between different growth paths or different concepts of the division of labour.
6.3 A FORMAL MODEL
The comparison of collective learning, specialisation, informal and formal 
exchange in the model is purely analytical in terms of exploring the 
characteristics of hierarchies and networks. However, while it entails a high 
degree of abstraction, I also hope to provide a conceptual framework for 
explaining different organisational characteristics of T.V.Es. In particular the 
model attempts to formalise the main arguments in this chapter through 
exploring three related issues: The first is a trade-off between collective
learning and specialisation depending on whether exchange is informal or 
formal. The second is a trade-off between collective learning and specialisation 
in the distinct group and extended sector. The third is to consider the effect of an 
exogenous increase in the size of the T.V.E sector on the first of the trade-offs.
186
First, consider the trade-off between collective learning and specialisation 
depending on the extent to which exchange is informal or formal. To do this let 
us assume that a T.V.E allocates labour to three activities. The first is 
specialisation, the second is collective learning and the third is building its 
reputation or discovering the reputation of other firms. Moreover assume the 
following: (a) the T.V.E must choose its optimal participation in each process at 
the start of the period (this is a one period model), (b) the firm can substitute 
between processes without cost (this means that factors such as the initial cost 
of training labour in different processes is overlooked), (c) the returns to 
each process depend on, and are increasing functions of, the amount of labour 
assigned to them, and (d) the T.V.E seeks to maximise a given utility function:
U =Enu(XCltr) (1)
c=d,i
where U is satisfaction, Xc is a composite which denotes two “states of outcome” 
or “two states of the world" - (i) when contracts are formal (xd) and (ii) when 
contracts are informal (xj). n  denotes the probability of state c. Let xd occur with 
probability n  and Xj occur with probability (1 -11) where 0 < n  < 1. n  refers to the 
probability that contractual rights are certain and tr denotes the net benefits of 
devoting time to nurturing reputation or discovering others’ reputation where:
x„ = (B, - Cs)NU(ls) + (B, -  Cs)u(l5) + (B„ - C c)NU(lc)
^  = S NU(ls) + S u(ls) + CNU(lc) (2)
x, = (Bc - Cc)NU(lc) + (Bo - Cc)u(lc) + (B, - CS)NU(IS)
X, = C NU(I0) + C u(lo) + SNU(ls) (3)
and tr=f(lr) where lr 0 as JT-^ 1 (4) 
subject to: L=lr + lc + ls (5) (endowment constraint) 
and lr> 0, lc>0, ls>0 (6) (non-negativity requirements) 
where: lr is labour allocated to nurturing or discovering reputation,
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[c is labour allocated to collective learning,
Is is labour allocated to specialisation,
Bs and Cs are the benefits and costs of specialisation, 
and Bc and Cc are the benefits and costs of collective learning
The relationships in (2) and (3) endeavour to formalise a trade-off between 
specialisation and collective learning, dependent on the value of n  (the extent to 
which contractual rights are certain). There are other formal models which 
attempt a similar trade-off in the context of the J-mode (see eg Aoki 1984, 1986, 
1989, Itoh 1987) and the ideas here borrow from those models. The 
underpinning premise in equations (2) and (3), consistent with Aoki’s and Itoh’s 
writings, is that (a) formal exchange reaps economies of specialisation, but at 
the expense of collective learning, while (b) informal exchange results in 
economies of collective learning, but at the expense of greater specialisation.
The net benefits from  specialisation 
Snu=(Bs - CS)NU and Su=(Bs - Cs)u represent the net benefits from specialisation.
SNU=(Bs - CS)NU denotes the net benefits and costs associated with specialisation 
that exists with both formal contracting (xd) and informal contracting ( X j ) .  
The rationale is that even when all exchange is informal, specialisation exists. 
Yang & Wills (1990) give a formal proof that specialisation within the firm and 
exchange occur simultaneously whether exchange is formal or informal.19
Su=(Bs - Cs)u represents economies of specialisation due to formal exchange. 
This depicts the net benefits associated with specialisation (over and above the 
general benefits) as exchange becomes more formal. The benefits arise 
because as the amount of arms-length exchange increases, labour is released 
from gathering and processing information through informal channels. This can 
be reallocated to specialised production in the firm. The costs denote the net 
benefits of collective learning from informal exchange which are foregone.
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The net benefits from  collective learning:
Cu=(Bc - Cc)u and CNU=(Bc- Cc)NU are the net benefits from collective learning.
Cnu=(Bc - Cc)NU denotes the net benefits and costs associated with collective 
learning that exists with both formal contracting (x )^ and informal contracting (Xj).  
Even when exchange is formal, some opportunities exist for collective learning 
within the firm and to some extent between firms through information exchange.
Cu=(Bc - Cc)u represents net benefits to collective learning specific to informal 
exchange. The benefits (Bcu) include inter-firm learning due to more flexible 
exchange which generate innovations which are in excess of value creation 
when exchange is at arms-length. The costs (Ccu) relate to the extra time and 
effort that need to be diverted from specialised processes to facilitate inter-firm 
integration and value creation. These include the extra costs of bargaining, as 
well as coordination and communication in the absence of formal exchange.
The condition in (4) suggests that as exchange becomes more formal, labour 
devoted to "reputation issues” decreases. The T.V.E devotes labour time to 
nurturing its own reputation and discerning the reputation of potential 
contractees. When exchange is informal (ie. low n ) nurturing and discerning 
reputation will be important ex ante when deciding whether to contract because 
of the absence of explicit sanctions. As exchange becomes more formal, 
reputation will be less of an issue. Having said this, I am not suggesting that the 
polar extreme (11=1) exists. The existence of court/arbitration costs means that 
even in high n  societies such as Western Europe some contracts will be 
negotiated on reputation (see eg Macauiey 1963, Williamson 1975 pp. 103-108).
If we substitute (2) and (3) into (1) the problem is now to maximise: 
U (X c ,  tr) =  n U (X d, t r )  +  (1-n) U(Xj, tr) ( 7 )
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subject to (5) with respect to the choice variables lr, lc and ls 
Thus, taking the first derivative, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are as follows:
au/ai < X
(au/ai).i<x (8)
l>0
where I denotes the optimal values for lr, lCl k and X (the Lagrangean multiplier) 
denotes the marginal utility of labour or marginal utility of the firm’s time (5U/dL).
We are interested in how the firm allocates labour between collective learning 
and specialisation as the degree to which contractual rights are certain varies. If 
we assume that labour allocated to reputational issues (lr) is given (for a given 
n), the optimal allocation of labour between specialisation and collective 
learning, in the case of an interior solution, must meet the first order condition:
A (cu + cw ) - ^ ‘7cM/ -(s "u + su) 1- =n U ' (X d )/(1 -n ) U- (Xi) (9 ) 
where: cu =rfCu« lCl cNU =dCm/d\c, / u =</SNU« ls, and su =rfSu« ls
The term on the left hand side of (9) is the slope of a production transformation 
curve (PTC) of the composite variable Xc between the two states of the world (Xd 
and Xj). The term, on the right hand side of (9) is the slope of an indifference 
curve (defined along dU*-0). The PTC, in figure 6.2, is defined between the 
points A and B because of the conditions in (4) and (5). The vertical and 
horizontal intercepts, drawing diagonals from A, are (CNU+Cu)(lc) + SNU(ls) where 
ls+lc=L-lr, and lr > 0. The horizontal intercept at B is (SNU+Su)(ls) + CNU(lc) where 
L=ls+Ic, lr=0 when n=1 given (4). Three indifference curves, in figure 6.2, (Ui, U2 
and U3) show three possible outcomes. A and B are both corner solutions 
denoting outcomes when contractual rights are ex ante certain (11=1) at B and 
contractual rights are ex ante uncertain (n=0) at A. These are polar cases. The 
point C shows the first order condition for the optimal allocation of ls and lc given
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an interior solution (/'e when 0< n<1)- The point C is a strict global maximum 
provided that (a) indifference curves are convex to the origin and (b) the PTC is 
linear or concave. The first implies diminishing marginal rate of substitutionXd.Xi 
while the second suggests diminishing marginal rate of transformationXd.Xi.
Equations (8) and (9) together with figure 6.2 can be used to consider the firm's 
allocation of labour between specialisation and collective learning as n  varies. 
At point B (11=1) a required condition to allocate more labour to collective 
learning is that the absolute value of the slope of the PTC exceeds the absolute 
value of the slope of the indifference curve (Ui). The reverse is true at A. At
FIGURE 6.2
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point A ffl=0) a required condition to allocate more labour to specialisation is 
that the absolute value of the slope of the indifference curve (U2) is greater than 
the absolute value of the slope of the PTC. When we take into account marginal 
returns to collective learning and specialisation this suggests the following:
Proposition 6.1:
If the extent to which contractual rights are certain increases (decreases) the firm will 
substitute Is for l c  ( l c  for Is ) provided that the marginal returns on economies of 
specialisation due to formal exchange [ie. su ] are greater than (are less than) the marginal 
returns on economies of collective learning due to informal exchange[/e. cu].
Second, consider the trade-offs between collective learning and specialisation 
determining the size of the regional network/distinct group and extended sector.
Let Un=otYE+(1-a)YH (10)
where:
Un denotes T.V.E willingness to contract for a given value of II,
Yh refers to the number of T.V.Es in the regional network/distinct group,
Ye refers to the number of T.V.Es in the extended T.V.E sector, 
and a is a positive function of the size of the T.V.E sector in terms of 
both (i) the actual size of T.V.Es and (ii) the number of T.V.Es.
The relationship in (10) captures the dualistic structure of the expanded T.V.E 
sector. The parameter a is a positive function of the size and number of T.V.Es 
where 0<a<1. When a=0 YE does not exist. This is the traditional and still 
predominant T.V.E regional network denoted here as YH. However, as the T.V.E 
sector grows it was suggested above that two things happen: (i) institutional 
innovation draws other parties into the distinct group and (ii) the T.V.E starts to 
contract outside of the distinct group forming a series of inter-regional 
relationships with other parties. The growth in the T.V.E sector is depicted in 
(10) via an increase in the parameter a. When a is greater than zero a dualistic
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structure emerges. When this occurs there is a core of informal exchange (with 
some formal exchange) in a distinct group (YH) and a core of arms-length 
exchange (with some informal exchange) in the extended sector (Y h).20
Let:
Y H=[Pd(ls) - M ls )]+ [C u*(lo) - Ri(lc)] (1 1 )
and
Y e=(P i(Io) - Vii(lc)]+[SU*(I5) - Rd(ls)l (1 2 )
where:
pd - |Lid are the net benefits of specialisation over and above the general 
benefits associated with limited formal exchange in the distinct group.
Cu*- Rj are the net benefits of collective learning in excess of the general 
benefits associated with informal exchange within the distinct group.
pi - pi are the net benefits of collective learning in excess of the general 
benefits associated with limited informal exchange in the extended sector.
Su*- Rd are the net benefits of specialisation over and above the general 
benefits associated with formal exchange in the extended sector.
and
L*=ls+lc (13) is the relevant labour constraint
Equations (11) and (12) are specified so that there is both informal and formal 
exchange in the distinct group and extended sector. The reason is that not all 
exchange in the distinct group is informal, nor is all exchange in the extended 
sector formal. Members of the regional network or distinct group are assumed to 
enter into some arms-length exchange and, in the extended sector, parties who 
normally exchange at arms-length are assumed to enter into some informal
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relationships. However, economies of collective learning due to informal 
exchange in the extended T.V.E sector (pi - pi) are assumed to be a strict 
subset, in terms of degree, of economies of collective learning due to informal 
exchange within the distinct group (Cu* - Ri). This seems reasonable given that 
informal exchange is much more extensive in the latter. Thus, let (Cu* - Ri)=(pi - 
pi)+(j>i where (j>i denotes the difference in the net benefits from informal exchange 
between extended sector (YE) and distinct group (YH). The same assumption is 
made, but in reverse, for the net benefits from formal exchange. Economies of 
specialisation from formal exchange within the distinct group (pd - pd) are 
assumed to be a strict subset, in terms of degree, of economies of specialisation 
from formal exchange in the extended sector (Su* - Rd). Thus, let (Su* - Rd)=(pd- 
Pd)+<j>d where (|)d depicts the degree to which net benefits from formal exchange in 
the extended sector (YE) exceed the net benefits from formal exchange within 
the distinct group (Yh). This also seems reasonable given that casual empiricism 
suggests formal contracts are more widespread in the extended T.V.E sector. If 
we substitute (11) and (12) into (10) and maximise (10) with respect to (13) we 
set up a first order condition for an interior solution which is analogous to (9):
- 1 (cu* - n) - (/&- //,,)/ (/?,- //,) - (su* - rd) I = aUn’ (YE)/(1-a) Un ' (VH) (14) 
where: ^^dC^Vcftu rFdR\/cJ[u Pd~d\)Jd\^ m~d\xdd\^ pj=dfyld\u fii=d\.ijd\u
^*=6/Su*/6/ldl rci=dRJd\d
The expression on the left hand side, as in (9), is the slope of a PTC. The 
expression on the right hand side is the slope of an indifference curve. If a=0 
we have a corner solution where all exchange occurs within a regional network 
and there is no extended T.V.E sector. If we start from a position where a=0, 
under what conditions will the T.V.E sector extend outside the regional network? 
Equation (10) suggests that an extended sector will emerge when a>0 where, as 
noted above, a is a positive function of the size and number of T.V.Es. An
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increase in the size and number of T.V.Es will effect the marginal net benefits to 
collective learning from informal exchange - [(cw* - ri)+ (/?,-juj)] - and the marginal 
net benefits to specialisation from formal exchange - [(su* - rd) +((3d- fid)].
The precise effects of an increase in the number and size of T.V.Es on marginal 
net benefits of collective learning and specialisation is an empirical issue. 
Nonetheless, some observations, although somewhat arbitrary and 
impressionistic, are still possible. Consider the effect of an increase in the 
numbers and size of T.V.Es on the marginal net benefits to collective learning 
from informal exchange. As the number of contracting parties increases we 
would expect that the marginal net benefits would decrease. This is because the 
marginal costs of collective learning specific to informal exchange (ie. dCculd\c or 
;•/+ fii) will increase. First, with larger numbers, more time and effort will need to 
be diverted from specialised production in the firm in order to collect and 
process information through informal channels. Second, with larger numbers, 
the costs of communication, co-ordination and bargaining in the absence of 
formal exchange will increase with more complex horizontal integration.
The effect of an increase in the size and number of T.V.Es on the marginal net 
benefit to specialisation from formal exchange, however, might not be the same 
over the entire range of a. First, it seems reasonable that the marginal net 
benefits to specialisation from formal exchange will increase with larger firms 
and more contracting parties for low to middle values of a. First, in terms of size, 
opportunities exist for economies of scale with vertical integration, but the 
marginal costs of specialisation due to worker alienation or boredom are likely to 
be small for low to middle values of a. With respect to an increase in the 
number of T.V.Es, the costs of facilitating specialisation through formal 
exchange is likely to small over low to middle values of a. It seems plausible
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that for low to middle values of a  an increase in the number of contracting 
parties will reduce the marginal cost of stipulating ex ante contractual rights 
because for the nth contractor most of the formal details will be in place.
However, for higher values of a  we might expect that the marginal net benefits of 
specialisation from formal exchange will decrease with more contracting parties 
and larger firms. In terms of size, there is likely to be diminishing returns to 
scale economies. In terms of numbers, the marginal cost of ex ante stipulating 
and ex post enforcing contractual rights will be high. The reason is that for high 
values of a  casual empiricism suggests the transactions will be ex ante more 
complex and, therefore, cost more (in terms of legal expenses) to enforce. We 
can summarise the suggested effects of an increase in a  on the marginal net 
benefits of specialisation from formal exchange as follows: For low to
intermediate initial values of a  such that a  is less than some specified value a*, 
an increase in the number and size of firms will have a positive effect on the 
marginal net benefits of specialisation from formal exchange. However, for 
higher initial values of a  (values of a  greater than a*), an increase in the number 
and size of firms will reduce the marginal net benefits to specialisation from 
formal exchange. Thus a* is the value of a  for which (su* + /y  - {fd+jnJ) changes 
from an increasing to a decreasing function of labour allocated to specialisation 
(ls). Given these observations (14) suggests the following three part proposition:
Proposition 6.2:
Given that cpi >0 and that cpd >0,
(i) with an increase in the size of the T.V.E sector a dualistic T.V.E sector will 
emerge provided that the marginal net benefits of specialisation from formal 
exchange in the extended sector (.vw* - i\i) are greater than the marginal net benefits 
of collective learning from informal exchange within the distinct group {cu* - r t).
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(ii) for values of a<a* (/<?. values for which the marginal net benefits of 
specialisation from formal exchange are an increasing function of ls given 10) with 
an increase in the number and size of firms, the size of the extended sector will 
increase provided that the marginal net benefits of specialisation from formal 
exchange in the extended sector (su* - r j)  are greater than the marginal net benefits 
of collective learning from informal exchange within the distinct group (cu* - r,-).
(iii) for values of a>a* (Je. values for which the marginal net benefits of 
specialisation from formal exchange are a decreasing function of ls given l0) with an 
increase in the number and size of firms, the size of the extended sector will 
increase provided that (a) the marginal net benefits of collective learning from 
informal exchange (cu*-rf) are greater than the marginal net benefits of 
specialisation from formal exchange ( f id  -  / / , /) within the distinct group, (b) the 
marginal net benefits of specialisation from formal exchange (su* - are greater 
than the marginal net benefits of collective learning from informal exchange (fit - 
//,) in the extended sector and (c) the marginal net benefits of specialisation from 
formal exchange in the extended sector are greater than the marginal net benefits 
of collective learning from informal exchange within the distinct group.
Third, consider the effect of an exogenous increase in the size of the T.V.E 
sector on the relationship between collective learning, specialisation, informal 
and formal exchange. To do this we must spell out what, to this point, has 
been implicit: (i) S u= (S u* -R d)+  (pd - pd) and (ii) C u= (C u*-R i)+ (p j - pi). When the 
equality in equation (14) holds (first order condition for an interior solution) there 
will be a value of n  for a given a which corresponds to the optimal value of n  in 
equation (9). This corresponds to the value of n  at C in figure 6.2. To show the 
effect of an increase in a on 11 in terms of both equation (9) and figure 6.2 
consider figure 6.3. Assume that there is an exogenous increase in the number
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and size of firms. The intercepts of the PTC in figure 6.2 will change. With an 
increase in a, the maximum possible Su will increase while the maximum 
possible Cu will decrease provided that <)>i>0 and tj>d>0. This follows when 
equations (11) and (12) are inserted into (10). The PTC will rotate as shown in 
figure 6.3. A1 will lie below and to the left of A and B1 will lie to the right of B.
Point C in figures 6.2 and 6.3 correspond. The dotted PTC in figure 6.3 has the 
same MRTXd.xi as A1 B1 for given values of xd and xi (ie for given values of n). 
The premise underpinning figure 6.3 is that an increase in the number and size 
of firms will generate a substitution effect and a labour effect. First, consider 
the substitution effect. If the PTC rotates from AB to A1 B1 the absolute value of 
the slope of the indifference curve (Ui), at C, is greater than the absolute value 
of the slope of the PTC - AB1. The firm will thus substitute towards xd given that 
su is greater than cu at C. This process will continue until the slopes are the 
same forgiven x,- andxd. Thus C to Ci, along Ui is the substitution effect.
With an increase in the number and size of firms, more scope exists for the 
division of labour (see Chen 1987, Yang & Wills 1990). The labour effect 
captures the effect on the division of labour. The labour effect will be from Ci to 
C2 in figure 6.3. At Z on A1 B1 the MRTXd.xi is the same as the MRTXd.xi at Ci. 
Thus the slope of A1 B1 at Z is the same as the slope of AB at Ci. The 
indifference curve (U2), in figure 6.3, is drawn so that it is tangent to A1 B1 at Z 
(C2 and Z coincide). This suggests that greater scope for the division of labour 
is allocated between specialisation and collective learning in equal amounts. 
The point to note is that the labour effect is neither positive nor negative. The 
reason is that su equals cu at Ci. Therefore, at Ci, there is no incentive for the 
firm to either increase ls relative to lc which would generate a positive labour 
effect or increase lc relative to ls which would generate a negative labour effect.
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Proposition 6.3:
With an increase in the size of the T.V.E sector, economies of specialisation due to formal 
exchange will increase relative to economies of collective learning due to informal 
exchange. The effect which an increase in the size of the T.V.E sector has on the trade-off 
between collective learning and specialisation can be broken down into the labour and 
substitution effects. Economies of specialisation due to formal exchange will increase 
relative to economies of collective learning due to informal exchange with an increase in 
the size of the T.V.E sector because of the substitution effect. The labour effect, 
however, promotes both economies of collective learning and economies of specialisation.
6.4 IMPLICATIONS IN TERMS OF THE DIVISION OF LABOUR
The implications in terms of the division of labour are considered in figure 6.4. It 
extends figure 6.1 to incorporate information flows and different concepts of the 
division of labour. It provides a schematic representation of the implications of 
an increase in the size of the T.V.E sector on horizontal and vertical information 
flows. To do this, figure 6.4 places proposition 6.3 from the formal presentation, 
and the earlier verbal argument relating to institutional innovation, into a 
consistent framework. With an increase in the number and size of firms, more 
opportunities exist for both horizontal information flows based on informal 
exchange and vertical information flows based on formal exchange. First, 
institutional innovation and more scope for the division of labour through the 
labour effect generate horizontal information flows. Second, both the 
substitution and labour effects generate vertical information flows. When we 
extend this framework to take account of the different concepts of the division of 
labour, a rationale exists for informal and formal exchange. As outlined above, 
and in chapter three, the detailed division of labour is consistent with vertical 
coordination and the social division of labour supports horizontal coordination.
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This raises wider issues about whether incomplete private property rights and 
less than arms-length exchange are feasible alternatives. The two previous 
attempts to consider this issue in these terms are in the market tradition of the 
firm (see Yang & Wills 1990, Ng & Yang 1995). Both conclude that the 
immediate introduction of unambiguous property rights is a precondition for 
sustained growth and argue that China’s legal system hampers economic 
reforms because of its incomplete protection of private entrepreneurs’ residual 
rights. In this respect, their reasoning is that more certain contractual rights is 
essential to promote the detailed division of labour and economic development. 
Hence, the detailed division of labour and economic development are seen as 
opposite sides of the same coin. For example Ng & Yang (1995 pp. 11-18) state:
“laws that protect free association and the residual rights of owners of 
firms are a driving force in economic development. Such protection of 
entrepreneurs’ residual rights can promote the division of labour in 
producing intangible management services and encourage experiment 
with various patterns of organisation and division of labour. This will in 
turn speed up the evolution of the division of labour that generates
endogenous economic growth and technical progress  Chinese
entrepreneurs’ claims to residual rights of firms cannot be well protected 
in the absence of a well stipulated property law and fair competition law. 
Hence, organisational innovation, which is a precondition for technical 
progress and the success of China’s reforms cannot be well developed”.
However, the view that unambiguous property rights are a precondition for 
sustained growth overlooks the role of collective learning through informal 
exchange. Yang & Wills and Ng & Yang suggest that an increase in the 
detailed division of labour will occur simultaneously with an increase in the
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number of contracting parties, but the role of the social division of labour is not 
considered. Three implications follow when we bring the social division of 
labour into the picture, (i) If the degree to which contractual rights are certain 
increases, the detailed division of labour (specialisation) will increase relative to 
the social division of labour (collective learning), (ii) As the number of 
contracting parties increase a dualistic structure emerges where (a) economies 
of collective learning are nurtured within a regional network or distinct group 
while (b) economies of specialisation are developed within an extended sector, 
(iii) In the case of an interior solution, the optimal outcome will be a solution 
where some ambiguity exists in the certainty of contractual rights - ie. 0< n<1.
The first point suggests that rather than putting private property rights in place 
from the start, the gradual introduction of less ambiguous property rights might 
be preferable as the T.V.E sector grows. The second point recognises that both 
informal and formal exchange present benefits and costs and there is a role for 
collective learning and specialisation. The third point implies that some 
ambiguity in property rights is optimal which is consistent with Li’s (1996) recent 
article, although he reaches this conclusion through taking a different approach. 
Li (1996) presents a model of the Chinese non-state sector which is based on 
the theory of grey markets (see section 5.2). His main conclusion (at p. 16) is 
that “an unconditional call for clarifying the ownership and property rights of 
enterprises, a popular slogan in China, may not be appropriate for transition 
economies. Given the greyness and imperfections of the market, a proper 
degree of ambiguity of property rights is perhaps necessary” (emphasis mine).
The broader implications relate to the similarities in the dualistic nature of the J- 
mode and T.V.E contracts. The dualistic character of the J-mode is well 
documented in Aoki (1990) and Itoh (1987), amongst others, but the emerging
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dualism in the T.V.E sector, while hinted at in different writings, has not been 
discussed or modelled in an explicit fashion. The chapter suggests that there 
are lessons in the J-mode experience for understanding both the T.V.E sector as 
it now is and its further development. Again the most important lesson hinges on 
recognising the dual character of the division of labour. The collective learning 
theme has a strong tradition in the J-mode literature. It follows that perhaps one 
of the reasons for neglecting the role of the social division of labour in the past 
has been the failure to see the similarities between the J-mode and T.V.Es.
6.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter had two inter-related aims. The first was to provide a simple model 
that formalises some trade-offs in the (emerging) expanded T.V.E sector. The 
second was to point out some similarities in the dualistic character of the 
external contracts of the J-mode and the T.V.E. The J-mode is often given as an 
example of a firm which contradicts standard textbook learning. Thus the 
suggestion, in this chapter, that there are similarities between the J-mode and 
T.V.E carries broader connotations for the post-socialist transition/post-socialist 
transformation debate. The notion that there is a role for collective learning 
within a regional network or distinct group which is based on informal exchange 
runs contrary to the orthodox transition theme prominent in the literature on 
Eastern Europe. In this respect the experience of the J-mode implies that 
unambiguous property rights per se need not be the end objective of post­
socialist transition. Instead there is a good argument for seeing the post­
socialist transformation process as ex ante open-ended where different 
organisational forms premised on informal and formal exchange and consistent 
with the detailed division of labour and social division of labour can coexist.
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CHAPTER 7
EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME AND 
PROFIT AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN T.V.Gs AND WORKER
SOCIALISATION
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The last two chapters suggested some theoretical propositions about T.V.Es.
This chapter presents two sets of regressions which test a couple of empirical 
based propositions in those chapters. However, it should be said from the start 
that no attempt will be made to provide a direct test of either of the models 
developed in chapter five or six. The problem relates to what data are available. 
To test the model developed in the last chapter, for example, we would need 
proxies for both the detailed and social division of labour. But the sort of data 
from which reasonable proxies could be constructed are not available. This 
chapter, therefore, has more modest aims. The first objective is to provide a test 
of the extent to which T.V.E behaviour corresponds to the behaviour of the J- 
mode. To do so the relationship between T.V.Es’ labour share and profit rate 
will be considered. The second more speculative objective is to test the 
argument, raised in chapter five, that the importance of T.V.Gs as a monitor on 
the evolution of collective norms diminishes with increased worker socialisation.
Both sets of regressions use pooled cross sectional and time series data. The 
sample observation points were 28 provinces (Hainan and Tibet were excluded 
because of lack of data). The time period covered in the income-profit 
regression was 1987-1991 inclusive and 1993. The time period covered in the 
T.V.G-socialisation regression was 1989-1991 inclusive. The regression, looking 
at the relationship between worker income and T.V.E profits, will be presented in 
section 7.2. The regression looking at the relationship between T.V.G influence 
and socialisation into the T.V.E will be presented in section 7.3. The two 
sections are set out in the same way. (i) The specification(s) is (are) set out and 
the choice of variables is considered, (ii) Prior expectations about the results
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are discussed, (iii) The initial results are presented and the statistical issues are 
examined, (iv) The results are recalculated where methodological shortcomings 
exist and (v) The results are reviewed in the light of prior expectations.
7.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORKER INCOME AND T.V.E PROFITS
The Specification
To test the income-profit relationship in T.V.Es the following function was used:
In (IN C O M E )t = a +  b l P R O F IT  + b2 SIZE, +  63 E D U C n  +  bA M A L E , +  b5 E C O N O M IC , +  f>6RE  
where:
INCOME is a measure of worker share,
PROFIT is a measure of the T.V.E's profit rate,
SIZE is a measure of the T.V.E’s size,
EDUC is a measure of workers' education,
MALE captures (potential) male-female wage differences, 
ECONOMIC measures the effect of macroeconomic conditions and 
RE is a vector of regional dummies.
The choice of proxies for each variable was dependent on what data were 
available. The choice of proxies also involved an iterative process where 
different possibilities were tested and, in some instances, discarded. The 
construction and limitations of the proxies in each case are elaborated below.
dependent variable:
INCOME
Two different proxies were tried, at the start, for this variable. The 
first was the average wage in T.V.Es (total wage bill/ total number 
of workers). The second was a measure of the workers’ share in 
T.V.Es (total wages per 1000 Yuan revenue). The second 
measure performed much better. A possible explanation for this 
might be that average wages are dependent on region specific
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factors, in particular economic rents which are not picked up in the 
regression For this reason the workers’ share measure was 
preferred. The pooled data for both average wage and workers' 
share was converted to 1987 Yuan. The proxies were constructed 
from data in Zhongguo Xiangzhen Qiye Nianjian (various volumes).
independent variables:
(1) PROFIT
Two different proxies for PROFIT were used - (a) the profit/sales 
ratio and (b) the profit/assets ratio. Total (pre-tax) profit per 1000 
Yuan revenue was used to represent the profit/sales ratio. Total 
(pre-tax) profit per 1000 Yuan gross fixed assets was used to 
represent the profit/assets ratio. The pooled data on both proxies 
were expressed in 1987 Yuan. Both proxies were constructed from 
data in Zhongguo Xiangzhen Qiye Nianjian (various volumes).
(2) SIZE
Two proxies were used for SIZE. The first was the average number 
of workers in each T.V.E (total workers/total number of T.V.Es). 
The second was average revenue (total revenue/total number of 
T.V.Es). The latter was used to pick up possible divergences 
between size in terms of worker numbers and size in terms of 
output value which need not be the same. The pooled data for 
average revenue was expressed in 1987 Yuan. The source for 
both proxies is Zhongguo Xiangzhen Qiye Nianjian (various volumes).
(3) EDUC.
There are no data on the education standard of T.V.E workers at 
an aggregate level. Thus a provincial level measure was used - the 
number of secondary school graduates per 1000 population. This 
proxy was constructed from the China Statistical Yearbook (various
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volumes). The education variable is lagged one period. The 
rationale for this is that it seems reasonable that students 
graduating in period t will not enter the workforce and therefore 
have a potential impact on income levels until period t+1. The 
proxy used raises two issues. The first is that it is not an actual 
measure of the education level of T.V.E workers, but the education 
level of the workforce as a whole. Therefore, the implicit 
assumption is that the proportion of educated individuals in the 
wider workforce is an accurate reflection of the proportion of 
educated workers in T.V.Es. There is no clear evidence on this 
point. And the evidence that does exist is both fragmentary in 
nature and restricted to observations on specific localities. Song 
(1990 p.406) suggests, on the basis of survey evidence in four 
counties - Wuxi in Jiangsu, Jieshou in Anhui, Shangrao in Jiangxi 
and Nanhai in Guangdong - that: “the educational level ... of 
sample workers in T.V.Es are a bit lower than those of local state 
enterprise workers”. Ho (1994 pp. 147-148), however, concludes, 
on the basis of interview evidence, that the education level of T.V.E 
workers in Jiangsu is slightly higher than the provincial average. 
Hence conflicting views makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions.
A second issue is whether the number of secondary school 
graduates is a good measure of education. There is a reasonable 
argument that it is. First, it is a commonly used proxy in the 
development and growth literatures. Second, Gelb (1990) reports 
on the basis of the same firm level data that Song (1990) used that 
the most common educational attainment in the T.V.Es sampled 
was junior middle school. Wong et al (1995) examine ten T.V.Es in 
Jiangsu and Shandong as case studies. Information on education,
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profit and wages in the ten T.V.Es is presented in table 7.1. Data 
on the education of the manager is given for nine of the enterprises 
and data on the education of the employees are given for six of the 
enterprises. Most of the managers had completed secondary 
school and most of the workers junior middle school. While there 
is no breakdown for junior middle school graduates in the 
aggregate statistics the grouping “secondary school graduates” 
includes inter alia both junior and senior middle school graduates.
(4) MALE
This variable is intended to capture the effect of a potential male- 
female income differential on total worker income. There is, 
however, no data giving separate breakdowns on male and female 
wages in T.V.Es. Thus the proxy used was males per 1000 T.V.E 
workers. The source is Zhongguo Nongye Nianjian and the English 
Edition China Agriculture Yearbook (various volumes). The rationale 
for using males per 1000 T.V.E workers is that if a positive 
(negative) male-female earning differential is influencing worker 
incomes this will be reflected in regions where a greater 
percentage of the workforce is male (female). Having said this, the 
number of males relative to females working in T.V.Es is far from a 
perfect means of capturing a possible earning differential. While it 
was the best alternative available, we need to be aware that it 
might not be an accurate measure when reviewing the results.
(5) ECONOMIC
This variable is intended to reflect the effect of macroeconomic 
conditions on worker income. The first choice proxy for this 
variable was the number of annual new projects which T.V.Es 
started. The problem, however, was that no consistent data were 
available over the time period. It were available some years for
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total T.V.Es, others for industrial T.V.Es and others no data were 
available on new projects at all. Thus an alternative proxy - the 
number of loss-making firms per 1000 T.V.Es - was used. This 
proxy was constructed using data in Zhongguo Xiangzhen Qiye 
Nianjian. The reasoning, therefore, is that in times of economic 
downturn the proportion of loss making firms will be greater.1
Prior Expectations
The theoretical arguments developed in the preceding two chapters suggest 
some general propositions about the factors that determine the workers’ share:
1. If T.V.E behaviour reflects J-mode behaviour the workers’ share will 
reflect the T.V.E’s performance. This might show up in the regression in 
two places - the PROFIT and ECONOMIC variables. There is a close 
relationship between the profit rate and workers’ share in the J-mode (see 
eg Nakatani 1984). Thus, if the T.V.E and J-mode are similar we would 
expect PROFIT to be statistically significant with a positive sign. While 
the sample size is small, some general observations on the relationship 
between labour share and the profit rate can be made on the basis of the 
case studies in table 7.1. First annual income in the Cable Factory is the 
highest, while annual incomes in the Engine Parts Factory and Silk Mill 
are the lowest. At the same time the Cable Factory is the most profitable 
while the Engine Parts Factory and Silk Mill are the least profitable. 
Second, the differential between the manager’s income and the workers’ 
average income seems dependent on the profitability of the firm. 
According to the 1988 State Council’s Provisional Regulations for the 
Contract Responsibility System in S.O.Es (which T.V.Es are supposed to 
follow as a guideline) the manager’s wage should not be more than three 
times the average worker (Wong et a /1995 p.45). Flowever, the Cable
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TABLE 7.1
Educational Attaiment, Profits and Wages in the Ten T.V.Es Examined as Case Studies in 
__________________________  Wong et a/ (1995)________________________ ____
Name of Firm  
Shandong
“Owner” Gross
Profit
(1991
million
yuan)
Number
of
Workers
(1991)
Profit per 
W orker 
(1991 
yuan)
Average
Annual
Income
(1991
yuan)
Income of 
Manager 
(1991 
yuan)
Education 
of the 
manager
Education of 
Employees
Fishing Gear 
Enterprise
Town 2.0 612 3,268 1,657 N.A Agro-
Technical
School
N.A
Plastic Medical 
Products 
Factory
Town 2.5 1,320 1,894 2,400 6,000 Secondary
School
Junior Middle 
School or 
higher (p.89)
Engine Parts 
Factory
Town 0.1 160 625 1,583 2,400
(1992)
Secondary
School
80% Junior 
Middle 
School, 20% 
Senior High 
School 
(p. 117)
Foundry Village 2.4 170 1,176 N.A N.A Secondary
School
N.A
Garment
Factory
Jiangsu
Town 1.5 924 1,623 2,326 N.A N.A High School 
(p. 169)
Silk M ill Village loss 310 - 1,800 2,500 Secondary
School
N.A
Oil Refinery Town 2.5 273 9,156 2,400 10,659 Secondary
School
Mostly
Middle
School
(p.229)
Cable Factory Town 6.5 467 13,919 3,778 20,000 Elementary
School
Mostly Junior 
High School 
(p.251)
Eiderdown
Products
Factory
town 0.4 205 1,951 1,531 14,000 Secondary
School
61% Junior 
Middle 
School, 19% 
Primary 
School, 9% 
High School 
(p.289)
Puinl Factory l'owu and 
Village
1.0 (Jan- 
Oct 1992)
78 1,282 N.A N.A Secondary
School
N.A
NOTES: (i) TVEs are described in the same way as in Wong et a l (1995) - ie. as the 
“Fishing Gear Enterprise”, the “Engine Parts Factory” etc. (ii) N.A = Not available 
SOURCE: Wong et a l (1995) table 2.3, table 2.4. The information on the educational 
attainment of workers is spread throughout the book - page references are noted in table.
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Factory and Oil Refinery which were both extremely profitable paid their 
managers many times the salary of the average worker. On the other 
hand, in the Engine Parts Factory and Silk Mill which were not performing 
well the manager was paid only marginally more than the average worker.
The previous statistical work on T.V.Es to consider the relationship 
between PROFIT and wages is conflicting. Gelb (1990) found that 
PROFIT was a statistically significant determinant of wages in the World 
Bank sample mentioned above using data on T.V.Es in four counties. 
However, Pitt and Putterman (1996), using firm level data on T.V.Es 
across ten provinces, and Xu (1995), using aggregate pooled data from 
1984 to 1987, found that wages were not correlated with PROFIT. If the 
workers’ share reflects enterprise performance we would also expect 
ECONOMIC to be statistically significant. The problem is that it is difficult 
to capture the macro-position of individual firms using aggregate data, but 
if there is a high proportion of loss-making firms this suggests relative 
economic stagnation which should show up in a lower workers’ share.
2. The model developed in chapter five stressed the broad notion of social 
and historical embeddedness in explaining how T.V.Es have evolved. 
The importance of path dependent considerations was also emphasised. 
The social and historical context in which T.V.Es have developed 
suggests that the workers’ share might, on the whole, be determined by 
broader firm and communal considerations. The importance of the 
T.V.E’s broader obligations to its nominal owners - the township and 
village residents - is relevant here. If broader communal considerations 
do determine wages it might follow, at least at a superficial level, that 
personal characteristics such as education and, to a lesser extent, sex will 
be of marginal importance.2 However, the latter might not be a good
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example of a "personal characteristic” because of possible wage 
discrimination against women in rural areas. Gelb (1990) et al provide 
empirical evidence of wage discrimination against women in T.V.Es, and 
Huang (1995) et a l3 document discrimination in the wider labour market.
3. The model presented in the last chapter, suggested that as T.V.Es 
become larger their communal character diminishes. This is evident in 
the labour market in the coastal provinces. For example, Ho (1994) 
documents the trend amongst T.V.Es in southern Jiangsu to hire 
immigrant workers, as labour in the local communities is exhausted. This 
has had two effects. First, the immigrant workers have no ties to the area 
so the communal nature of the T.V.Es is undermined. Second, as labour 
markets have developed to meet the demand for immigrant labour there 
has been a trend towards more market determined distribution. This 
contrasts with T.V.Es in less developed rural areas, in particular in the 
interior provinces, where broader social obligations are important 
including the provision of jobs for the local residents. There tends to be 
surplus labour in these T.V.Es which implies that the wage rate is greater 
than the marginal product of labour (MPL). However, where labour 
markets are more developed, and social obligations less important - in the 
coastal provinces - we would expect the wage rate to be closer to the 
MPl . If this is the case we might expect that the worker share would be 
smaller in the larger T.V.Es which tend to be in the coastal provinces.
The Results
The initial results are presented in tables 7.2 and 7.3. The results using the 
functional form above (with a natural log of the dependent variable) are in table
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TABLE 7.2
Regression Results For All Provinces 1987-1991.1993
The Dependent Variable is in (Total Wages Per 1000 Yuan Revenue)
independent variables (i) 00 (iii) (iv)
1. Total Profit per 1000Yuan .62 .58 NE NE
Revenue (10.94) (10.63)
2. Total Profit per 1000 NE NE .36 .33
Yuan Fixed Assets (4.82) (4.74)
3. Average Number of -.62 NE -.49 NE
Workers per firm (3.11) (1.95)
4. Average Revenue per firm NE -.33 NE -.39
(5.29) (5.03)
5. Number of Secondary School .11 .10 .09 .08
Graduates per 1000 population (1.87) (1.88) (1.29) (1.14)
6. Males per 1000 workers .07 .06 .07 .06
(1.26) (1.12) (.94) (.88)
7. Number of loss making .47 .04 .40 .19
firms per 1000 firms (2.36) (.60) (1.63) 0-53)
8. D-CENTRAL .60 .46 .49 .79
(3.87) (3.98) (4.87) (5.22)
9. D-WESTERN 1.28 1.97 1.33 .94
(4.71) (6.26) (3.33) (4.76)
D.W 1.00 1.05 1.08 1.24
Adjusted co-efficient .47 .52 .19 .29
of Determination 
NOTE:
(1) The number of cases was 168. (2) The eastern zone covers Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei,
Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong and Guangxi. The 
central zone: covers Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei 
and Hunan; The western zone covers Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi Gansu, Qinghai, 
Ningxia and Xinjiang. Hainan and Tibet was excluded because of lack of data. (3) NE denotes 
that the proxy was not included in the regression. (4) The figures in parenthesis are t-values. 
(5) D-CENTRAL and D-WESTERN are regional dummies for provinces in the central and 
western zones respectively. Provinces in the eastern zone were treated as the reference group.
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TABLE 7.3
Regression Results For All Provinces 1987-1991. 1993
The Dependent Variable is Total Wages Per 1000 Yuan Revenue
independent variables 0) 00 (iii) (iv)
1. Total Profit per lOOOYuan 
Revenue
.36
(4.91)
.31
(4.30)
NE NE
2. Total Profit per 1000 
Yuan Fixed Assets
NE NE .45
(6.10)
.42
(5.99)
3. Average Number of Workers 
per firm
-.39
(1.85)
NE -.19
(.87)
NE
4. Average Revenue per firm NE -.28
(3.51)
NE -.28
(3.69)
5. Number of Secondary School .05 .04 .02 .00
Graduates per 1000 population (.63) (.52) (.24) (.02)
6. Males per 1000 workers .11 .10 .09 -.08
(1.43) (1.37) (1.22) (1.23)
7. Number of loss making .27 .02 .15 .08
firms per 1000 firms (1.33) (.25) (.71) (.07)
8. D-CENTRAL .52 .24 .47 .51
(1.90) (1.88) (1.64) (1.96)
9. D-WESTERN .81 .45 .69 .78
(2.25) (2.67) (2.22) (2.23)
D.W 1.16 1.24 1.21 1.38
Adjusted co-efficient 
of Determination
.16 .20 .22 .27
NOTE:
(1) The number of cases was 168. (2) The eastern zone covers Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei,
Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong and Guangxi. The
central zone: covers Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei
and Hunan; The western zone covers Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi Gansu, Qinghai, 
Ningxia and Xinjiang. Hainan and Tibet was excluded because of lack of data. (3) NE denotes 
that the proxy was not included in the regression. (4) The figures in parenthesis are t-values.
(5) D-CENTRAL and D-WESTERN are regional dummies for provinces in the central and 
western zones respectively. Provinces in the eastern zone were treated as the reference group.
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7.2. The results using a linear functional form for the dependent variable, for 
purposes of comparison, are in table 7.3. The results for both proxies of PROFIT 
(Total Profit per 1000 Yuan Revenue & Total Profit per 1000 Yuan Fixed Assets) 
and both proxies of SIZE (Average Number of Workers per Firm & Average 
Revenue) are presented. The results are not satisfactory. PROFIT and SIZE are 
both consistently significant with the expected signs regardless of functional 
form. However the Durbin-Watson statistic is low in each regression such that it 
is impossible to reject the existence of serial correlation at any reasonable level 
of significance. While the regional dummies indicate significant variation in 
workers’ share across zones, the adjusted co-efficient of determination, in most 
of the regressions, is also low. The best results, in terms of the adjusted co­
efficient of determination, were obtained using Total Profit per 1000 Yuan 
Revenue to measure PROFIT and Average Revenue per Firm to measure SIZE 
(regression (ii) in table 7.2). Thus, given that the initial regressions suggest that 
both proxies for PROFIT and SIZE give similar results it was decided to use a 
Cochrane-Orcutt transformation on this regression (regression 2 in table 7.2) to 
attempt to remove the serial correlation. The results for the Cochrane-Orcutt 
regression are in table 7.4. The transformation was successful in removing the 
serial correlation. The Durbin-Watson statistic (1.86) is such that d>du so H0 
(p=0) is not rejected at the 5% level. PROFIT and SIZE remain significant at the 
1% level, but the adjusted co-efficient of determination is still low. Given this, a 
separate regression was run omitting the insignificant variables. However, the 
results which are reported as regression (ii) in table 7.4 were almost identical.4
INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS
The low adjusted coefficient of determination is a disappointing feature of the 
results, but the performance of individual variables seems consistent with prior 
expectations. This subsection elaborates on the results for individual variables 
and explores some reasons for the low adjusted coefficient of determination.
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TABLE 7.4
Regression Results Using A Cochrane-Orcutt Transformation
The Dependent Variable is In (Total Wages Per 1000 Yuan Revenue)
independent variables 0) (ii)
1. Total Profit per lOOOYuan .46 .46
Revenue (6.45) (6.46)
2. Average Revenue per firm -.26 -.28
(3.42) (3.83)
3. Number of Secondary School .11 NE
Graduates per 1000 population (1.54)
4. Males per 1000 workers -.03
(-.44)
NE
5. Number of loss making -.05 NE
firms per 1000 firms (-.74)
6. D-CENTRAL .52 .31
(5,65) (3.22)
7. D-WESTERN 1.65 1.08
(4.09) (2.89)
D.W 1.86 1.84
Adjusted co-efficient 
of Determination
.34 .34
NOTE:
(1) Cochranc-OrcuU Transformation is on regression (ii) in tabic 7.2 (2) The number of cases
was 140. For provinces in each zone sec tables 7.2 and 7.3. All provinces were included (except
Hainan & Tibet which were excluded because of lack of data) over 1987-1991, 1993 (3) NE
denotes that the variable was not included in the regression. (4) t values arc in parenthesis.
(5) D-CENTRAL and D-WESTERN arc regional dummies for provinces in the central and 
w'cstcrn zones respectively. Provinces in the eastern zone were treated as the reference group.
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(1) PROFIT
The results in table 7.4 indicate that PROFIT is significant at the 1% level. 
This seems to confirm the notion that there is a close relationship 
between the profit rate and workers’ share in T.V.Es and also gives 
support to the view that T.V.E behaviour comes close to J-mode 
behaviour. However, as noted above, previous empirical research has 
reached differing conclusions on this issue. Pitt and Putterman (1996), 
using firm level data, and Xu (1995), using aggregate data, found no 
statistical relationship between the profit rate and wages. A possible 
explanation for the difference between the results here and the results in 
the Pitt & Putterman (1996) and Xu (1995) studies might lie in the choice 
of proxies for the dependent variable. Both Pitt & Putterman and Xu use 
average wages to measure the dependent variable. The results here 
indicate that profit sharing (wages/profits) in T.V.Es is in line with the J- 
mode - rather than wage setting per se or the mechanism (T.V.Gs or 
otherwise) through which wages are set. Wages might be determined 
through a range of factors and Xu (1995) points out that his results are 
consistent with field research which has found that some community 
governments force T.V.Es to adopt the wage policies of local state firms.
Lin et al (1992) and Gang (1993) investigate this issue in field research. 
Lin et al (1992) sampled 400 T.V.Es in Yuanping County, Shanxi in 1984- 
85. The responses which they received when T.V.Es were asked about 
how wages were set and the reason for the most recent wage increase 
are presented in table 7.5. Only 11.1% of T.V.Es responded that wages 
were determined solely by the T.V.G. However, in a further 38.9%, wages 
were either mutually agreed between the T.V.E and T.V.G or had to be 
submitted to the T.V.G for approval. With respect to the most recent 
wage increase or bonus only 17.4% of T.V.Es said that it had been
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TABLE 7.5
Wage Setting and the Reasons for Wage Increases in Lin ef a/'s (1992) Sample of T.V.Es
in Yuanping County. Shanxi Province 
(% of total firms sampled)
Waee determination
Wages set by TVG 11.1
Wages mutually agreed between TVE and TVG 16.7
Wages set by TVE, but have to be submitted to 
the TVG for approval
22.2
Wages determined solely by the TVE 50%
Reasons for the most recent waee increase or bonus
Arranged by the TVG 17.4
Due to an increase in enterprise retained profits 21.5
overtime or piecework 32.2
Influenced by pressure from wage increases in 
other enterprises
28.9%
SOURCE: Lin et a l (1992) p.262
TABLE 7.6
Local Government Influence on Wage Setting in Gang’s (1993) Sample of Rural 
Enterprises in Sichuan and Zhejiang Provinces
Does The Enterprise Sets Waees Independently?
Yes (%) No (%)
Whole Sample 79.8 19,2
Collective 73.3 25.6
Non-Collective 84,5 14.9
SOURCE: Gang (1993) table 10
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arranged by the T.V.G. For the rest it was due to either an increase in 
enterprise retained profits (21.5%), overtime or piecework (32.2%) or 
because of pressures due to wage increases in other enterprises (28.9%).
Gang (1993) surveyed 630 rural enterprises (262 collective and 368 non­
collective) in Sichuan and Zhejiang in 1991. He asked whether the rural 
enterprise set wages independently. His results are reproduced in table 
7.6. About 25% of the collective enterprises and 15% of the non- 
collective enterprises were subject to government interference in wage 
setting. The smaller figure for non-collective enterprises is consistent 
with the World Bank finding that in Wuxi average income in the local 
private sector was higher than in local state-owned enterprises (Byrd & 
Lin 1990 pp.15-16). Nevertheless, if T.V.Gs are exerting a strong
influence over local wage setting practices in collective enterprises in 
particular, this gives some support to the view, postulated above, that the 
average wage might be picking up regional specific factors. But this 
suggestion is tentative, given that the initial regressions which were run in 
this exercise, using average wage as the dependent variable, did not 
shed light on the issue. The results are not reported, but each of the 
independent variables was insignificant and the adjusted coefficient of 
determination was low. This makes it impossible to draw firm conclusions.
This said, the results for PROFIT are consistent with the attitudes which 
workers expressed in T.V.Es in the sample of four counties which the 
World Bank conducted. The results of the worker questionnaire are 
reported (in part) in Gelb (1990). Most workers in the sample thought that
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there was a close relationship between their incomes and the profit rate of 
their firm. A total of 71% thought that the link was strong or very strong, 
while just 10% saw no link at all. This breakdown was consistent across 
each of the four counties. This sort of evidence, of course, is sporadic in 
nature. There are also well-known limitations on this sort of field 
research. These include the fact that the World Bank results are based 
on T.V.Es in a few select localities (although each was a major T.V.E 
region) and that there are methodological problems with opinion surveys 
which might be biasing the results. The opinions expressed on the 
income-profit relationship, nevertheless, support the findings here and the 
broader argument regarding similarities between T.V.Es and the J-mode.
(2) SIZE
SIZE has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% level. This is 
consistent with the suggestion above that in larger T.V.Es communal 
obligations are less important. This is related to the idea, developed in 
the last chapter, that as T.V.Es become larger there is a trade-off between 
the social division of labour and the detailed division of labour. This is 
also related to the trend, mentioned above, for larger firms, in particular in 
the coastal provinces, to hire immigrant labour. This undermines the 
communal culture which underpins the collective learning theme at a 
localised level. The local social basis of the T.V.E, premised on its 
obligations under a communal welfare function - including the provision of 
jobs to local residents - becomes marginalised as part of this process.
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The results for SIZE appear consistent with the two part view: (t) There 
might be surplus labour in the smaller - communal based - T.V.Es and if 
so this suggests that the wage rate is in excess of the marginal product of 
labour (MPL) (ii) Where labour markets are more developed, and social 
obligations less important - such as in the larger T.V.Es in the coastal 
provinces - the wage rate is more in line with the MPL. The results for the 
regional dummies, support this perspective. The workers’ share in the 
eastern zone is statistically lower than in the central and western zones 
ceteris paribus. But, at least at first glance, this seems inconsistent with 
some recent studies such as Xu (1995), Dong & Putterman (1996) and 
Pitt & Putterman (1996). Xu (1995) found that for T.V.Es, across all 
provinces, the mean MPL was 2.8 times higher than the wage rate. Dong 
& Putterman (1996) found that for T.V.Es across 15 provinces the mean 
MPl was 3.6 times higher than the wage rate. However, these results 
might reflect a labour shortage in the most developed coastal regions.
In both Xu (1995) and Dong & Putterman (1996) the difference between 
MPl and wages was largest in the most developed coastal provinces. 
Dong & Putterman (1996 p.74) report that the regional dummy variables 
showed that the mean gaps between MPL and wages in the coastal 
provinces were significantly larger than in the non-coastal provinces. 
Xu’s results were similar. He reports (at p.35) that in 1987 in the most 
developed province - suburban Shanghai - the MPL was 5.6 times higher 
than the T.V.E wage. This suggests that even if the MPL is greater than 
the wage rate for T.V.Es as a whole this does not rule out the possibility 
that the reverse might be true if small rural and communal based T.V.Es 
were considered in isolation. For example Dong & Putterman (1996 
footnote 19) note that when the non-coastal provinces in their sample 
were introduced separately, the regional dummy estimates were not
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statistically significant in any of them. Xu (1995 p.40) acknowledges the 
point that “in many surveys researchers have found that while a labour 
shortage is a serious problem in relatively industrialised areas, in most 
rural areas the still abundant labour supply has not been fully utilised".
A lot of research suggests that the areas of labour shortage are restricted 
to a few core regions near the coast and near major urban areas (see eg 
Blank & Parish 1990, Perkins 1990, Knight & Song 1993, Parish 1994). 
There is also evidence to suggest that the amount of available labour 
varies between developed and developing regions in the same province. 
For example, Ho (1994) found that there was a shortage of labour in the 
marketised sunan region, but in the less developed northern parts of 
Jiangsu there was a substantial labour surplus. Consistent with the 
results for SIZE using provincial level data, it is well known that T.V.Es in 
southern Jiangsu are larger than those in the northern part of the 
province. In fact village enterprises in the south are as large and often 
larger than township enterprises in the north. To illustrate, in the mid 
1980s on average, the size of village industrial enterprises in the south 
delta region (59 workers per firm) was more than twice that of village 
industrial enterprises (26 workers per firm) and almost equal to that of 
township enterprises (70 workers per firm) in the north (Ho 1994 p.56).
(3) EDUC
While EDUC was significant in some of the initial regressions at the 10% 
level (see table 7.2), following the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation it 
became insignificant. This is a surprising result given that most studies 
have found that in developing countries there is a strong relationship 
between education and labour share (see eg Knight & Sabot 1981, Byron 
& Takahashi 1989). The poor nature of the proxy might be a limiting
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factor here restricting the conclusions we can draw, but the result cannot 
be dismissed just because the proxy is crude. The reason is that other 
studies, using better data sets, have reached similar results - Gelb 
(1990), Peng (1992), Gregory & Meng (1995), Meng & Miller (1995), 
Parish et al (1995) and Meng (1996) using firm level data on either T.V.Es 
or rural enterprises found that education did not have a statistically 
significant effect on wages. This is also consistent with the finding that 
just 2% of workers in the World Bank sample believed that education was 
an important factor in wage determination (reported in Meng 1992),
There are a number of reasons which might explain the result for EDUC. 
Meng (1996 p.721) puts forward one possible explanation: "In [T.V.Es] 
many jobs are unskilled and productivity would be the same for all 
workers in these jobs, regardless of education level”. In addition Gregory 
and Meng (1995 p.359) suggest “education may not be used as a 
screening device as [T.V.Es] do not usually freely hire workers". In the 
sample Gregory & Meng (1995) used, at least 40% of workers were 
assigned to the T.V.E by community authorities, often in pursuit of income 
distribution objectives across families. If screening devices are 
marginalised this supports the position, outlined above, that broader 
communal and firm considerations are more important determinants of 
workers’ share than personal characteristics such as education level.5
(4) MALE
MALE was also insignificant. This differs from previous studies. Gelb 
(1990) and Meng (1992), who used data from the World Bank sample of 
four counties, both found that gender dummies were statistically 
significant. Gelb (1990) found that female wages were 14% lower than 
male wages and Meng (1992), using a different set of independent
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variables, found that female wages were 30% lower than male wages 
when other variables were held constant. Peng (1992), Knight & Song 
(1993) and Parish et al (1995) reached similar conclusions Using panel 
data from 1988 on 1670 people working in rural enterprises, Knight & 
Song (1993) got the same result as Gelb (1990). Using data on ten 
counties in the central and eastern zones collected in the 1993 Chinese 
General Social Survey, Parish et al (1995) found that female wages in the 
rural collective sector were about 80% of male wages. Using data from 
the World Bank sample on just two of the four counties (Wuxi and 
Jieshou) Peng’s (1992) results suggest that women with the same 
education, experience and tenure earn about 87% of men’s earnings.
Given each of these previous studies, there are a few different 
interpretations that could be put on the results in this exercise. The first is 
that the results are evidence that there is no wage discrimination against 
women in T.V.Es. This would sit well with the thesis that personal 
characteristics have little effect on workers' share, but conclusions along 
these lines have to be cautious. It has already been pointed out that sex 
is probably not a good example of a personal characteristic in this sense. 
A second interpretation is that the results for MALE reflect the poor nature 
of the proxy. The fact that the results are inconsistent with previous 
research gives some support to this interpretation The data sets, used by 
each of the studies mentioned above, were restricted to T.V.Es in a few 
select localities so, on one hand, it might be argued that the data set used 
here is more representative. But on the other the data each of the studies 
used, at the firm level, is likely to be of a better standard. A third 
possibility is that the results for MALE reflect the failure to explicitly model 
occupational segregation. A number of studies for developed countries
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(eg Brown et al 1990, Miller 1987) and limited studies for developing 
countries (eg Cohen & House 1993) suggest that it is important to model 
occupational segregation when measuring male/female wage differences.
It was not possible to do this using aggregate data given there is no 
breakdown for different occupations. However, Meng & Miller (1995) do 
this using firm level data on T.V.Es. Their results suggest that when 
gender wage differences are broken down into inter-occupational and 
intra-occupational sources women earn about 20% less than men in 
T.V.Es. Also, when drawing conclusions, it should also be borne in mind 
that the finding here that there is no wage discrimination is inconsistent 
with a wealth of literature documenting wage discrimination in the wider 
labour market (see eg Byron & Manaloto 1990, Huang 1995, Zhao 1995). 
This does not mean that the result for MALE should be disregarded, but 
it does suggest that the result needs to be viewed with some caution.
(5) ECONOMIC
The economic variable was not significant. It was suggested earlier that if 
there was a close relationship between workers’ share and economic 
performance we might expect ECONOMIC to be significant with a negative 
sign. The reason for this expectation was the common practice among 
traditional T.V.Es to reduce wages and/or shut down for a short period in 
times of economic hardship. There are a few possible explanations for 
the fact that ECONOMIC is not significant. The first is that workers’ share 
is not related to economic performance at all. As a blanket statement this 
seems unlikely given the performance of the PROFIT variable. A second 
possible explanation is that in times of economic hardship workers’ share 
could be falling slower than the profit rate which implies that the ratio 
wages/profit is increasing. This explanation would be consistent with the
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existence of a segmented labour market between local and immigrant 
labour. Thus, in times of economic downturn, T.V.Es might lay off 
immigrant workers, but retain local workers at similar wage levels.
A third possibility is that given the nature of the proxy, it is being 
dominated by region specific factors in the coastal/suburban provinces. 
The highest proportion of loss-making T.V.Es are concentrated among 
the larger firms in the suburban and coastal provinces and often these 
T.V.Es do not behave as traditional T.V.Es. There is little or no evidence, 
at the level of casual empiricism, of the close understanding between 
management and worker in these T.V.Es, or the communal basis, that 
allows traditional T.V.Es to often make subsistence payments in times of 
economic difficulties. These sorts of informal labour arrangements 
common in traditional T.V.Es, consistent with the model in the last 
chapter, give way to formal labour contracts which are more in line with 
the A-mode in the developed coastal areas. This explanation would also 
be consistent with the results for both SIZE and the regional dummies.
THE COEFFICIENT OF DETERMINATION
The adjusted coefficient of determination, in the Cochrane-Orcutt 
transformation was .34. While this is a disappointing result, it is perhaps 
not surprising. It might be tempting to put it down to the crude nature of 
some of the proxies. This might have something to do with it, but there 
seems to be more to it. Other studies running similar regressions using 
data on T.V.Es have also got low values for the adjusted coefficient of 
determination. For example Peng (1992), Knight & Song (1993), Gregory 
& Meng (1995), Meng & Miller (1995) and Meng (1996) run regressions 
using firm level data where the dependent variable is the wage rate and 
there are independent variables measuring factors such as human capital
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(age, education) firm tenure and job experience. A number of different 
specifications are used over these articles - for example log-linear, 
natural log of the dependent variable, logit and probit. The values for the 
adjusted coefficient of determination in each case were around .2 to .4.
In addition Gelb (1990) got similar results in initial regressions. While the 
actual results are not given, Gelb (1990 endnote 3) reports that in a 
regression where the link between wages and PROFIT was tested using 
occupational dummies “although many of the variables [were] significant 
[the adjusted coefficient of determination was] only .10”. The value for the 
adjusted coefficient of determination in Gelb’s regressions only started to 
rise when a range of other independent variables were included. These 
were variables for education, experience, sex, number of days worked 
and occupational breakdown (shift or group leader, operations personnel 
technical adviser etc.). When all of these independent variables were 
included the adjusted coefficient of determination increased to .7.
This suggests that there might be other factors affecting workers’ share 
which would lift the overall variance explained, but this is difficult to 
confirm or reject at an aggregate level. Of the variables Gelb added, 
putting aside possible problems with the proxies, it seems that education 
and sex do not explain any of the overall variance in workers’ share. The 
adjusted coefficient of determination when the insignificant variables were 
omitted (regression (ii) in table 7.4) was also .34. As for the other 
variables (experience, days worked etc), given data limitations, there are 
no reasonable proxies at an aggregate level which can be used. A point 
to note is that PROFIT was significant in each of Gelb’s regressions 
regardless of the other variables added. The high t value for profit in 
table 7.4 suggests that this is also likely to be the case if other variables
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were added in this regression. However, in the absence of further 
regressions with added variables (and thus better data) we can’t rule out 
the possibility that PROFIT and SIZE are correcting for other variables.6
7.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN T.V.G INFLUENCE AND WORKER
SOCIALISATION
The Specifications
The relationship between T.V.G influence and worker socialisation was tested 
using two separate regressions. The specifications which were used are:
111 (SOCIAL) =  a + b) T.V.G + b2 PROFIT + b3 SIZE +  b4 RE (1) and 
In (SOCIAL) = a +  /j, T.V.G + b2 PROFIT + b3 SIZE + bA IM M  + b5 RE (2) w h ere:
SOCIAL measures worker socialisation,
T.V.G is a measure of T.V.G influence,
PROFIT is a measure of the T.V.E’s profit rates,
SIZE is a measure of the T.V.E’s size,
IMM is a measure of immigrant labour and 
RE is a vector of regional dummies
The first specification was tested using pooled data on T.V.Es as a whole for the 
period 1989-1991. The second was tested using data on industrial T.V.Es for 
1987. The data that were available dictated this. First, the proxies used for 
SOCIAL and T.V.G were available for industrial T.V.Es for 1987 and for T.V.Es, 
as a whole, for 1989-1991, but were not available at all in other years. Second, 
data on inter-provincial migration was available for 1982-1987, but consistent 
data on inter-provincial migration was not available for 1989-1991. The 
construction and limitations of the proxies in each instance are discussed below.
dependent variable:
SOCIAL
SOCIAL is a measure of worker socialisation. SOCIAL, ideally,
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measures the extent to which workers identify with the objectives 
of the firm or the degree to which workers are prepared to accept 
responsibilities for others’ work. The problem is, however, that it is 
difficult to measure the extent to which workers identify with their 
firm, at least in a direct fashion, using aggregate data. Therefore 
the importance of broader communal objectives relative to material 
reward was used to depict the degree of socialisation. The proxy 
used for this was remittance to the township-village/total wage bill. 
The remittance to the township-village captures the importance of 
broader communal aims. This is because most of the remittance to 
the township-village is used to finance communal social programs 
(such as collective welfare and education) and infrastructure 
projects (such as road and irrigation construction) in the township- 
village. The total wage bill reflects the importance of material 
reward. To this extent, it might be argued that the measure 
remittance to the township-village/total wage bill reflects the 
importance of social/communal values in the township-village more 
than it does in the T.V.E per se. Nonetheless, given the 
communal basis of T.V.Es, the objectives of the T.V.E tend to 
coincide with, or at least complement, the broad communal aims of 
the T.V.G. The proxy was constructed from data in Zhongguo 
Xicingzhen Qiye Nicmjian (various volumes). However, as pointed out 
above, a problem is that consistent data for remittance to the 
township-village are limited. The data were available for industrial 
T.V. Es for 1987 and for total T.V. Es for the period 1989 to 1991.
independent variables
(1) T.V.G
T.V.G is a measure of the importance of the T.V.G in the contracts 
into which the T.V.E enters. T.V.G attempts to measure the extent
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to which T.V.G influence is acting as a surrogate in the absence of 
formal contracts and/or as a monitor on the evolution of collective 
norms. The proxy used is the ratio of T.V.E bank credit to external 
financing. This was constructed from data in Zhongguo Xiangzhen 
Qiye Nianjicin (various volumes). The data, like SOCIAL, were 
available for industrial T.V.Es for 1987 and for T.V.Es. as a whole, 
for 1989 to 1991. The rationale for this proxy is that the ratio bank 
credit/external financing is dependent on the T.V.G's role as 
guarantor. The legal rights of creditors are not well protected. 
Therefore, it is common for T.V.Es to borrow on the basis of a 
guarantee from the T.V.G (see section 5.2). However, the usual 
practice is that the actual guarantee is not formalised. The process 
is, instead, consultative where the lending institution seeks the 
T.V.G’s views and priorities. The reputation of the T.V.G for 
meeting the T.V.E's obligations in the event of default is an 
important reference point in this respect. If the T.V.G supports the 
T.V.E’s application for credit, the usual practice is for the lending 
institution to approve it on the implicit understanding that the T.V.G 
will absorb the risk. The reasoning is, the higher the ratio bank 
credit/external financing the more important the role of the T.V.G.
(2) PROFIT
PROFIT was constructed in the same manner as discussed in 
section 7.2. The source for the data used is also the same. Both 
proxies for PROFIT were used - total (pre-tax) profit per 1000 yuan
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revenue and total (pre-tax) profit per 1000 yuan fixed assets - and 
the results for both are presented. PROFIT and SIZE are both 
included as region specific variables designed to pick up 
systematic variations not captured in T.V.G. PROFIT is intended to 
pick up the potential effect which variations in profit rate between 
' provinces might be having on worker socialisation - ie it measures 
the impact of having a number of profitable T.V.Es in the province.
(3) SIZE
The discussion about SIZE in section 7.2 also applies here. Two 
proxies for SIZE were used in most of the regressions - total 
workers/total number of firms and total revenue/total number of 
firms. SIZE, as a region specific variable, complements the role of 
PROFIT - ie it captures the effect of variations in the T.V.E’s size.
(4) IMM
IMM measures the impact of immigrant labour on worker 
socialisation (immigrant labour, in this sense, refers to labour from 
outside the province). One estimate is that the number of migrant 
workers in China is over 100 million.7 There are no data available, 
at an aggregate level, on the proportion of immigrant labour 
working in T.V.Es. Therefore a proxy at the provincial level was 
used - the number of immigrants per 1000 population. The data on 
inter-provincial migration are from The Institute of Developing 
Economies Population Policy and Vital Statistics in China and data on
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population are from The China Statistical Yearbook. The data on 
inter-provincial migration in Population Policy and Vital Statistics in 
China are for 1982-1987 as a block. Therefore, as mentioned 
above, cross sectional data on industrial T.V.Es, for 1987, were 
used to test the second model. IMM could not be used in the first 
model because most of the time there was no data at all on inter- 
provincial migration and where there was data it was not consistent 
over the period 1989-1991. There is a possible limitation on using 
the number of immigrants per 1000 population as a proxy for the 
proportion of immigrant labour working in T.V.Es. The implicit 
assumption is that the former is an accurate reflection of the latter. 
At best, there will be an approximate relationship between the two, 
but this assumption seems reasonable. The reason is that both 
documentation (eg Ho 1994) and casual empiricism suggest that 
provinces, like Jiangsu, which have a high immigrant population 
also have a high proportion of immigrants working in T.V.Es..
Prior Expectations
The model, in chapter five, raised the idea that the T.V.G might be acting as a 
solution to the second order problem of free riding on collective norms and/or as 
a de facto surrogate for the socialisation process. It was suggested that if this is 
the case, giving the control rights to the T.V.G might make it easier for the T.V.G 
to monitor the flow of information about collective behaviour within an informal 
regional framework. It was also suggested that a shift in control rights to the 
T.V.E manager and skilled workers over time might represent a progression in 
the socialisation process. The argument was that as the soft trading culture 
becomes embedded in the social environment, the role of the T.V.G as a point of 
reference for external contractors might diminish. If this argument is valid and if 
the proxies for worker socialisation and the T.V.G are reasonable surrogates for
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these variables we would expect T.V.G to be significant with a negative sign. As 
broader communal objectives increase in importance relative to material reward 
(the dependent ratio increases) we would expect the role of the T.V.G as a 
monitor on this process and as a point of reference to diminish in importance.
The expected signs on PROFIT and SIZE are ambiguous - ie there is no a priori 
expectation about the effects of variation in profit levels and size on theoretical 
grounds. However, in the second specification, we might expect IMM to be 
significant with a negative sign. The first reason is that immigrant workers, in 
most instances, do not receive the local welfare benefits from remittance to the 
township-village such as collective welfare, education etc.8 The second reason 
is that immigrant workers in T.V.Es are from different regions and, therefore, do 
not share the local social values which are the basis for collective norms and co­
operative culture. Thus, if remittance to the township-village captures the 
relative importance of communal values we might expect these to be 
undermined in T.V.Es with a high proportion of immigrant labour - ie. we would 
expect immigrant labour to have an adverse effect on worker socialisation.9
The Results
The initial results, using pooled data from 1989-1991 for T.V.Es as a whole, are 
presented in table 7.7. Both proxies for PROFIT (Total Profit per 1000 Yuan 
Revenue & Total Profit per 1000 Yuan Fixed Assets) and proxies for SIZE 
(Average Number of Workers per Firm & Average Revenue) are significant at 
the 1% level. The regional dummies suggest that ceteris paribus the ratio 
remittance to the township-village/total wage bill is higher in the eastern zone 
than the central and western zones. The adjusted coefficient of determination 
varies between .34 and .60, depending on the proxies used for PROFIT and 
SIZE. The Durbin-Watson statistic, in each case, is such that d>du so H0 (p=0) is 
not rejected at the 5% level. The results of various diagnostic tests on each
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TABLE 7.7
Regression Results For Total T.V.Es - All Provinces 1989-1991 
The dependent variable is In(Remittence to Township or Village/ Total Wage Bill)
independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Ratio of Bank Credit -.08 -.07 -.05 -.05
to External Financing (.94) (.79) (.78) (.66)
2. Total Profit/Total 
Revenue
.36
(4.22)
.36
(3.94)
NE NE
3. Total Profit/Gross Fixed 
Assets
NE NE .57
(7.55)
.61
(7.45
4. Average Number of Workers 
per firm
-.51
(6.01)
NE -.36
(4.76)
NE
5, Average Revenue per Firm NE -.41
(4.47)
NE -.25
(3.10
6. D-CENTRAL -.41 -.65 -1.02 -.98
(5.98) (4.87) (4.77) (2.65
7. D-WESTERN -1.65 -1.45 -1.43 -.54
(4.34) (6.28) (2.98) (.80)
DW 1.61 1.63 1.56 1.59
Adjusted co-efficient 
of Determination
.45 .34 .60 .54
NOTE:
(1) The number of cases was 84 (pooled data on 28 provinces - Hainan &  Tibet were excluded - 
for 1989-1991 inclusive. For the provinces in each zone sec tables 7.2 and 7.3. (2) The figures 
in parenthesis are t statistics. (3) NE denotes that the proxy was not used in the regression. 
(5) D-CENTRAL and D-WESTERN are regional dummies for provinces in the central and 
western zones respectively. Provinces in the eastern zone were treated as the reference group.
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regression in table 7.7 suggest that neither multicollinearity nor 
heteroscedasticity presents problems for the sample,10 but the disappointing 
aspect of the results is that T.V.G is not significant in any of the four regressions.
A possible reason for the poor performance of T.V.G seemed to be that the 
scope of the initial regressions might be too wide. The initial results suggest that 
the notion that T.V.Gs might be acting as c/e facto surrogates in the socialisation 
process is not a concept which applies to all T.V.Es across all provinces. To test 
whether the argument had more limited application the regressions were rerun 
on selected provinces for 1989-1991. The selected provinces were the eight 
provinces with the highest T.V.E output value in the eastern, central and western 
zones in 1994. The provinces included were: eastern - Hebei, Liaoning, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong and Guangdong; central - 
Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan; and 
western - Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and 
Xinjiang. While not absolute these provinces provide wide coverage in terms of 
both numbers (24 provinces, 72 cases) and level of economic development.
The results for the second series of regressions are presented in table 7.8. The 
results are similar to the regressions in table 7.7, but there are a couple of 
differences. The proxies for PROFIT and SIZE continue to be significant at 1%. 
T.V.G remains insignificant when total profit per 1000 yuan revenue is used, but 
is significant at 10% when total profit per 1000 yuan fixed assets is entered for 
PROFIT. The adjusted coefficient of determination also a little higher in three out 
of four of the regressions. A possible reason for this is that the provinces with 
the smallest T.V.E output value were outliers adversely affecting the initial 
results.11 The Durbin-Watson statistic indicated that serial correlation is not a 
problem. The various diagnostic tests also suggested that neither 
multicollinearity nor heteroscedasticity appears to be influencing the results.12
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TABLE 7.8
Regression Results For Total T.V.Es - Selected Provinces 1989-1991 
The dependent variable is ln(Remittence to Township or Village/ Total Wage Bill)
independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Ratio of Bank Credit 
to External Financing
-.11
(1.27)
-.10
(1.09)
-.13
(1.82)
-.13
(1.67)
2. Total Profit/Total 
Revenue
.36
(4.00)
.37
(3.76)
NE NE
3. Total Profit/Gross Fixed 
Assets
NE NE .61
(7.84)
.65
(7.85)
4. Average Number of Workers 
per firm
-.51
(5.74)
NE -.34
(4.39)
NE
5. Average Revenue per Firm NE -.41
(4.21)
NE -.23
(2.81)
6. D-CENTRAL -.38
(6.01)
-.53
(4.92)
-1.48
(4.66)
-1.21
(2.63)
7. D-WESTERN -1.42
(4.21)
-1.45
(6.22)
-1.44
(3.03)
-1.01
(2.02)
DW 1.60 1.57 1.64 1.62
Adjusted co-efficient 
of Determination
.45 .35 .64 .59
NOTE;
(1) The number of cases was 72 (pooled data on 24 provinces for 1989-1991 inclusive). The 
provinces included were the 8 with the highest T.V.E output value, in each of the three official 
development regions - eastern, central and western- in 1994. The provinces included were: 
eastern - Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong and Guangdong; 
central - Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Anlnii, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan; western - 
Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang (2) t statistics are 
in parenthesis (3) NE denotes that the proxy was not used in the regression. (4) D-CENTRAL 
and D-WESTERN are regional dummies for provinces in the central and western zones 
respectively. Provinces in the eastern zone were treated as the reference group.
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TABLE 7.9
Regression Results For Industrial T.V.Es - Selected Provinces 1987
The dependent variable is ln(Remittence to Township or Village/ Total Wage Bill)
independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Ratio of Bank Credit 
to External Financing
-.24
(-1.87)
-.28
(-1.59)
-.27
(-2.20)
-.32
(-1.99)
2. Proportion of Immigrant 
Labour in the Province
.83
(4.13)
NE .76
(3.60)
NE
3. Total Profit/Gross Fixed 
Assets
.45
(2.65)
.67
(2.94
NE NE
4, Total Profit/Total 
Revenue
NE NE .35
(2.74)
.54
(3.58)
5. Average Number of Workers 
per firm
-.59
(-2.93)
-.10
(-.42)
-.29
(-1.46)
.26
(1.61)
6. D-CENTRAL -.53
(2.76)
-.43
(3.09)
-.96
(4.99)
-.42
(2.98)
7. D-WESTERN -1.53
(3.11)
-1.41
(2.88)
-1.22
(6.23)
-.38
(2.87)
Adjusted co-efficient 
of Determination
.76 .51 .76 .58
NOTE:
(1) The number of cases was 24, To facilitate comparison with the results in table 7.8 the 
provinces included were the 8 with the highest T.V.E output value, in each of the three official 
development regions - eastern, central and western- in 1994. See notes to table 7.8 for the 
provinces included. (2) I statistics are in parenthesis (3) NE denotes that the proxy was not used. 
(4) D-CENTRAL and D-WESTERN arc regional dummies for provinces in the central and 
western zones respectively. Provinces in the eastern zone were treated as the reference group.
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The results for the second model, using cross-sectional data on industrial T.V.Es 
in 1987, are presented in table 7.9. Given the results using pooled data, the 
data set was restricted to the same 24 provinces that were used in the second 
series of regressions. Two regressions were run including IMM and, in order to 
facilitate comparison with the results in table 7.8, two regressions were run 
excluding IMM. The results for both proxies of PROFIT are presented but, 
because of data limitations, the only proxy used for SIZE was total workers/total 
number of firms. The proxies for PROFIT are significant, at 1% or 5%, in each 
regression. SIZE is significant in two of the four regressions, but the signs differ. 
IMM is significant at 1%, but has a positive sign. T.V.G is significant in three of 
the four regressions, at the 10% level, with the expected negative sign. The 
adjusted coefficient of determination is .51 and .58 in the two regressions where 
IMM was excluded and it increased to .76 when IMM was included. The 
pairwise correlation between IMM and SIZE, in the two regressions including 
IMM, is high, but the tests for multicollinearity, as a whole, and the Goldfeld- 
Quandt test for heteroscedasticity suggest that neither is affecting the results.13
INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 
There are some differences between the results (eg. T.V.G is significant in some 
regressions and not others), but the results for most of the variables (eg. 
PROFIT) are consistent throughout regardless of specification and regardless of 
whether the data set is for industrial T.V.Es or T.V.Es as a whole. This 
subsection discusses the performance of specific variables and elaborates on 
some reasons for the results in the light of prior expectations and data problems.
(1) T.V.G
T.V.G was not significant when all provinces were included in the data set. 
However, T.V.G was significant, with the expected sign, in two of the four 
regressions using pooled data for selected provinces. T.V.G was also
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significant, with a negative sign, in three of the four regressions using cross- 
sectional data on industrial T.V.Es for selected provinces. These results give at 
least some support to the argument that the role of the T.V.G diminishes with 
progression in worker socialisation, but it is qualified. The initial results, 
presented in table 7.7, suggest that the argument is not applicable to all T.V.Es 
across all provinces. This, perhaps, should not be surprising, given that it is 
difficult to take account of regional variations in T.V.Es across provinces. These 
results, nevertheless, have to be seen in light of the limitations of the dependent 
variable. The dependent variable purports to be a measure of socialisation. 
The reasons behind this interpretation of the proxy are discussed above, but 
there is also another interpretation. The other interpretation is that remittance to 
the township-village is dependent on profits so that the dependent variable is, in 
fact, a measure of profit share. The results for PROFIT give some support to this 
interpretation. The evidence on the relationship between debt financing and 
profit share in socialist economies is, on this point, speculative, but if the 
experience of western market economies carries over we might expect T.V.G to 
have a positive sign. A possible reason for the poor results for T.V.G, in the 
initial regressions, therefore, is that the two interpretations (the two effects) - ie 
worker socialisation and profit share - might be cancelling each other out.
(2) SIZE
Both proxies for SIZE are significant at 1% with a negative sign in both series of 
regressions using pooled data on T.V.Es as a whole. This seems a reasonable 
result. The argument relating to socialisation applies to, on the whole, small 
communal based T.V.Es. The result is consistent with the observation that in the 
larger T.V.Es, in the coastal provinces, broader communal considerations are 
less important. The result is also consistent with the observation that the 
detailed division of labour is more prominent than the social division of labour as 
a method of coordination in these T.V.Es. The results for T.V.Es as a whole
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contrast with the results for industrial T.V.Es. The only proxy used in the 
regressions on industrial T.V.Es was the average number of workers. The 
results for SIZE, in these regressions, were mixed. SIZE was insignificant in 
three of the regressions and in the other regression was significant at 5% with a 
negative sign. These are difficult results to explain. There does not seem to be 
any a priori reason why the results for industrial T.V.Es should be different from 
T.V.Es as a whole on this point. However, taking into account the consistent 
and robust results for T.V.Es as a whole and given the small number of cases in 
the cross-sectional sample the results for industrial T.V.Es might be due to some 
anomalies in the data. There is, nevertheless, no clear evidence on this issue.
(3) PROFIT
Both proxies for PROFIT have a positive sign and are significant at 1% in each 
regression. This is irrespective of the data set or specification. This result also 
holds for both industrial T.V.Es and T.V.Es as a whole. This is a robust result, 
but what we can read into this depends on the underpinning reasons for it. 
There seem to be two possible explanations. The first is that worker 
socialisation is more prominent in profitable firms. The second is that remittance 
to the township-village is higher in profitable firms because it is a function of 
profit rather than being indicative of workers in more profitable firms having a 
greater social awareness per se. The fact that remittance to the township-village 
is a function of profit is well known and has been recognised in other research 
(see eg. Gelb 1990 pp.294-295). However, if the reason for the results for 
PROFIT rest with the second explanation what we can learn from the results 
about the relationship between profit and socialisation might be limited.
The problem is that the result for PROFIT, while reasonable, might be due to the 
construction of the dependent variable rather than the perceived relationship 
between profit and worker socialisation. The fact that remittance to the
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township-village is a function of profit and the notion that worker socialisation is 
more prominent in more profitable firms, of course, need not be inconsistent. 
Nevertheless the second explanation needs to be borne in mind when 
considering the results. The results for the regional dummies also suggest a 
need for caution in interpreting PROFIT. One interpretation on the results for the 
regional dummies is that in the eastern zone control rights have shifted to 
managers and skilled workers in T.V.Es as a progression in the socialisation 
process. However, this interpretation seems inconsistent with the explanation of 
the results for SIZE - in particular the argument that socialisation is likely to be 
higher in smaller communal based T.V.Es which tend to predominate in the 
interior provinces. Hence a more plausible explanation is that the results for the 
regional dummies reflect the well known observation that T.V.Es in the eastern 
zone are generally more profitable than T.V.Es in the other two zones.
(4) IMM
IMM was included in two of the regressions using cross-sectional data. IMM 
has a positive sign and is significant at the 1% level. This differs from prior 
expectations which was that IMM would have a negative sign. A possible 
explanation for the results might rest with the construction of the dependent 
variable. The reason is that there is evidence, in the wider labour market, to 
suggest that immigrant labour are paid lower wages (see eg Davin & Messkoub 
1990, The Economist July 6 1996 p.72). If the position in the wider labour 
market reflects the situation in T.V.Es, provinces with a higher proportion of 
immigrant labour will have a lower workers’ share. The evidence at the level of 
casual observation suggests that this is the case, but if the result for IMM is due 
to limitations on the dependent variable, the implications that we can draw about 
the impact immigrant labour has on worker socialisation into the firm are limited.
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7.4 SOME GENERAL COMMENTS AND CONCLUSION
Before making some general comments about the implications of the results for 
the earlier theoretical part of the thesis a few words about their limitations are 
needed. First, the regressions are ad hoc. The regressions, therefore, do not 
provide a direct test for either of the theoretical models. The reason for this, as 
stated at the start of the chapter, is that the data were not available to construct 
reasonable proxies. Second, the regressions focus on the more narrow 
argument put forward in previous chapters - ie. the explanation for T.V.E 
behaviour and the proposed similarities between the T.V.E and the J-mode. The 
regressions do not provide empirical verification for the broader argument, in 
earlier chapters, that T.V.Es are a specific example of regionalism and, as such, 
contain lessons for the transition path in Eastern Europe. Third, some of the 
proxies used are crude. This makes it difficult to give a definitive interpretation 
of some of the results - for example IMM in the second series of regressions. 
Thus, on this basis, the conclusions that we can draw from the results are 
tentative and subject to reconsideration with better data sets at the firm level.
However, in spite of the limitations of some of the proxies, the results give at 
least some support to the earlier theoretical arguments. This is a pleasing result 
given data limitations and the ambitious nature of the second set of regressions.
(i) The finding in the first set of regressions that there is a strong 
relationship between profit rate and workers’ share is strong evidence that 
the T.V.E comes close to the J-mode. The results for PROFIT are 
consistent with previous empirical work (see eg. Nakatani 1984 pp.235- 
236) on the relationship between workers’ share and profit rate in the J- 
mode. This result, in itself, is not empirical verification for the wider 
argument that there are similarities between the external contracts of the
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T.V.E and the J-mode. However, at a level which is able to be tested, the 
results are suggestive of strong similarities between the T.V.E and J- 
mode. This supports the theoretical arguments made in earlier chapters.
(ii) The results for SIZE, in both sets of regressions, are important. The 
results for SIZE, when both sets of regressions are considered together, 
suggests that in larger T.V.Es (a) workers’ share tends to be more 
market determined meaning communal considerations are less important 
(b) the detailed division of labour increases in importance relative to the 
social division of labour. This does not provide direct verification for the 
formal arguments developed in the last chapter. However this proposition 
is both consistent with, and supportive of, the main idea - in particular that 
a trade-off exists between the social division of labour, which 
predominates in smaller communal oriented T.V.Es and the detailed 
division of labour, which is dominant in the larger market oriented T.V.Es.
(iii) The results for T.V.G are far from conclusive. This is due, perhaps, more 
to the speculative nature of the dependent variable than the underpinning 
arguments. The results, nevertheless, give some support to the 
suggestion that, in the main T.V.E provinces, the T.V.G is acting as a 
surrogate in the socialisation process and/or as a monitor on collective 
norms and that the role of the T.V.G diminishes with worker socialisation. 
With respect to the broader implications for the theoretical arguments, 
this proposition was not central to the concept of a regional network. The 
distinction between soft and hard contracting was the basis of this 
argument. Therefore, it follows that to provide some empirical support on 
the T.V.G-worker socialisation relationship does not, in itself, provide 
empirical verification for the wider argument that a regional network 
explains T.V.E development. However, the relationship between the role
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of the T.V.G and the socialisation process is important to two sub-themes 
in the wider argument. The first is the explanation for shifting control 
rights over time - ie. the control rights shift from the T.V.G to the manager 
and skilled workers with a progression in socialisation. The second is 
that the T.V.G performs a dual role of the political entrepreneur. The 
T.V.G monitors the evolution of collective norms and with an increase in 
collective or social consciousness the role of the T.V.G diminishes.
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CHAPTER 8 
SOME BROAD LESSONS AND GENERAL IMPLICATIONS
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The last four chapters have focused on T.V.Es, in the main, in isolation from the 
wider debate. This chapter explores some possible lessons for the wider 
literature. There are two main differences, however, between this chapter and 
the previous literature exploring similar themes. First, the chapter is restricted to 
issues which T.V.Es in general, and the models in chapters five and six in 
particular, raise for post-socialist transformation. This is narrower than the 
previous comparative literature which has focused on the possible lessons from 
the reforms as a whole (eg Lee 1994, Naughton 1994b). The theoretical 
framework does not exist in this thesis to consider the potential relevance of the 
wider reforms, hence a broader perspective lies outside the scope of this thesis. 
Second, the lessons which I suggest we can learn from T.V.Es raise issues 
about the theoretical framework of the debate on post-socialist transition, rather 
than suggesting particular policies in different countries. This differs from 
previous articles which focus on possible lessons for the mechanics of reform, 
rather than the reform process (eg McMillan & Naughton 1992, Chen st al 1992).
The method of reasoning, in this chapter, will be that T.V.Es show that certain 
features are important and/or feasible, therefore these features might also be 
important and/or feasible in the transformation process in other economies. The 
tone, however, is cautious, for a few reasons. First, to be more conclusive the 
thesis would need to provide a more comprehensive framework to consider post­
socialist transformation. This would entail more detailed consideration of the 
circumstances which exist in specific countries. The treatment of issues facing 
specific countries in this thesis, though, other than China, has been negligible. 
Second, the reforms, in Eastern Europe, have not been in place for a sufficient
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period to be more conclusive. The results are suggestive, but the empirical 
evidence does not exist to make absolute judgments about the merits of the 
different strategies. Third, it is premature to conclude that T.V.Es, in the end, 
will prove successful. This thesis has tried to emphasise that less than arms- 
length relationships contain some positive features in terms of productive 
efficiency, but there are also costs, such as interference in managerial decisions 
(see chapter four) which impinge on allocative efficiency. Moreover, the 
performance of T.V.Es to this point has been exceptional, but it is impossible to 
be certain whether the problems T.V.Es have will change this in the future.
The rest of the chapter is set out as follows. The possible lessons which I 
suggest T.V.Es contain for post-socialist transformation are listed in the next 
section. There is some discussion about T.V.Es in general, but where possible, 
reference is made to the main arguments and/or conclusions in the two 
theoretical models in chapters five and six. There are four main lessons. The 
first is that path dependence is a relevant consideration. The second is that 
more than one organisational form is feasible. The third is that it is possible to 
experiment with different organisational forms and still end up with ex post 
coherent reforms. The fourth is that economic progress is possible without 
privatisation. The implications of these lessons for post-socialist transformation, 
in general, are discussed in section 8.3. The strands of a different framework for 
considering the post-socialist transformation process are explored in section 8.4. 
The framework builds on the concept of a broader new regionalism, which was 
first explored in chapter five, to suggest at least the basis of an alternative 
perspective stressing differences between specific (post) socialist countries.
8.2 POSSIBLE LESSONS
(i) Lesson one - Path Dependence is a Relevant Consideration
The theoretical model in chapter five, in a broad sense, stresses that T.V.Es did 
not evolve in a vacuum. The contractual environment, or the social, institutional
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and organisational context in which contracts are embedded played a role. Two 
factors, in particular, which are path dependent, were important in the 
explanation. The first was pre-existing socialist institutions. The model stressed 
the role of the cadre-entrepreneur as a vehicle to solve collective action 
problems that build up around informal institutions. If this argument is valid, the 
mechanics which underpin the success of T.V.Es lie with socialist political 
heritage. The second was the social component of contracting. The importance 
of clan forms, in local contracting, is the out growth of communal ties which 
extend back centuries.1 T.V.Es seem to be successful because the potential for 
both of these path dependent factors was explored. This differs from the 
transition path in many other socialist and post-socialist countries where
(i) factors such as pre-existing socialist institutions are often viewed as 
impediments rather than vehicles for reform, and (ii) the potential for different 
forms of governance structures founded on social embeddedness tend to be 
overlooked. The success T.V.Es have had suggests that a different attitude to 
these factors might open up the potential for different organisational forms.
(ii) Lesson two - More than One Organisational Form is Feasible
At one level, there is a significant range of ownership varieties in China. The 
different sorts of ownership structures are given in table 8.1. The state-owned 
sector has enterprises at the central, provincial and local level. Most of the 
state-owned sector in contrast to Eastern Europe, is controlled at sub-central 
levels. However, the most diverse range of organisational forms is in the non­
state sector which has a mix of private and public enterprises. It includes inter 
alia  T.V.Es, “individuals" (private firms with fewer than eight workers) and 
“others" (private firms with more than eight workers, joint ventures, foreign 
owned ventures, joint stock companies etc). The success, to this point, of the 
wider reforms seems to suggest that post-socialist transformation can be 
consistent with a diverse range of ownership forms. While it is a debatable point
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TABLE 8.1
TYPES OF ENTERPRISE OWNERSHIP IN CHINA
Area State-Owned Non-State-Owned Enterprises
Enterprises
Collectives Individual Others
Public Enterprises Private Enterprises
Controlled by
Central, District and Urban Urban Private; joint-
Urban Provincial, 
City and 
Country 
Governments
Neighbourhood
Enterprises
Co-operatives 
Rural Enterprises
Individual stock; joint 
ventures
Rural n/a T.V.Es Rural
Co-operatives
Rural
Individual
SOURCE: Based on Qian (1995) Table 7.1
some go further than this and suggest that plural ownership has been integral to 
the broader reforms. For example Qian (1995 pp.238-250), in passing, argues 
that: "diversity has value because the kind of enterprise reforms ... in China are 
unprecedented and must encompass a wide range of experiments. ... In property 
rights and enterprise reforms, China needs diversity. In this sense the most 
dangerous reform strategy is to insist on a single organisational model for all 
enterprises in the country” (emphasis in original). Amsden et a l (1996) point 
out that diverse ownership forms in China have complemented each other:
“Whereas transition strategy in Eastern Europe has emphasised the 
demise of state-owned firms alongside the rise of private enterprises, new 
and old forms of property in China have been reformed interactively 
(whether by design or default). Typically collectively-owned T.V.Es have
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received their technology, equipment, intermediate inputs and often final 
demand from state-owned firms. To increase their profits, state-owned 
firms have invested directly in T.V.Es" (Amsden et a l 1996 p.277).2
These comments relate to the reforms in general, but the models in chapters 
five and six suggest that different organisational forms have also evolved in 
T.V.Es. The traditional T.V.E, with close ties to the T.V.G, resembles the clan 
form with a strong communal basis. The larger coastal and urban T.V.Es are 
hierarchical where emphasis is on vertical information flows aimed at maximising 
economies of specialisation. The model, in chapter six, explored some of the 
trade-offs between different methods of coordination. The model suggests, at a 
conceptual level, that post-socialist transformation is consistent with more than 
one organisational form. The potential exists for organisations which are based 
on horizontal and vertical information flows. The main arguments, in chapter six, 
build on, and are consistent with, Aoki’s treatment of the trade-offs between the 
J-mode and the A-mode. When the J-mode is seen as one strand in a broader 
collective learning theme embracing inter alia, the flexible specialisation and 
techno-economic paradigms, a basis exists for generalising the notion that 
different organisational forms might be feasible in other (post) socialist countries.
(iii) Lesson three - Ex post Organisational Coherence is Possible
(Murrell 1992c p.3) suggests that "the Chinese reforms began, not with a grand 
plan on the part of the leadership, but rather with the leaders validating and 
spreading experiments that had been conducted under the initiative of the 
leadership of some localities”. This is reflected in the slogan: China should 
adopt ‘pick-ism’ {nalai zhuyi), ie. it should adopt bits from different models that are 
useful (.Inside China Mainland  March 1993 pp.21-27). This approach
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characterises the evolution of T.V.Es. Wong (1991), among others, argues that 
the development of T.V.Es was due to deliberate state promotion. While T.V.Es, 
at times, have been restricted to certain industries, as a general observation this 
is true. However, the actual institutional characteristics or organisational form of 
T.V.Es is a different matter. The emergence of the particular institutional 
features of T.V.Es were not planned, but were, to a large degree, the out growth 
of government vacillation. Nonetheless, the reforms ex post seem coherent. The 
model, in chapter six, suggests that T.V.Es have developed a dual character 
consisting of (i) a core of strategic alliances based on informal exchange and
(ii) an extended sector where formal exchange is predominant. This is similar to 
the J-mode - which is an advanced capitalist form - but it was never planned. 
Sachs (1991), arguing from a big bang perspective, posits that there is no time 
for experimentation, because if privatisation is not rapid, the economic gains 
from transition to the market will be lost, but the success which T.V.Es have 
had seems to suggest that it is possible to experiment with different 
organisational forms and still end up with ex post coherent reforms. Moreover, 
T.V.Es show that experimentation can be compatible with high rates of growth.
(iv) Lesson fo u r - Economic Progress is Possible Without Privatisation
A fourth possible lesson is that significant progress in industrialisation can be 
feasible without privatisation. T.V.Es were not planned, but were spontaneous 
initiatives at the local level. For example Oi (1995 p.1148) argues: “The success 
of local governments as entrepreneurs suggests that privatisation is not the only 
way to stimulate economic growth.” Nolan (1995 p.222) elaborates on this view:
"China’s experience shows that community ownership can be an effective 
way of overcoming market failure for an important segment of the rural 
non-farm sector. Privatisation proved to be an unimportant part of the 
explanation for the accelerated growth of this sector. ... China’s local
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authorities were able, in most areas, to generate revenue from the rural 
non-farm sector so that they were in a better position than might have 
been the case with privatised small businesses to undertake community 
welfare expenditures of benefit to ... the whole local community”.
Thus, given the large number of socialist and post-socialist economies 
attempting market reform and economic development, T.V.Es stand as a less 
radical and viable alternative to privatisation. However, the suggestion that 
progress is possible without privatisation is, perhaps, the most controversial of 
the proposed lessons. While T.V.Es have done well without privatisation, the 
performance of the state-owned sector and whether privatisation of S.O.Es is a 
pre-requisite for further growth is debatable. Moderate economists such as 
Chen et al (1992 p.222) suggest that “privatising state enterprises [is] not 
essential for the near and mid-term success of [China’s] industrial reform 
program. Expanding managerial autonomy and incentives ... have, to a 
substantial degree, substituted for the privatisation of state enterprises”. In 
contrast, the advocates of big bang argue that S.O.Es have not performed well 
and are not reformable (see eg Lipton & Sachs 1990, Sachs & Woo 1994, Woo 
1994). The issues are clouded due to difficulties with measuring performance 
(see section 2.3). Moreover, while T.V.Es have performed well so far, as 
stressed in the first section, it is impossible to state for certain whether this will 
continue without clarification of existing “ambiguous” institutional arrangements.
8.3 RELEVANCE TO OTHER TRANSFORMING ECONOMIES
Most (but not all) would accept that T.V.Es show that each of the above 
propositions is possible. The more contentious issue is whether the lessons are 
relevant to the wider debate (ie. is it possible for other countries to achieve 
similar results if each lesson is followed). Two points are important when
252
considering the possible lessons for other socialist and post-socialist economies. 
The first is that the object is not to set up a comprehensive blueprint as an 
alternative to big bang. The point, rather, is that a blueprint might not be 
possible. In chapter five the broader argument was that T.V.Es are a specific 
example of a new regionalism which emphasises the individual features of 
different economies. This idea stresses that the transformation paths in various 
socialist and post-socialist economies differ. The second point, which follows 
from the first, is that T.V.Es can contain lessons for post-socialist transformation 
in other countries, without other countries replicating the T.V.Es’ institutions. In 
this respect the possible lessons lie in the process rather than the mechanics of 
reform. The institutional features of T.V.Es are specific, but the idea that 
institutional specific characteristics, which differ between countries, can be 
developed is general. T.V.Es seem to show that it is possible for individual 
countries to nurture institutions which are specific to their transformation path. If 
this is true, this goes some of the way towards weakening the argument that 
T.V.Es contain no lessons because there are structural differences between 
China and other socialist and post-socialist economies. This line of argument in 
itself, is not totally successful in dealing with big bang reasoning. The reason is 
that the advocates of big bang argue that the lessons are not relevant because 
there are structural similarities in Eastern Europe, which differ from China. 
However, at a few different levels, there are some objections to this argument.
A first possible objection is less tangible. More moderate economists have 
pointed out that there are signs in Sachs & Woo (1994) that the authors argue 
from pre-existing convictions that market regulation must be superior. Most 
prominent economists and the main aid and lending institutions were vocal 
advocates of rapid transition in Eastern Europe. It follows that their reputation 
rests on the correctness of these strategies. Nolan (1995 p.263) goes as far as 
to suggest: “it is not too fanciful to talk of an intellectual ‘compradore’ mentality in 
Russia ... with those who followed the path of ‘free market reform’ able to 
expect visiting fellowships in western institutions and other rewards as part of an
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implicit contract for their help in legitimising the correct line”. The thinly veiled 
suggestion, in this passage, of an academic conspiracy might be going too far, 
but it does highlight the obvious incentive which big bang advocates have to limit 
the potential relevance of policies which appear to contradict the “correct line".
A second more fundamental objection is that Sachs & Woo (1994) base their 
argument on a normal path of development. This suggests China’s growth rate 
is higher because its reforms were easier due to structural advantages and 
because it was coming off a lower base. According to Sachs & Woo (1994 
p.43): "China’s reform problem is the classic development problem of moving 
surplus agricultural labour into industry and services, while Eastern Europe and 
Russia’s reform problem is the more difficult and conflictive adjustment problem 
of inducing labour to move from non-competitive industries". This, in itself, might 
be a fair depiction of the processes involved in China vis-a-vis Eastern Europe, 
although which was easier is not clear cut. A point that a number of writers have 
made is that while surplus agricultural labour proved to be a plus ex post, it 
wasn’t considered an advantage at the start of the reforms (see eg Singh 1993, 
Nolan 1995 and Chang & Nolan 1996). Singh (1993) makes the following point:
“It is often argued that it is easier to carry out market reforms in 
agriculture than to reform the industrial economy. This, however, fails to 
take into account the differences in the nature of the markets for 
agricultural and industrial products. As is well known, left to themselves 
the former are highly volatile. ... This consideration should in principle 
make complete marketisation of the agrarian economy a more difficult 
undertaking than that of the industrial economy" (Singh 1993 p.13).
Chang & Nolan (1996 p.22) reinforce this view through stressing the fact that the 
capital needs for expanding agriculture can be particularly large in a densely 
populated country like China. These authors (at p.22) also refer to research
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TABLE 8.2
GROWTH RATES AND THE PROPORTION OF LABOUR IN AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY
IN CHINA AND RUSSIA. COMPARED TO THE NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
COUNTRY
or LABOUR FORCE IN  EACH SECTOR ( % )
COUNTRY AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY
GROUPING 1980 1990 1980 1990
CHINA 74 72 14 15
INDIA 70 64 13 16
RUSSIA 16 14 44 42
L.I.Es 73 69 13 15
M.I.Es 38 31 27 27
H.I.Es 7 5 35 31
H.P.A.Es 31 25 28 28
AVERAGE ANNUAL G ROW TH RATE G.D.P f% )
1980-1990 1990-1994
CHINA 10.2 12.9
INDIA 5.8 3.8
RUSSIA 1.9 -10.6
L.I.Es 2.9 1.4
M.I.Es 2.2 0.2
H.I.Es 3.2 1.7
H.P.A.Es 6.2 6.9
NOTES:
LIEs = lower income economies (excluding China and India)
MIEs = middle income economies 
HIEs = high income economies
H.P. A.Es = high performing Asian Economies which were the subject of World Bank (1993)- ie 
Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. 
SOURCE: World Bank (1996)
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which people like Little (1979) have carried out which suggests that the 
economic success of the “four tigers" (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and 
Taiwan) was due to the fact that each had a small farm sector at the start of their 
phase of accelerated growth. When we take account of arguments like these, 
the empirical dilemma for Sachs & Woo’s line of reasoning is that China has not 
just outperformed Eastern European countries, but has (i) performed much better 
than all developing countries, which were coming off similar bases with similar 
structural advantages in terms of large agricultural sectors and (ii) has 
performed better than the high performing Asian economies - the “four tigers” 
and the “new industrial countries” (Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand). Table 8.2 
contains some statistics on this point. China's growth rate is well in excess of 
the average for the middle income and high income countries (where the 
proportion of labour in agriculture is low) and the average for the low income 
countries (where the proportion of labour in agriculture is much higher).
More than this, the issue of whether there even is a "normal path of 
development” is controversial. The issues, here, are manifest in the debate over 
The East Asian M iracle  (World Bank 1993).3 The World Bank, in The East Asian 
M iracle , put forward a similar argument to Sachs & Woo (1994) in relation to the 
"four tigers”, the “new industrial countries" and Japan. The challenge, for the 
World Bank, in that report, was to explain the success of these high performing 
economies in terms of its "market friendly approach”. To do this, The East Asian 
M iracle  explains economic development in terms of a “neoclassical 
transformation". The report, commenting on industrial policies, states: "the
manufacturing sector[s] ... evolved roughly in accord with neoclassical 
expectations. .. It is possible that the governments] undertook measures such 
as the provision of social overhead capital, [but this just] facilitated the 
‘neoclassical’ transformation” (World Bank 1993 pp.333-334). However, this 
seems to suggest that irrespective of how much government intervention (or
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promotion) there is, as long as the economy, or a sector of it, is successful, its 
success must have conformed to neoclassical prescriptions (Kwon 1994 p.641) - 
ie. a normal path of development. However, this leaves unresolved the issue of 
what would have happened in the absence of non-market regulation - would 
there actually have been a normal path of development or underdevelopment?
A third objection is that advocates of big bang such as Sachs & Woo (1994) 
highlight the differences in initial conditions between China and Eastern Europe, 
but tend to discount the fact that, in spite of structural similarities, there are a 
range of transitions - social economic and political - occurring in different 
countries in Eastern Europe. While writers advocating big bang often recognise 
that these different transitions are taking place, the big bang approach does not 
incorporate them into its general model. Instead economic, political and social 
differences across countries are treated as aberrations on the model’s 
assumptions which will be ironed out over time with further market liberalisation. 
Stark (1992 p.18) sums up the implications and limitations of this approach:
"The [advocates of big bang] approach the problem of the transition 
exclusively through the lens of their general models. Through such a 
gaze, differences among the countries in the region are merely 
differences in degree (the timing and rapidity of collapse, the strength of 
elite commitment to reform, the speed of introducing new policies and the 
like). ... Contrary to such views we should regard East Central Europe as 
undergoing a plura lity o f transitions in a dual sense: across the region we 
are seeing a multiplicity of distinctive strategies; [while] within given 
countries, we find not one transition, but many occurring in different 
domains - political, economic and social" (emphasis mine).
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The fourth objection is that, although the potential of some of the normative 
lessons can be debated on structural grounds (such as, for example, whether 
progress is possible without privatisation) most of the underpinning features of 
T.V.Es’ reform such as the role of path dependence and the existence of diverse 
organisational forms are inherent in the transformation process itself. These sort 
of broader factors relate to process and are of general relevance irrespective of 
structural differences. The main point, in this regard, is that the fundamental 
issues that T.V.Es raise for the theoretical framework, in particular in terms of 
ownership, cannot easily be dismissed on the grounds of structural differences. 
The success T.V.Es have had show that it is possible to cultivate institutions 
which are specific (eg. the T.V.E-T.V.G relationship). If T.V.Es suggest a general 
lesson, it seems to be that distinctive strategies might be needed to get the best 
out of various specific factors that exist in different socialist and post-socialist 
economies. The rest of this section will explore some of the implications for the 
theoretical framework that follow from the suggested lessons in more detail.
(i) The Implications of Lesson one - Path Dependence is Important
(a) The transition path differs between countries and within countries.
The theoretical framework stressing the role of path dependent factors in T.V.Es’ 
success does not shed light on the similarities or differences in the transition 
paths in other countries. Therefore, in order to make some comments about the 
heterogeneous nature of transition we need to move outside the framework. The 
experience of different countries can be illustrated with a couple of (broad- 
brushed) examples. The experience of Eastern European countries in terms of 
enterprise restructuring and privatisation has been diverse. First, some countries 
(eg Hungary and Poland) seemed more market oriented to begin with than 
others. Second, as central controls were lifted the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and, to a lesser extent, Hungary experienced a wave of break-ups and spin-offs
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of large S.O.Es. This did not happen in other countries to the same extent. 
Third the Czech Republic and the former G.D.R have undertaken privatisation at 
a much faster rate than other countries (Svejner 1996 p. 123). The political 
transitions have also varied between countries, (eg. reunification between East 
and West Germany, compromise between the communists and trade union 
movement in Poland and electoral competition in Hungary - Stark 1992, Welsh
1994). At best these examples give a superficial picture of the complex nature 
of the different transitions, but still suggest that there might be "diverse paths of 
extrication from socialism” (Stark 1992 p.48) across countries. The theoretical 
framework stressing the importance of path dependence in T.V.Es’ success does 
not shed light on whether these different transitions actually exist. However, it 
does suggest that if it is accepted that these differences do exist, there is 
potential in exploring the manner in which path the dependencies interact.
(b) There is a potential role for pre-existing socialist institutions
The model in chapter five stressed the role of pre-existing socialist institutions - 
in particular the importance of socialist political heritage. The model suggested 
that the cadre-entrepreneur is a vehicle to solve collective action problems that 
build up around informal institutions. The implication for other socialist and post­
socialist countries is that there might be a role for pre-existing socialist 
institutions in their respective transformations. This does not mean that pre­
existing socialist institutions will a p rio r i assume a pro-active role as the cadre- 
entrepreneur seems to. However, the big bang approach, in Eastern Europe, 
sometimes appears to be based on the premise that individual economies are 
"starting from scratch” (Stark 1992 p.20). But the collapse of Soviet type 
economies in Eastern Europe did not leave an institutional void. Thus the 
implication is that variations in the institutional legacies of socialism in different 
countries might have an effect on how economic and political institutions are 
shaped in the transformation period (see Skocpol 1979, Bruszt & Stark 1992).
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While it is not hard to imagine circumstances where pre-existing socialist 
institutions can preclude some directions, T.V.Es show that pre-existing socialist 
institutions can also open up opportunities for different transformation paths.
(c) The theoretical basis of the big bang approach is undermined 
If the transformation process is path dependent and, as such, rooted in the 
conventional behaviour of economic agents, the theoretical basis of the big bang 
approach is brought into issue. The lines of argument, here, echo gradualist 
objections to the big bang approach (see eg Murrell 1991b, Nove 1992, Van Ees 
& Garretson 1994, Home 1995). First, if path dependence is relevant in the 
transformation period, economic behaviour will, at least to some extent, still be 
based on pre-existing socialist constraints. If this is the case an immediate shift 
to “the market” might be counter-productive because economic agents might 
have good reason to doubt whether the imposed institutions are credible and/or 
reliable (Van Ees & Garretson 1994 p.9). Second, the big bang approach treats 
post-socialist transformation as an exercise in comparative statics. The focus is 
on comparing static efficiency in two equilibrium states - ie. central planning and 
markets. The transition from the former to the latter is depicted as a "seamless 
web" (Lipton & Sachs 1990 p.99). The problem with this is that if post-socialist 
transformation is path dependent, the process cannot be reduced to general 
equilibrium theorising. This carries implications for whether it is desirable or 
even possible to transfer the institutions of western economies to Eastern 
Europe. The main point is spelt out in Van Ees & Garretson (1994 pp.9-10):
"If path dependency is no longer just another equilibrium outcome ... 
historically determined institutions and conventions in western type 
economies are no longer necessarily a blue-print for Eastern Europe. 
This implies that our set of institutions cannot simply be transferred to 
Eastern European countries. In case institutions and/or conventions ... 
are interdependent, agents in Eastern Europe may wish to follow a
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different adjustment strategy that is not automatically compatible with 
'western' institutions or conventions. From the point of view of 
transformation this means that the transition in Eastern Europe towards a 
market economy cannot merely be a copy of the development of market 
economies in western countries. ... Similarly, if path dependency is 
understood as being interwoven with the individual decision making 
process there is no longer any reason to assume that the ability of agents 
to transform existing institutions or conventions is the same across 
Eastern and Central Europe. As Weitzman [1993], for instance, 
observes there might be sound cultural or historical reasons why this 
ability could differ between say Russian and individual Czech agents”.
(ii) The Implications of Lesson two - Different Organisational Forms 
There might be alternatives to the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism in other 
socialist and post-socialist economies. The existence of different organisational 
forms in T.V.Es does not, in itself, mean that diverse organisational forms will be 
preferable in other transforming countries. However, it does suggest that there 
might be advantages in shifting the focus from transition (which emphasises 
destination) to transformation (which emphasises actual processes). At one 
level this would provide opportunities to explore the merits of, and the potential 
for, diverse organisational forms such as “networks”, “alliances” and “inter-firm 
agreements". There is some work on different governance structures in Eastern 
Europe (eg Carroll et al 1988 Szelenyi 1989, Stark 1989), but in relative terms it 
has not been influential. At a different level it opens up possibilities to explore 
the merits of different models of capitalism or even market socialism. The 
choice, and merits, of different forms of capitalism - for example the “Anglo- 
Saxon model", the “Japanese model” and the "German model” - has received 
little attention in reform programs (Nolan 1993a chap. 6, Chang 1995, Horne
1995). The model, in chapter six, suggests that T.V.Es are similar to the J-
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mode. The fact that T.V.Es have evolved to resemble the J-mode suggests that 
a different strand of capitalism (whether it is the "Japanese model”, the “German 
model" or some variation involving something new) might also be preferable to 
the “Anglo-Saxon model” in other socialist and post-socialist economies.
(iii) The Implications of Lesson three - Ex post Coherence of Reforms 
The success of T.V.Es show that there are alternatives to implementing new 
institutions through conscious design. In fact, there may be advantages in 
taking an ad hoc approach. “[The leadership] refrained from making quick 
judgements and suppressing 'illegal practices’; instead they let time be the 
judge. This tolerance of heterodoxy fostered innovation in institution building. ... 
[T.V.Es1] success demonstrates the effectiveness of providing time for learning 
and adaptation, rather than importing foreign systems overnight” (Chen 1993 
p. 139). Of course there are also costs in adopting an ad hoc approach. The 
lack of a clear blueprint for reform is a significant shortcoming. However, at the 
same time, the relative merits of conscious institutional design are also 
debatable. If it is accepted that no single approach to reform is perfect then the 
orthodox approach needs to be subjected to the same treatment as the 
alternatives - both its benefits and costs have to be weighed up, rather than 
treating it as an ideal against which all other approaches are assessed. In this 
respect the advocates of big bang point to the perceived longer-term benefits of 
an ex ante coherent reform package, but whether the (potential) longer-term 
benefits will outweigh the more immediate socio-economic costs is not clear.
To this point the evidence from big bang economies suggests that the imposition 
of new institutions, inherent in conscious design, has had a destructive effect on 
fledgling organisational forms, at least in the shorter term. The critics of big 
bang argue that this reflects the fact that it is not possible to remake property 
relations according to design (see Murrell 1992c, Stark 1992). While, on
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available evidence, this overstates the case against big bang, what is more 
defensible is that T.V.Es seem to have ex post developed an advanced capitalist 
form - the J-mode - at a lower cost, measured in terms of output, than conscious 
reform strategies in Eastern Europe. Thus, inspite of the fact that 
experimentation lacks a clear blueprint at the outset, this suggests that ad hoc 
reform might present a more gentle alternative to conscious institutional design. 
Even if this is going too far on the limited time frame so far, it seems reasonable 
to conclude that the empirical support for conscious design is, at this stage, 
uncertain and T.V.Es show that experimentation can be a feasible alternative.
(iv) The Implications o f Lesson four - Progress Without Privatisation 
The possible implications of this suggested lesson are controversial on a couple 
of different fronts. As stressed throughout this chapter, it is uncertain whether 
T.V.Es will continue to perform well with “ambiguous” institutional arrangements. 
Second, the advocates of big bang point to the higher percentage of S.O.Es in 
Eastern Europe and argue that there was little choice but to privatise most of 
them. Sachs (1995 pp.457) states "The critical differences in economic structure 
revolve around the level of economic development. Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union were much more industrialised and urbanised at the start of 
their reforms than the East Asian transition economies at the start of their 
reforms or than Japan in the immediate post-war period” (emphasis in original). 
But, whether this paints an accurate picture is debatable. In terms of the 
proportion of the labour force in agriculture it is true that the U.S.S.R was more 
industrialised than China at the start of the reforms (see table 8.2), but if we 
look at a breakdown of G.D.P, the structural differences are not as clear cut.
263
TABLE 8.3
STRUCTURE OF G.D.P IN PRE-REFORM CHINA AND THE U.S.S.R. COMPARED TO THE
NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
(figures are for 1980, expressed as percentages)
SECTOR U.S.S.R. CHINA LIEs MIEs IMEs
AGRICULTURE 16 31 45 15 4
INDUSTRY 62 47 17 40 37
SERVICES 22 22 38 25 62
NOTES:
LIEs = lower income economies (excluding China and India)
MIEs = middle income economies 
IMEs = industrial market economies 
SOURCE:
Nolan (1995) Table 5.2
Table 8.3 presents some statistics on this point which are taken from Nolan 
(1995 p. 124). The statistics are for 1980 which is representative of the pre­
reform period in both countries. These show that a large share of G.D.P in the 
U.S.S.R, was produced in the industrial sector (62%). However, Nolan (1995 
p. 124) points out “China was also ‘overindustrialised’ in the sense that the 
industrial sector reportedly produced a very much larger share of output than 
might be expected for a country at its level of income”. The figures bear this out. 
The industrial share of G.D.P, in both China (47%) and the U.S.S.R (62%), was 
much larger than the average for the lower income countries (17%), and even 
outstripped the average for the industrial market economies (37%). The 
conclusions Nolan (1995) reaches contrast with Sachs (1995). Nolan (1995 
p. 124) writes: “If one accepts that there were serious inefficiencies in Chinese 
industry, just as there were in Soviet industry, then it may be argued that China’s 
‘over-industrialisation’ was an even greater burden [in] China than it was [in] the 
Soviet Union. ... [T]he ‘over-industrialisation’ was in a vastly poorer country, 
with a much lower income level from which to generate resources for growth”.
If this is the case, it is difficult to dismiss the suggestion that progress is possible 
without privatisation on structural grounds. If the ‘over-industrialisation’ burden
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was similar in both countries, the fact that T.V.Es provided a vehicle to drive 
growth rates while reforms were made to S.O.Es, must be of relevance to 
Eastern Europe. However, even accepting the big bang perspective, if we put 
privatisation to one side, T.V.Es seem to demonstrate that rapid economic 
improvements can occur through creating an environment where new industries 
and new institutions can emerge. This is a wider point than whether or not to 
privatise. Thus, even if we accept the basic premise of the big bang argument 
that, given its structural characteristics, mass privatisation was the best option in 
Eastern Europe, the success of T.V.Es suggests that it might not be optimal for 
Eastern Europe to place too much emphasis on privatisation per se as a panacea 
to revitalise its industries (Johnson 1994 p.72). The important issue, which is 
separate from the ownership structure, relates to whether the reform program 
creates an environment for new industries and institutions to emerge. As a 
starting point this requires further discussion about how to design and implement 
long-term industrial strategies, but the problem is that this issue has been 
marginalised in the debate on Eastern Europe (see Chang 1995 pp.386-387).
8.4 TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON 
POST-SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION
The problem with most of the transition literature is that in attempting to explain
firm-level performance, it focuses on the market rather than the firm. As a result
it ignores the potential contribution of organisational and technological
innovation, including the role of collective learning in generating innovation.
Hence, if the theorising about T.V.Es in this thesis is to provide the basis of an
alternative view of post-socialist transformation, the cooperative culture theme
needs to be viewed in more general terms. A point made in earlier chapters is
that influential papers such as Weitzman & Xu (1994) make no attempt at all to
challenge the post-socialist transition approach in Eastern Europe. Weitzman &
Xu (1994) argue that T.V.E success is due to co-operative culture at the societal
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level. Pei (1996), however, presents an alternative view to Weitzman & Xu 
(1994). He argues (at p.44) that "the success of T.V.Es is mainly due to the 
specific [cooperative] elements of a village or rural community, and not to 
general cultural elements". An advantage which Pei's argument has is that it 
focuses attention on the "group" (ie. corporate group, village-township etc) as 
the basis for co-operative action. This line of reasoning opens up possibilities 
for generalising the lessons from T.V.Es to Eastern Europe because, when the 
focus is on the potential for cooperation in a group, the co-operative culture 
theme ceases to be an Asia-Europe issue. The potential for group co-operation, 
instead, becomes analytically traceable. This was the basis of the argument, in 
chapter five, that T.V.Es are a subset of a broader literature on regionalism.
If there are lessons in the T.V.E experience for Eastern Europe, the J-mode also 
needs to be seen as part of a broader cooperative culture theme which has a 
more general application. The relationship between the different strands of co­
operative culture and their inter-relationship with the market-hierarchies 
rationale, was explored in chapter three. The point made in that chapter is that 
when the J-mode is seen as part of a broader collective learning culture T.V.Es 
begin to reflect Best's (1990) "new competition", encompassing elements of the 
J-mode, flexible specialisation and the techno-economic paradigm. While there 
is some contrary evidence, a wealth of studies exist which suggest that J-mode 
institutions have wider application. For example, Adler (1993), Helper (1991), 
Kenney & Florida (1993) and Morris & Imie (1992) document the success of J- 
mode transplants in a number of industries (eg automobiles, consumer 
electronics and steel) in the United States and Western Europe.4 In addition, 
Ouchi (1981) found J-mode features in the best managed American firms and 
Kochan et a! (1986) describe the increasing adoption of J-mode features such as 
flexible team work and worker participation programmes in ww-union firms in the 
United States. There is also extensive research on profit sharing and 
cooperative work organisation in the U.S which draws on the J-mode suggesting 
that differences between the A-mode and J-mode are matters of degree (see
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Bonin & Putterman 1986, Bradley & Gelb 1983). Chapter six buiit on these 
ideas to explore different organisational forms in terms of the division of labour.
The literature on new regionalism provides a possible avenue for generalising 
the collective culture theme as an alternative perspective on post-socialist 
transformation given that in China regional development provided the basis for 
nurturing new and diverse institutional forms. The collective learning theme is 
not just about small firms. Analytically it is indifferent to firm size with some 
cases involving mostly small firms - for example industrial districts - and others 
not - for example the J-mode. Nevertheless an important aspect of the new 
regionalist approach entails considering possibilities for promoting small and 
medium enterprise development alongside large-scale S.O.Es and in some 
cases former S.O.Es. This was the approach which was adopted in China. In 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union "U-form" hierarchical planning 
coupled with the military industrial complex discouraged the growth of small- 
scale industries. Although some declared themselves to be federations (such as 
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union) and/or established a number of 
'autonomous republics’ (the Soviet Union) the economies were centrally planned 
from their capitals. The responsibilities of regions were mainly limited to issues 
relating to culture, language and schooling, while those of lower administrative 
units such as counties and districts were mostly insignificant (Balaz 1995 p.353).
In contrast to China, in the Soviet model of socialism in Eastern Europe one or 
two industries dominated entire local economies. "The industrial economy that 
was created produced distinct regional formations of enterprise regulation. 
Vertically integrated large enterprises dominated many regional economies and 
created local ‘cathedrals in the desert’ characterised by high levels of local 
autarky” (Smith 1995 p.763). For example in the former G.D.R in the late 1980s 
in one-third of 189 districts the leading local industry accounted for 40-60% of 
total employment (Grabher 1994 p. 180). Apart from utilising the local labour 
force, individual plants generally had no economic relations with the region in
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which they were located. As a result the notion of the region as a socio-spatial 
network had no economic meaning. However, since the collapse of central 
planning, regional governments have been strengthened and local authorities 
with the support of central governments have attempted to shift the focus to 
regional based development in quite a number of East European countries.5
Foreign donors are also attempting to foster the growth of small enterprises in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. For example in September 1996, 
the World Bank’s IFC created a $US40 million small enterprise fund to support 
small and medium enterprises in sixteen countries including transition 
economies such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Slovakia and Uzbekistan.6 The 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is another foreign 
lender which pins great hopes on the contribution of small and medium 
enterprises to economic reconstruction and income generation in Eastern 
Europe (EBRD 1992). The EBRD (1992) argues that a possible avenue 
forward is to promote regional development paths through technoparks and 
small firm incubators. The main idea behind this approach is to provide clusters 
of start-up firms with space (site, building and workshop) and producer services 
(for example advice on finance management and marketing). A number of 
institutions have been identified in Eastern Europe that might be able to facilitate 
regional development policies of this sort such as HESPA in Russia, REGRO 
CSFR and NADSME in the Czech and Slovak Republics and SEEC in Estonia.7
European Union aid programmes such as PHARE8 and agencies such as the 
EBRD and World Bank have been looking for "models” which can assist them in 
deciding how this process can be supported from outside with financial and 
technical assistance. However, potentially one of the problems with most 
existing projects of this sort is that small-scale industries are promoted at the 
expense of larger firms. In all of the major capitalist economies large firms are 
important in a range of industries. Hence, it is at least arguable that there 
should continue to be a role for large firms in Eastern Europe as part of a pattern
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of institutionalised diversification,9 but a major aim of the World Bank and the 
EBRD is to promote small-scale industries as a method of industrial 
restructuring. For example, in 1992, an EBRD report recommended that its main 
objective should be to promote conversion “from monopolistic, large scale, rigid 
structures to competitive, smaller scale, flexible structures” EBRD (1992 p.9). 
More recently, the president of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, expressed a 
similar view. He is reported as stating that one of the Bank's main objectives is 
"to help Russia restructure its natural monopolies”.10 The Chinese experience 
with developing T.V.Es in a regional framework suggests that there is a 
different and arguably better approach than down-sizing. In China small-scale 
flexible industries were promoted in conjunction with multi-plant regional based 
S.O.Es rather than as an alternative. The result is that both have benefited from 
the existence of diverse ownership forms through providing an outlet for each 
others products, the provision of inputs and the exchange of technical staff.11
Most of this thesis has focused on T.V.E regionalism, but there is historical 
precedent which suggests that regionalism provides a more general avenue for 
economic development. Sabel (1989 p. 17), writing about Europe, points out: 
“Until at least the mid-nineteenth century, the region was a natural unit of 
economic activity and analysis. ... [The] regions were both flexible and 
specialised. ... Even the strongest firms in these systems of flexible 
specialisation depended on extensive co-operation with their competitors either 
directly through complex, rapidly changing subcontracting relations or indirectly 
through joint participation in the institutions regulating the municipal; economy.” 
The potential relevance of regional based economies was overlooked for a 
significant period. However, the concept of regional based economies has re- 
emerged as a dissident perspective on advanced capitalist economies in recent 
times - in particular since Piore & Sabel (1984). The flexible specialisation 
literature provides an alternative perspective for dissenting economists 
disenchanted with the perceived failure of mass production. The renewed 
prominence of flexible specialisation has also been reinforced with the re­
269
emergence of a number of successful regional based economies in the 1970s 
and 1980s in diverse industrialised market economies in Europe, Japan and the 
United States as well as a range of developing countries in Asia and Africa.12
There have been several criticisms made of flexible specialisation. The main 
criticisms focus on its empirical validity, its heuristic application and the capacity 
of its central conclusions to be converted into policy. A common criticism is that 
industrial districts - in particular in the Third Italy - have not performed as well in 
the 1990s as in the 1970s and 1980s.13 For example Cooke & Morgan (1994) 
refer to Emilia Romagna as a growth region under duress and Bianchi (1994) 
suggests that it is time to sound the first note of a "Requiem for the Third Italy". 
Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that the perceived decline of 
industrial districts in recent times has tended to be overstated by the critics of 
flexible specialisation. Franchi (1994) considers the performance of industrial 
districts in Emilia Romagna over the period 1983-1994. She concludes that 
some industrial districts are in crisis, but most are not. Franchi’s (1994) findings 
are supported by other studies of the Third Italy - for example Harrison (1994) 
and Camagni & Rabellotti (1993) who focus on the Italian footwear districts.
A more serious objection is flexible specialisation is often used as a pseudonym 
for post-Fordism. To overcome this, there is a good argument that “‘flexibility’ 
itself needs to be unbundled into a range of separate components - not least ... 
in terms of the increasing sophistication, scope and flexibility and heterogeneity 
of flexible specialisation itself as a concept" (Fine 1995 p. 109). This relates to 
the criticism, discussed at length in chapter three, that there is a tendency in the 
flexible specialisation literature to draw a dichotomy between Fordist and post- 
Fordist production where none need exist. If the concept of ‘flexibility’ is 
unbundled “it is not necessarily the case that the separate components will 
always shift in the same direction, towards or away from new forms of 
production. Indeed it is apparent that flexibility in one component of an 
economic system may require rigidity in another component” (Fine 1995 p. 109).
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However, inspite of the fact that flexible specialisation has some theoretical 
shortcomings and at an empirical level the verdict on industrial districts remains 
open, new regionalism suggests a clear analytical approach. The emergence of 
new successful forms of production in some regions, but not others, suggests 
something fundamental about the relationship between localisation, regional 
differences and specificities which provides the foundations for some general 
lessons that are helpful for approaching reform, irrespective of where one stands 
on the debate over the theoretical underpinnings of flexible specialisation. The 
specific imagery associated with pure regional models - like the Third Italy - or 
the J-mode might not be appropriate given the fragile nature of the industrial 
economies in Eastern Europe, but a range of studies in different sectoral, 
regional and national contexts reveal that inter-firm cooperation can take a 
diversity of forms (see eg Bureau of Industry Economics 1994). And there is 
growing recognition that the dynamic forces in contemporary capitalist 
development are both localised and territorially specific, not just amongst 
regionalists, but also amongst economists and management strategists (see 
eg Dosi etcil 1990, Porter 1990, Amendola etal 1992, Krugman 1992, 1995).
The new regionalism literature is useful because it places models of industrial 
organisation in the context of trajectories (see Humphrey & Schmitz 1996). The 
notion that different organisations reflect growth trajectories is consistent with 
most of the points made in the last section - in particular that distinctive 
strategies might be needed to get the best out of various specific factors that 
exist in different (post) socialist economies. There are parallels between the 
prescription, in the flexible specialisation literature, for developing poorer 
regions within capitalist economies and the idea that transforming economies 
should be left to develop their own institutions. Sabel (1989 pp.40-41) states: “In 
the heyday of mass production poorer regions were conceived as blank spaces 
on the national map of industry, to be filled in by the same development strategy. 
... [But this view has given way to] a single view of the region as an economic
271
entity full of under - or unused resources that range from traditional artisanal 
skills to petty commerce. Prosperity depends, according to the new doctrines o f 
endogenous growth, on developing these resources rather than importing the equipment 
and skills o f  a mass production economy from  the rich exterior" (emphasis mine).
There are strong similarities between mass production, in the debate on late 
industrialisation, and big bang in the post-socialist transformation debate. The 
focus of both tends to be on a general model with general application which fails 
to recognise the embeddedness of regional economies. Notions that in Eastern 
Europe there can be a smooth transition from planning to the market fails to 
recognise the existence of different regional patterns. The regional approach 
shifts the emphasis from a general model to the specific circumstances that exist 
in individual economies and focuses on how to make the most of their potential. 
This approach is reflected in the so-called urban literature which crosses the 
social sciences, but has strong roots in economic geography. It focuses on the 
political and social organisation for change, in capitalist economies, in the main 
at a local urban level (eg Agnew 1987, Cox & Mair 1987, Gottdiener 1987, 
Savitch 1988). This approach presumes multiple avenues for development, 
dependent upon contingent conditions within local contexts. Thus variations in 
strategies for development are explained in terms of a wide range of factors 
relating to the character of production and the role of socio-economic, political, 
financial and legal institutions - both formal and informal. The different avenues 
for development are “the synergistic results of context" (Ettlinger 1994 p. 146).
The concept of “the region” is developed in this thesis, in terms of a group (eg. 
village-township or corporate grouping) based on a high degree of trust. If these 
ideas are to be generalised as an alternative perspective on post-socialist 
transformation, an immediate issue is what perspectives are applicable outside 
of the group or where a group does not exist? This is particularly relevant given 
the point made above that the effects of "U-form” planning means that a lot of 
Eastern European industries are still centralised with vertical information flows
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which is potentially problematic for regional policies. A major criticism of the 
flexible specialisation is that it is confined to specific industries and regions 
which share certain characteristics. This is an issue with which the flexible 
specialisation literature is battling to come to grips. As Storper (1995 p. 194) 
puts it in the context of the literature on Western European regionalism: “There 
are deep historical roots to the Italian and German examples. ... [Thus] the 
critics asked how it could be expected that in other regions similar forms of 
industrial skill and co-ordination could be built de novo. This [is] a valid doubt 
about the collaboration-competition thesis: if it [is] a particularity of the 
conventions of certain regions, what about other regions with more orthodox 
(that is Anglo-American) competitive norms?" This raises basic concerns about 
the extent to which flexible specialisation claims to be an absolutist paradigm.
Piore & Sabel (1984) generalise the case for regionalism, in this manner, in 
attempting to set up flexible specialisation as a complete post-Fordist 
alternative. These authors speak of two “industrial divides". The first industrial 
divide was the rise of mass production following the industrial revolution. The 
second industrial divide is the replacement of mass production with flexible 
specialisation. A superficial interpretation is that generalisations of flexible 
specialisation of this sort do no more than point to geographical differences and 
emphasise that regions should be allowed to develop at their own rate. A more 
critical interpretation is that their argument denies the relevance of markets and 
hierarchies. If the latter reading is correct this reflects a confusion in the new 
regionalism literature about (i) whether flexible specialisation is a general 
paradigm and (ii) if so what scope remains for the market-hierarchies' rationales.
The confusion in the new regionalism literature is dissipated when flexible 
specialisation is placed in the context of the broader collective learning
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literature. The literature comparing the A-mode with the J-mode, in particular, is 
important in this regard. An attempt was made in chapter three to reconcile the 
market-hierarchies and collective learning paradigms through placing them in 
the context of the division of labour. The social division of labour can support 
the existence of networks conducive to collective learning. The detailed division 
of labour can support the market-hierarchies rationale. Piore & Sabel (1984) 
overstate the case for flexible specialisation. Consistent with the late 
industrialisation literature, depending on the circumstances, informal 
arrangements might be preferable to both markets and hierarchies in terms of 
promoting productive efficiency. This does not rest on denial of either markets 
or hierarchies as purposeful institutional alternatives. The models in chapters 
five and six suggest that it is possible for the collective learning and market- 
hierarchies’ paradigms to co-exist in transforming economies as complements, 
and it is possible to combine different features of markets and hierarchies to 
create new distinctive organisational forms. The implication is that no single 
paradigm provides a universal explanation for organisational structure in post­
socialist transformation. Hence post-socialist transformation is consistent with 
diverse organisational forms - markets, hierarchies and collective learning.
If it is recognised that collective learning and market-hierarchies can co-exist as 
valid institutional complements, the basis exists for theorising about the 
performance of different enterprises in the process of transformation. The basic 
argument is that sometimes, and in some circumstances, there might be 
advantages in rigidities inherent in markets and/or hierarchies and at different 
times, and in different circumstances, there might be advantages in flexibilities 
inherent in less formal institutions. A possible rationale for this lies in the form of 
market demand. If market demand is stable, rigid institutional forms will perform 
better, but if market demand is volatile, flexible institutional forms will be more 
successful. It assumes that certain exogenous or endogenous market conditions 
give rise to uncertainties - for example shifts in market conditions or movements 
along technological trajectories. These uncertainties are met by deepening the
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division of labour, in one case to minimise exposure to risks of overcapacity, in 
another to maximise the benefits of specialisation and minimise the danger of 
technological lock-in. This provides a possible ex post explanation for enterprise 
performance, but it is not clear to what extent a market demand rationale can 
support strategies for development at a micro level. To put it in different terms, 
market demand is ex ante a parameter for the firm which is predetermined at a 
macro level through a range of broader economic and political considerations.
An alternative rationale which complements, or at least is consistent with, the 
market demand rationale focuses on the degree of trust in the trading relation. 
This rationale, which was considered in chapter five, suggests that if trust in the 
trading relation is high, flexible institutions will be preferred because of the 
potential for value creation over and above value allocation in markets and/or 
hierarchies. If trust in the trading relation is low, the parties will sacrifice 
flexibility for more rigid forms of deterministic exchange and division of labour. 
These rationales are both prominent in the collective learning literature, but 
there is an important difference between the two. The difference is that, in the 
latter, the degree of soft trading is endogenous to the firm - ie. the degree of soft 
trading is a choice variable for the firm which is dependent on perceived risk of 
default - where, as pointed out above, market demand is exogenous to the firm.
However, irrespective of the rationale, (ie. whether it is ex ante a function of trust 
in the trading relation or ex post dependent on market demand) the choice of 
flexible or rigid institutional form will be a function of time and space. The 
choices are variable between countries and within countries and at different points 
in time, perhaps even different stages in the transformation process. This 
suggests that if we look at different socialist and post-socialist countries, the mix 
between flexible and rigid institutional responses will differ, but the potential
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exists for a diverse range of organisational forms both at a given point in time 
and over time. The scope for flexible institutional forms is not fixed in advance, 
but is dependent on the extent to which firms, and governments, are willing to 
experiment with new and different governance structures. The main point is that 
there are advantages and disadvantages in both flexible and rigid institutions 
which might depend on factors such as the degree of trust in the trading relation 
(ie. the risk of default) and/or the pattern of growth (ie. whether market demand 
is stable or volatile). In a broad sense the new regionalism suggests that 
policies should be designed which recognise that these advantages and 
disadvantages exist and nurture the institutional choices made at a micro level. 
This requires close attention to the role played by institutional forces which are 
largely specific to countries, regions or sectors such as the legal system, social 
norms and practices governing business practices and prevailing notions of what 
constitutes ethical behaviour in business relations (Arrighetti et al 1997 p. 173).
It is arguable that a shortcoming with this approach is the absence of a clear 
blueprint with well-defined policies. In this respect there are similarities between 
this approach and more mainstream gradualist perspectives. The failure to 
come up with a well-defined blueprint is not trivial. Van Ees & Garretsen (1994) 
suggest that the main reason big bang was implemented in Eastern Europe was 
political - ie. it provided governments with a set of well spelt-out policies in 
advance. However, the fact is that policies designed to create regional 
economies have had limited success. There are some notable exceptions. Two 
examples are the Centro Informazione Tessile Emilia Romagna (CITER) in 
Modena and the Danish network programme.14 However, most industrial 
districts in capitalist economies were not intentional creations, but organisational 
initiatives at the micro level. This reflects the fact that, first and foremost, 
regionalism involves a bottom-up approach to development. Thus "according to 
the theory of flexible production, it is exclusively the firms that are able to
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manage regional development (industries 'produce1 regions); in the logic of this 
argument there is little room for political influence1 (Sternberg 1996 p.528).
This is not to suggest that, at one level, policies do not exist which could make 
the preconditions more favourable. The establishment of specific preconditions 
tend to be seen in terms of either fostering communication among economic 
actors or formulating capacities for collective action. In this sense, in contrast to 
mainstream gradualism, new regionalism does not leave the evolution of new 
organisational forms solely to the market, but makes a conscious effort to foster 
their evolution in territorially specific spaces, especially in terms of national 
systems of innovation (see eg Freeman 1988). Along these lines Lorenz (1992) 
suggests that a policy maker could act as Popkin’s (1988) political entrepreneur:
“[The] policy maker as political entrepreneur would persuade producers, 
with the use of selective incentives, that they would benefit from 
independently providing tangible collective goods such as apprenticeship 
training or collaborative research and development. ... Persuading 
producers actively to participate in the effort would be key. Active 
participation, if successful, would increase the amount of communication 
among producers and would contribute to creating the trust among them 
that is the prerequisite for sharing technical information.” (at pp.202-203).
Storper (1995) highlights the importance of capacities for collective action:
"[The regional framework] calls for policies to produce public goods where 
markets are likely to fail or to be slower than desired, but allows that they 
may be specific to technological-economic spaces; it is the developmental 
properties of these spaces (evolution through learning, spillovers and 
complementarities) that ultimately generalise their benefits, and make it 
possible for such general effects to widen over time, in an open-ended 
fashion. Such specific public goods include such traditional objects of
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policy as labour skills and training, technologies and industry - or region 
specific - assistance to firms, but the most important of public goods ... 
[is] the conventions which make possible certain capacities fo r  collective 
action and co-ordination ... ” (at p.212 emphasis in the original).
The concept of capacities for collective action is illustrated by the Danish 
network programme which operated from 1988 to 1993 with a view to fostering 
Danish small and medium enterprises. The central figure was a “network 
broker” who identified opportunities, brought participants together and assisted 
in implementing new ideas and projects.15 In the Third Italy there are a lot of 
examples of policies that are designed to promote public goods. One example 
is CITER operating in knitwear in Modena which was set up with public funds in 
1980, but now it is financed by member companies. It collects and distributes 
information on market prices, fashion trends and technological developments to 
local firms. A second is Centro Servizi in Pisa which services the footwear and 
leather industries through providing a data bank on clients, markets and other 
information relevant to the sector. Others are TECNOTEX in Biella which 
provides professional training, research and technological experimentation to 
the textile industry and the Comitato Servizio Tendenze Moda in Empoli which 
provides professional training and information on fashion trends to local firms.16
Whether these institutions are relevant to Eastern Europe is debatable. Bianchi 
(1992) and Murray (1992), amongst others, suggest that capacities for collective 
action can be developed in Eastern Europe, even where there is no tradition o f 
in te rfirm  cooperation. Bianchi (1992 p.94) argues that "social consensus is not 
self-evident, it must be acquired during the process of change”. The interesting 
thing about the Danish programme is that it was successful, although there was 
no tradition of inter-firm cooperation. But in some other cases, attempts to 
cultivate cooperation between firms, where there has not been a long tradition of 
cooperation have been less successful. The critics such as Smith (1997) argue
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that it is pointless, or even harmful given the fragile nature of social consensus 
in Eastern Europe, to attempt to “create” a collective culture in regions where 
there there is no tradition of inter-firm cooperation. Smith (1997) argues that in 
Slovakia, for example, where there is not a strong tradition of inter-firm 
cooperation, attempts to nurture cooperative norms in two specific districts - 
Martin and Liptovsky Mikulas - have not worked: He states (at p.60) that in these 
two districts "forms of emerging regional specialisation do not appear to be 
leading to the establishment of local inter-firm cooperation. ... Firms tend to be 
similar in their production profiles, placing them in competitive positions for 
market shares rather than in cooperative relations with other local firms".
However, where collective norms are well entrenched the same problems do not 
exist. Thus, while Smith’s (1997) research suggests that attempts to nurture 
inter-firm cooperation have not on the whole been successful in certain parts of 
Slovakia, other East European countries have regions or sectors which have 
long traditions of cooperative culture. To take one well-known example, studies 
of the second economy in Hungary indicate that it operates on the basis of 
informal networks and information sharing (see eg Joffe 1990, Bruszt & Stark 
1992, Stark 1996). There are other cases. For example, Greif & Kandel (1995) 
report the existence of extensive informal contracting, based on reputation, 
between “business groups” in Russia. And a report in The Economist17 suggests 
that an industrial core of small and medium enterprises interspersed with larger 
firms, similar to Baden-Wurttemberg, is emerging in Thuringia, in the former 
G.D.R. Policies designed to promote public goods and sub-contracting between 
small and large firms could be expected to work well in situations like these.
Policies which are designed to promote capacities for collective action make a 
conscious attempt to influence the relevant choice variable for the firm - ie. the 
softness of the trading environment. However, the vision of new regionalism for 
post-socialist transformation suggested here is wider than the intentional 
creation of industrial districts. This is just the narrow agenda of the flexible
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specialisation literature. The broader vision for new regionalism is about 
fostering new and diverse organisational forms which represent 
improvements on existing governance structures, at least given the imperfect 
realities which lie behind their development. “[T]he Chinese are not content with 
aspiring to match foreign achievements. They trumpet their intention to surpass 
the west by developing a ‘socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics’ 
and initiate bold experiments that involve genuine institutional innovation” 
(Rawski 1995 p. 1171). T.V.Es show that transforming economies have the 
potential to develop governance structures which are not in the mould of existing 
organisational forms. As Aoki (1995 p.351) puts it: ”[0]ne of the advantages of 
transitional economies is that they may be able to generate a diversity of 
organisational forms by the selective emulation of better organisational forms".
The previous two sections suggested that T.V.Es contain lessons for other (post) 
socialist countries. A controversial point is whether it is too late for big bang 
economies to change direction. Nolan (1995) takes a negative stance on this 
point. "Careful study of China’s reform path would have been relevant to 
devising a reform strategy for [Russia] in the late 1980s. It is not much relevant 
[sic] to Russia’s current situation. This requires thinking afresh from the present 
conditions. The ‘Chinese solution1 is no more an answer to Russia’s current 
disastrous situation than were 'free markets' and ‘democracy’ an answer to the 
problems of the communist command system" (1995 p.302). This view 
might be too pessimistic. If the "Chinese solution" involved the simple transplant 
of T.V.Es1 institutions to Eastern Europe it would be difficult to disagree with 
Nolan because the preconditions that make them work do not exist now in 
Eastern Europe (and didn’t exist in the late 1980s). However, this is not the 
suggested course of action here and it is not what Nolan had in mind either.
The real issue is whether the process, rather the mechanics, can be relevant 
now, given the current situation in Eastern Europe. This is a different issue. As 
far as this goes, although it is controversial, there is at least one chain of thought
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which suggests that economic crisis can be cathartic for the emergence of a new 
regionalism. For example, the EBRD (1992) report suggests that policies based 
on firm clustering seem particularly promising given the current situation in 
Eastern Europe. The argument is that in times of economic stability, politically it 
is difficult to get individuals to invest in long-term intangibles like capacities for 
collective action. "From this vantage point, local economic development may be 
more likely to occur in locales that have experienced economic upheaval ... and 
political dismantling, thereby laying an open foundation for a new economic 
order. ... New industrial spaces, thus, are not necessarily a matter of 
geographic shifts of economic activity from one region to another; rather they 
may emerge as a function of restructuring, predicably where an economy has 
faltered and local sociopolitical relations have been dismantled. Heuristically, 
and ironically, this suggests greater potential for socioeconomic restructuring 
among cities experiencing higher levels of poverty, unemployment, firm failures 
and so forth” (Ettlinger 1994 p. 160). This suggests that economic crisis can 
have a positive effect on the development of location-specific institutions.
8.5 CONCLUSION
The suggested lessons might seem modest (even banal). However, if their 
potential wider application is accepted, their combined effect challenges the 
dominant theoretical framework on post-socialist transition. The success of 
T.V.Es seem to contradict the central tenets of the big bang approach: (i) the 
importance of ironing out property rights and (ii) that a single “rigid" 
organisational form - the market with arms-length transactions - is superior in all 
circumstances. Nevertheless, the issue of whether the suggested lessons are 
relevant to other socialist and post-socialist countries is a controversial one. 
The existence of structural differences between China and Eastern Europe and, 
related to this, the fact that China possessed some undeniable initial advantages 
clouds the issue. The discussion is also couched in a suggestive fashion for a 
few reasons, the most important of which is that a sufficient period of time has
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not elapsed to be absolutist about the relative merits of different strategies. This 
said, the relative performance of China compared with other transforming 
economies, in particular in Eastern Europe, to this point suggests that big bang 
advocates should at least be giving some consideration to the proposed lessons.
The ideas on new regionalism, in the second part of the chapter, at best, 
represent the skeleton of an alternative approach. The debate on post-socialist 
transition/post-socialist transformation tends to be labelled big bang versus 
gradualist. There is good reason to attempt to shift the debate outside these 
labels. Thus the rejection of big bang does not, in itself, suggest the wholesale 
acceptance of gradualism, as the terms are used in the literature, and vice- 
versa. The framework, posited above, stresses this through emphasising that 
both flexible and rigid institutional forms have their pluses in different 
circumstances. Nevertheless, if the approach had to be labelled, there are 
obvious parallels with gradualism. Most of the ideas, though, are suggestive 
rather than conclusive. This reflects the fact that the approach is novel, to the 
extent it differs from mainstream gradualism, and therefore underdeveloped, at 
least in the post-socialist transition/post-socialist transformation literature. A 
valid criticism of the regional literature is that it is conditional on a lot of factors 
and it does not have macro policies to provide the general environment. This 
manifests a tension between the market demand and trading environment stories 
and unresolved issues, in the literature, about which is dominant. The potential, 
nonetheless, might exist to link these ideas with other emerging dissident views, 
such as Post-Keynesian perspectives on post-socialist transformation (eg Knell & 
Yang 1992), to give the ideas a macro framework and more bite at a policy level.
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION
The thesis had two objectives. The first was to provide a theoretical and 
empirical contribution to the existing literature on T.V.Es. The second was to 
suggest that T.V.Es contain some general lessons for other (post) socialist 
countries and outline an alternative approach to post-socialist transformation 
through drawing on the literature on collective learning and regionalism.
9.1 THE THEORETICAL ASPECT OF THE THESIS
This thesis has suggested that the problem with the orthodox transition literature 
is that it cannot explain the success of China’s economic reforms, particularly 
compared with the poorer performing East European economies. As Amsden et 
al (1996 p.276) put it, “the Chinese economy has grown very rapidly on the basis 
of heterodoxy while Eastern Europe’s economies stagnated (or collapsed in the 
case of Russia) on the basis of orthodoxy". The problem is that the transition 
literature focuses on “completing the reform” meaning transition to the notional 
“pure” market. However, the process of post-socialist transformation in reality is 
a complex one. Thus simply prescribing a textbook method based on mass and 
immediate privatisation as a general blueprint for transition will not always be 
apposite. "U.S. style market institutions ... are not universally appropriate. In 
transitional economies, the functions performed by these institutions can 
and perhaps should be performed in alternative ways” (Leitzel 1997 p.52).
The problem with the orthodox literature is that it cannot explain the success of 
reform measures which have differed from its prescribed approach. The 
success of the Chinese reforms when compared with orthodox reform strategies 
proposed by institutions such as the World Bank is best summed up by Cui 
(1994). He states: “because China has violated a canon of market theory by not
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privatising it may be said to have prospered by getting the property rights 
wrong”. In chapter two it was suggested that in the Chinese case private 
property is reduced to one factor among many that potentially explain its high 
growth rate so that property rights cease to be a theory of transition. This point 
was emphasised in later chapters through concentrating on the experience of 
T.V.Es. In particular it was argued that a theory of transition which claims that 
unambiguous property rights is a precondition for successful reform cannot 
explain the success which T.V.Es have had with vaguely-defined ownership.
As a first step toward developing a rationale for different ownership forms, it was 
argued in chapter three that different theories of the firm reflect the 
heterogenous nature of the division of labour. The chapter focused on three 
different rationales for the firm - the market, hierarchies and collective learning 
paradigms; and two concepts of the division of labour - the detailed division of 
labour and the social division of labour. Two main arguments were put forward;
(i) The detailed division of labour underpins the market-hierarchies paradigms 
and the social division of labour underpins the collective learning paradigm.
(ii) The two concepts of the division of labour are reflected in different patterns of 
growth. The narrow endogenous growth treats the detailed division of labour as 
a defining growth path. The broad endogenous growth, on the other hand, can 
accommodate both the detailed division of labour and the social division of 
labour. It was tentatively suggested that different organisational forms reflect 
different trajectories. This provided the basis for the regional based explanation 
of T.V.Es in chapter five and the formal model in chapter six which explored the 
trade-offs between different paradigms of the firm in the context of T.V.Es.
The main theoretical contribution to the literature on T.V.Es was concentrated in 
chapters five and six. The model in chapter five draws on the literature on 
implicit contracts and reputation effects. The T.V.E was depicted as a strategic 
core which is supported through a series of informal institutions or strategic
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alliances. The relationship between the T.V.E and political centre was also 
represented as a form of strategic alliance. It was argued that the political 
centre confers legitimate authority on the T.V.E sector and that the relationship 
between the T.V.E and the T.V.G forms a mechanism for solving collective 
action problems that build up around informal institutions. There are two main 
similarities between this model and most of the existing literature on T.V.Es. 
First, it focuses on traditional communal based T.V.Es with close ties to the 
T.V.G. Second, it provides a verbal rather than a mathematical theory of T.V.Es' 
institutions. However, it goes further than the existing literature in at least one 
respect. The first chapter suggested that there are two institutional features, 
which seem central to the success of T.V.Es. The first was the existence of 
informal institutions. The second was the concept of social embeddedness. The 
model, in chapter five makes these institutional factors the central focus of the 
explanation. In doing so it provides an explanation which takes into account both 
informal institutions and the widespread existence of T.V.E regional networks.
The model in chapter six suggests that with an increase in the size of T.V.Es and 
breadth of T.V.E contracting, economies of specialisation due to formal 
exchange will increase relative to economies of collective learning due to 
informal exchange. The effect which an increase in the number and size of firms 
has on the trade-off between specialisation and collective learning was broken 
down into labour and substitution effects. The model suggested that with larger 
numbers there is an increase in the degree to which contractual rights are 
certain. It was argued that this is due to the substitution effect, while the labour 
effect promotes both economies of collective learning and economies of 
specialisation. This represents a departure from the existing literature on T.V.Es 
in a couple of ways. The first is that it attempts to model both the evolution of 
hierarchical T.V.Es and the trade-offs which occur as T.V.Es extend outside 
localised regions. The evolution of hierarchical T.V.Es, with some similarities to
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the state-owned sector, is a phenomena which has been recognised at an 
intuitive level for some time in relation to the larger, often coastal, T.V.Es, but 
hasn’t been modelled before. The second is that the trade-offs between 
collective learning and specialisation inherent in this process are formalised in 
mathematical terms. While the actual model in chapter six is a simple one, 
development of the ideas in mathematical terms differs from most of the previous 
theoretical literature which has generally been at the level of verbal reasoning.1
9.2 THE EMPIRICAL ASPECT OF THE THESIS
The empirical contribution in chapter seven, is a modest one. The chapter sets 
out two sets of regressions which tested propositions related to the theoretical 
models in chapters five and six. The model in chapter six suggested that there 
are similarities between the J-mode and T.V.Es. A well-documented feature of 
the J-mode is the close relationship between PROFIT and workers1 share. The 
first set of regressions tested the relationship between PROFIT and workers’ 
share in T.V.Es. Two proxies were used for PROFIT - profit per 1000 yuan 
revenue and profit per 1000 yuan fixed assets. The proxy for workers’ share 
(INCOME) was wages per 1000 yuan revenue. These regressions used pooled 
cross-sectional and time series data for the period 1987-1991 and 1993 
inclusive. The second set of regressions considered the connection between 
the importance of the T.V.G and the degree of worker socialisation. This tested 
the speculative argument in chapter five, that the role of the T.V.G, as a 
mechanism for solving collective action problems, diminishes with increased 
worker socialisation. These regressions used cross-sectional data on industrial 
T.V.Es for 1987 and pooled data on T.V.Es as a whole for 1989-1991 inclusive.
The empirical results were of mixed standard. This, in part, reflected the ad hoc
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nature of the regressions, but it also reflected the primitive nature of some of the 
proxies. The results, nevertheless, gave some support for the arguments in the 
theoretical chapters. The finding, in the first set of regressions, that there was a 
strong relationship between the profit rate and workers’ share is strong evidence 
that T.V.Es come close to the J-mode. The results for the size variable, in both 
sets of regressions, suggest that in larger T.V.Es (a) workers’ share tends to be 
more market determined meaning communal considerations are less important 
and (b) the detailed division of labour increases in importance relative to the 
social division of labour. The results for T.V.G, in the second set of regressions, 
are far from conclusive, but, taken as a whole, give some support to suggestions 
that, in the main T.V.E provinces, the role of the T.V.G as a monitor on collective 
norms diminishes with worker socialisation. None of these results provide direct 
verification of the theoretical models in chapters five and six. However the 
results are both consistent with, and supportive of, their central propositions.
9.3 AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO POST-SOCIALIST 
TRANSFORMATION?
The more speculative objective was to suggest that (i) T.V.Es contain lessons 
for other transforming countries and (ii) T.V.Es illustrate an alternative approach 
to post-socialist transformation based on a collective learning theme. The last 
chapter stressed the provisos attached to these suggestions and hence their 
tentative nature. The main objection to attempts to generalise lessons from 
T.V.Es is the big bang perspective that there are structural differences between 
China and other (post) socialist countries - in particular in Eastern Europe. The 
last chapter outlined a few objections to this argument. The main objection was 
to the notion that there is a normal path of development. The problem with 
arguing that China’s success is due to its relative “backwardness" and the 
related fact that it is coming off a lower base than Eastern Europe is that China 
has outperformed all developing countries with similar economic structures.
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There were some initial advantages in China which were not present in Eastern 
Europe so even if the countries in Eastern Europe had adopted a different 
approach there is nothing to suggest that their growth rates would have been as 
spectacular. Nevertheless the fact that the performance of T.V.Es is an important 
reason for China’s economic growth and China has performed better than 
countries with similar structural advantages suggests that T.V.E success might 
be due to systemic features which contain general lessons for other economies.
This thesis has drawn on a number of different areas of economics which means 
that some selective treatment and/or simplifications are inevitable. This is 
particularly true of the manner in which the concept of new regionalism has been 
used in the thesis. There are quite a few well-known criticisms of the flexible 
specialisation literature - some of which are well-founded, but others of which 
are not. However, even the valid shortcomings do not change the fact that there 
are aspects of flexible specialisation which make a positive contribution to 
understanding a broader literature on collective learning. The vision for 
regionalism, at least in the manner in which the term has been used in this 
thesis, is wider than just flexible specialisation. It shifts the emphasis from a 
general model to focus on the specific circumstances that face individual 
economies undergoing transformation. “The approach assumes no determined 
path of regional development, but rather allows for changes in each phase as a 
result of strategic modifications to industry” (Sternberg 1996 p.525). This 
provides for multiple paths for reform which recognise and nurture path 
dependent differences between and within countries. The fact that in a narrow 
sense reasonable doubts have been expressed about the micro-foundations and 
empirical basis of flexible specialisation in specific cases does not affect the 
validity of these ideas as a general approach to post-socialist transformation.
A general theme which runs through the thesis is that T.V.Es are a specific
288
example of a broader collective learning literature. The central feature of an 
alternative vision for post-socialist transformation is recognition of the existence 
of diverse organisational forms and that distinctive strategies might be needed to 
get the best out of a range of potential governance structures. As Nolan (1995 
p. 317) suggests: "A wide variety of property rights regimes can now be seen to 
be compatible with effective economic performance. In between ‘all people’ and 
individual private ownership is a great variety of property rights arrangements, 
which may be more or less compatible with strong incentives for managers of 
those assets to use them effectively to earn income and expand the value of the 
resources under their disposition”. Boisot & Child (1996 p.50) make a similar 
point: "The highly complex forms of property rights in China have prompted the 
realisation that ‘property rights’ do not constitute a simple binary set of 
possibilities - state versus private. Instead, they may incorporate a bundle of 
rights, relating to such diverse matters as the appointment of managers [and] 
determination of output mix". The thesis has attempted to first provide a 
theoretical basis for the existence of less than arms-length property rights 
structures and second place them in a theoretical context where their existence 
is compatible with state and full private ownership as an entity in their own right.
The notion that different concepts of the division of labour underpin diverse 
organisations is novel in the literature and therefore, it was developed in a 
fashion that is far from conclusive and at times tended to be speculative. This is 
reflected in the fact that the main points are reflected in a series of abstract 
propositions which are based on stylised facts. However, if valid, it supports the 
notion that there is no a priori justification for a particular ownership form. 
Instead, post-socialist transformation is consistent with a range of organisational 
forms dependent on prominent factors in the collective learning literature like the 
degree of trust in the transaction and the form of market demand. In chapter 
three it was argued that the social division of labour can support a wide range of
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flexible less than arms-length organisational forms consistent with collective 
learning. The detailed division of labour can support more rigid organisational 
forms such as full private ownership and hierarchies including state ownership.
9.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Further theoretical investigation using less stylised depictions of T.V.Es 
Consistent with previous theorising about the Chinese non-state sector, the two 
models in chapters five and six rely on a highly stylised depiction of T.V.Es’ 
institutions. To some extent, there is a necessary trade-off in attempting an 
exercise like this between, on one hand, developing a rigorous theoretical 
framework and, on the other, accurately describing what actually exists. In 
attempting to state the theoretical arguments as succinctly as possible some 
simplifications and generalisations are inevitable. For most purposes the broad 
brush description of T.V.Es in chapters four to six summarise fairly the basic 
features of T.V.Es. However, the potential exists for future research to address 
aspects of T.V.E ownership which the models in this thesis ignore. For example 
the models focus on the sunan pattern of ownership and do not address other 
variants such as the Wenzhou model. Thus one important issue for future 
research might be to investigate why some T.V.Es are private and others are 
collective. Future research along these lines could investigate whether this is 
just a path dependent outcome reflecting the fact that some regions such as 
Wuxi have strong traditions in collective ownership or is it related to different 
patterns of growth and/or forms of market demand in a more systematic way.
2. Further empirical investigation of T.V.E behaviour using better data sets 
The empirical results in this thesis using aggregate data are supportive of the 
theoretical arguments, but are limited in their scope because of reasonable 
concerns about the interpretations on some of the proxies. Further empirical 
research using panel data is needed to clarify existing ambiguities - for example 
in interpreting the T.V.G and IMM variables in the second set of regressions. It
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would be difficult, if not impossible, for future research to provide direct tests of 
either of the theoretical models even using panel data because the variables are 
not readily quantifiable. However, field research could shed light on issues such 
as the relationship between the political centre and T.V.E sector over time and 
the role of the T.V.G in this process. The extent and implications of an extended 
T.V.E sector also needs further empirical investigation including the proposition 
that the external contracting of T.V.Es is similar to the J-mode. This thesis has 
focused on the relationship between PROFIT and workers’ share in T.V.Es to test 
this proposition, but there are other aspects of T.V.Es and the J-mode that need 
further empirical and theoretical investigation - for example the perceived 
similarities and differences between the roles of the T.V.G and the “main bank”. 
The main bank represents the interests of the major shareholders - analogous to 
syndicate banking. One issue touched on in this thesis that requires further 
research is whether the ownership-control relations in the extended T.V.E sector 
are developing in this direction where T.V.Gs perform similar roles for T.V.Es.
3- Further theoretical and empirical investigation into the broader application of 
regionalism as an alternative approach to development in Eastern Europe 
The potential relevance of regionalism as a solution to the problems posed by 
post-socialist transformation in Eastern Europe is a third issue that requires 
further investigation. This thesis has suggested that the collective learning 
literature presents a possible path forward and has made some speculative 
arguments along these lines. However, more empirical and theoretical research 
is needed to either verify or reject the validity of this approach in the context of 
the circumstances facing particular countries. There is a significant literature on 
the pros and cons of regional development in Western Europe, but more 
research needs to be done on the potential for (i) regional development and
(ii) the evolution of diverse organisational forms in Eastern Europe.2 One aspect 
that deserves particular attention in future research on regional development in 
Eastern Europe is how to overcome the problems which the lingering effects of a 
“U-form” planning structure pose. In this context the challenge is to develop a
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regional approach that does not set out to down-size enterprises per se, but 
provides a framework where diverse organisational forms (large-scale firms and 
small and medium sized enterprises) can co-exist in an evolving environment.
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APPENDIX
DIAGNOSTIC TESTING ON THE REGRESSIONS IN CHAPTER SEVEN
Various diagnostic tests were performed on the Cochrane-0rcutt transformation 
(regression (i) in table 7.4) to check for the existence of multicolfinearity and 
heteroscedasticity. The results are given below in table A1. Three different tests 
for multicollinearity are given. The first is the pairwise correlations between 
independent variables, A number of rules of thumb exist for deciding when 
multicollinearity becomes a problem. Gujarati (1988 p.298) suggests that if any 
of the pairwise correlations are in excess of .8, then multicollinearity is a serious 
problem. The highest value, was .28 so according to that criteria 
multicollinearity is not a problem here. However, simply examining pairwise 
correlations has some limitations. First, rules of thumb such as the pairwise 
correlations should not be higher than .7 or .8 are unsatisfactory. They do not 
show the extent to which the efficiency of the parameter estimates are affected 
(Schmidt & Muller 1978 p.272) nor do they provide any quantitative measure of 
the impact of multicollinearity on the results (Neter, Wasserman & Kutner 1990 
p.408). Second, examining pairwise correlations amongst regressors is, at best, 
an informal measure of multicollinearity. Where the regression involves more 
than two independent variables, Gujarati (1988 p.300) points out that simple 
correlations do not provide an infallible guide to the presence of multicollinearity.
Therefore, the variance inflation factors for each independent variable and the 
condition index are given to check the conclusions based on pairwise 
correlations. Gujarati (1988 p.301) states that if the condition index is between 
10 and 30 there is moderate to strong multicollinearity and if it is in excess of 30 
there is severe multicollinearity. Chaterlee and Price (1991 p. 195) suggest that 
remedial action is needed if the condition index is greater than 30. However, 
the condition index for our sample was 1.63 which indicates that 
multicollinearity is not a concern. The variance inflation factors reinforce this
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view. The variance inflation factors range in value between 1.02 and 1.11, 
but Chaterlee and Price (1991 p. 198) state that multicollinearity is a problem if 
the largest variance inflation factor exceeds 10. Thus, the three measures - 
pairwise correlations, the condition index and the variance inflation factors - 
support the conclusion that multicollinearity is not affecting the sample.
The Goldfeld-Quandt test was used to test for heteroscedasticity. T.V.Es are 
diverse across provinces making it reasonable to a priori expect that 
heteroscedasticity might be present. Given the substantial diversity that exists in 
size, in particular between coastal and interior provinces, I postulated that 
possible heteroscedastic variance might be positively related to SIZE. There is 
also the fact that SIZE (Total Revenue/Total Number of Firms) has an element of 
regression of the dependent variable upon itself. There is some difference of 
opinion as to the number of central observations which it is appropriate to delete 
in conducting the Goldfeld-Quandt test. Goldfeld & Quandt (1972) recommend 
that 8 observations should be deleted if the sample size is 30 and 16 
observations be omitted if the sample size is 60. Judge et a! (1982), though, 
suggest that omitting 4 observations if the sample size is 30 and 10 observations 
if the sample size is 60 is sufficient. The sample size used in the Cochrane- 
Orcutt transformation, however, was 140. Therefore, consistent with Judge et al 
(1982) the central 20 observations of SIZE were omitted and regressions were 
run on the first 60 and last 60 observations. This gave 55 degrees of freedom. 
Tables for the F statistic do not give values for 55 degrees of freedom, but the 
critical F value for 60 numerator and 60 denominator (which is a more stringent 
test than 55 numerator and 55 denominator) is 1.84. Since the estimated F 
value (.731) is less than 1.84 we can reject the hypothesis that there is 
heteroscedasticity in the error variance. This suggests that variance in SIZE is 
unrelated to groupings into province despite size differences across provinces.
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TABLE A1
Various Diagnostic Tests on the Cochrane-Orcutt Transformation
(regression (i) in Table 7.4)
Multicollinearity
Pairwise Correlations
PROFIT SIZE EDUC MALE
PROFIT
-
SIZE -.18 „
EDUC .02 -.06 _
MALE .03 -.05 .21
ECONOMIC -.06 .28 .03
Condition Index = 1.63 
Variance Inflation Factors
PROFIT=1.02 SIZE=1.11 EDUC=I.02 MALE=1.02 ECONOMICAL 06 
Goldfeld-Quandt Test F(55,55)=.731
SIZE was used in the Goldfeld-Quandt tests in the second series of regressions 
(T.V.G-socialisation). The number of ommitted variables varied with sample size.
TABLE A2
Various Diagnostic Tests on the regressions in Table 7.7
TESTS ON REGRESSION CO
Multicollinearity
Pairwise Correlations
PROFIT
PROFIT
SIZE
T.V.G
.18
.01
SIZE
Condition Index =1.48
Variance Inflation Factors 
PROFIT=1.14 SIZE=1.13 T.V.G=.98
.03
Heteroscedasticity
Goldfeld-Quandt Test F(29,29)=.812
TESTS ON REGRESSION (2)
Multicollinearity
Pairwise Correlations
PROFIT
PROFIT
SIZE
SIZE
T.V.G
.21
.01 .05
Heteroscedasticity
Goldfeld-Quandt Test F(29}29)=. 52
Condition Index =1.51
Variance Inflation Factors 
PR0F1T=1.16 SIZE=1,16 T.V.G=98
TESTS ON REGRESSION (3)
Multicollinearity
Pairwise Correlations
PROFIT
PROFIT
SIZE
Condition Index =1.50
SIZE
T.V.G
.37
.05 .03
Variance Inflation Factors 
PROFIT=1.01 SIZE=1.01 T.V.G= 98
Heteroscedasticity
Goldfeld-Quandt Test F(29,29)=.875
Multicollinearity
Pairwise Correlations
PROFIT
PROFIT
TESTS ON REGRESSION (49
Condition Index =1.25
SIZE
SIZE
T.V.G
.39
.05
Variance Inflation Factors 
PROFIT=1.02 S1ZF-1 03 T.V.G=.98
.10
Heteroscedasticity
Goldfeld-Quandt Test F(29,29)=.77
TABLE A3
Various Diagnostic Tests on the regressions in Table 7.8
TESTS ON REGRESSION (1)
Multicollinearity
Pairwise Correlations
PROFIT
PROFIT
SIZE
SIZE
T.V.G
.18
.01
Condition Index =1.20
Variance Inflation Factors 
PROFIT=1.00 SIZE=1.01 T.V.G=97
.03
Heteroscedasticity
Goldfeld-Quandt Test F(29,29)=.825
TESTS ON REGRESSION (21
Multicollinearity
Pairwise Correlations
PROFIT
PROFIT
SIZE
SIZE
T.V.G
.20
.01
Condition Index =1.25
Variance Inflation Factors 
PROFIT=1.10 SIZE=1.24 T.V.G=99
.06
Heteroscedasticity
Goldfeld-Quandt Test F(29,29)=.72
TESTS ON REGRESSION (31
Multicollinearity
Pairwise Correlations Condition Index =1.72
PROFIT SIZE
PROFIT
SIZE .39 _ Variance Inflation Factors
PROFIT=1.15 SIZE=1.15 T.V.G=1.00
T.V.G .03 .03
Heteroscedasticity
Goldfeld-Quandt Test F(29,29)= 872
TESTS ON REGRESSION (41
Multicollinearity
Painvisc Correlations
PROFIT SIZE
PROFIT
SIZE .39
T.V.G .03 ,06
Heteroscedasticity
Condition Index =1.51
Variance Inflation Factors 
PROFIT=1.15 SIZE=1.15 T.V.G=98
Multicollinearity
Pairwise Correlations
PROFIT
PROFIT
Goldfeld-Quandt Test F(29,29)=.80 
TABLE A4
Various Diagnostic Tests on the Regressions in Table 7.9
TESTS ON REGRESSION (11
Condition Index= 3.72
SIZE T.V.G
SIZE
T.V.G
IM M
.70
.41
.70
.41
.80
Variance Inflation Factors 
PROFIT=1.90 SIZE=2.62. T.V.G=.1.0 
IMM=2.66
.41
Heteroscedasticity
Goldfeld-Quandt Test F(4, 4) = 6.5
Multicollinearity
TESTS ON REGRESSION (2 )
Pairwise Correlations
PROFIT
PROFIT
SIZE .70
T.V.G .41
Heteroscedasticity
Goldfeld-Quandt Test F (5, 5) = .639
SIZE
.41
Condition Index= 2.59
Variance Inflation Factors 
PROFIT=1.82 SIZE=1.81 T.V.G=1.11
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Multicollinearity
TESTS ON REGRESSION f3)
Pairwise Correlations
PROFIT
PROFIT
SIZE .17
T.V.G .17
IM M  .40
SIZE T.V.G
.41
.80 .41
Condition Index= 3.70
Variance Inflation Factors 
PR O FITS .15 SIZE-1.15 T.V.G-1.00  
IM M-2.93
Heteroscedasticity
Goldfeld-Quandt Test F (4, 4) = .455
Multicollinearity
TESTS ON REGRESSION (41
Pairwise Correlations
PROFIT
PROFIT
Condition Index- 1.60
SIZE
SIZE
T.V.G
.17
.17
Variance Inflation Factors 
PROFIT-.934 SIZE-1.08 T.V.G -1.08
.41
Heteroscedasticity
Goldfeld-Quandt Test F (5, 5) = .938
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ENDNOTES
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER ONE
1. When the term "Eastern Europe” is used in this thesis it is inclusive of the 
transition economies in Central Europe and the former U.S.S.R.
2 Statistics on rural enterprises were only published from 1984. The real
figures are deflated using gross output implicit price deflators. All of these
statistics are presented more fully in figure and table form in chapter four.
3 However, in the last couple of years the realisation in many quarters that
the reforms in Eastern Europe will take longer than first thought has led to 
more widespreasd criticism of this approach than in the past. The articles 
collected in a special issue of The Journal of Economic Perspectives 
(1996) vol. 10(2) is representative of this change in thinking. Comments 
by Brada and Rapaczynski are illustrative of the general thrust of views 
expressed in that issue. Rapaczynski (1996 p.87) states: "The 
experience of post-communist countries in Eastern Europe is a good 
reminder that economists tend to assume a can opener when one is 
needed. Indeed the statement that 'property rights must be put in place1 
assumes away one of the most intricate and interesting questions 
concerning economic development”. Brada (1996 p.84) writes: “The 
experience of transition economies [suggests] that grand designs for 
privatisation cannot be drawn up, and any country wishing to make 
significant progress in privatisation must employ a range of methods".
4. For criticisms of this approach see Nolan (1995) and Chang & Nolan
(1996). These criticisms are discussed in detail in chapter eight.
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ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER TWO
In this thesis institutions are defined broadly to include (i) organisations - 
which is a common definition in Williamson’s writings and (ii) norms and 
rules - which is a common definition in North’s writings. The latter tends to 
be overlooked by property rights theorists like Alchian & Demsetz (1972).
Madsen Pirie “The Anglo- Saxon Model” - lecture given at a conference 
entitled "Different Models of Capitalism” held at L.S.E 15 November 
1995. Pirie suggests that the Anglo-Saxon model rests on, what he 
refers to as, two “strands” - the adversarial and evolutionary principles..
From a different perspective the people might be the principal and the 
central leadership just an agent because while the central leadership 
bears the political risk, the people bear the economic responsibility. As 
Cauley & Sandler (1992 p.40) note: “There are a number of ways to 
characterise the principal-agent problem with respect to the Chinese 
economic system. The appropriate characterisation depends upon the 
purpose of the researcher and whether viable insights can be garnered”.
The relationship between state and society is complex. Hence, a possible 
objection is that the dichotomies which both North and Haggard draw do 
not do justice to the issues involved. For more general theories of the 
state it is necessary to look outside economics - eg Poulantzas (1982).
There are reports suggesting that cadres at differrent levels might prefer 
private ownership. The guandao and xiahai campaigns mentioned in the 
text are two examples. There are also reports detailing the business 
dealings of Deng Xiaoping's own family (see eg The Australian Financial 
Review May 5 1995 The Age May 12 1995) and the “new capitalist elite” 
with close ties to the government (see eg Business Week June 5 1995).
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6. There are really two evolutionary traditions. One is individualistic
emphasising information and exchange. The other is collective
emphasising knowledge and production. However, it is common for 
writers on evolutionary economics to blur the boundaries and draw on 
both traditions - sometimes in the same article or book, but more often in 
different writings. Nelson & Winter (1982) is an example in the broader 
literature. Murrell’s selective use of evolutionary economics in various 
articles is illustrative in the context of writings on post-socialist 
transformation. The following focuses more on the individualistic tradition.
7. The reasoning here resembles Olson’s argument that politics is 
vulnerable to small-group sectional interests (see eg Olson 1993).
8. For a recent overview of these arguments see World Bank (1996).
9. Although Jefferson et al (1996) in a recent article using a new data set for 
the period 1980 to 1992 cast doubt on the reliability of earlier studies. 
Their conclusion (at p. 170) is: “Our initial calculations, like the results of 
other studies, show T.F.P growth in collective industry consistently 
outpacing T.F.P gains in the state sector, often by large margins. These 
findings are not robust. ... In the absence of a careful review of the price 
and output data used to analyse productivity, the conclusion that China’s 
collective industries have raised total factor productivity more rapidly than 
state-owned industrial enterprises cannot be firmly established”.
10. The labels "Anglo-Saxon model”, “German model” and "Japanese model” 
are adopted from the titles of three lectures given at the conference 
mentioned in endnote 2. I am not suggesting that these labels are the 
only way to categorise the models to which they refer nor that they are the
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only models of capitalism that exist. Moreover I am not suggesting that 
everybody would agree on what the “Anglo-Saxon” model, the "Japanese 
model” and the "German model” actually are. There is widespread 
disagreement on this point. My intention is to simply point out that there 
are different models of capitalism rather than a model of capitalism.
11. For a somewhat similar treatment of the issues in this section see 
Putterman (1995a). At least much of the same ground is covered.
12. Kung (1995) surveyed the attitudes of 400 farmers in four counties in
Hunan and Sichuan. One of the things which he asked the peasants 
about was their confidence in contractual agreements with village 
authorities. In response to the question: Will contracts be prematurely 
terminated? 88% of the sample answered no. In response to the 
question: Will you be able to get the same plots of land in the next 
contract? 82% of the sample said yes (see Kung 1995 table 17).
13. This is particularly true in the developed coastal provinces. For example, 
Knight & Song (1993 p. 194) note: “in Wuxi [Jiangsu] land is left untended 
because household income is maximised by wage specialisation”.
14. The overview of enterprise reforms draws on Lo (1997 pp.84-85).
15. There has been a moderate escalation in the number of S.O.E
bankruptcies since 1994. The figures for 1990 to 1996 are as follows:
1990 32
1991 117
1992 428
1993 710
1994 1625
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1995 2,200
1996 (Qi-Q3) 3,400
SOURCE: Xinxi Shibao (Information Times) October 16 1996 p.1
16. The proportion of loss making state-owned enterprises (covering township 
and above independently accounting industrial enterprises) according to 
Zhongguo gongye jingji tongji nianjian 1993 and 1994 editions were:
1990 27.6%
1991 25.8%
1992 23.4%
1993 28.8%
These figures and those for other years are given in table 4.8 below.
17. From this perspective the point is not whether S.O.Es are performing as 
well as non-S.O.Es. The issue is (i) whether S.O.Es are reformabie - ie. 
capable of making a positive contribution to the economy as a whole and 
(ii) whether their economic role can be substituted by non-S.O.Es.
18. A recent example of an institutional irregularity concerns the issue of "A” 
and “B" shares on the Shanghai stock exchange. “A” shares are 
denominated in yuan and intended for Chinese investors. “B” shares are 
denominated in $US and intended for overseas investors. However, local 
investors have been investing in “B" shares. A report states: "Regulations 
still clearly bar local Chinese from buying B shares. But in China, the 
important thing often is which regulations governments choose to enforce” 
- “Chinese Bend Stock Rules - Investors Play Cat and Mouse With 
Regulators” International Herald Tribune December 13 1996 p. 19.
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ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER THREE
1. What I call the “A-mode” corresponds in Aoki (1990) to the “H-mode”. The 
following represents a stylised depiction of the dominant view of the J- 
mode. For an alternative dissenting view of the J-mode see Miwa (1996).
2. This poses an interesting question: Why are banks willing to take on the 
burden associated with the debt dominated J-mode? In part the answer 
seems to be that the main bank method works best when there is high 
growth and few financial problems. This has been the case in Japan, at 
least until recent times, but it is not clear what effect the slower growth 
rates of recent years will have on the potential soft budget constraint. 
As a result of slower growth rates in recent times questions have been 
raised about the effects of growing bad debts. For example see G. Baker 
"Collapse that may force Japan to put its house in order” Financial Times 
March 19 1996 p.6; G. Baker “Japan’s banks make progress in debt 
mountain” Financial Times May 25-26 1996 p.6; J. Sapsford "Market Fall 
Threatens Japanese Banks” The Asian Wall Street Journal January 9 
1997 p.1 and Japanese Finance Financial Times Survey March 25 1997.
3. The concept of the J-mode as a “community of people” where the 
shareholder, like the banks, are just one group is stressed by Ronald 
Dore in an address called “The Japanese Model”. This address took 
place at a conference entitled “Different Models of Capitalism” which was 
held at L.S.E 15 November 1995. These ideas are also reflected in 
recent debates in the U.K about "stakeholder economies”. The potential 
for U.K companies to emulate the J-mode were summed up in one 
newspaper comment as follows: “Capitalism is generally equated with 
individualism: market forces are said to require well entrenched and well 
defined rights in private property. Yet most successful market economies
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are far from being individualistic societies. ... Commentators looking at 
[Japan] find it difficult to identify quite where economic or political power 
lies. The structure of the Japanese corporation is complex, tacit and even 
incoherent. ... The U.K cannot simply emulate Japan. Markets operate 
within a social framework which is the product of each country’s culture 
and history". J. Kay “Social life of the markets” Financial Times Jan. 7 
1996 p.22. These comments reflect the importance of path dependence.
4. Dosi et al (1990) is a good example. This is a book which is over three 
hundred pages long, but neither Williamson nor Chandler appears in the 
author index and neither writer is cited in the references at the end.
5. Aoki (1994), in a later paper hints at this possibility. He writes (at p.27): 
"One might tentatively hypothesise ... that the stylised Japanese firm and 
the stylised Western firm may be on different equilibrium paths in their 
relationship with factor markets and in internal structuring, setting aside 
for a while the problem of whether those paths are convergent or distinct” 
(emphasis mine). He then asks (at p.27): Why are there different 
equilibrium paths, ie., why are there different systematic sets of attributes 
of the firm?” However, Aoki goes on to consider another point and does 
not answer this question (in the context of growth paths) in the paper.
6. Soiow sums up the achievements and limitations of the narrow 
endogenous growth: “Growth theory was invented to provide a systematic 
way to talk about and compare equilibrium paths for the economy. In that 
task it has succeeded reasonably well. In doing so, however, it failed to 
come to grips adequately with an equally important and interesting 
problem: deviations from equilibrium growth” (Solow 1988 p.311).
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7. Kaldor was a student of Young’s at L.S.E . Blitch (1990) examines the
lecture notes Kaldor took in Young’s classes and compares them with 
Kaldor’s later writings. He shows that Young’s lectures had a significant 
influence on Kaldor. Blitch (1990) reports that Kaldor’s lecture notes 
consisted, in effect, of the main ideas that made up Young’s 1928 paper. 
The influence of Young on Kaldor - in particular Kaldor’s cumulative 
growth model - is also discussed in Boyer & Petit (1991) pp.488-489.
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR
1. T.V.Es were distinguished from rural enterprises in chapter one. The
term “T.V.E” is used in this thesis to refer to T.V.Es, affiliated with a 
township or village government - ie. xiang (township) and cun (village). 
The broader term - rural enterprises - is used here to refer to rural, non­
state, non-agricultural enterprises. The term “rural enterprises” covers 
both T.V.Es (as defined above) and various "below village” categories 
such as co-operatives, partnerships and private and individual firms.
2 Jiang Zemin’s comments are reported in Nongmin Ribao, Beijing, in
Chinese, 10 December 1996 p.1. Text reproduced in Summary of World 
Broadcasts, Part 3, Asia and the Pacific February 15 1997.
3. For more detailed discussions of regional variations in T.V.Es see Svejner 
& Woo (1990), Ody (1992), Watson & Wu (1994), Weitzman & Xu (1994), 
Goodhart & Xu (1995), Whiting (1995) and Yang & Wei (1996).
4. Some sense of the growing number of successful T.V.Es in Guangdong 
comes through in articles such as: “Rich Townships Spring up in 
Guangdong” [Transcribed Text], Beijing, XINHUA (in English) GMT 
November 21, 1994, FBIS-CHI-94-224, November 21, 1994.
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5. Huadu, in Wuxi, is discussed in Dai Yannian “Huadu: Integration of 
Towns and Country” Beijing Review November 21-27, 1994, pp. 14-18.
6. For example Jing Wei “Revisiting Huaxi Village” Beijing Review May IQ- 
16 1993 pp. 13-17 and Han Baocheng "Development Strategy for Central 
and Western Regions” Beijing Review April 19-25 1993 23 at p.24.
7. Wuxi is discussed inter alia in “Rural Enterprises Thrive in Jiangsu’s 
Wuxi” [FBIS Translated Text”], Beijing XINHUA domestic service (in 
Chinese) GMT September 26 1994, FBIS-CHI-94-193, October 5 1994.
8. See Liang Hong “Zhangjiagang: A Miracle of Urban Development”
Beijing Review February 19-25, 1996. See also Shi Lihong “Rural 
Revolution Improves Village Life” China Daily January 2, 1996 p.10.
9. “A Decision Regarding the Development of Rural Forestry and 
Agricultural Subsidiary Production” - see Whiting (1995) p.86.
10. This paragraph draws on Whiting (1995 pp.89-92). For a good discussion 
of these issues in the context of Wujiang County - see Shen (1990).
11. This figure is calculated as follows. Wong (1991 pp.186-187) estimates 
that (i) state grants under the categories of special funds for the five small 
industries and aid to people’s communes contributed 7 billion yuan, (ii) 
special allocations during the fourth Five-Year Plan (1970-1975) for 
building key projects in the five small industries - chemical fertilisers, farm 
machinery, iron and steel, cement and energy - contributed 8 billion yuan, 
and (iii) bank loans providing working capital contributed 20 billion yuan.
12 See Wong id: 187-191 for elaboration on “informal methods”.
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13 Han Baocheng “Readjustment Improves Rural Enterprises” Beijing Review 
27 August - 2 September 1990 p. 18
14. These regulations are discussed in Xu (1995 chap.2).
15. This statements is reported in Byrd & Lin (1990a p. 11)
16. ibid
17. Xinhua news agency domestic service, Beijing, in Chinese, 0946 GMT 29 
October 1996. Text reproduced in Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 3, 
Asia and the Pacific November 2 1996.
18. Zhongguo nongcun jingji (August 1995).
19. Zhonghua Gongshang Shibao (China Industry and Commerce Times) 
March 19 1997 p. 4
20. Xi Mi “Who Really Owns the Township Enterprises” China Daily June 6, 
1994, p.4.
21. This is similar to S.O.Es-see Byrd (1991)
22. PRC Ministry of Agriculture “A View on Reforms in the Property Rights of 
Town and Township Enterprises as at April 1 1994” [Text], Beijing, 
NONGMIN RIBAO (in Chinese) April 14 1994 p.4, “Article on Rural 
Enterprise Property Rights” FBIS-CHI-94-097 May 19 1994.
23. Xi Mi "Who Really Owns the Township Enterprises” supra note 20
309
24. For official statements see “Tian Jiyun Calls For Township Enterprise 
Shareholding” [Text], Beijing, ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE (in English) 
GMT September 16 1993 FBIS-CH1-93-180 September 20; PRC Ministry 
of Agriculture “A View on Reforms in the Property Rights of Town and 
Township Enterprises as at April 1 1994" supra note 22. However, local 
officials might have a vested interest in overstating the need for 
shareholding enterprises. For example there are reports from 
Guangdong suggesting that some T.V.Gs have become current profit 
maximising. Their objective is to raise current profits in order to sell 
successful T.V.Es to foreign capital. These attempts are being resisted 
by communal welfare-oriented managers and workers in the T.V.Es.
25. Xi Mi “Who Really Owns the Township Enterprises” supra note 20.
26. Statistics on rural enterprises were published from 1984 when below 
village categories were added to T.V.Es. The 1978 figures are for T.V.Es.
27. Statistics for commerce and transportation were not available.
28. The Working Conference is discussed in Jing Wei “Township Enterprises 
Boom in Ethnic Minority Areas” Beijing Review December 20-26 1993.
29. The eastern zone covers Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Hainan and Guangxi. 
The central zone: Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, 
Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan; and the western zone: Sichuan, 
Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Tibet, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang.
30. This statement is reported in Jing Wei supra note 28
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31. A "Decision on Accelerating the Development of Township Enterprises in 
Centra] and Western Regions" is considered in more detail in Han 
Baocheng “Development Strategy for Central and Western Regions” 
Beijing Re view April 19-26 1993. Also see Wu Yunhe “Rural Firms to 
Continue Rapid Development” China Daily September 20 1993 p.1
32. The article in Nongmin Ribao supra note 2 states that in 1996: "The 
central and western regions markedly accelerated their development; 
regional gaps with regard to township enterprises were shrinking. An 
important reason in this regard was that East-West cooperation on 
township enterprises produced some effects, and East-West cooperation 
has now become a new point of economic growth in the development of 
township enterprises in the central and western regions”. China’s central 
and western regions grew faster than the eastern region during January- 
May in 1996. Growth in investment in capital construction and 
technological renovation (year on year) was 15.6% in the central region, 
13.41% in the western region and 6.85% in the eastern region. Xinhua 
news agency, Beijing, in English 0811 GMT 26 June 1996. Text 
reproduced in Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 3, Asia and the Pacific 
July 3 1996. Between January and June 1996 the industrial value added 
in the central zone increased by 107.2 billion yuan. This was 30.5% 
higher than the corresponding figure for January to June 1995. It was 
7.8% higher than growth in industrial value added in the eastern zone and 
6% higher than the growth rate in the western zone. Renmin Ribao, 
Beijing, in Chinese, 9 August 1996 p.1. Text reproduced in Summary of 
World Broadcasts, Part 3, Asia and the Pacific August 27 1996.
33. Xu Yuanchao “100 Million Will Shift From Farming to Industry” China 
Daily September 4, 1987 p. 1
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34. “Township Firms Propel China’s Economic Growth” China Daily February 
15 1997 p.4.
35. The survey was carried out by the State Environmental Protection Bureau 
and the State Statistical Bureau in 1991. The results are reported in 
Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 3, The Far East January 1 1992.
36. Xia Zifen (ed) Shanghai xiangzhen qiye jingji keji fazhan zhanlue he 
zhengce wenti yanjiu (Research on Problems Concerning the Strategy 
and Policy for the Economic and Technological Development of Township 
and Village Enterprises in Shanghai) (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexue 
yuan chubanshe, 1988) p.53 referred to in Ho (1995 p.375).
37. Yan Yinglong “Lun Sunan xiangzhen gongye fazhan zhong de huanjing 
baohu wenti” (On the Problems of Environmental Protection in the 
Process of Rural Industrialisation in Sunan) Jiangsu jingji tantao (Jiangsu 
Economic Inquiry) 1988 no.6 p.29 referred to in Ho (1995 p.375).
38. "Polluting Industries Endanger Rural Areas” China Daily October 13 1988 
p.3
39. Xinhua December 5, 1990, referred to in Ody (1992 pp.20-21).
40. “Township Firms Propel China’s Economic Growth” supra note 34
41. Given the conflicting evidence, more research is needed. A nationwide 
survey of T.V.E. pollution levels was scheduled to take place in late 1996. 
This will update the previous studies mentioned in the text and provide 
data to the National Environmental Protection Agency to be used to
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implement further pollution controls - see Liu Yinglang "Pollution by 
Township Firms to be Investigated” China Daily April 12, 1996 p.2.
42. This sort of depiction is common in the wider literature. For other 
descriptions of America and Europe as “individualistic societies" and East 
Asia as "communal societies” see Franke et al (1991) and Gray (1996).
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE
1. To date the structural evolution of T.V.Es has proceeded in four main 
ways: (a) Forming of associations between T.V.Es. (b) Forming of 
associations between T.V.Es and S.O.Es or foreign trade companies, (c) 
Forming of associations between T.V.Es and foreign funded enterprises, 
(d) Forming of associations between T.V.Es and universities or research 
institutions - see Goodhart & Xu (1995) Li (1995) and Shen (1990) for 
elaboration. Wang & Lu (1990) and Naughton (1995) make similar points 
about the external contracts of rural enterprises: Wang & Lu (1990 p. 128) 
write: "Rural Enterprises form joint ventures with firms in different areas. 
... As a result blocks of rural enterprises are being created all over China. 
Many rural enterprises like to cooperate with larger enterprises in cities to 
gain access to both new markets and new technologies. The large firms 
from the cities also gain from the low cost of land and housing - as well as 
the low wages of many rural enterprises”. Naughton (1995 p. 155) states: 
“The growth of rural enterprises in peri-urban areas was facilitated by 
direct co-operation between urban state-run firms and rural factories, 
primarily in the form of sub-contracting. In the three province level 
municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin, [up to 1984] an estimated 
60-80% of rural industrial output was produced by subcontracting with 
large urban firms. The proportions were only slightly lower in nearby 
provinces such as Jiangsu and Zhejiang. ... In 1985 in the southern
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Jiangsu town of Wangshi every one of the 93 rural enterprises had some 
kind of subcontracting or joint-venture with an urban enterprise ...".
2. See Lin et al (1992 p.265), Gang (1993) and Naughton (1995 p153).
Gang (at pp.53-54) writes: “It is common knowledge that in granting loans 
[the Agricultural Bank of China and Rural Credit Co-operatives] are 
heavily influenced by local government. Given the severe lack of formal 
institutions in China, local governments have proved indispensable to 
banking institutions at the local levels”. In 1993 The Economist (February 
6 1993 p.60) reported that “in normal times branch banks listen much 
more to the demands of provincial and local officials than to instructions 
from authorities in Beijing. Last year the banks, all of which are state- 
owned, lent twice as much as the government originally authorised”.
3 Chang & Kwok (1990) provide another example of flexible labour
allocation. They state (at p. 146) that in the sunan region: “In areas with 
an annual cropping system of rice-rice-wheat, there are three periods of 
factory days off per year to release workers for work on their farms, each
lasting about seven days. The first occurs in May, for harvesting winter
wheat and transplanting the first rice crop. The second occurs toward the 
end of July, when the first crop of rice is harvested and the second crop of 
rice transplanted. The third covers the last few days of October and the 
first few days of November, when the second crop of rice is harvested and 
a winter crop of wheat or rapeseeds is planted. In the area where the 
crop system includes only one criop of rice, there are two periods of days 
off. During these periods, the entire factory is closed down and every 
worker is busy on his or her farm, including the manager of the factory”.
4. The notion of self enforcing implicit contracts is discussed, in the context 
of the broader literature on the firm, in Hart & Holmstrom (1987 pp. 141- 
147). Most of these ideas draw on a broader general literature on contract
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law and social norms. For a recent exposition of this literature see the 
special issue of Cambridge Journal of Economics (1997) vol. 21 (2).
5. I am not going to enter the debate here that has evolved out of Kreps 
(1990), as to what extent formal institutions depend on reputation effects. 
The argument I am making is that Kreps’ explanation fits well with informal 
institutions observed in the T.V.E sector. This makes no judgment about 
the wider application of his argument. For further discussions of the wider 
issues see either Borland & Garvey (1994) or Milgrom & Roberts (1988).
6. As Boisot & Child (1996 p.48) put it: "These transactional arrangements 
... appear to have considerable latent strengths. Thus the institutionalised 
use of negotiation between enterprises and local authorities appears to 
introduce flexibility into regional property rights and to allow for the 
reconstitution of transactions to meet new opportunities and changing 
circumstances”. The strengths of these arrangements are reflected in the 
saying common amongst local people in the sunan region in southern 
Jiangsu: “small boats turn around quickly” - see Shen (1990 pp166-167).
7. A related development has been the emergence of a number of “clan 
networks” since the middle of the 1980s. For example, one survey, 
reported in Mao (1991), found that among 273 villages in Linhu County, 
Hunan Province, 230 villages had established clan organisations such as 
“clan committees” since 1988. Another survey, reported in Cheng (1990) 
found that in Yueyang District, Hunan Province, one-third of the villages 
had clan organisations. These clan networks often facilitate informal 
contracting in the T.V.E sector. For example Oi (1986) and X.Lin (1996) 
mention that clan networks have become an important element in getting 
a job in small-scale village enterprises. In other cases the influence of the 
clan network is so extensive that it rivals the T.V.G (see X.Lin 1996).
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8. The full passage in Shih (1995 p. 139) is “what separates China from 
Japan is that the tight relationship of rights and obligations between the 
workers and the factory is not combined with a sense of belonging and 
identity. This happens not only in some of the most successful factories, 
but also in those that suffer a low profit margin. ... This is the crux of the 
problem of China’s workers’ culture. Most have no vision and refuse to 
identify with their factory. The more fortunate are elevated by their 
superiors and may gradually develop a sense of future and belonging. 
Most workers, though, must be prodded by material reward”.
9. For example Pei (1996 p.50) states: “A young director of a village 
enterprise said, in answer to my question of why there was no 
supervision: ‘We have grown up together and I knew who worked hard 
and who didn’t in my village before I chose workers from among them. 
Therefore I trust my workers and know they will not let me down”.
10. Also see the discussion of Nee’s general approach to "market transition” 
in Lin (1995). Lin (1995) makes a detailed comparison between Nee’s 
approach and Jean Oi’s contrasting concept of “local corporatism”.
11. This paragraph draws on a discussion of Popkin’s (1988) paper in Lorenz 
(1992). Lorenz discusses Popkin in the context of industrial districts.
12. For example, the introduction of “villagers’ committees” (cunmin 
weiyuanhui), in the 1982 constitution was designed to act as both a pivot 
between the T.V.G and peasants and to promote collective ownership and 
co-operation at the village level. Moreover, commensurate with the 
introduction of “villagers’ committees” local party structures were 
strengthened. Both measures were designed to give the political centre a 
greater role at the village level - see Christiansen (1992 pp. 36-37). See 
also “China’s Grassroots Democracy” The Economist (November 2 1996
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pp.81-85). In that article it is reported (at p.85), that “while some cadres 
are prepared to suggest that democracy in the villages may lead to bigger 
things, it is not at all clear that this is what the architects of village 
democratisation had in mind. ... The party, says one senior cadre, hopes 
that village democracy ‘can help safeguard central authority” '.
13. I prefer to use the term “regional based economies” rather than the term 
“industrial districts”. The reason is that the latter term conceivably carries 
notions of the “Third Italy” or other particular European or American 
regional variations like Route 128 or Silicon Valley. The phrase “regional 
based economies”, is intended to be both more general and inclusive.
14. Gelb & Svejner (1990 p.422), nevertheless, note that: “Z-firms lie. the J- 
mode] often derive from strong identification between firms and 
communities”. These authors point out that "many originated in small 
isolated towns and were started by owners with strong ethical principles”.
15. See the two special issues of Eastern European Economics (1996) vol. 34 
Nos. (1) and (2) entitled “Regional Problems and Small and Medium 
Enterprise Development in Transition Economies”. See also the 
references cited in chapter eight endnote 4. These papers take a 
regionalist approach to post-socialist transformation in Eastern Europe.
16. This point is discussed further in chapter eight.
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER SIX
1. The term "traditional T.V.E” is used in this chapter to represent the 
standard conception of the T.V.E as regional based with vaguely-defined
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ownership rights. This distinguishes regional based T.V.E from larger 
often coastal and suburban T.V.Es which don’t fit the traditional mould.
2. According to China Daily (25 September 1991 p.1) in 1980 there were just
48 rural enterprises capable of manafacturing products considered to be 
internationally marketable. However in 1991 there were almost 80,000 
rural enterprises exporting overseas. The foreign exchange earned by 
the exports of rural enterprises in 1990 was $US 13 billion which was one 
quarter of China’s total export earnings. Exports by rural enterprises as a 
share of total exports increased from less than 13% in 1987 to 21% in 
1990 and 30% in 1991 (“Learning the Rules of Foreign Trade China 
News Analysis no. 1464 p.7). The trend is continuing. Estimates suggest 
that rural enterprises now account for one-third or more of China’s total 
exports. For some of the media reports documenting this phenonomen 
see “Beijing Rural Enterprises Move into the World Market” [Text] Beijing 
XINHUA September 1 1994 GMT Foreign Broadcasting Information 
Sen/ice; “Rural Enterprises in Zhejiang Expand Business Overseas” 
[Text] Beijing XINHUA August 12 1994 GMT Foreign Broadcasting 
Information Sen/ice, Chen Junsheng “Township Enterprises Develop an 
Export Oriented Economy” Beijing Review January 15-21 1996 pp. 17-20 
and “Chinese to Widen Investment Abroad” China Daily April 4 1996 p.5.
3. Articles on the J-mode are common in journals such as Shehuixue Yanjui
(Sociological Research), Shenzhen Tequbao (Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone Papers) and Shehui (Society). For reviews of this
literature in English see Lewis & Wanning (1994) and Chan (1995). 
The best known report discussing the pros and cons of the J-mode and 
broader Japanese management in the Chinese context is CESRRI (1988)
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4. To some extent the T.V.G performs the same role as the main bank 
does in the J-mode case. The importance of the T.V.G to the T.V.E is 
discussed inter alia in Chang & Wang (1994) and Naughton (1994). The 
role of the T.V.G is similar to the main bank in the sense that the T.V.G is 
an important mechanism underpinning the efficacy of informal exchange. 
For example, as pointed out in the last chapter the T.V.G often acts as 
guarantor on loans which the T.V.E takes out. The stabilising role which 
the T.V.G performs depends on its prominence as a recognisable 
communal institution. However, more than this, the model, in the last 
chapter, suggested that the T.V.G’s role extends to monitoring the 
evolution of collective norms in the absence of formal sanctions.
5. For example, a recent report suggests that moves to convert T.V.Es to 
joint stock firms in Jiangsu have been motivated by two main factors: 
(i) rising levels of debts and (ii) falling profits - see Zhonghua Gongshang 
Shibao (China Industry and Commerce Times) March 19 1997 p.4
6. This topic has recently received extensive coverage in the financial press 
- see eg “Japanese Finance" Financial Times Survey March 25 1997.
7. Song-Yi & Han Guojian “Rural Economy Records Progress" Beijing 
Review 21-27 February 1994 p. 14.
8. Jingji Ribao (Economic Daily) January 17 1997 p. 10
9. Li Linhuan “Township Enterprises Drive the Value of Export Up” Intertrade 
April-May 1993 p. 16. See also Zhou Handa “The Position and Role of 
Township Enterprises in Foreign Trade” Intertrade July 1992 p.30.
10. Li Linhuan id: 16-17.
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11. The ownership arrangements in these enterprises is often more
ambiguous than in T.V.Es. The parent group invests capita! in these firms 
on an informal basis when the group has funds to spare, but there are no 
contracts governing the relationship between the investors and the 
enterprise. Thus, when the enterprise grows it is not clear whether the 
assets belong to the enterprise or parent group (see Zhai 1997 p. 17).
12. Edward Cody "China’s Mills Close a Chapter - Textile Workers Who Spun 
a Revolution Lose Jobs” International Herald Tribune January 6 1997 p.1
13. Jingji Ribao supra note 8
14. Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) Febuary 17 1997 p. 10
15. Renmin Ribao Febuary 19 1997 p.2
16. Renmin Ribao supra note 14
17. ibid
18. Xinhua news agency, Beijing, in English 1115 GMT 18 July 1996 
reproduced in Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 3, Asia and the Pacific 
24 July 1996.
19. This is consistent with the often cited observation that piece rates are
common in rural enterprises and that the work tends to be amenable to
this form of renumeration (see eg Nolan 1993a p.304).
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20. A dual structure will emerge with an increase in a irrespective of (i) the
extent of institutional innovation (drawing parties into the core) and (ii) the 
extent of arms-length contracting in the extended sector. If we start from 
a position where a=0, given 0<a<1, provided that an increase in the 
number of contracting parties results in some arms-length exchange in 
the extended sector a must become greater than zero. Once a dual 
structure exists the extent of the extended sector relative to the distinct 
group will depend on trade-offs between formal and informal exchange.
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN
1. Average losses which loss making firms incurred was also tried in some 
of the initial regressions. While the results are not reported, this proxy 
gave similar results to the number of loss making firms per 1000 firms.
2. The previous empirical work considering the relative importance of 
communal and personal characteristics on wage determination is 
conflicting. Gelb (1990) suggests that communal characteristics are 
more important, while Knight & Song (1993) suggest that personal 
characteristics are more important. Two points need to be borne in mind. 
First, neither of these studies use workers5 share as the dependent 
variable. Second I am glossing over the fact that sometimes it is hard to 
know what personal characteristics are and what communal 
characteristics are. The two are sometimes merged in the extended clan 
structure of the township-village To illustrate the point, if the township- 
village as a whole, sponsors an individual’s education, is education a 
personal or communal characteristic? To this extent it is impossible to 
know the relative importance of personal and communal characteristics.
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3. See, in general, papers presented at the conference “Socio-Economic 
Transformation and Women in China” held at SOAS June 8 1995.
4. Various diagnostic tests were performed on the Cochrane-Orcutt 
transformation to check for the existence of both multicollinearity and 
heteroscedasticity. The tests, however, suggested that neither was a 
problem. The tests and results are set out in table A1 (in the appendix).
5. Gregory & Meng (1995 footnote 18) note that education is an important 
screening device at university graduate level. In particular they mention 
a regulation that university graduates and above should be assigned to 
jobs as technical supervisors or management staff and that their wage 
level has to be higher than that of workers. However, this is likely to be of 
marginal importance in T.V.Es given the education level of most workers.
6. Further regressions were run on selected provinces (ie the provinces with
the highest T.V.E output value) in an attempt to increase the magnitude of
the adjusted co-efficient of determination, but the results were similar.
7. “China on the Move” The Economist July 6 1996 pp.72-73 at p.73
8. For example The Economist article ibid notes (at p.73) that schooling is
provided free in the home village, but costs 1000 yuan a term elsewhere.
9. This is consistent with the results of a study of more than 10,000 workers 
employed in 100 enterprises (S.O.Es, T.V.Es and private firms) conducted 
by the Chinese Workers' Movement Institute in seven provinces - 
Guangdong, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Gansu, Heilongjiang, Yunnan and 
Hebei (see Feng & Xu 1993) The findings suggest that in the coastal
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provinces, where there is a higher proportion of immigrant labour, workers 
are more market-oriented than workers in the interior provinces. For 
example, in the sample workers in the coastal provinces were more 
mobile and wages depended more on performance-related bonuses.
10. The results of the diagnostic tests are set out in table A2 in the appendix.
11. To test whether outliers were affecting the results I considered a plot of 
residuals against fitted values, but it was difficult to tell from the graph.
12. The results of the diagnostic tests are set out in table A3 in the appendix.
13. The results of the diagnostic tests are set out in table A4 in the appendix.
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT
1. These two factors (communal ties and socialist political heritage) have 
sometimes been intertwined - for example Maoist strategies attempted to 
cultivate socialist policies through fostering communal development.
2. There is also a fair bit of official support for the notion that China should 
promote diverse organisational forms. For example, see Du Runsheng’s 
speeches which are collected in Gottschang (ed) (1995). Du Runsheng 
was a major spokesman on rural reform in the 1980s. To illustrate, in one 
speech - “Striving for Stable Growth of the Rural Economy” delivered at 
the Party Central Committee Conference on Rural Work, November 12 
1986 (Gottschang ed 1995 chap. 16) he made the following observation:
“There are ... forms of association developing every day that break out of 
the boundaries of the ownership system, such as joint-stock entities, 
combinations of industry and agriculture, combinations of production, 
supply and marketing, production combined with science and technology,
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urban-rural enterprise groups and companies with mutual investment by 
enterprises with different forms of ownership. ... [Each] must be allowed 
to play their own roles and develop in their own ways. This approach is 
conducive to providing the masses with more opportunities for choices, ... 
it is also conducive to gradually forming a rural socialist system that is 
economically beneficial and moves towards common social prosperity 
through diversified development” (Gottschang ed 1995 pp. 175-176).
3. See the special issue of World Development (1994) vol. 22 (4).
4. Most of the contrary evidence relates to Western Europe where, some 
attempts to adopt J-mode features have been less successful due to 
workers’ resistance. For a critical view of the success of Japanese 
transplants in Europe see the special issue of Asia Pacific Business 
Review (1996) vol. 2(4). And for documentation of worker resistance to 
J-mode transplants in Britain see Wilkinson & Oliver (1988).
5. For general overviews of attempts to develop regional policies and/or 
foster small and medium enterprise development in post-socialist 
economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union see Bianchi 
(1992), Ernste & Meier (1992a) Murray (1992), Malle (1996), Paulenko 
(1995), Petrakos (1996), Semenov & Shutl’berg (1995) and Tykkylainen 
(1995). For examples of regional policies in specific countries see Joffe 
(1990), Neumann (1992, 1993) - Hungary; Huber (1995) - Poland; Anton 
et ai (1996) - Romania; Balaz (1995), Benacek (1995), Myant (1995), 
Smith (1995, 1996, 1997) - Czech and/or Slovak Republics; Chekurov 
(1995), Leskin & Shvestsov (1995), Matsnev (1996), Mau & Stupin 
(1997) - Russia; and Grabher (1992, 1994) - the former G.D.R.
6. For full details see S.Miller and R.Rutherford 'MFC’s Small Enterprise 
Fund Reaches Out” Transition November-December 1996 pp.20-22.
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7. For discussion about the potential role of the Higher Education Science 
Park Association (HESPA) in Russia see EBRD (1992). For elaboration 
on the National Agency for the Development of Small and Medium 
Enterprises (NADSME) and the Foundation for Regional Development 
(REGRO CSFR) in the Czech and Slovak Republics see Smith (1997) 
and Tomasek (1992) respectively. The role of the South-East 
Entrepreneur Centre (SEEC) in Estonia is discussed in Raagmaa (1995).
8. The PHARE programme (Poland/Hungary Assistance in Ecomomic 
Reconstruction) was established in 1989, originally for Poland and 
Hungary, and later expanded to Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. It has been 
the major source of multilateral foreign assistance from Western Europe.
9. Peter Nolan put forward a similar argument to this in an address entitled 
“Indigenous and International Big Business in China” at the 8th Annual 
Conference of the CEA (UK) held at L.S.E December 17 and 18 1996. 
These ideas are also articulated in Nolan (1993a pp. 186-187, 1996).
10. “World Bank to Lend $6 Billion to Russia” The Wall Street Journal Europe 
April 15 1997 p.2
11. This point is reinforced by the fact that while the evidence is mixed - see 
section 2.3 - recent research suggests that in China T.V.Es and large 
S.O.Es are now the best pertformers (see Nolan 1996, Lo 1997 chap. 4).
12. For an overview of regional based economies in Europe, Japan and the 
United States see Storper (1995). For an overview of industrial districts 
and regional based economies in developing countries see Schmitz 
(1990) and the special issue of World Development (1995) vol. 23 (1).
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13. This paragraph draws heavily on Humphrey & Schmitz (1996 p. 1861).
14. These and other examples are reviewed in Humphrey & Schmitz ibid.
15. There are a few other well known cases in the literature of schemes set 
up with institutions analogous to network brokers. An often cited example 
in Baden-Wurrtemberg is the Steinbeis Foundation. There are over 100 
Steinbeis centres throughout the region which perform the dual role of 
advising small and medium enterprises and working strategically on 
technology transfers - see eg Schmitz & Musyck (1994). An example from 
a developing country is the Proyectos de Fomento (Development 
Projects) in Chile. The Chilean small and medium enterprise (S.M.E) 
promotion agency - SERCOTEC - set up schemes to foster networking 
between groups of S.M.Es and in some cases promote links between the 
network and large customers - see eg Humphrey & Schmitz (1996).
16. For other examples see Brusco (1992) and Brusco & Righi (1989).
17. “Divided Still: A Survey of Germany” The Economist November 9 1996
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER NINE
1. As far as I know Li (1996) presents the only other mathematical treatment 
of the ambiguous relationship between T.V.Es and T.V.Gs. Although 
other articles looking at related issues like wage determination in T.V.Es 
present mathematical models - for example Dong & Putterman (1996).
2. For two recent exceptions, which explore the potential for new 
organisational forms in Eastern Europe see Frydman et al (eds) (1996) 
vol. 1 - in particular Stark 1996 - and Grebher & Stark (eds) (1996).
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